JUDGMENT : SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner. 2. This petition has been filed under Article 227 of Constitution of India for setting aside order dated 19.06.2024 passed by the learned A.J.C.-V, Ranchi in Misc. Civil Application No. 404 of 2023 (in Civil Appeal No. 100 of 2020) whereby the petition filed by the petitioner under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. has been rejected. 3. Mr. Prakash Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that plaintiff/respondent no.1 has instituted Partition Suit No. 122 of 2002 for partition and claiming 1/2 share in the same property in question and in between the near about similar parties as mentioned in Partition Suit No. 183/2005. He submits that the said Partition Suit no. 122/2002 was dismissed vide order dated 16.09.2003 and for the same relief another partition suit being Partition Suit No. 183 of 2005 was instituted which was decreed in favour of the plaintiff/respondent no.1 by allowing her 1/2 share in the suit property in question vide judgement dated 08.02.2008 and decree signed on 21.02.2008 and against the said judgment F.A. No.117 of 2008 was filed before this High Court and thereafter the High Court remanded the matter to the learned District Court on the ground of pecuniary jurisdiction pursuant to that Civil Appeal No. 100 of 2020 was registered. He submits that in that appeal petitioner preferred petition under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. which was rejected by the learned court. He submits that documents of earlier partition suit was found later on in view of that said petition was filed and the learned court without considering the provision of Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C wrongly rejected the said petition. He further submits that since the earlier partition suit was already dismissed, another suit is barred by res-judicata in view of that said petition was filed and the learned court has wrongly rejected the said petition. On these grounds, he submits that order dated 19.06.2024 may kindly be set aside. 4. It is an admitted position that Partition Suit No. 122 of 2002 was instituted for partition which was dismissed. Partition Suit No. 183/2005 was instituted for partition of suit property. The contention was made before the learned First Appellate Court by way of filing of the said petition that in view of earlier dismissal of the suit, the second suit is barred by res-judicata. 5. Partition Suit No. 183/2005 was instituted for partition of suit property. The contention was made before the learned First Appellate Court by way of filing of the said petition that in view of earlier dismissal of the suit, the second suit is barred by res-judicata. 5. The learned court has considered Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C. and found that provision for production of additional evidence oral or documentary at appellate stage is governed by certain restrictions. The learned court considering the provision of Order 41 Rule 27 of the C.P.C has found that the conditions made therein is not fulfilled by the petitioner. The learned court has further found that in the Partition Suit No. 183 of 2005 the Issue No. III was whether the suit is barred by res-judicata and the learned court has found that defendant/petitioner has not filed document to show that Partition Suit No. 122 of 2002 was instituted by the plaintiff against them for the suit property and it was finally decided by the learned court. The written statement was also silent about the decision of the said suit and the res- judicata was decided in favour of the plaintiff. The learned court further found that the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to produce the documents which he wants but he could not produce the same and in the light of above the learned court has dismissed the petition under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. 6. Further, res-judicata point has already been decided by the learned trial court. The appeal is still pending and the petitioner herein has to prove his case before the learned appellate court and onus lies upon him to prove that fact. 7. For deciding petition under Order 41 Rule 27 the learned appellate court is not required to travel outside the record of the learned trial court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. The reference may be made to the case of “Union of India Vs. Ibrahim Uddin reported in (2012) 8 SCC 148 wherein paragraphs Nos. 25, 26 and 37 it has been held as under:- “ 25. The general principle is that the Appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order XLI Rule 27 CPC enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. 25, 26 and 37 it has been held as under:- “ 25. The general principle is that the Appellate Court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and cannot take any evidence in appeal. However, as an exception, Order XLI Rule 27 CPC enables the Appellate Court to take additional evidence in exceptional circumstances. The Appellate Court may permit additional evidence only and only if the conditions laid down in this rule are found to exist. The parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such evidence. Thus, provision does not apply, when on the basis of evidence on record, the Appellate Court can pronounce a satisfactory judgment. The matter is entirely within the discretion of the court and is to be used sparingly. Such a discretion is only a judicial discretion circumscribed by the limitation specified in the rule itself. (Vide: K. Venkataramiah v. A. Seetharama Reddy & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 1526 ; The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Lala Pancham & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 1008 ; Soonda Ram & Anr. v. Rameshwaralal & Anr., AIR 1975 SC 479 ; and Syed Abdul Khader v. Rami Reddy & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 553 ). 