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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 764 (HP)

Rajesh Kumar Patil v. State of H. P.

2025-04-22

JYOTSNA REWAL DUA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. Petitioner is aged 74 years. On 23.01.2025, he represented to the respondents for granting him the benefit of pay scale of Rs.2400-4000/- w.e.f. 01.01.1986 and Rs.2850-4375/- w.e.f. 18.02.1989. The prayer was made on the basis of decision rendered in Kurmo Devi and others Versus The State of Himachal Pradesh and another, CWP(T) No.6082 of 2008 (OA No.2652 of 1999), decided on 26.08.2011. The respondents declined to extend the benefit of the judgment in Kurmo Devi (supra), case in favour of the petitioner on the ground that the applicability of the said judgment had been restricted only to the parties therein. Representation of the petitioner was rejected on 28.02.2025. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner has instituted this writ petition seeking following substantive reliefs:- “a). That the impugned order of rejection of the representation of the petitioner dated 28-2-2025 (P-5) passed by the respondents may kindly be quashed and set aside or may kindly be modified by directing the respondent to grant the pay scale as is given to the similar situated persons with all consequential benefits from the date of joining as Project Officer on 26-2-1978. b). That the respondent may kindly be directed to give all the consequential benefit to the petitioner.” 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and considered the case file. 2(i). The sole basis of the petitioner for seeking higher pay scale is the decision rendered in Kurmo Devi’s (supra) case. In the following operative part of the said decision, petitioners therein were allowed the pay scale of Rs.2400- 4000/- w.e.f. 01.01.1986 and Rs.2850-4375/- w.e.f. 18.02.1989 and all the corresponding revisions, which took place in the State of Punjab for the category of Project Officers:- “11. Consequently, in view of the observations and discussions made hereinabove, the petition is allowed. Respondents are directed to grant the petitioners the pay scale of Rs.2400-4000 with effect from 1.1.1986 and Rs.2850-4375 with effect from 18.2.1989 and all the corresponding revisions which have taken place in the State of Punjab so far as the category of Project Officers is concerned, within a period of 12 weeks after the production of certified copy of this judgment by the petitioners. The pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.” 2(ii). Respondents-State preferred Letters Patent Appeal, being LPA No.339 of 2012, against the aforesaid decision. The pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. No costs.” 2(ii). Respondents-State preferred Letters Patent Appeal, being LPA No.339 of 2012, against the aforesaid decision. The LPA was dismissed on 24.08.2021 as under:- “The judgment passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from no infirmity. Consequently, the instant appeal being devoid of merit, is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application is also disposed of. It is clarified that the present judgment is being passed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case keeping in view the judgments passed by the learned erstwhile H.P. Administrative Tribunal on 04.06.1990 in T.A. No.662/1986 and the judgment dated 28.02.1997 passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeals No.1709-1710 of 1997. The benefit of present judgment shall be confined only to the parties herein.” While dismissing the letters patent appeal, it was clearly observed in the decision that “benefit of present judgment shall be confined only to the parties herein”. 2(iii). Respondents-State preferred Special Leave to Appeal No.5565 of 2022 against the aforesaid decision. The SLP was decided on 10.09.2024 as under:- “We have heard learned senior counsel and learned Advocate General for the State of Himachal Pradesh and learned senior counsel for the respondents. During the course of submissions, it was brought to our notice that the post of Project Officer has since ceased to exist. Secondly, that there are only five respondents herein who are seeking parity in the pay- scales and thirdly, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that these respondents have all since been superannuated. Having regard to the aforesaid peculiar facts of this case, we dispose of the Special Leave Petition by reserving liberty to the petitioner-State to raise all contentions which are raised in the present Special Leave Petition in any other appropriate case. The impugned orders as far as the respondents herein are concerned are not interfered with. Consequently, all questions of law, which arise in this Special Leave Petition are left open. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.” While disposing of the SLP, Hon’ble Apex Court took specific notice of the facts that:- (i) The post of Project Officer had ceased to exist; (ii) There were only five respondents (original writ petitioners), who were seeking parity in the pay scales and; (iii) All the respondents before the Hon’ble Apex Court (original writ petitioners) had since superannuated. Inter alia taking these factors into consideration, judgment dated 24.08.2021 rendered in LPA No.339 of 2012 and judgment dated 26.08.2011 rendered in CWP(T) No.6082 of 2008 (OA No.2652 of 1999) were not interfered with though questions of law raised in the SLP were left open. 2(iv). After the disposal of the SLP, the decision in Kurmo Devi’s (supra) case was implemented by the respondents qua the petitioners therein on 20.06.2023. It is about two years thereafter the petitioner aged 74 years, preferred a representation on 23.01.2025, seeking benefit of the pay scale as granted to the petitioners in Kurmo Devi (supra). The respondents rejected his representation on 28.02.2025. 