JUDGMENT : A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J. 1. The claimants in M.V.O.P.No.418 of 2010 on the file of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal-cum-IV Additional District Judge, Kurnool, (hereinafter referred to as „the learned MACT?), feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 27.01.2017 passed therein filed the present appeal. The petition filed by the claimants was dismissed by the learned MACT. 2. The parties are hereinafter referred to as „the claimants? and „the respondents? as per their status before the learned MACT. 3. Respondent No.1 is the owner of the auto bearing registration No.AP 21 Y 7759 (hereinafter referred to as „the offending vehicle?); and Respondent No.2 is the Insurance Company with which the offending vehicle was insured. Case of the Claimants: 4..... (i) One Mangali Veeranna (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") was waiting for a means of transport to travel to Nannur Village on 02.12.2009. While he was waiting near the Dhaba situated close to Postal Colony, the offending vehicle, driven by its driver came in a rash and negligent manner, hit the deceased, resulting in his instantaneous death. The driver of the offending vehicle did not stop and flied away from the scene. Upon receiving the information, the police registered a case, conducted an inquiry, and filed a charge sheet against Respondent No.1 vide Crime No. 152 of 2009 at Kurnool Traffic Police Station and C.C.No.403 of 2019 on the file of the Additional Judicial First Class Magistrate, Kurnool. ii. The deceased, who was in good health and aged about 50 years old by the time of his death. He was working as a barber, earning Rs.200/- to Rs.300/- per day, and used to participate in certain functions with his team, earning an additional income of Rs.2,000/- per month. Further, he was cultivating lands, earning between Rs.30,000/- to Rs.40,000/- per annum from agricultural activities. 5. Claimant No.1 is the wife of the deceased, claimant Nos.2 to 4 are the daughters and claimant Nos.5 is the son. All of them are dependants and legal heirs, and hence entitled for just and reasonable compensation. 6. Respondent No.1-owner and driver of the offending vehicle remained ex parte. Case of Respondent No.2-Insurance Company: 7..... (i) The claimants shall prove all the allegations made. They must prove valid and subsisting insurance policy issued by Respondent No.2-Insurance Company for the offending vehicle. All of them are dependants and legal heirs, and hence entitled for just and reasonable compensation. 6. Respondent No.1-owner and driver of the offending vehicle remained ex parte. Case of Respondent No.2-Insurance Company: 7..... (i) The claimants shall prove all the allegations made. They must prove valid and subsisting insurance policy issued by Respondent No.2-Insurance Company for the offending vehicle. The case involves a hit-and-run accident, and the jurisdiction for the claim lies with the enquiry officer of the relevant division or taluka of the district. According to the FIR, it is a hit-and-run case, hence, the learned MACT does not have jurisdiction. The alleged offending vehicle has been falsely implicated. The claimants shall prove the negligence of the driver and valid driving licence. There was no transport endorsement; therefore, there is violation of conditions of policy. The claimants shall prove the age, occupation, income of the deceased, as well as the dependency of the claimants. 8. On the strength of pleadings, the following issues were settled for trial by the learned MACT: 1. Whether the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of Auto Rickshaw bearing registration No. AP 21 Y 5579? 2. Whether the claimants are entitled to the compensation of Rs.3,00,000/- or to what just amount and from whom the same shall be recovered? 3. To what relief? 9. Evidence before the learned MACT: Particulars Description Remarks Oral evidence P P PW1: Saroja W2: Hari Ram Prasad PW3: M.C. Ranganayakulu W4: N. Ravi Prakash Wife of the deceased. Eye witness Inspector of Police Junior Assistant R RW1: Desai Sringeri Jamadagni W2: Azeez Khan Senior Executive of Respondent No.2 / Insurance Company Typist, RTO, Kurnool Documentary evidence E E E E E Ex.A1:Certified copy of FIR in Crime No.152 of 2009 of Kurnool Traffic Police Station x.A2: Certified copy of Inquest Report of the deceased x.A3:Certified copy of Post Mortem Report x.A4: Certified copy of MVI Report x.A5: Certified copy of charge sheet x.A6:Arrest Panchanama O n behalf of the petitioners. E Ex.X1: O.P. Chit issued by the Government General Hospital, Kurnool x.X2: X-ray E E E E Ex.B1: True Copy of Policy along with terms and conditions. E Ex.X1: O.P. Chit issued by the Government General Hospital, Kurnool x.X2: X-ray E E E E Ex.B1: True Copy of Policy along with terms and conditions. x.X1: Driving Licence x.X2: Authorization Letter x.X3: Registration extract pertaining to Auto Rickshaw bearing Registration No. AP 21 Y 7759 x.X4: True extract of Auto Rickshaw permit On behalf of the Respondent No.2 - Insurance Company Findings of the learned MACT: 10..... (i) PW1, the wife of the deceased, is not an eyewitness to the accident. She deposed that she came to know about the involvement of the auto only five days after the accident. PW2, a driver of another auto-rickshaw, stated that he witnessed an auto- rickshaw, (bearing registration No. AP 21 Y 5579 – the offending vehicle), overturning causing a person to fall beneath it. However, PW2 made no attempt to apprehend the driver of the offending vehicle and merely informed the Traffic Police the next day without lodging any formal complaint or report. ii. Citing inconsistencies in the evidence of PW1, the learned MACT concluded that the claimants failed to establish that the deceased died due to injuries caused by the rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle?s driver. Accordingly, Issue