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2025 DIGILAW 765 (GAU)

Monish Chhabra, S/o. Sri Madanlal Chhabra v. State Of Assam, rep. By The PP, Assam

2025-05-09

MITALI THAKURIA

body2025
JUDGMENT : (MITALI THAKURIA, J.) Heard Ms. K. Malakar, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Ms. S. H. Bora, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State respondent No.1 and Mr. B. D. Konwar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. B. Soren, learned counsel for the respondent No.2. 2. This application is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., praying for quashing and setting aside of the impugned Notice and impugned Order dated 29.01.2024 passed in connection with the D.V. Case No.08/2024, registered under Sections 12/18/19/20/21/22 and 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, which is pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kamrup (M), Guwahati. 3. The brief facts of the case is that the present respondent No. 2 [complainant in D.V. Case No.08/2024] was married to Sri Ashish Chhabra on 08.10.2009, as per Hindu rituals, at her parental residence in Kamrup (M) District. She has alleged that the intervention of the present petitioner [respondent No. 4 in D.V. Case No. 08/2024], who is her brother-in-law, negatively influenced the dynamics of her marital relationship with her husband. She further alleged that during her visit to her matrimonial home in August 2023, the present petitioner unjustifiably instigated her husband against her. It is also alleged that the petitioner has inflated ego, considering himself superior to everyone, and used to tell the aggrieved person/present respondent No.2 that society is male dominated, where a female must comply with the choices and desires of the male members of the household and remain subordinate to them. She further alleged that the petitioner strategically damaged her relationship with her parents and other family members through unfounded accusations and that she has been subjected to severe mental and physical torture by respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4 [the present petitioner in D.V. Case No. 08/2024]. Having no other alternative, she filed a domestic violence case seeking protection under Section 18 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005; accommodation under Section 19(f); monetary relief of Rs. 2,72,00,000/- under Section 20; interim relief of Rs. 1,50,000/- under Section 23(2); custody of her children under Section 21; and compensation of Rs.3,00,00,000/- under Section 22, along with interim prayers for the reliefs as mentioned. 4. 2,72,00,000/- under Section 20; interim relief of Rs. 1,50,000/- under Section 23(2); custody of her children under Section 21; and compensation of Rs.3,00,00,000/- under Section 22, along with interim prayers for the reliefs as mentioned. 4. However, it is the case of the present petitioner that respondent No. 2 sent the notice of D.V. Case No. 08/2024 to the petitioner at his parents’ residential address, without mentioning any date. Further, the petitioner’s parents informed him about the said notice over the phone. The petitioner was surprised by the misleading and false statements made by respondent No. 2 in the complaint, especially since respondent No. 2 had never stayed with the petitioner. The petitioner is a national of Singapore and has been residing there since 1997, whereas respondent No. 2 has all along been residing with her husband, namely Sri Ashish Chhabra, who is the petitioner’s younger brother at Kahikuchi, Kamrup (M), Assam. Subsequently, the petitioner enquired about the notice with his younger brother, who informed him that his wife (i.e., present respondent No. 2) had filed the said case against him and his family due to a dispute between them regarding their marital relationship and their business. 5. Being highly aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order dated 29.01.2024 passed in D.V. Case No. 08/2024, as well as the issuance of a notice without mentioning a date, the present petitioner has preferred this petition for quashing of the same. 6. Ms. Malakar, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the present petitioner is the brother-in-law of the respondent No.2/complainant. She further submits that the complaint petition filed by respondent No. 2 is not maintainable, as the alleged matrimonial dispute pertains to a residence in Guwahati, where the present petitioner never resided. The petitioner has been residing in Singapore since 1997 and acquired Singaporean citizenship in 2014. It is further contended that the petitioner is the Managing Director of his own company, “Lodestar Holding Limited,” based in Singapore. He married Cheryl Tan, a Singaporean and a school teacher, in 2008, and they are presently living as a happy couple with three children [two daughters and a son]. The petitioner has no business in India, nor is he a business partner in any enterprise with respondent No. 2 or her husband, nor does he hold any share in their business. 7. The petitioner has no business in India, nor is he a business partner in any enterprise with respondent No. 2 or her husband, nor does he hold any share in their business. 