3. The respondents were justified in not extending the benefit of the decision rendered in Kurmo Devi’s (supra) case to the present petitioner. Petitioners in Kurmo Devi (supra) had filed Original Application (OA) No.2652 of 1999 seeking higher pay scale. This original application was decided on 26.08.2011 in their favour. LPA No.339 of 2012 instituted by the respondents-State was dismissed on 24.08.2021, but in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case mentioned in the judgment, with the observation that the benefit of the judgment would be confined only to the parties therein. Hon’ble Apex Court while deciding the Special Leave Petition instituted by the respondents-State against the decision dated 24.08.2021, further restricted the applicability of the judgment by observing that there were only five writ petitioners, who were seeking parity in the pay scales. All those writ petitioners had superannuated by the time the SLP was taken up for disposal. Inter alia keeping this in view, judgments dated 24.08.2021 passed in LPA No.339 of 2012 and dated 26.08.2011 in CWP(T) No.6082 of 2008 (OA No.2652 of 1999) were not interfered with. In Bichitrananda Behera Versus State of Orissa and others, Civil Appeal No.6664 of 2023 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.16238 of 2017), decided on 11.10.2023 , Hon’ble Supreme Court highlighted the significance of the doctrines of delay & laches and acquiescence in service-related disputes. Hon’ble Court observed that the claimant therein had delayed pursuing his claim for over 12 years despite being aware of the appointment of another person to the same post of Physical Education Trainer (PET). This prolonged inaction was held to amount to acquiescence, which effectively bars the claim because it implies consent through silence or failure to act. Hon’ble Court observed that the claimant therein had delayed pursuing his claim for over 12 years despite being aware of the appointment of another person to the same post of Physical Education Trainer (PET). This prolonged inaction was held to amount to acquiescence, which effectively bars the claim because it implies consent through silence or failure to act. Hon’ble Court explained that while laches refers to an unreasonable delay without active consent, both delay and laches serve the important purpose of preventing stale claims that disrupt settled rights and administrative decisions. In service matters, these doctrines were held to play crucial roles as they protect the stability and finality of administrative decisions. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:- “21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this Court: (A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : “To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied) (B) Union of India v N Murugesan, (2022) 2 SCC 25 : "Delay, laches and acquiescence 20. The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the court. Laches 21. The word “laches” is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy. 22. Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy on a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy. 23. A defence of laches can only be allowed when there is no statutory bar. The question as to whether there exists a clear case of laches on the part of a person seeking a remedy is one of fact and so also that of prejudice. The said principle may not have any application when the existence of fraud is pleaded and proved by the other side. To determine the difference between the concept of laches and acquiescence is that, in a case involving mere laches, the principle of estoppel would apply to all the defences that are available to a party. Therefore, a defendant can succeed on the various grounds raised by the plaintiff, while an issue concerned alone would be amenable to acquiescence.” Admittedly, present petitioner was not one of the petitioners in Kurmo Devi (supra). He was only a fence sitter, who probably was waiting and watching for the verdict in Kurmo Devi (supra). It is not his case that he ever represented to the respondents before the decision in Kurmo Devi’s (supra) case for grant of higher pay scale to him. Only a vague averment has been made in the petition that “the petitioner was represented so many time to grant of pay scale as is given to the other similar situated persons posted as Project Officer in the department to be given to the petitioner but nothing has been done by the respondent department”. No representation has been placed on record by the petitioner even in this writ petition. In the impugned order dated 28.02.2025 (Annexure P-5), one can decipher that the petitioner had represented to the respondents only on 23.01.2025, seeking benefit of the higher pay scale. No representation has been placed on record by the petitioner even in this writ petition. In the impugned order dated 28.02.2025 (Annexure P-5), one can decipher that the petitioner had represented to the respondents only on 23.01.2025, seeking benefit of the higher pay scale. No explanation for the delay and laches has been accorded in the writ petition for petitioner’s approaching the Court at this belated stage. Further, as noticed above, the relief has been claimed only on the basis of judgments, which have been restricted in their applicability only to the petitioners therein. No submission was made for independently establishing petitioner’s right upon higher pay scale. 4. In view of all these factors, the relief, as prayed for by the petitioner, cannot be granted to him at this belated stage as also in view of the ratio of decisions on the basis of which relief has actually been prayed. The writ petition, therefore, lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.