No.1 was decided against the claimants. iii. Although the learned MACT found that the claimants would have been entitled to Rs.4,70,000/- as compensation, held that since the involvement of the offending vehicle (allegedly belonging to Respondent No.1) in the accident was not proved, the claimants were not entitled to any compensation. iv. Further, the learned MACT observed that the Insurance Company shall prove the absence of a valid driving licence and violation of insurance policy. v. Aggrieved by the dismissal of their claim, the claimants have filed the present appeal before this Court, challenging the propriety and sustainability of the judgment passed by the learned MACT. Arguments in the appeal: a. For the claimants: 11..... (i) The appellants submit that the learned MACT erred in discarding both the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the claimants. It is contended that the learned MACT failed to appreciate that proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act are summary in nature and should not have considered as if a criminal trial. (i) The appellants submit that the learned MACT erred in discarding both the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the claimants. It is contended that the learned MACT failed to appreciate that proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act are summary in nature and should not have considered as if a criminal trial. (ii) It is further argued that the learned MACT ignored the charge sheet filed by the police against the driver of the offending vehicle, which clearly indicated the involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident. The charge sheet contents are supported by witnesses. The dismissal of the claim petition was therefore based on mere assumptions and presumptions, rather than on proper evaluation of the evidence. (iii) The appellants specifically asserted that the learned MACT erroneously disregarded the categorical and consistent testimony of PW2, an eyewitness to the accident, who clearly identified the offending vehicle and described the manner in which the accident occurred. b. For Respondent No.2-Insurance Company: 12..... (i) Respondent No.2 while supporting the dismissal of the claim petition by the learned MACT, contend that dismissal is proper and justified. It is argued that the primary documents, such as the FIR and the inquest report, initially recorded that an unknown auto was involved in the accident, without mentioning the offending vehicle by number. In such a case, clinching and credible evidence is required to prove the involvement of the alleged offending vehicle. Since no such convincing material was presented, the claim was rightly rejected. (ii) Absence of a valid driving license and other violations of the insurance policy conditions should have also been taken into account. (iii) The insurance Company argues that it is not liable to pay compensation and appeal is fit to be dismissed with costs. 13. Perused the record. Thoughtful consideration given to the arguments advanced by both sides. 14. The points that arise for determination in this appeal are: 1). Whether the auto bearing registration No. AP 21 Y 5579 (offending vehicle) was actually involved in the accident, or whether the same has been planted in a hit and run case as contended by the Insurance Company? 2). Whether the pleaded accident that occurred on 02.12.2009 was due to the rash and negligent driving of the auto bearing registration No. AP 21 Y 5579 (offending vehicle) by its driver, the 1 st respondent, G. Basavaraju? 3). 2). Whether the pleaded accident that occurred on 02.12.2009 was due to the rash and negligent driving of the auto bearing registration No. AP 21 Y 5579 (offending vehicle) by its driver, the 1 st respondent, G. Basavaraju? 3). Whether the claimants are entitled for compensation? If so, what is the quantum of compensation, and what is the extent of liability of the respondents? 4). Whether the judgment and decree dated 21.01.2017 passed by the learned IV Additional District Judge, Kurnool, in MVOP No.418 of 2010 are sustainable in law, or whether they require any interference? If so, on what grounds and to what extent? 5). What is the result of the appeal? Point No.1: Statutory and Precedential Guidance: a) Defence of Hit and Run case: 15. If the case is hit and run accident case and it has to be addressed in terms of “Solatium Scheme, 1989” and that the application in terms of Section 166 (1)(c) of the Motor Vehicles Act is not applicable. The learned MACT has no jurisdiction to entertain the present claim and that the offending vehicle referred by the claimants is planted required to be addressed at the outset. 16. The provisions dealing with hit and run cases? in terms of Section „161? of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (Act No.59 of 1988), reads as follows: 161. Special provisions as to compensation in case of hit and run motor accident . (1) For the purposes of this section, section 162 and section 163— (a) “grievous hurt” shall have the same meaning as in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860); (b) “hit and run motor accident” means an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles the identity whereof cannot be ascertained in spite of reasonable efforts for the purpose; (c) “scheme” means the scheme framed under section 163. