JUDGMENT : Vivek Singh Thakur, J. Petitioner/tenant has filed this Revision Petition under Section 24 (5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (herein after referred to as “the Rent Act”) against the judgment dated 19.5.2014 passed by Appellate Authority in Rent Appeal No. 24-S/13b of 2013/12, titled as Bawa Jang Bahadur Vs. D.P. Bhardwaj, whereby order dated 24.9.2012 passed by Rent Controller-2 Shimla in Rent Case No. 14/2 of 2009, titled as Baba Jang Bahadur Vs. D.P. Bhardwaj has been reversed and petitioner/tenant has been ordered to be evicted for arrears of rent of ?48,243/- with direction that on deposit of arrears of rent within 30 days from the date of passing of order dated 19.5.2014, tenant will not be evicted from the demised premises. 2. Supreme Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana and others , reported in (1993) 1 SCC 499 , referring its earlier pronouncement in Rai Chand Jain vs. Chandra Kanta Khosla, (1991) 1 SCC 422 , with respect to scope of revisional power under Section 20 of Kerala Rent Control Act, which is similar to H.P. Rent Act, has observed that notwithstanding the fact that Section 20 of the Act conferring revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is widely worded, such a jurisdiction cannot be converted into an appellate jurisdiction. 3. With respect to scope of jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction and the extent of power which High Court can exercise in a Revision filed under Section 24(5) of the Rent Act, Five Judges’ Constitution Bench of Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh , (2014) 9 SCC 78 , has observed as under:- “28. Before we consider the matter further to find out the scope and extent of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Acts, a quick observation about the 'appellate jurisdiction' and 'revisional jurisdiction' is necessary. Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice-versa. Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of statutes. No party to the proceeding has an inherent right of appeal or revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves re-hearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate jurisdiction. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is co-extensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves re-hearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid of revisional court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided in the statute. It goes without saying that if a revision is provided against an order passed by the tribunal/appellate authority, the decision of the revisional court is the operative decision in law. In our view, as regards the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, much would, however, depend on the language employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction. 29. With the above general observations, we shall now endeavour to determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms "legality or propriety", "regularity, correctness, legality or propriety" and "legality, regularity or propriety" which are used in three Rent Control Acts under consideration. 29.1. The ordinary meaning of the word 'legality' is lawfulness. It refers to strict adherence to law, prescription, or doctrine; the quality of being legal. 29.2. The term 'propriety' means fitness; appropriateness, aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or condition conformity with requirement; rules or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy. 29.3. The terms 'correctness' and 'propriety' ordinarily convey the same meaning, that is, something which is legal and proper. In its ordinary meaning and substance, 'correctness' is compounded of 'legality' and 'propriety' and that which is legal and proper is 'correct'. 29.4. The expression "regularity" with reference to an order ordinarily relates to the procedure being followed in accord with the principles of natural justice and fair play. 30. In its ordinary meaning and substance, 'correctness' is compounded of 'legality' and 'propriety' and that which is legal and proper is 'correct'. 29.4. The expression "regularity" with reference to an order ordinarily relates to the procedure being followed in accord with the principles of natural justice and fair play. 30. We have already noted in the earlier part of the judgment that although there is some difference in the language employed by the three Rent Control Acts under consideration which provide for revisional jurisdiction but, in our view, the revisional power of the High Court under these Acts is substantially similar and broadly such power has the same scope save and except the power to invoke revisional jurisdiction suo motu unless so provided expressly. None of these statutes confers on revisional authority the power as wide as that of appellate court or appellate authority despite such power being wider than that provided in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision under consideration does not permit the High Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. Revision does not lie under these provisions to bring the orders of the Trial Court/Rent Controller and Appellate Court/Appellate Authority for rehearing of the issues raised in the original proceedings. 