7. In support of her submission, she relies on the decision passed by the Bombay High Court, reported in 2018 SCC Online Bom 17170 [ Avinash Madhav Deshpande & Ors. vs. Madhuri Satish Deshpande & Ors. wherein, it has been held that the relatives of the husband cannot be roped in the proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, merely on the basis of vague or omnibus allegation. Paragraph 6 and 7 of the said judgement read as under: “6. By now, in view of the latest judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in K. Subba Rao v. The State of Telangana it is settled position of law that the relatives of the husband cannot be roped in the proceedings initiated under Section 498A or the proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, merely on the basis of vague or omnibus allegation. The allegations, if are required and called upon to be inquired into, must be specific and instances must be given to as to substantiate the said allegation. Making of mere bald allegation and roping in the in- laws has been deprecated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment and the observation reads as follows: “A perusal of the charge sheet and the supplementary charge sheet discloses the fact that the Appellants are not the immediate family members of the third Respondent/husband. They are the maternal uncles of the third Respondent. Except the bald statement that they supported the third Respondent who was harassing the second Respondent for dowry and that they conspired with the third Respondent for taking away his child to the U.S.A., nothing else indicating their involvement in the crime was mentioned. The Appellants approached the High Court when the investigation was pending. The charge sheet and the supplementary charge sheet were filed after disposal of the case by the High Court. Criminal proceedings are not normally interdicted by us at the interlocutory stage unless there is an abuse of process of a Court. This Court, at the same time, does not hesitate to interfere to secure the ends of justice. See State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 . Criminal proceedings are not normally interdicted by us at the interlocutory stage unless there is an abuse of process of a Court. This Court, at the same time, does not hesitate to interfere to secure the ends of justice. See State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 . The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out. See Kans Raj v. State of Punjab (2000) 5 SCC 207 and Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 16 SCC. 7. In light of the settled position of law and the fact that the application preferred by the applicants do not contain any allegation as against the present applicants under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act, the issuance of the notice to the present applicants is totally unsustainable and it is liable to be quashed and set aside in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court is competent enough to invoke and apply its power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to prevent an abuse of process of law and in my considered opinion, issuance of process against the present applicants in proceedings instituted by the respondent no. 2 under the provisions of Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is nothing but an abuse of process of the Court, and therefore, interference of this Court is warranted in order to prevent such a misuse and abuse of law and its process. In such circumstances, the application deserved to be allowed and is so allowed in terms of prayer clause (b).” 8. Ms. Malakar, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the allegation leveled by respondent No. 2 against the present petitioner that he instigated her husband in the month of August 2023 when she visited her matrimonial house is entirely fabricated and concocted, as he did not visit at all during that month. Ms. Malakar, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the allegation leveled by respondent No. 2 against the present petitioner that he instigated her husband in the month of August 2023 when she visited her matrimonial house is entirely fabricated and concocted, as he did not visit at all during that month. He also submitted that since the petitioner never resided in a shared household with respondent No. 2, he does not fall within the definition of a respondent under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, and therefore, the provisions of the Act is not applicable to him. 9. In addition to his submissions, she relied on the following decision passed by the different High Courts which are as follows: i. Girish & Ors. vs. Poonam , reported in 2013 2 Crimes (HC) 18; ii. K. Narasimhan vs. Rohini Devanathan , reported in 2009 0 Supreme (Kar) 812, (Para Nos. 6, 8 and 9). 10. The ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Girish & Ors. (supra) in paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 read as under: “6. K. Narasimhan vs. Rohini Devanathan , reported in 2009 0 Supreme (Kar) 812, (Para Nos. 6, 8 and 9). 