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 (57 of 1972) or any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having the force of law, the General Insurance Corporation of India formed under section 9 of the said Act and the insurance companies for the time being carrying on general insurance business in India shall provide for paying in accordance with the provisions of this Act and the scheme, compensation in respect of the death of, or grievous hurt to, persons resulting from hit and run motor accidents. (3) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the scheme, there shall be paid as compensation— (a) in respect of the death of any person resulting from a hit and run motor accident, a fixed sum of[twenty-five thousand rupees]; (b) in respect of grievous hurt to any person resulting from a hit and run motor accident, a fixed sum of[twelve thousand and five hundred rupees]. (4) The provisions of sub-section (1) of section 166 shall apply for the purpose of making applications for compensation under this section as they apply for the purpose of making applications for compensation referred to in that sub-section. 17. This provision applies where death or injuries are result from hit and run motor accident, which suggests that the vehicle is not traced and no charge sheet is filed, although a crime is registered. In one breath, the Insurance Company is contending that the cases arising out of hit and run accident and in next breath contending that the offending vehicle is planted. The contention is self contradictory. However, reconcilement both stands is possible if a hit and run case is converted into planting of a vehicle who has to dispute the involvement of a vehicle in an accident is a serious question. The owner and driver of the vehicle shall dispute the same. b) Defence of planting vehicle and proof of Negligence: Relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules,1989: 18..... (i) It is relevant to note that the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 are applicable in deciding the cases by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals and they are made in exercise of powers conferred under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act which reads as follows: 176. Power of State Government to make rules. (i) It is relevant to note that the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 are applicable in deciding the cases by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals and they are made in exercise of powers conferred under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act which reads as follows: 176. Power of State Government to make rules. — State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of sections 165 to 174, and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:— (a) the form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars it may contain, and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of such applications; (b) the procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this Chapter; (c) the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal; (d) the form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and (e) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed. (ii) Chapter „11? of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 commencing from Rule 455 to Rule 476A deals with the powers of the Tribunal and all other allied aspects like form of application, registration, notice to parties, appearance and examination of parties, local inspection, summary examination of parties, method of recording evidence, adjournments, framing and determination of issues, judgments and enforcements of awards, Court fee relating to claim petitions applicability of Civil Procedure Code and the application for claim basis to award the claim by the claims tribunal. Rule 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 reads as follows: Rule 476: Application for claim:- (1) Every application in the case of claim under Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; shall be made in Form CWF (Claim Without Fault); Provided that the application shall also be accompanied by an affidavit stating that the petitioner has not filed any other claim petition regarding the same cause of action or the same accident in the same Tribunal or any other Tribunal to his/her knowledge. (2) Fees:- Every applicant along with application for claim under Chapter X shall pay a fee of Rs.10/-. (2) Fees:- Every applicant along with application for claim under Chapter X shall pay a fee of Rs.10/-. (3) Consideration of the claim: Every claim under Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act shall be adjudicated by the Tribunal summarily complying with the principles of natural justice. (4) Application not to be rejected on technical flaw - The Claims Tribunal shall not reject any application made as per the provision of Chapter X of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on the ground of any technical flaw, but shall give notice to the applicant and get the defect rectified. (5) Presence of owner and insurer not necessary to award the claim after notice:- The Claims Tribunal shall give notice to the owner and insurer, if any of the motor vehicle involved in the accident, directing them to appear on a date not later than 10 days from the date of issue of notice. The date so fixed for such appearance shall also be not later than 15 days from the receipt of the claim application. The Claims Tribunal shall state in such notice, that in case they fail to appear on such appointed date, the tribunal will procede ex-parte on the presumption that they have no contention to make against, the award of compensation. (6) Award of Claim :- The Claims Tribunal shall obtain whatever information necessary form the Police, Medical and other authorities and proceed to award the claim whether the parties who were given notice, appear or not on the appointed date. (7) Basis to award the claim :- The Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim on the basis of;- (i) Registration Certificate of the Motor Vehicle involved in the accident; (ii) Insurance Certificate or Policy relating to the insurance of the Motor Vehicle against the Third party risk; (iii) Copy of First Information Report; (iv) Post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the Medical Officer; and (v) The nature of the treatment given by the Medical Officer who has examined the victim. (7A) Specification of amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal to each victim:- Where compensation is awarded to two or more persons, the Claims Tribunal shall also specify the amount payable to each of them. 19. The Hon?ble Apex Court in Bimla Devi and others Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation , 2009 (13) SCC 530 , in para 15 observed as follows: “ 15. 