43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re- appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity. 4. Present Revision Petition is to be decided keeping in view the aforesaid exposition of law with respect to scope of revisional jurisdiction of this Court for the purpose of assessing illegality and proprietary of the order or proceedings under the Act. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that impugned judgment deserves to be interfered with for commission of illegality and impropriety on the part of Appellate Authority on two counts (a) the Appellate Authority has failed to consider that tenancy between the petitioner and the landlord had been terminated immediately after passing of eviction order dated 31.8.2006 against the petitioner in Rent Petition/case No. 31/2 of 2002 titled as Baba Jang Bahadur Vs. D.P. Bhardwaj, whereby petitioner herein was ordered to be evicted for arrears of rent as well as for requirement of the premises by the respondent for re-building and re- construction as the building had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Copy of order dated 31.8.2006 has been placed on record in evidence as Ex. AW-1/B. (b) Further that in order dated 25.10.2008 (Ex. R-2) Rent Controller No. 6, Shimla in Rent Case No. 101/2 of 2006, titled as Baba Jang Bahadur Vs. H.L. Sethi and D.P. Bhardwaj (present petitioner) has held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. AW-1/B. (b) Further that in order dated 25.10.2008 (Ex. R-2) Rent Controller No. 6, Shimla in Rent Case No. 101/2 of 2006, titled as Baba Jang Bahadur Vs. H.L. Sethi and D.P. Bhardwaj (present petitioner) has held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Therefore, it has been contended that for termination of relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties, Rent Petition as well as appeal preferred by landlord had to be dismissed, but the Appellate Authority has failed to consider this issue in right perspective. (c) It has been further contended that Rent Petition in present matter was preferred by respondent/landlord for arrears of rent as well as for bonafide requirement, whereas earlier Rent Petition No. 31/2 of 2002, decided on 31.8.2006 (Ex. AW-1/B) was also filed on the same ground and was allowed. But the landlord did not execute the same and, therefore, for the same relief second Rent Petition is not maintainable on account of principle of resjudicata in operation against the landlord. 7. To substantiate the plea that of termination of relationship between landlord and tenant on the date of passing of decree of eviction, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. Vs. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705 ; State of Maharashtra & Another Vs. Super Max International Private Limited & others (2009) 9 SCC 772 ; Martin and Harris Private Limited and Another Vs. Rajendera Mehta and others, (2022) 8 SCC 527 and order dated 1.4.2025 passed by the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 4595-4596 of 2025 , titled as Amritpal Jagmohan Sethi Vs. Haribhau Pundlik Ingole. 8. There is no dispute as it is well settled that after passing of a decree of eviction, the tenancy terminates from the date of passing of decree for eviction. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon Ravinder Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Assam and others, (1999) 7 SCC 435; Banarsi and others Vs. Ram Phal, (2003) 9 SCC 606 and Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education and Research and Another Vs. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon Ravinder Kumar Sharma Vs. State of Assam and others, (1999) 7 SCC 435; Banarsi and others Vs. Ram Phal, (2003) 9 SCC 606 and Postgraduate Institute of Medical Education and Research and Another Vs. A.P. Wasan and others, (2003) 5 SCC 321 , with the submission that for any adverse findings by the Rent Controller against the tenant, for filing an appeal by the landlord against the said order, no fresh separate appeal or cross-objections are required to be filed by the tenant and tenant can contest the findings arrived at against the tenant in appeal preferred by the landlord. Therefore, it has been contended that petitioner-tenant can raise issue of relationship of landlord and tenant decided by the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority against the petitioner/tenant. 10. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that though Rent Petition was filed on two grounds, but before the Appellate Authority, landlord-respondent did not press eviction of the tenant on the grounds of bonafide requirement and that it was unfit and unsafe for human habitation, but had pressed for eviction only on the ground for arrears of rent since September, 2006. Therefore, as in earlier petition, decided on 31.8.2006, eviction was ordered on the ground of arrears of rent since 1993 till August, 2006, no resjudicata will be applicable for filing, adjudicating and deciding a fresh eviction petition for arrears of rent accrued for subsequent tenancy as established before Courts below. It has been further contended that despite termination of tenancy on passing of eviction decree on 31.8.2006, tenant who happens to be an Advocate, was again inducted as tenant on his request and intervention of other Advocate including counsel for the landlord, therefore, for non payment of arrears of subsequent rent from the date of fresh tenancy, fresh petition was maintainable and, therefore, issue of tenancy decided against the tenant was never assailed either by filing independent appeal or otherwise by agitating the same in appeal preferred by landlord. Therefore, reopening of this issue related to finding of fact is not permitted in present petition and thus orders dated 31.8.2006 (Ex. AW- 1/B) or 25.10.2008 (Ex. R-2) have no impact on present petition, as it has been filed on the basis of fresh tenancy created and continued in favour of tenant on his request. 