10. The ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Girish & Ors. (supra) in paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 read as under: “6. Section 2 (a), (f), (q) and (s) of the Act read as under:- "(a) "aggrieved person" means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent; (f) "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family; (q) "respondent" means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act: Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against a relative of the husband or the male partner; (s) "shared household" means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household." 7. A combined reading of the above definitions reveals that an 'aggrieved person' is a woman, who is in a domestic relationship with the respondent and has been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent. 'Domestic relationship' would mean a relationship between two persons, who live or have at any point of time lived together in a shared household. 'Domestic relationship' would mean a relationship between two persons, who live or have at any point of time lived together in a shared household. 'Shared household' means a household where the person aggrieved lives at any stage in a domestic relationship either singly or along with respondent. The respondent has, thus, never resided with the petitioners in the household along with her husband to constitute an offence under the Act against the petitioners. In these circumstances, the continuation of criminal proceedings against the petitioners would be nothing but an abuse of process of law.” 11. Ms. Malakar submits that respondent No. 2 issued the notice without mentioning any date, and that the impugned order dated 29.01.2024, passed by the learned Trial Court, was made without proper judicial application of mind and in this regard, he relied on the decision passed by the Hon’ble Orissa High Court passed in CRLM No. 597/2022 dated 15.05.2023 [ Durga Das Panigrahi & Ors. vs. Sweta Mishra ], wherein, it has been held that “it is not that the Magistrate without judicial application of mind to simply summon the respondent on receiving an application under Section 12 of the DV Act without reaching at a decision that there has been a domestic relationship between the parties or that they once lived together in a shared household. The responsibility of a Magistrate while entertaining any such proceeding and before summoning the respondent is not merely an empty formality which must depend on a conclusion being arrived at that the parties have or had been in a domestic relationship as defined in Section 2(f) of the DV Act. The same view has been expressed in K. Narasimhan (supra). Without further elaboration, the Court reaches at an irresistible conclusion that the proceeding under the DV Act vis-à-vis the petitioners, for the reasons discussed hereinabove, cannot be justified”. Thus, refereeing the aforesaid judgments, she accordingly prays for the setting aside and quashing of the entire proceeding arising out of D.V. Case No. 08/2024 by invoking the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 12. On the other hand, Mr. Konwar, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 2, has submitted that the petitioner's statement that he has been residing in Singapore since 1997 and has not been living with respondent No. 2 is self- contradictory. On the other hand, Mr. Konwar, learned Senior Counsel for respondent No. 2, has submitted that the petitioner's statement that he has been residing in Singapore since 1997 and has not been living with respondent No. 2 is self- contradictory. This is because respondent No. 2’s matrimonial home is the petitioner’s own family home, where his parents are still living. Therefore, as their son, his claim that he never visited Guwahati is completely false and fabricated. He further submits that the petitioner has been regularly visiting his home and has been actively involved in planning and executing acts of domestic violence against respondent No. 2. In fact, the petitioner is the key conspirator, influencing and guiding his other family members in their misdeeds, as already described in the D.V. case. He also submits that, during the pendency of the aforementioned D.V. case, the petitioner’s family members continued committing domestic offences and even ousted respondent No. 2 from her matrimonial home, while using her stridhan property and other articles. It is also submitted that the petitioner’s claim of having no business is highly questionable, as he is allegedly running a business under the name “Lodestar Holding Limited” at the 2nd Floor, Sunshine Plaza, Azara, Guwahati, using her stridhan property without informing or obtaining any permission from her. In this regard, she has also filed an FIR dated 29.05.2024. Thus, the petitioner has attempted to conceal his wrongdoings by providing false and misleading statements. 13. He further submits that, according to the petitioner, no date was specified in the notice of the order dated 29.01.2024. However, the petitioner was well aware that it was a typographical error, as his engaged counsel had duly represented him in defending the said case. The petitioner is raising this trivial typographical error before this Court solely to divert attention from his continuous misdeeds against respondent No. 2. He also submitted that, as per Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act, “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family”. 