19. The Hon?ble Apex Court in Bimla Devi and others Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation , 2009 (13) SCC 530 , in para 15 observed as follows: “ 15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties..” Analysis of Evidence: 20. It is relevant to note that in view of the summary nature and mode of enquiry contemplated under Motor Vehicles Act and social welfare nature of legislation the Tribunal shall have holistic view with reference to facts and circumstances of each case. It is sufficient if there is probability. The principle of standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering a claim seeking compensation for the death or the injury on account of road accident. The touch stone of the case, the claimants shall have to establish is preponderance of probability only. The legal position to this extent is settled and consistent. 21. Sri G. Basavaraju / Respondent No.1 said to be the auto driver remained ex-parte. Charge sheet Ex.A5 is laid down against Respondent No.1 / G. Basavaraju. 22. Further, Ex.A4 / MVI Report is indicating the involvement of the auto-rickshaw bearing registration No. AP 21 Y 5579 and name of the owner and driver as G. Basavaraju. The record covered by Ex.A4 and Ex.A5 viz. MVI Report and charge sheet respectively on the official records. Prima facie there presumed to be correct, unless some contradicting evidence is placed. Added to the same, there is evidence of PW.3 / M.C. Ranganayakulu, Inspector of Police, Kurnool IV Town Police Station. He has stated that after investigation charge sheet is filed against the accused by name G. Basavaraju vide Crime No. 152 of 2009 of Traffic Police Station. Prima facie there presumed to be correct, unless some contradicting evidence is placed. Added to the same, there is evidence of PW.3 / M.C. Ranganayakulu, Inspector of Police, Kurnool IV Town Police Station. He has stated that after investigation charge sheet is filed against the accused by name G. Basavaraju vide Crime No. 152 of 2009 of Traffic Police Station. As per his investigation on 02.12.2009 at about 21:00 hours, the accused G. Basavaraju drove the offending vehicle with high speed in a rash and negligent manner and dashed against the deceased. As per the investigation LW.5 / Mohammed Fakruddin Baig, LW.6 / Golla Jambulaiah and LW.7 / B. Hari Rama Prasad are eye witnesses to the accident and statements recorded under Section161 Cr.P.C by PW.3 on the basis for the charge sheet. 23. During his cross examination it was suggested that inquest report did not reveal the registration number of the Auto and name of the driver and that the auto is seized on 23.04.2010 under the cover of Ex.A6-Arrest Panchanama. The accused is the owner- cum-driver of the auto and that the driver did not have valid driving licence to rebut the evidence placed by the claimants viz. the evidence of PW.3 and Ex.A4 and Ex.A5. There is no convincing evidence placed by the Respondent-Insurance Company. Evidence of RW.1 is touching the aspects relating to driving licence and category of driving licence possessed by Respondent No.1/ G. Basavaraju. RW.1 / Desai Sringeri Jamadagni, Senior Legal Executive of Respondents Insurance Company admitted during cross examination that it is not mentioned in FIR that it is a hit and run case. The accused confessed the offence as per the charge sheet. 24. In the light of the evidence and discussion made above, it is found that the objection of the Insurance Company that the Auto Bearing No.AP 21 Y 7759 (offending vehicle) did not involve in the accident and same has been planted is not acceptable and fit to be rejected. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered against the Insurance Company and in favour of the claimants. Point No.2: 25. The evidence of PW.3, Ex.A3 and Ex.A4 and effect of the same has been discussed under point No.1 and the same extends for answering point No.2 also. 26. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered against the Insurance Company and in favour of the claimants. Point No.2: 25. The evidence of PW.3, Ex.A3 and Ex.A4 and effect of the same has been discussed under point No.1 and the same extends for answering point No.2 also. 26. However, it is also relevant to note that evidence of PW.2 / B. Hari Ram Prasad shows that on 02.12.2009 at about 09:00 P.M. while he was proceeding to Nannur from Kurnool, he saw one auto turn turtle and one person was under the said auto bearing registration No.AP 21 Y 7759. He went to the accident spot and informed to the Police Constable about the accident and the police examined him. The reason of death of deceased is due to the hitting of Auto. 27. During cross examination, it has stated that tsince 1998 he was driving auto bearing registration No.AP 13 Y 1314. There are no street lights throughout the roads from Nandyal check post to Nannur. He could not seen the registration numbers of the vehicles. But, he volunteers that he went near to the crime vehicle and saw the registration number of the auto. The accident occurred as the deceased suddenly crossed the road. He witnessed the accident from 10 feet distance. Three persons were travelled at the time of accident apart from PW.2. He do not know how many passengers were travel in the crime vehicle and other vehicle. He saw the accident and rushed to the spot. He did not try to catch the driver of the crime vehicle or to informed the police on the date of accident. None informed about the accident to the police. He did not try to shift the deceased to the hospital because deceased was already died on the