11. Therefore, reopening of this issue related to finding of fact is not permitted in present petition and thus orders dated 31.8.2006 (Ex. AW- 1/B) or 25.10.2008 (Ex. R-2) have no impact on present petition, as it has been filed on the basis of fresh tenancy created and continued in favour of tenant on his request. 11. Undisputedly, Rent Case No. 31/2 of 2002, decided on 31.8.2006 was allowed and tenant was ordered to be evicted for arrears of rent as well as bonafide requirement of the petitioner for rebuilding and re-construction as the building has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation, therefore, no fresh Rent Petition for the same relief was maintainable. 12. Second petition was filed against H.L. Sethi and D.P. Bhardwaj in October, 2006 for eviction on ground of arrears of rent as well the premises was unfit and unsafe for human habitation. Further in this petition, it was claimed by the landlord that H.L. Sethi was inducted as tenant, but he had sublet the premises in favour of D.P. Bhardwaj (present petitioner), therefore, in this petition claim was against H.L. Sethi with respect to premises rented out to him. 13. Present petition has been filed against D.P. Bhardwaj (petitioner/tenant). Though initially it was filed on two grounds i.e. for arrears of rent and bonafide requirement for rebuilding and reconstruction, as the building had become unfit and unsafe for human habitation, however, after dismissal of petition, in appeal preferred by the landlord against dismissal of the petition, second ground was not pressed and petition was pressed only for eviction on the ground of arrears of rent w.e.f. September, 2006. 14. Resjudicata for filing a Rent Petition No. 31/2 of 2002 would have been applicable for eviction on the basis of arrears of rent for a period prior to August, 2006 as well as for eviction on the ground of rebuilding and reconstruction on account of unsafe and unfit building for human habitation. Present petition has been filed for arrears w.e.f. September, 2006 and second ground has not been pressed by the landlord, therefore, no resjudicata would be applicable for adjudicating and deciding present petition for relief pressed. 15. Plea of the petitioner/tenant that for decision dated 25.10.2008 passed in Case No. 101/2 of 2006 (Ex. Present petition has been filed for arrears w.e.f. September, 2006 and second ground has not been pressed by the landlord, therefore, no resjudicata would be applicable for adjudicating and deciding present petition for relief pressed. 15. Plea of the petitioner/tenant that for decision dated 25.10.2008 passed in Case No. 101/2 of 2006 (Ex. R-2), resjudicata will also be applicable with respect to relationship of tenant and landlord between the parties is also misconceived, because in the said petition, it was alleged that H.L. Sethi was the tenant of petitioner and, therefore, the issue, decided with respect to status of landlord Baba Jung Bahadur and tenant H.L. Sethi regarding their relationship of tenant and landlord, shall have no bearing on the issue of relationship of tenant and landlord between Baba Jung Bahadur landlord and petitioner-tenant D.P. Bhardwaj, which has been decided afresh by the Rent Controller. 16. Even otherwise finding in Ex. R-2 are not that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, but the finding is that petitioner miserably failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, on the basis of preponderance of probabilities, by leading cogent and reliable piece of evidence. Therefore, for lack of evidence Rent Controller had observed that relationship was not proved. The findings is not that there was and is no relationship of landlord and tenant, but is that the petitioner had failed to establish such relationship by leading cogent and reliable evidence. Thus also said observation/finding of Rent Controller shall not have any bearing on present petition, especially for adjudication of the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant afresh between Baba Jang Bahadur (respondent) and petitioner-tenant D.P. Bhardwaj on the basis of evidence lead by the parties and stood taken by them in present matter. 17. Issue No. 3, framed in Rent Petition by the Rent Controller in present case is with respect to relationship of parties, which reads as under:- “3. Whether there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, as alleged? OPR” 18. On this issue Rent Controller has returned following findings. “Although, my findings on issue No. 5 supra is sufficient to dispose off the lis but keeping in view the mandate of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC that even if a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall pronounce judgment on all issues. OPR” 18. On this issue Rent Controller has returned following findings. “Although, my findings on issue No. 5 supra is sufficient to dispose off the lis but keeping in view the mandate of Order 14 Rule 2 CPC that even if a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court shall pronounce judgment on all