14. It is an admitted fact that the present petitioner is the younger brother of respondent No.2’s husband. 14. It is an admitted fact that the present petitioner is the younger brother of respondent No.2’s husband. Since the year 2009 until 2024, he has been visiting the matrimonial home of respondent No.2, living as part of the joint family, and continuously perpetrating acts of domestic violence against her. He took the initiative to shut down her beauty parlour, named ‘Queen Parlour’, by removing all the beauty products and other items such as furniture, lights, etc., thereby trespassing upon her stridhan property. He further submitted that respondent No.2 had also produced photographs of WhatsApp conversations between the petitioner and his mother (i.e., the mother-in-law of respondent No.2). In this regard, she attached a certificate in compliance with the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872, marked as Annexure-4 in the said D.V. petition. Also, the petitioner did not appear before the learned Trial Court, despite a vakalatnama having been filed by his engaged counsel. On numerous occasions, the petitioner’s counsel sought adjournments, seemingly only to delay the proceedings. 15. He additionally submitted that although the petitioner may be a citizen of Singapore, he has been maintaining close ties with his family members, his mother and brother and has instigated them to inflict mental and physical harassment upon respondent No.2. On several occasions, he also visited the matrimonial house and inflicted cruelty upon her. In fact, he is alleged to be the mastermind behind the entire sequence of domestic violence perpetrated against respondent No.2. He further submitted that a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., challenging the procedure under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, is not maintainable except on limited grounds. In this context, he relied on the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Crl.O.P. SR. Nos. 31852, 28394, 29208, 29745, 32249, 32612, 32966, 33350, 33623, 33780, 33937, 34048, 34753, 35061, 35431, 35555, 35838, 35983, 36564, 36570, 36636, 36648, 36683, 36948, 36956, 37007, 37218, 37713, 37872, 37980, 38281 & 38330 of 2022, dated 17.11.2022, wherein he emphasised paragraph 75 of the judgment, which reads as under: “75. We now summarise our conclusions to the questions set out in paragraph 1 of this opinion: a. A petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging a proceeding under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is not maintainable. We now summarise our conclusions to the questions set out in paragraph 1 of this opinion: a. A petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. challenging a proceeding under Section 12 of the D.V. Act is not maintainable. A petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is maintainable on a limited ground of patent lack of jurisdiction, as indicated in paragraphs 40 and 41, supra. b. Except on the limited ground indicated, supra, jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution will not be exercised, as a measure of self- imposed restriction, by-passing the statutory remedies under the D.V. Act in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai, supra. c. In the light of the aforesaid conclusions, we uphold the decision of N. Anand Venkatesh, J. in Pathmanathan, supra, including the directions set out, in paragraph 52 in their entirety, though, in our view, the reference to Section 483 Cr.P.C. therein, may not be appropriate. The decision of the Division Bench in P. Ganesan, supra, to the extent that it is contrary to this opinion, shall stand overruled. Ex consequenti, the decisions of learned single judges in S.Gowrishankar, supra, Sathiyaseelan, supra, G.Jayakumar, supra, Mohana Seshathri, supra, and other cases following or adopting the line of reasoning therein, shall stand overruled, to the extent that they are contrary to the view taken herein. d. As a sequitur to the above, it must necessarily follow that the petitions in this batch are not maintainable. We, therefore, see no useful purpose in remitting the matter to the learned single judge to perform the obsequies. Accordingly, exercising power under Order I Rule 7 of the Appellate Side Rules, we hold that all the petitions filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. shall stand dismissed at the SR stage itself, preserving all the rights and contentions of the parties and granting liberty to move the Magistrate to agitate their grievances, which shall be considered in consonance with the directions set out in paragraph 52 of the decision in Pathmanathan, supra.” 