spot. He did not know what happened to the passengers travelled in the crime vehicle. Next day of the accident, he returned to Kurnool and went to informed about the accident to the Traffic Police Station, Kurnool. But, he did not give report. He do not know who lodged the complaint. He was examined by police of about 10:30 am, of the next day of the accident. The evidence of PW.2 is somehow natural. Next day of the accident, he returned to Kurnool and went to informed about the accident to the Traffic Police Station, Kurnool. But, he did not give report. He do not know who lodged the complaint. He was examined by police of about 10:30 am, of the next day of the accident. The evidence of PW.2 is somehow natural. When the Insurance Company intends to seriously dispute involvement of the vehicle as well as negligence, nothing would prevent the Insurance Company from summering the other witnesses cited or collection of any other material from the accident spot. 28. Evidence of PW.2 coupled with the entries in crime record covered by FIR, charge sheet, MVI Report and evidence of PW.3 / investigating officer would lead to infer that the pleaded accident has occurred due to the negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle who is Respondent No.1 particularly in the context of no contest by Respondent No.1. 29. It is also pertinent to note that the Insurance Company did not choose to summon and examine the Respondent No.1. What happened to the criminal case is also not whispered. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the involvement of crime vehicle and the occurrence of pleaded accident dated 02.12.2009 due to rash and negligent driving of the crime vehicle by Respondent No.1, its driver can be believed. Point No.2 is answered accordingly in favour of the claimants. Point No.3: 30. Claimant No.1 is the wife, claimant Nos.2 to 4 are the daughters and claimant No.5 is the son of the deceased. The relationship with the deceased is not in dispute. Death of deceased is also not in dispute. Therefore, all are dependents and legal representatives. Claimant No.2 to 4 may not have complete dependency but claimant Nos.1 and 5 can be considered as both legal heirs and dependents. The death of deceased due to accident is evident from crime record as well as Inquest and Post mortem-reports. Therefore, the entitlement of claimants for compensation is clear. 31. While disputing the liability the Insurance Company contended that the driver did not possess the valid driving licence and the driving license is of non transport category. For the said purposes the Insurance Company relied on evidence of RW.1 and R.W.2. 32. Therefore, the entitlement of claimants for compensation is clear. 31. While disputing the liability the Insurance Company contended that the driver did not possess the valid driving licence and the driving license is of non transport category. For the said purposes the Insurance Company relied on evidence of RW.1 and R.W.2. 32. The defences as to want of transport endorsement does not merit any consideration in the context of judgment of the Hon?ble Supreme Court. The legal position as to a person holding of non- transport category driving licence of „Light Motor Vehicle? driving transport vehicle has been addressed by the Hon?ble Apex Court in Mukund Dewangan vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited, (2016) 4 SCC 298 [Mukund Dewangan (2016)] and Mukund Dewangan vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited , (2019) 12 SCC 816 [Mukund Dewangan(2017)]. 33. Further, reference made on the point whether “a person holding a licence for a „Light Motor Vehicle? class non transport can drive a „Transport Vehicle? without a specific endorsement, provided the „Gross Vehicle Weight (GVW)? of the vehicle does not exceed 7,500 Kgs?” is answered by the Hon?ble Apex Court in Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Company Limited vs. Rambha Devi and Others , 2024 SCC Online SC 3183 at length and the observation are made under the caption of conclusion vide para Nos.125 to 131 which are as follows: 125. The licensing regime under the MV Act and the MV Rules, when read as a whole, does not provide for a separate endorsement for operating a „Transport Vehicle?, if a driver already holds a LMV license. We must however clarify that the exceptions carved out by the legislature for special vehicles like e-carts and e-rickshaws74, or vehicles carrying hazardous goods75, will remain unaffected by the decision of this Court. 126. As discussed earlier in this judgment, the definition of LMV under Section 2(21) of the MV Act explicitly provides what a „Transport Vehicle? „means?. This Court must ensure that neither provision i.e. the definition under Section 2(21) or the second part of Section 3(1) which concerns the necessity for a driving license for a „Transport Vehicle? is reduced to a dead letter of law. Therefore, the emphasis on „Transport Vehicle? in the licensing scheme has to be understood only in the context of the „medium? and „heavy? vehicles. is reduced to a dead letter of law. Therefore, the emphasis on „Transport Vehicle? in the licensing scheme has to be understood only in the context of the „medium? and „heavy? vehicles. This harmonious reading also aligns with the objective of the 1994 amendment in Section 10(2) to simplify the licensing procedure. 127. The above interpretation also does not defeat the broader twin objectives of the MV Act i.e. road safety and ensuring timely compensation and relief for victims of road accidents. The aspect of road safety is earlier discussed at length. An authoritative pronouncement by this Court would prevent insurance companies from taking a technical plea to defeat a legitimate claim for compensation involving an insured vehicle weighing below 7,500 kgs driven by a person holding a driving license of a „Light Motor Vehicle? class. 