issues. Hence, I proceed to give findings on other issues also. It is clear from the evidence on record that the relations of landlord and tenant exist between the parties. Petitioner Bawa Jang Bahadur Singh had been granted probate and letter of administration qua the estate of late Dr. Bawa Rattan Singh on the basis of his will dated 14.1.1986 as is clear from the order dated 30.6.1989 passed by Ld. District Judge, Shimla certified copy Ex. AW- 1/A. The demised premises clearly falls within the estate qua which letter of administration was granted in favour of petitioner. Petitioner has been given right to collect the rent, arrears of rent etc. from the tenants of the property known as (I) Bawa Hotel with Annexe lands and shops (ii) Bawa Niwas, Lower Kaithu, Shimla. The respondent is claiming that he was residing in Bawa Estate with Late Shri H.L. Sethi who was landlord/owner of the premises in question. He has also alleged that he had neither taken the premises in question from Bawa Jang Bahadur nor said Bawa Jang Bahadur is owner of the same. It is clear from the evidence on record that said H.L. Sethi who died in the year 2010 had put his claim to the property in question on the basis of impugned Will dated 30.12.1987 allegedly executed by testatrix late Smt. Manorama Rattan Singh in favour of said H.L. Sethi. Said Will had been declared null and void by the Ld. Trial Court vide judgment dated 24.4.2000, certified copy Ex.P1. It is also clear that appeal filed by said H.L. Sethi against judgment and decree of Ld. Trial Court has also been dismissed by Ld. First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 27.8.2007, certified copy Ex. P-2. Although, late Shri H.L. Sethi had preferred second appeal before Hon’ble High Court but the same is pending adjudication. Thus, it is clear at this juncture that the impugned Will has no force in the eyes of law as it had been declared null and void bu the ld. First Appellate Court vide judgment dated 27.8.2007, certified copy Ex. P-2. Although, late Shri H.L. Sethi had preferred second appeal before Hon’ble High Court but the same is pending adjudication. Thus, it is clear at this juncture that the impugned Will has no force in the eyes of law as it had been declared null and void bu the ld. Trial Court as well Ld. 1 st Appellate Court. It is clear from the perusal of record that said H.L. Sethi has also been declared tenant of present petitioner in a petition preferred by present petitioner against said H.L. Sethi and Dinesh Kumar Gupta, certified copy of order dated 24.2.2010 is Ex.P3. Thus, it has become clear that the respondent cannot be held as tenant of H.L. Sethi who himself had been held tenant of petitioner qua the premises held by him. Undoubtedly, Melrose Building, Bawa Building and Bawa Estate are the properties qua which the petitioner has letter of administration. Thus, as per definition of Section 2(d) of H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 an ‘Administrator’ is also covered under the definition of landlord. Admittedly, respondent is residing in the demised premises only in the capacity of tenant but claiming Late H.L. Sethi as his landlord. Since, Late H.L. Sethi was never owner or landlord of demised premises, thus it is clear that petitioner is landlord while respondent is tenant and there is landlord and tenant relationship between the parties vis-a-vis demised premises. Hence this issue is decided in negative. 19. It is apt to record that now Regular Second Appeal No. 606 of 2007, preferred against the judgment dated 27.8.2007 passed by District Judge in case titled as Harbans Lal Sethi through legal representative Vs. Baba Jung Bahadur also stands dismissed on 25.9.2019 and, therefore, claim that Harbans Lal Sethi was owner of the premises in question on the basis of Will stands rejected by the High Court also. It is not claim of the petitioner-tenant that judgment dated 25.9.2019, passed in RSA No. 606 of 2007, has been assailed in Supreme Court. 20. Appellate Authority in its judgment has categorically mentioned as under:- “10. …..The appellant/petitioner is feeling aggrieved by the findings returned by the Rent Controller on issue No. 5 and consequential dismissal of his eviction petition. It is not claim of the petitioner-tenant that judgment dated 25.9.2019, passed in RSA No. 606 of 2007, has been assailed in Supreme Court. 20. Appellate Authority in its judgment has categorically mentioned as under:- “10. …..The appellant/petitioner is feeling aggrieved by the findings returned by the Rent Controller on issue No. 5 and consequential dismissal of his eviction petition. On the other hand, the respondent has not assailed the findings returned by the Rent Controller with respect to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the respondent is also in arrears of Rent since September, 2006.” 21. It is also relevant to notice that petitioner-tenant is a practising Advocate. He is not a rustic or ordinary common lay man having no knowledge about his right to assail or challenge findings rendered against him in issue No. 3 decided by Rent Controller, either filing cross-objection/appeal or contesting during course of arguments in appeal preferred by the landlord. It is not case in present Revision Petition that Appellate Authority has recorded wrongly that finding with respect to Issue No. 3 were not assailed by the petitioner-tenant. Even in this Court correctness of facts recorded by the Rent Controller for deciding Issue No. 3 have not been disputed or contested. 