JUDGMENT : P.B.Suresh Kumar, J. This is a proceedings instituted seeking a writ of habeas corpus commanding the respondents to produce the brother of the petitioner, Mobish, who is detained as per Ext.P1 order issued under Section 3 (1) of the Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (the Act) and to set him at liberty. Ext.P1 order of detention was issued on 23.11.2024 and the same was confirmed as per Ext.P6 order on 22.01.2025. In terms of Ext.P6 order, the period of detention is for one year. 2. Six cases in which the detenu was involved during the last seven years were considered for the purpose of issuing Ext.P1 order. Among the said cases, the last case is Crime No.794 of 2024 registered at Ollur Police Station on 24.08.2024 under Sections 22 (c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). The detenu is the first accused in the said case. He was arrested in that case on 24.08.2024 itself and has been in custody since then. It was whilst so, the competent authority made the proposal for his detention under the Act on 22.10.2024. Later, two additional reports were also submitted before the detaining authority by the competent authority which made the proposal on 08.11.2024 and also on 14.11.2024. It is thereafter, on a consideration of the proposal as also the additional reports, the order of detention was issued on 23.11.2024. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned Government Pleader. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that inasmuch as the detenu was in judicial custody when the order of detention was issued, there should be compelling reasons for the detaining authority to detain him under the Act, and the order of detention does not show any reason, much less any compelling reason, to detain him under the Act. It was also contended by the learned counsel that there was a long delay of almost three months between the date of the last prejudicial activity and the date of the order of detention and that the said delay snaps the live link between the order of detention and the purpose of detention. It was also contended by the learned counsel that there was a long delay of almost three months between the date of the last prejudicial activity and the date of the order of detention and that the said delay snaps the live link between the order of detention and the purpose of detention. It was also contended by the learned counsel that the last case in which the detenu is involved namely, Crime No.794 of 2024 of Ollur Police Station is a case which is pending investigation, and it is placing reliance on the records in that case, including the mahazar in terms of which the contraband involved in that case was allegedly seized from the detenu, that the order of detention was issued. According to the learned counsel, in the circumstances, the detenu is entitled to be given copies of every document which are relied on, to issue the order of detention and he was not given a legible copy of the seizure mahazar in the case. The detenu is a person who was detained under the Act once and the impugned order is the second detention order against him. The last contention advanced by the learned counsel is that inasmuch as the first order of detention against the detenu was one issued prior to the amendment made to Section 12 of the Act with effect from 31.12.2014, the present order of detention has to be treated as the first detention order against him under the Act and if that be so, Ext.P6 order directing his detention beyond the period of six months, is illegal. The learned counsel relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Supdt., Narcotic Control Bureau v. Parash Singh , (2008) 13 SCC 499 , in support of his argument. 5. In Kamarunnissa v. Union of India , (1991) 1 SCC 128 , it was held by the Apex Court that a detention order can validly be passed even against a person who is in custody, if the detaining authority has reason to believe, on the basis of reliable materials placed before him, that (a) there is a real possibility of his being released on bail and (b) on being so released he would, in all probability, indulge in prejudicial activities. Reverting to the case on hand, the detaining authority has rendered a finding in Ext.P1 order of detention that there is a real possibility of the detenu being released on bail and on being so released, he would, in all probability, indulge in prejudicial activities. The relevant portion of Ext.P1 order reads thus: The detenu has no case that he is not likely to be released on bail in Crime No.794 of 2024, especially since it is the first case registered against him under the NDPS Act. As evident from the extracted portion of the order, the detenu is a person who got himself indulged in other crimes, despite being released on bail in earlier crimes on the condition that he shall not indulge in any other offences while on bail. Whether the aforesaid materials are sufficient to order detention of a person who is in custody, is a matter that falls within the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority and what this Court is expected to examine in a proceedings of this nature is as to whether there is due application of mind on the part of the detaining authority on the aspect whether there is a real possibility of he being released on bail and (b) on being so released, he would, in all probability, indulge in prejudicial activities. Inasmuch as the detaining authority considered those aspects based on the materials placed before it, we are unable to countenance the contention that there were no compelling reasons to issue the order of detention to the detenu who was in judicial custody. 