128. In an era where autonomous or driver-less vehicles are no longer tales of science fiction and app-based passenger platforms are a modern reality, the licensing regime cannot remain static. The amendments that have been carried out by the Indian legislature may not have dealt with all possible concerns. As we were informed by the Learned Attorney General that a legislative exercise is underway, we hope that a comprehensive amendment to address the statutory lacunae will be made with necessary corrective measures. 129. Just to flag one concern, the legislature through the 1994 amendment in Section 10(2)(e) in order to introduce „transport vehicle? as a separate class could not have intended to merge light motor vehicle (which continued as a distinct class) along with medium, and heavy vehicles into a single class. Else, it would give rise to a situation in which Sri (our hypothetical character), wanting to participate in the cycling sport, is put through the rigorous training relevant only for a multisport like Triathlon, which requires a much higher degree of endurance and athleticism. The effort therefore should be to ensure that the statute remains practical and workable. 130. Else, it would give rise to a situation in which Sri (our hypothetical character), wanting to participate in the cycling sport, is put through the rigorous training relevant only for a multisport like Triathlon, which requires a much higher degree of endurance and athleticism. The effort therefore should be to ensure that the statute remains practical and workable. 130. Now harking back to the primary issue and noticing that the core driving skills (as enunciated in the earlier paragraphs), expected to be mastered by all drivers are universal - regardless of whether the vehicle falls into “Transport” or “Non-Transport” category, it is the considered opinion of this Court that if the gross vehicle weight is within 7,500 kg - the quintessential common man's driver Sri, with LMV license, can also drive a “Transport Vehicle”. We are able to reach such a conclusion as none of the parties in this case has produced any empirical data to demonstrate that the LMV driving licence holder, driving a „Transport Vehicle?, is a significant cause for road accidents in India. The additional eligibility criteria as specified in MV Act and MV Rules as discussed in this judgment will apply only to such vehicle („medium goods vehicle?, „medium passenger vehicle?, „heavy goods vehicle? and „heavy passenger vehicle?), whose gross weight exceeds 7,500 Kg. Our present interpretation on how the licensing regime is to operate for drivers under the statutory scheme is unlikely to compromise the road safety concerns. This will also effectively address the livelihood issues for drivers operating Transport Vehicles (who clock maximum hours behind the wheels), in legally operating “Transport vehicles” (below 7,500 Kg), with their LMV driving license. Perforce Sri must drive responsibly and should have no occasion to be called either a maniac or an idiot (as mentioned in the first paragraph), while he is behind the wheels. Such harmonious interpretation will substantially address the vexed question of law before this Court. 131. Our conclusions following the above discussion are as under:— (I) A driver holding a license for Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) class, under Section 10(2)(d) for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight under 7,500 kg, is permitted to operate a „Transport Vehicle? without needing additional authorization under Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act specifically for the „Transport Vehicle? class. For licensing purposes, LMVs and Transport Vehicles are not entirely separate classes. An overlap exists between the two. without needing additional authorization under Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act specifically for the „Transport Vehicle? class. For licensing purposes, LMVs and Transport Vehicles are not entirely separate classes. An overlap exists between the two. The special eligibility requirements will however continue to apply for, inter alia, e-carts, e-rickshaws, and vehicles carrying hazardous goods. (II) The second part of Section 3(1), which emphasizes the necessity of a specific requirement to drive a „Transport Vehicle,? does not supersede the definition of LMV provided in Section 2(21) of the MV Act. (III) The additional eligibility criteria specified in the MV Act and MV Rules generally for driving „transport vehicles? would apply only to those intending to operate vehicles with gross vehicle weight exceeding 7,500 kg i.e. „medium goods vehicle?, „medium passenger vehicle?, „heavy goods vehicle? and „heavy passenger vehicle?. (IV) The decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is upheld but for reasons as explained by us in this judgment. In the absence of any obtrusive omission, the decision is not per incuriam, even if certain provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules were not considered in the said judgment. 34. In view of the observations of the Hon?ble Apex Court, the objection of the Insurance Company as to absence of proper driving licence found fit to be ignored. Accordingly, the said defense is rejected and it is found that the Insurance Company is liable to pay the compensation. 35. For the reasons aforesaid, point No.3 is answered concluding that the claimants are entitled for compensation and the Respondents are liable to pay the compensation jointly and severally as the ownership of Respondent No.1 over the crime vehicle and valid policy issued for it by Respondent No.2 are not disputed. Quantum of Compensation: Precedential guidance for quantifying the compensation in case of claims arising out of Motor Vehicles Accidents causing death:- a) Adoption of Multiplier, Multiplicand and Calculation: 36..... (i) Hon?ble Apex Court to have uniformity of practice and consistency in awarding just compensation provided certain guidelines in Smt. Sarla Verma and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. , 2009 (6) SCC 121 vide paragraph Nos.18 and 19, while prescribing a table directed adoption of suitable multiplier mentioned in column No.4 of the table. As per the observations in the judgment the claimants have to establish the following: 1. Age of the deceased. 