16. However, in the said case, it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal , reported in (2004) 7 SCC 338 , that once the process has been issued, it cannot be reviewed or recalled in the context of D.V. proceedings. However, in the said case, it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Adalat Prasad vs. Rooplal Jindal , reported in (2004) 7 SCC 338 , that once the process has been issued, it cannot be reviewed or recalled in the context of D.V. proceedings. Furthermore, preliminary issues such as the existence of a shared household or a domestic relationship, which form the jurisdictional basis for entertaining an application under Section 12 of the D.V. Act, can be determined as preliminary issues in appropriate cases. Thus, he submits that this is not a fit case for setting aside or quashing the D.V. proceedings which is pending before the Trial Court by invoking the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 17. On the other hand, Ms. Bora, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has submitted that the learned Trial Court has rightly issued summons to the petitioner by applying its judicial mind after verifying the record. Hence, she submits that this is not a fit case to quash the entire D.V. proceeding at this stage. 18. Hearing the submissions made by the learned counsels for both sides, it is seen that the petitioner has primarily raised the issue that the notice was issued against him without a date by the learned Trial Court, without application of judicial mind and without considering the fact that he has neither a domestic relationship nor shares any household with respondent No.2. He has already obtained citizenship of Singapore and has been residing there since 2007. He also married a woman from Singapore and is presently living there with his family. The petitioner contends that he has never shared a household with respondent No.2 at any point in time, nor has he instigated any of his family members against her, as alleged. Therefore, it is submitted that the learned Trial Court took cognizance against the petitioner and issued notice without applying judicial mind. Ms. Malakar has also emphasized the definition under Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act and stated that, as per this definition, it is essential to have either a domestic relationship or to have shared a household with the aggrieved person. 19. On the other hand, it is the case of respondent No.2 that the petitioner is the main person who instigated his brother, the husband of respondent No.2, to inflict mental and physical harassment upon her. 19. On the other hand, it is the case of respondent No.2 that the petitioner is the main person who instigated his brother, the husband of respondent No.2, to inflict mental and physical harassment upon her. Respondent No.2 further claims that it is not believable that the petitioner, being the own brother of her husband, has not maintained any relationship with his family members. She asserts that he used to visit his hometown and established a business under the name and style of “Lodster Holding Limited” by utilizing her stridhan property. It is also alleged that the acts of domestic violence were committed at the petitioner’s instigation, who influenced his family, including his brother and mother, from Singapore through WhatsApp calls. It is an admitted position that the petitioner is the own brother of respondent No.2’s husband, and thus, he had a domestic relationship with respondent No.2. As per Section 2(f) of the D.V. Act, "domestic relationship" means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption, or are family members living together as a joint family. 20. In the instant case, it is an admitted fact that the petitioner is related to respondent No.2 through marriage, being the brother of her husband. It is also difficult to accept that he has no contact or relationship with his family or family business, despite being her husband’s own brother. Thus, prima facie, it cannot be held that there is no case against the petitioner under the D.V. Act. It has been observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Adalat Prasad (supra) that issues such as shared household and domestic relationship can be raised as preliminary issues before the learned Magistrate, who may decide them accordingly. However, the entire proceeding cannot be quashed without recording any evidence, particularly when respondent No.2 has brought forth prima facie material indicating domestic violence perpetrated by her husband and his family members, including the petitioner. 21. However, the entire proceeding cannot be quashed without recording any evidence, particularly when respondent No.2 has brought forth prima facie material indicating domestic violence perpetrated by her husband and his family members, including the petitioner. 21. In view of the above discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that this is not a fit case for invoking the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to set aside and quash impugned Notice and impugned Order dated 29.01.2024 passed in connection with the D.V. Case No.08/2024, registered under Sections 12/18/19/20/21/22 and 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, pending before the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kamrup (M), Guwahati. Accordingly, the petition stands dismissed. 22. In terms of above, this criminal petition stands disposed of.