JUDGMENT : (DEVASHIS BARUAH, J.) Heard Mr. SP Roy, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. 2. This is an application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, the Code), read with Section 151 of the Code challenging the order dated 02.04.2025 passed by the Court of the learned Additional District Judge No.1, Kamrup(M) at Guwahati (for short, ‘the learned Appellate Court’), whereby the application filed under Section 151 for grant of a stay to the execution proceedings being Title Execution Case No.4/2023 pending before the Court of the learned Civil Judge No.3, Kamrup(M) at Guwahati was rejected. 3. This Court prior to dictating the instant order enquired with the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as to whether he would like to convert the instant application to a proceedings under Article 227 of the Constitution. The learned counsel submitted that by the instant proceedings the revisional jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of the Code has been invoked on the ground that the learned Court failed to exercise the jurisdiction and if the application under Section 151 of the Code would have been allowed, it would amount to the disposal of the said application. 4. In the opinion of this Court, the present application is hit by the proviso to Section 115 of the Code inasmuch as, the application under Section 151 of the Code if allowed would not have resulted in disposal of any proceedings except granting a stay to the Execution Proceedings. Be that as it may, as an important issue is involved, this Court would deal with the merits of the challenge. 5. It is seen from the materials on record that the petitioner herein had filed an appeal against the orders dated 05.04.2016 passed in Misc.(J).Case No.288/2013 and Misc.(J).Case No.289/2013 arising out of Title Suit No.102/2012 whereby the application filed for setting aside the ex-parte decree passed in Title Suit No.102/2012 was dismissed. In other words, the Appeal is filed under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) read with Section 104 of the Code. 6. The petitioner along with the said appeal had filed an application for condonation of delay of 3240 days. In other words, the Appeal is filed under Order XLIII Rule 1(d) read with Section 104 of the Code. 6. The petitioner along with the said appeal had filed an application for condonation of delay of 3240 days. The delay is yet to be condoned and it is under such circumstances, the petitioner had filed an application under Section 151 of the Code in the Appeal for grant of the stay of the execution proceedings being Title Execution Case No.4/2023. The learned First Appellate Court had rejected the said application and it is under such circumstances, the present revision application is filed. 7. The question which primarily arises is as to whether in absence of the delay being condoned, the learned Appellate Court would be in a position to stay the execution proceedings and secondly, if so whether the learned Appellate Court was justified in rejecting the said application. 8. Order XLI Rule 3A of the Code provides that when an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period specified, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit setting forth the facts on which the Appellant relies to satisfy the Court that the Appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the Appeal within such period. It is relevant to take note of that the limitation for filing an appeal against the decree or an order permitted by the Code has to be traced to the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, ‘the Act of 1963’). In this regard, it is pertinent to take note of Article 116 of the Schedule to the Act of 1963 which provides that the period specified to file an Appeal to the High Court is 90 days from the date of the decree or order and 30 days from the date of the decree or order to any other Court. Therefore, for the purpose of the instant case, the period of Limitation specified is 30 days as the Appeal was filed before other Court and not the High Court. Admittedly, the delay in presenting the Appeal is 3240 days, for which, an application was filed under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 which was registered and numbered as Misc. (J).Case No.9/2025. 9. Now let this Court take note of Sub-Rule (3) to Rule 3A of Order XLI of the Code. Admittedly, the delay in presenting the Appeal is 3240 days, for which, an application was filed under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 which was registered and numbered as Misc. (J).Case No.9/2025. 9. Now let this Court take note of Sub-Rule (3) to Rule 3A of Order XLI of the Code. A perusal of the said Sub-Rule would show that the Appellate Court shall proceed to deal with the Appeal under Rule 11 of Order XLI of the Code only after finally deciding the application for condonation of delay and an order for stay of the execution of the decree, in an application preferred under Order XLI Rule 5 of the Code, against which the appeal is filed shall not be made unless the appeal is not considered under Rule 11 of Order XLI of the Code. In other words, Sub-Rule (3) of Order XLI Rule 3A of the Code would come into play only after the delay is condoned in terms with Sub-Rule (2) of Order XLI Rule 3A of the Code. 10. It is also pertinent to observe that Order XLI of the Code and, more particularly, Sub-Rule 3A of Order XLI provides the procedure of filing time barred appeal but does not empower the Court to condone the delay. The substantive provision for condonation of delay is provided in Section 5 of the Act of 1963. 11. A perusal of Section 5 of the Act of 1963 would reveal that the Court dealing with an application or an appeal is conferred with the jurisdiction to decide the application under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 filed in terms with the procedure mandated under Order XLI Rule 3A of the Code. It is very apposite herein to observe that Section 5 of the Act of 1963 does not stipulate the requirement for filing an application for condonation of delay and if the provision of Order XLI Rule 3A was not there in the Code, an appeal presented or an application filed beyond the period of limitation specified could have been proceeded with, without an application for condonation of delay. This aspect of the matter can be seen from a perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. Vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co- Operative Bank Ltd And Anr., reported in (2021) 7 SCC 313 . This aspect of the matter can be seen from a perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. Vs. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co- Operative Bank Ltd And Anr., reported in (2021) 7 SCC 313 . Paragraphs 61 and 62 of the said judgment are reproduced hereinbelow: “61. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not speak of any application. The section enables the court to admit an application or appeal if the applicant or the appellant, as the case may be, satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the application and/or preferring the appeal, within the time prescribed. Although, it is the general practice to make a formal application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in order to enable the court or tribunal to weigh the sufficiency of the cause for the inability of the appellant applicant to approach the court/tribunal within the time prescribed by limitation, there is no bar to exercise by the court/tribunal of its discretion to condone delay, in the absence of a formal application. 