2. Income of the deceased. 3. Number of dependents. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr. , 2009 (6) SCC 121 vide paragraph Nos.18 and 19, while prescribing a table directed adoption of suitable multiplier mentioned in column No.4 of the table. As per the observations in the judgment the claimants have to establish the following: 1. Age of the deceased. 2. Income of the deceased. 3. Number of dependents. (ii). Hon?ble Apex Court directed certain steps while determining the compensation, they are: Step No.1: Ascertain the multiplicand, which shall be the income of the deceased he / she should have contributed to the dependents and the same can be arrived after deducting certain part of personal living expenses of the deceased. Step No.2: Ascertaining Multiplier. This shall be with reference to the table provided and table is provided in judgment itself. Step No.3: Calculation of the compensation. Final Step: After calculation adding of certain amount towards conventional heads towards loss of estate, loss of consortium, funeral expenditure, cost of transport, cost of medical expenses for treatment of the deceased before the death etc. are advised. b) Adding of future prospects: 37..... (i). Enhancing the scope for awarding just compensation, the Hon?ble Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Others , 2017 (16) SCC 680 case guided for adding of future prospect. In respect of permanent employment, 50% where the deceased is below 40 years, 30% where the deceased is 40-50 years and 15% where the deceased is 50-60 years. (ii). The actual salary to be taken shall be after deducting taxes. Further, in respect of self employed on fixed salary addition is recommended, at 40% for the deceased below 40 years, at 25% where the deceased is between 40-50 years, at 10% where the deceased is between 50-60 years. Further, adding of compensation for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses at Rs.15,000/- and Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively is recommended by Hon?ble Apex court with an addition of 10% for every three years in Pranay Sethi’s case. c) Loss of Consortium under the heads of parental and filial consortium: 38. Further, adding of compensation for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses at Rs.15,000/- and Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively is recommended by Hon?ble Apex court with an addition of 10% for every three years in Pranay Sethi’s case. c) Loss of Consortium under the heads of parental and filial consortium: 38. Further enlarging the scope for awarding just and reasonable compensation in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram and Others , (2018) 18 SCC 130 , Hon?ble Apex Court observed that compensation can be awarded under the heads of loss of consortium not only to the spouse but also to the children and parents under the heads of parental and filial consortium. d) Just Compensation: 39. In Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others , (2013) 9 SCC 54 , the Hon?ble Supreme Court in para Nos.10 and 11 made relevant observations, they are as follows: 10. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in excess of what is claimed in the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in this case. At para 10 of Nagappa case [Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 274 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 523 : AIR 2003 SC 674 ] , it was held as follows: (SCC p. 280) “10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to „make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just?. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be „just?. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation.” The principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir [ (2009) 6 SCC 280 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ) 877 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 987] and in Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [ (2009) 13 SCC 710 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 241 :(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1213] 11. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions is with regard to the duty of the court to fix a just compensation and it has now become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or technicalities, in such matters. Ltd. [ (2009) 13 SCC 710 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 241 :(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1213] 11. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions is with regard to the duty of the court to fix a just compensation and it has now become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the court should be to equate, as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned by the victim. e) Adding of future prospects in respect of self employed, non- earning group and notional income group : 40. In Meena Pawaia and Ors. v. Ashraf Ali and Ors . 