6. We are not impressed by the contention that the delay between the last prejudicial activity and the order of detention snaps the live link between the order of detention and the purpose of detention. As noted, even though the last prejudicial activity attributed against the detenu is one that took place on 24.08.2024, he was in judicial custody ever since 24.08.2024. Inasmuch as the detenu was in custody all throughout, we fail to understand, how the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention would be snapped on account of the delay. Inasmuch as the detenu was in custody all throughout, we fail to understand, how the live and proximate link between the grounds of detention and the purpose of detention would be snapped on account of the delay. The issue of snapping the live link would arise only when the person concerned does not indulge in any prejudicial activities when he is free to do so and the said scenario would not arise in the case of a person who is in judicial custody. 7. No doubt, the seizure mahazar in Crime No.794 of 2024 is one of the documents considered by the detaining authority in the matter of issuing the order of detention. Even assuming that a legible copy of the seizure mahazar has not been furnished to the detenu as claimed by him, it is seen that the detenu has been served with a copy of the First Information Report in that case which contains the full particulars of the seizure mahazar. The learned counsel for the petitioner has no case that the First Information Report does not contain the full particulars of the seizure mahazar. The learned counsel has also no case that the copy of the First Information Report served on the detenu is not legible. The rationale behind the insistence that copies of every document relied on in the order of detention shall be furnished to the detenu is to enable him/her to prefer an effective representation against the order of detention as provided for under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Inasmuch as a legible copy of the First Information Report in the case, which contains the particulars of the seizure mahazar has been served on the detenu, no prejudice has been caused to him in the matter of invoking his constitutional right to prefer an effective representation against the order of detention. Needless to say, the contention raised in this regard is only to be rejected. 8. Section 12 of the Act as it stood prior to its substitution was as follows: “12. Maximum period of detention.—The maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order made under this Act, which has been confirmed under section 10, shall not exceed six months from the date of detention.” Section 12 of the Act as substituted in terms of Act 41 of 2014 reads thus: “12. Maximum period of detention.—The maximum period for which any person may be detained in pursuance of any detention order made under this Act, which has been confirmed under section 10, shall not exceed six months from the date of detention.” Section 12 of the Act as substituted in terms of Act 41 of 2014 reads thus: “12. Maximum period of detention. — In pursuance of the first detention order made against any person under this Act and confirmed under Section 10, he may be detained for a period which may extend upto six months from the date of the detention and in pursuance of such subsequent detention order made against such person, he may be detained for a period which may extend upto a maximum of one year.” The contention is that inasmuch as the first order of detention against the detenu was issued prior to Act 41 of 2014, the present order of detention has to be treated as the first order against him under the Act. It is trite that an amendment by substitution has the effect of wiping out the earlier provision from the statute and replacing it with the amended provision, as if the unamended provision never existed. In other words, the substituted provision has to be understood independent of the earlier provision. Going by the plain words used in Section 12 as it stands now, what is discernible is that the period for which a person can be detained under the Act for the first time shall not exceed six months and the period can exceed six months but shall not exceed one year, in subsequent detention orders made against the same person. In the light of the words used in the provision, there is absolutely no scope to raise an argument that the expression “the first detention order” used in Section 12, refers only to the first detention order after Act 41 of 2014. According to us, if one reads the provision independent of the earlier provision, the expression “the first detention order” can only be understood as the first detention against the person under this Act, irrespective of the fact whether it is prior to or after Act 41 of 2014. According to us, if one reads the provision independent of the earlier provision, the expression “the first detention order” can only be understood as the first detention against the person under this Act, irrespective of the fact whether it is prior to or after Act 41 of 2014. The judgment of the Apex Court in Supdt., Narcotic Control Bureau dealing with the provision contained in Article 20(1) of the Constitution cannot have any application to the facts of the present case. Needless to say, there is no merit in this argument as well. In the light of the discussion aforesaid, the writ petition is devoid of merits and the same is accordingly dismissed.