62. A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes it amply clear that, it is not mandatory to file an application in writing before relief can be granted under the said section. Had such an application been mandatory, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would have expressly provided so. Section 5 would then have read that the court might condone delay beyond the time prescribed by limitation for filing an application or appeal, if on consideration of the application of the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, for condonation of delay, the court is satisfied that the appellant applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Alternatively, a proviso or an Explanation would have been added to Section 5, requiring the appellant or the applicant, as the case may be, to make an application for condonation of delay. However, the court can always insist that an application or an affidavit showing cause for the delay be filed. No applicant or appellant can claim condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as of right, without making an application.” 12. However, the court can always insist that an application or an affidavit showing cause for the delay be filed. No applicant or appellant can claim condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act as of right, without making an application.” 12. From the above analysis, it would be clear that the Court exercising jurisdiction as regards an application filed or an appeal presented beyond the period of limitation prescribed is vested with the power to deal with an application under Section 5 of the Act of 1963. The natural corollary, therefore, is that the Court exercising civil jurisdiction empowered under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 also inheres in itself the powers under Section 151 of the Code to pass appropriate orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. This aspect can also be seen from a recent judgment of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Gayatri Balasamy Vs. ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 986 , wherein the majority opinion rendered by His Lordships Sanjiv Khanna, C.J. held in the context of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Paragraph 49 of the said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow: “49. Notwithstanding Section 33, we affirm that a court reviewing an award under Section 34 possesses the authority to rectify computational, clerical, or typographical errors, as well as other manifest errors, provided that such modification does not necessitate a merit-based evaluation. There are certain powers inherent to the court, even when not explicitly granted by the legislature. The scope of these inherent powers depends on the nature of the provision, whether it pertains to appellate, reference, or limited jurisdiction as in the case of Section 34. The powers are intrinsically connected as they are part and parcel of the jurisdiction exercised by the court.” 13. It is thus the opinion of this Court that in a fit case the Court exercising the power under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 would be within its jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders upon an application filed under Section 151 of the Code in the proceedings emanating under Section 5 of the Act of 1963. It is thus the opinion of this Court that in a fit case the Court exercising the power under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 would be within its jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders upon an application filed under Section 151 of the Code in the proceedings emanating under Section 5 of the Act of 1963. For the sake of clarity, this Court finds it apt to observe that the application to be filed under Section 151 of the Code cannot be filed in the Appeal arising out of the decree or order but is required to be filed in the application under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 inasmuch as, till the delay is not condoned, the Court’s jurisdiction is only vested on the basis of Section 5 of the Act of 1963. 14. In the backdrop of the above analysis and determination, let this Court take note of the facts and as to whether the learned Appellate Court was justified in rejecting the application filed under Section 151 of the Code. The application under Section 151 of the Code is enclosed as Annexure-19 to the present application. A perusal thereof would show that the application was filed in the Appeal and not in the application filed under Section 5 of the Act of 1963 which was registered as Misc.(J).Case No.09/2005. A further perusal of the said application would show that nothing material have been mentioned as to why the Court is required to exercise its inherent jurisdiction. The contents of the application are completely vague as regards the material particulars justifying the inherent jurisdiction and the learned Appellate Court in the opinion of this Court was, therefore, justified in dismissing the said application. 15. In that view of the matter, this Court does not find that the learned Appellate Court had committed an error in exercise of its jurisdiction, for which, the instant petition stands dismissed on the merits also. 16. 15. In that view of the matter, this Court does not find that the learned Appellate Court had committed an error in exercise of its jurisdiction, for which, the instant petition stands dismissed on the merits also. 16. Before parting with the record, this Court finds it relevant to observe that the application under Section 151 of the Code filed by the petitioner was not in the jurisdiction which was vested upon the learned Appellate Court and it appears that the counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner before the learned Appellate Court had on an erroneous presumption laid emphasis upon the Appeal and the Application seeking stay which were yet to be registered. The consequences of such presumption was that the petitioner sought to rely upon the Appeal as well as the Application seeking stay of the execution while moving the application filed under Section 151 of the Code. This was clearly not permissible as the Appeal or the Stay application could not have been taken into consideration by the learned Appellate Court unless the delay was condoned. 17. Accordingly, this Court observing that the mistake on the part of the petitioner was in fact a mistake of the counsel representing the petitioner before the learned Appellate Court grants liberty to the petitioner to file an appropriate application under Section 151 of the Code in the proceedings being Misc. (J).Case No.09/2025 and placing all such materials as deemed fit for consideration of the prayer of stay of the execution proceedings pending disposal of the condonation application. 18. This Court observes that if such an application is filed, the learned Appellate Court shall consider the same on its merits without being influenced by the liberty given herein by this Court. 19. With the above observation(s) and direction(s), the instant proceedings stands disposed of.