9 , the Hon?ble Apex Court vide para 13 and 14 of the judgments, observed that in respect of self-employed or in respect of non- earning or not doing any job persons also there is no bar of adding future raise of income or adopting notional income. f) Granting of more compensation than what claimed, if the claimants are otherwise entitled:- 41. The legal position with regard to awarding more compensation than what claimed has been considered and settled by the Hon?ble Supreme Court holding that there is no bar for awarding more compensation than what is claimed. For the said preposition of law, this Court finds it proper to refer the following observations of the Hon?ble Supreme Court made in: (1) Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others , [ (2003) 2 SCC 274 ] , at para 21 of the judgment, that – “..there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is to award “just” compensation, (2021) 17 SCC 148 which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record.” (2) Kajal Vs. Jagadish Chand and Ors. 2020 (04) SCC 413 at para 33 of the judgment, as follows:- “33 . We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount claimed. Jagadish Chand and Ors. 2020 (04) SCC 413 at para 33 of the judgment, as follows:- “33 . We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount claimed. However, it is well settled law that in the motor accident claim petitions, the Court must award the just compensation and, in case, the just compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the claimant is a minor.” (3) Ramla and Others Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Others , [ (2019) 2 SCC 192 ] at para 5 of the judgment, as follows:- “5 . Though the claimants had claimed a total compensation of Rs.25,00,000 in their claim petition filed before the Tribunal, we feel that the compensation which the claimants are entitled to is higher than the same as mentioned supra. There is no restriction that the Court cannot award compensation exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the Tribunal or Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award “just compensation”. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. A “just compensation” is one which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. It cannot be said to have become time-barred. Further, there is no need for a new cause of action to claim an enhanced amount. The courts are duty-bound to award just compensation.” 42. The case of claimants is that the deceased was aged about „50? years; Barber by profession; earning Rs.200/- to 300/- per day and also getting Rs.2,000/- additionally per month by attending functions etc. As per Inquest Report and Post-mortem certificate, the age of the deceased is „52? years It is the usual practice and procedure to adopt the age mentioned in inquest and post mortem reports. Hence, the same is adopted. 43. Considering the age of the deceased and his profession income of the deceased inclusive of future prospects is accepted and adopted at Rs.5,000/- per month which comes to Rs.60,000/-. 1/3 rd of the income of the deceased deducted towards personal expenditure, taking the number of dependents into consideration. Then, the contribution of deceased to the family and also loss of income to the family comes to Rs.40,000/- per annum. On application of Multiplier „11?, the loss of dependency comes to Rs.4,40,000/- (Rs.40,000/-x11). Claimants are entitled for Rs.15,000/- towards funeral expenditure. Then, the contribution of deceased to the family and also loss of income to the family comes to Rs.40,000/- per annum. On application of Multiplier „11?, the loss of dependency comes to Rs.4,40,000/- (Rs.40,000/-x11). Claimants are entitled for Rs.15,000/- towards funeral expenditure. Rs.15,000/- towards loss of estate, each claimant is entitled for Rs.40,000/- towards loss of consortium; Claimant No.1 is entitled for spousal consortium, claimant Nos.2 to 5 are entitle for parental consortium. 44. In the light of precedential guidance and in view of the reasons and evidence referred above, the entitlement of the claimants for reasonable compensation in comparison to compensation awarded by the learned MACT is as follows: S. No. Head Arrived by the learned MACT Fixed by this Appellate Court 1. Loss of income / dependency Rs.4,45,500/- Rs.4,40,000/- 2. Funeral Expenditure Rs.5,000/- Rs.15,000/- 3. Loss of estate Rs.10,000/- Rs.15,000/- 4. Loss of consortium Rs.10,000/- Rs.2,00,000/- (Spousal and parental consortium to Claimant No.1 and Claimant Nos.2 to 5@ Rs.40,000/- each) Total: Rs.4,70,500 /- Rs.6,70,000/- 45. In view of the reasons stated and discussion made above and conclusions drawn under Point Nos.1 and 2, Point No.3 is answered concluding that claimants are entitled for compensation of Rs.6,70,000/- and the Respondents are jointly and severally liable to pay the same. Point No.4: 46. For the aforesaid reasons and conclusions drawn on Point No.1 to 3, the decree and judgment dated 21.01.2017 passed by the learned MACT in M.V.O.P.No.418 of 2010 found not sustainable on law or facts. Accordingly, the same is set-aside and the claimants are entitled for a compensation of Rs.6,70,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum. Point No.5: 46. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the findings of point Nos.1,to 4, Point No.5 is answered as follows: In the result, (i) The appeal is allowed. (ii) The order and decree dated 27.01.2017 passed by the learned MACT are set-aside. (iii) M.V.O.P.No.418 of 2010 is allowed as follows: a) Claimants are entitled for a compensation of Rs.6,70,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization. b) The Respondents are liable to pay the compensation jointly and severally. c) Claimant No.1 is entitled for Rs.3,70,000/- with proportionate interest and total costs. d) Claimant Nos.2 to 5 are entitled for Rs.75,000/- each with proportionate interest and costs. b) The Respondents are liable to pay the compensation jointly and severally. c) Claimant No.1 is entitled for Rs.3,70,000/- with proportionate interest and total costs. d) Claimant Nos.2 to 5 are entitled for Rs.75,000/- each with proportionate interest and costs. e) All the claimants are entitled to withdraw the amount at once on deposit. f) The claimants are liable to pay the Court fee for the enhanced part of the compensation, before the learned MACT. (iv) There shall be no order as to costs, in this appeal. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the appeal shall stand closed.