26. The Appellate Court should not, ordinarily allow new evidence to be adduced in order to enable a party to raise a new point in appeal. Similarly, where a party on whom the onus of proving a certain point lies fails to discharge the onus, he is not entitled to a fresh opportunity to produce evidence, as the Court can, in such a case, pronounce judgment against him and does not require any additional evidence to enable it to pronounce judgment. (Vide: Haji Mohammed Ishaq Wd. S. K. Mohammed & Ors. v. Mohamed Iqbal and Mohamed Ali and Co., AIR 1978 SC 798 ). 37. To sum up on the issue, it may be held that application for taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed as a matter of right. The court can consider such an application with circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite condition incorporated in the statutory provisions itself. 37. To sum up on the issue, it may be held that application for taking additional evidence on record at a belated stage cannot be filed as a matter of right. The court can consider such an application with circumspection, provided it is covered under either of the prerequisite condition incorporated in the statutory provisions itself. The discretion is to be exercised by the court judicially taking into consideration the relevance of the document in respect of the issues involved in the case and the circumstances under which such an evidence could not be led in the court below and as to whether the applicant had prosecuted his case before the court below diligently and as to whether such evidence is required to pronounce the judgment by the appellate court. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the application filed comes within the four corners of the statutory provisions itself, the evidence may be taken on record, however, the court must record reasons as on what basis such an application has been allowed. However, the application should not be moved at a belated stage.” 8. For proper adjudication of the present petition Order 41 Rule 27 is reproduced hereinbelow:- “Order 41 Rule 27 CPC:- Production of additional evidence in Appellate Court - (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court, But if -- (a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or [(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or] (b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” 9. (2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission.” 9. From the above legal position as it stands, is that the parties to an appeal are not entitled to produce additional evidence (oral or documentary) in the appellate court except on the principles enumerated in clause (a), (aa) and (b) of the Code where the appellate court requires a document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce the judgment, or for any other substantial cause. The expression "to enable it to pronounce judgment" has been interpreted so as to mean that when the appellate court finds itself unable to pronounce judgment owing to a lacuna or defect in evidence as it stands, it may admit additional evidence. But that does not mean that the clause should be resorted to patch up the weakness of the evidence of the unsuccessful party before the trial court, though, if the court itself requires the evidence to do justice between the parties, it may accept it. The ability to pronounce a judgment is to be understood as the ability to pronounce a judgment satisfactory to the mind of the court delivering it. But a mere difficulty in coming to a decision is not sufficient for admission of evidence under this rule. This provision does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can satisfactorily pronounce judgment in the case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for the purposes of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way. The words "or for any other substantial cause" must be read with the word "requires", which is set out at the commencement of the provision, so that it is only where, for any other substantial cause, the appellate court requires additional evidence, that this clause would apply. Furthermore, if recourse is to be taken to the said clause, that is clause (c), which is pari materia clause (b) of the Code, the appellate court is required to consider the entire evidence on record to come to an independent conclusion whether for arriving at a just decision, adduction of additional evidence, as has been prayed for, is necessary. Furthermore, if recourse is to be taken to the said clause, that is clause (c), which is pari materia clause (b) of the Code, the appellate court is required to consider the entire evidence on record to come to an independent conclusion whether for arriving at a just decision, adduction of additional evidence, as has been prayed for, is necessary. Therefore, ordinarily, an application seeking adduction of additional evidence by taking recourse to the aforesaid clause is to be considered at the time of hearing by taking a conspectus of the entire evidence on record for drawing satisfaction whether the evidence, the adduction of which is sought is necessary for pronouncing a judgment. 10. Coming to the facts of the present case, the petitioner has not stated in the application that how this document came to his knowledge. What was the source of information and this application also does not disclose what exercise the petitioner/defendant has undertaken that this document is relevant for the purpose of the present case. 11. In view of above, the petitioner has failed to satisfy the requirement of exercise provision under Order 41 Rule 27 of C.P.C. As such there is no illegality in the impugned order. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. Pending I.A, if any, stands dismissed.