ORDER : 1. The Special Leave Petition is filed by the respondent in an appeal, who was the plaintiff in the original suit, assailing the judgment in appeal reversing the judgment and decree passed in the suit. The plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title as sole owner of the three items of land, one of which was purchased in the sole name of the plaintiff, one in the joint name of the plaintiff and his deceased mother and the last in the name of the mother alone. The cause of action for the suit, as projected by the plaintiff, was since the respondent Nos.1 to 5; married daughters of the plaintiff, had sought for a partition of the properties alleging that they belong to the parents of the plaintiff. Respondent Nos.6 and 7 are the sons of the plaintiff and respondent No.8 is the wife of the plaintiff. 2. The Trial Court framed five issues; (i) with respect to the declaration of sole ownership of the lands covered by the three sale deeds, (ii) whether the disputed land and house constructed thereon are self-acquired properties of the plaintiff, (iii) whether a partition was made on 18.03.2008 in favour of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 by which, the part possession of the house was given to the said defendants, (iv) whether the suit was one collusively filed by the plaintiffs and defendant Nos.6 to 8 to deprive defendant No.1 her rights in the ancestral properties, and (v) whether a mere suit for declaration is maintainable when possession of the house constructed in the property was not available with the plaintiff. 3. The Trial Court found that the properties are not partible, the suit was not collusive and that the suit, with sole prayer for declaration, was maintainable. The Trial Court also found that the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration sought for since the properties were self-acquired and the house was also constructed by the plaintiff. The said judgment and order was reversed by the Division Bench of the High Court finding that the very claim raised by the plaintiff is barred under Section 4 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 ['the Act']. The said judgment and order was reversed by the Division Bench of the High Court finding that the very claim raised by the plaintiff is barred under Section 4 of the Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 ['the Act']. The High Court also found that the properties jointly owned; in the name of the plaintiff and the mother, and that in the name of the mother, cannot be said to have devolved solely on the plaintiff. Despite the mother having died intestate, the plaintiff cannot be declared exclusive owner of the suit properties since there is no pleading to the effect that the plaintiff alone succeeds to his mother. Coupled with the prohibition created under Section 4 of the Act1 the declaration sought for was rejected insofar as the the properties in the joint name of the plaintiff and his mother and the one in the sole name of his mother. 4. The leaned Counsel for the petitioner, vehemently, argued that in the first appeal there was no issue raised with respect to the claim being hit by the Act1 and in such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have reversed the well-considered judgment of the Trial Court. The learned Counsel relied on the decisions of this Court in Prakash Chandra vs. Narayan, (2012) 5 SCC 403 , Kalyan Singh Chauhan vs. C.P. Joshi, (2011) 11 SCC 786 , B.V. Nagesh & Anr. vs. Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530 and K. Karuppuraj v. M. Ganesan, (2021) 10 SCC 777 . 5. We do not find any application of the cases cited. Prakash Chandra was a case in which the first appellate court reversed the judgment allowing specific performance on the ground of hardship to the defendant; which was not pleaded or proved. Hardship, it was held was a question of fact and ought to have been framed as an issue. Kalyan Singh Chauhan specifically also referred to framing of issues on questions of fact; in the context of there being no pleading with respect to some votes, alleged to be cast by imposters, in a challenge to an election to the Legislative Assembly. B.V. Nagesh held that it was the duty of the High Court to deal with the issues and the evidence led by the parties and also that the parties have the right to be heard, both on the questions of law and on facts. B.V. Nagesh held that it was the duty of the High Court to deal with the issues and the evidence led by the parties and also that the parties have the right to be heard, both on the questions of law and on facts. In K. Karuppuraj, the appellate order reversing the judgment and decree in the suit was set aside since the High Court had relied solely upon an affidavit of readiness and willingness filed at the appellate stage. 6. The order impugned herein has dealt with the issue and clearly found the prohibition under Section 4 of the Act1 based on the very claim raised by the plaintiff that two of the suit properties were purchased, one in the joint name of the plaintiff and his mother and the other in the sole name of his mother; out of the self-generated income of the plaintiff who was a teacher in a government school. The High Court has rejected the prayer for declaration with respect of the said two properties relying on the decisions of this Court under the Act . There is no disputed fact and the law on the very claim raised, is crystal clear. Kalyan Singh Chouhan held that when parties proceed to trial fully aware of the rival claims and lead evidence to that end and in refutation thereof, there cannot be an insistence for framing issues. In the above case, even before us there was not even a contention raised by the petitioner's Counsel against the finding in the impugned judgment regarding the prohibition under the Act, which finding cuts at the very root of the plaintiff's claim. 7. Having looked through the Trial Court judgment, we cannot but notice that though, the plaintiff asserted that all the three properties were self-acquired, there was nothing produced to show his income or the manner in which the properties were acquired. The Trial Court merely, on the deposition of the plaintiff's witnesses and the admission of defendant No.1; that the plaintiff was a government servant, granted the declaration prayed for. We find absolute lack of evidence of either the income of the plaintiff or the means to purchase the lands. 8. Furthermore, as has been noticed by the Division Bench, the plaintiff has not disclosed whether his mother had other legal heirs. We find absolute lack of evidence of either the income of the plaintiff or the means to purchase the lands. 8. Furthermore, as has been noticed by the Division Bench, the plaintiff has not disclosed whether his mother had other legal heirs. The claim for partition was declined by the Trial Court based on Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956; which we hasten to add, has not been disturbed in the impugned order of the High Court. The devolution of the property of a female who had died intestate first falls upon the sons and daughters including any children of sons or daughters and the husband. The father of the plaintiff died in the year 1980 and the mother in the year 1997. The plaintiff has not produced any document to show that he is the only legal heir. There is not even a pleading to that effect or a succession certificate produced. In the totality of the circumstances, we find absolutely no reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. 9. Accordingly, the Special Leave Petition stands rejected. 10. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.