22. In Ravinder Kumar Sharma’s case, two Judges bench of the Supreme Court has observed as under:- “20. So far as the Explanation was concerned, the Law Commission stated (page 298) that it was necessary to "empower" the respondent to file cross-objection against the adverse finding. That would mean that a right to file cross-objections was given but it was not obligatory to file cross-objections. That was why the word “may” was used. That meant that the provision for filing cross-objections against a finding was only an enabling provision. 21. … … … 22. A similar view was expressed by U.N. Bachawat, J. in Tej Kumar vs. Purshottam AIR 1981 MP 55 that after the 1976 Amendment, it was not obligatory to file cross- objection against an adverse finding. The Explanation merely empowered the respondent to file cross-objections. 23. 21. … … … 22. A similar view was expressed by U.N. Bachawat, J. in Tej Kumar vs. Purshottam AIR 1981 MP 55 that after the 1976 Amendment, it was not obligatory to file cross- objection against an adverse finding. The Explanation merely empowered the respondent to file cross-objections. 23. In our view, the opinion expressed by Mookerjee, J. of the Calcutta High Court on behalf of the Division Bench in Nishambhu Jena's case and the view expressed by U.N. Bachawat, J. in Tej Kumar's case in the Madhya Pradesh High Court reflect the correct legal position after the 1976 Amendment. We hold that the respondent- defendant in an appeal can, without filing cross-objections attack an adverse finding upon which a decree in part has been passed against the respondent, for the purpose sustaining the decree to the extent the lower court had dismissed the suit against the defendants-respondents. The filing of cross- objection, after the 1976 Amendment is purely optional and not mandatory. In other words, the law as stated in Venkata Rao's case by the Madras Full Bench and Chandre Prabhuji's case by this Court is merely clarified by the 1976 Amendment and there is no change in the law after the Amendment.” 23. In Banarsi and others’ case, two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has observed as under:- “10. The CPC Amendment of 1976 has not materially or substantially altered the law except for a marginal difference. Even under the amended Order 41 Rule 22 sub-rule (1) a party in whose favour the decree stands in its entirety is neither entitled nor obliged to prefer any cross objection. However, the insertion made in the text of sub-rule (1) makes it permissible to file a cross objection against a finding. The difference which has resulted we will shortly state. A respondent may defend himself without filing any cross objection to the extent to which decree is in his favour; however, if he proposes to attack any part of the decree he must take cross objection. The amendment inserted by 1976 amendment is clarificatory and also enabling and this may be made precise by analyzing the provision. A respondent may defend himself without filing any cross objection to the extent to which decree is in his favour; however, if he proposes to attack any part of the decree he must take cross objection. The amendment inserted by 1976 amendment is clarificatory and also enabling and this may be made precise by analyzing the provision. There may be three situations:- (i) The impugned decree is partly in favour of the appellant and partly in favour of the respondent; (ii) The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent though an issue has been decided against the respondent; (iii) The decree is entirely in favour of the respondent and all the issues have also been answered in favour of the respondent but there is a finding in the judgment which goes against the respondent. 11. In the type of case (i) it was necessary for the respondent to file an appeal or take cross objection against that part of the decree which is against him if he seeks to get rid of the same though that part of the decree which is in his favour he is entitled to support without taking any cross objection. The law remains so post amendment too. In the type of cases (ii) and (iii) pre-amendment CPC did not entitle nor permit the respondent to take any cross objection as he was not the person aggrieved by the decree. Under the amended CPC, read in the light of the explanation, though it is still not necessary for the respondent to take any cross objection laying challenge to any finding adverse to him as the decree is entirely in his favour and he may support the decree without cross objection; the amendment made in the text of sub-rule (1), read with the explanation newly inserted, gives him a right to take cross objection to & finding recorded against him either while answering an issue or while dealing with an issue. The advantage of preferring such cross objection is spelled out by sub-rule (4). In spite of the original appeal having been withdrawn or dismissed for default the cross objection taken to any finding by the respondent shall still be available to be adjudicated upon on merits which remedy was not available to the respondent under the unamended CPC. The advantage of preferring such cross objection is spelled out by sub-rule (4). In spite of the original appeal having been withdrawn or dismissed for default the cross objection taken to any finding by the respondent shall still be available to be adjudicated upon on merits which remedy was not available to the respondent under the unamended CPC. In the pre-amendment era, the withdrawal or dismissal for default of the original appeal disabled the respondent to question the correctness or otherwise of any finding recorded against the respondent.” 24. In A.P. Wasan’s case, two Judges Bench of the Supreme Court has observed as under: “26. According to the appellants although they did not prefer a counter appeal, which they could have done under the Explanation to Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, they could nevertheless challenge the finding in the respondent No.1's appeal to the Division Bench. It may be, as has been held in Ravinder Kumar Sharma V. State of Assam 1999 (7) SCC 435 that the Explanation inserted by the 1976 amendment to Order XLI Rule 22 the Code does not make it obligatory to file a cross-objection against an adverse finding of a lower Court and that the respondent could attack such finding in its submissions to the appellate forum. But in this case, there is nothing to show from the records that the appellants did in fact challenge the finding of the Single Judge before the Division Bench. If they had and the Division Bench had not recorded it, it was incumbent on the appellants to have had the matter clarified before the Division Bench particularly when the Division Bench expressly recorded that the appellants had not challenged the finding. [See Chitra Kumar V. Union of India 2001(3) SCC 208 , 220].” 25. The findings with respect to relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties decided by the Rent Controller were never objected or assailed by the petitioner/tenant during the course of arguments in present Revision Petition. It is not a case of the petitioner in Revision Petition either in grounds mentioned in the Revision Petition or during the course of arguments that petitioner/tenant had agitated or assailed or opposed or objected the correctness of facts recorded by the Rent Controller before Appellate Authority with respect to relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It is not a case of the petitioner in Revision Petition either in grounds mentioned in the Revision Petition or during the course of arguments that petitioner/tenant had agitated or assailed or opposed or objected the correctness of facts recorded by the Rent Controller before Appellate Authority with respect to relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Therefore, in view of above discussion, findings of Rent Controller with respect to relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties returned on the basis of evidence on record have become final. 26. The only plea taken in Revision Petition as well as during course of arguments is that Appellate Authority has failed to appreciate decision dated 25.10.2008 passed in Rent Petition No. 101/2 of 2006 (Ex. R-2), but there is no whisper either in the ground of the Revision Petition or during the course of arguments about illegality, perversity or impropriety with respect to reasons assigned by the Rent Controller for returning findings of fact that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant. For discussion hereinbefore the findings returned in Ex. R-2 do not have any impact on present petition. 27. Plea of resjudicata with respect to second ground, i.e. bonafide requirement for reconstruction and rebuilding and that building has become unfit and unsafe for human habitation, is not relevant as landlord had not pressed the eviction on that ground. The plea of resjudicata on this count has lost its relevancy. 28. Appellate Authority has appreciated the material placed before it duly and properly. I do not find any illegality, irregularity, perversity or impropriety in the impugned judgment. 29. The plea of resjudicata on this count has lost its relevancy. 28. Appellate Authority has appreciated the material placed before it duly and properly. I do not find any illegality, irregularity, perversity or impropriety in the impugned judgment. 29. Learned counsel for the respondent/landlord has submitted that there is nothing on record to reflect that arrears of rent were paid by the petitioner/tenant within 30 days of passing of judgment for eviction and thus he has submitted that petitioner/tenant has failed to deposit the arrears of rent within 30 days from the date of passing of judgment dated 19 th May, 2014 by the Appellate Authority and further that judgment by Appellate Authority was passed on 19.5.2014 whereas present Revision Petition was filed on 24.9.2014, i.e. about more than 6 months after passing of eviction decree and thereafter it was listed in the Court on 14.10.2014 and on that date impugned judgment for eviction was not stayed, but parties were directed to maintain status quo qua demised premises till further orders and, therefore, during currency of 30 days, the prescribed period provided for deposit the arrears of rent after passing of eviction decree, there was neither any stay nor any amount has been deposited by respondent/tenant, and, therefore, the eviction decree on account of arrears of rent has become final and executable. 30. In case petitioner/tenant has failed to deposit the amount within the time prescribed under law, natural consequences shall follow as per provisions of the Act. With aforesaid observations, petition is dismissed being devoid of any merits, alongwith pending applications.