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2025 DIGILAW 767 (HP)

Jaswant Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-04-22

RAKESH KAINTHLA

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JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 144 of 2024, dated 18.11.2024, for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 318 (4) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), registered at Police Station Paddar, District Mandi H.P. and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that respondent No. 2, the informant, made a complaint to the police asserting that he received a call from Prem Chand on 27.09.2024 for lending money to purchase the land. The informant declined by saying that he also intended to purchase the land. Prem Chand said that the accused had some land available with him. The informant talked to the accused, who said that he had land measuring 12 Biswas for sale at Jail Road, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P., however, the land was mortgaged to State Bank of India, Mandi. The accused said that he had reached an agreement with the Branch Manager and an amount of Rs.32,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Two Lakhs) was to be paid to the bank. Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) was to be paid to the owner. He also said that he had only Rs.23,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Three Lakhs) in his account and needed Rs.9,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Lakhs) so that Rs.32,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty-Two Lakhs) could be deposited in the bank, otherwise the property was to be put an auction. The accused also shared the videos of the land with the informant. The informant discussed the matter with Prem Chand, who also confirmed that the accused was working in A.G. Office Shimla. The informant paid Rs.9,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Lakhs) to the accused through a cheque. The informant asked the accused to get the land transferred. The accused delayed the matter on one pretext or the other. The accused called the informant on 09.10.2024 and demanded Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) from the informant. The informant transferred Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) but no sale deed was executed. The informant demanded money and the accused issued a cheque for the return of the money, however, the informant insisted upon the execution of the sale deed. The informant went to the spot and found that there was no land. The informant presented its cheque before the bank but the cheque was dishonoured. The police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. 3. The informant went to the spot and found that there was no land. The informant presented its cheque before the bank but the cheque was dishonoured. The police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the F.I.R., the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. The petitioner/accused is the owner of the land.He had not entered into any agreement with the informant. The dispute between the parties is civil in nature. The proceedings under Section 138 of N.I.Act are pending between the parties. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. as well as consequential proceedings be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by respondent-State by filing a reply making preliminary submissions regarding lack of maintainability, the petition having been filed with some ulterior purpose. The contents of the petition were denied on merits except to the extent of registration of the F.I.R. It was asserted that an application was filed before the Revenue Department to obtain the record of the land shown to the informant by the accused. As per revenue record, Khasra No. 681 is in possession of Amar Singh and is owned by the State of H.P. The police conducted the investigation and filed the charge sheet. The accused committed the offence not only against the petitioner but against the society. The informant had transferred a sum of Rs.9,00,000/- (Rupees Nine Lakh) through RTGS and deposited Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) in cash. The accused issued a cheque to the informant, which was dishonoured. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter and this Court should not exercise the jurisdiction to quash the F.I.R. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. A separate reply was filed by respondent No.2/informant making a preliminary submission regarding lack of maintainability and the contents of the F.I.R. disclosing the commission of cognizable offence. It was asserted that the accused induced the informant to purchase the land bearing Khasra No. 681, which is actually owned by the State of H.P. He told the informant that he was working in A.G.Office Shimla, which was found to be false. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. It was asserted that the accused induced the informant to purchase the land bearing Khasra No. 681, which is actually owned by the State of H.P. He told the informant that he was working in A.G.Office Shimla, which was found to be false. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have heard Mr Dibender Ghosh, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State and Mr Vinod Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.2-informant. 7. Mr. Dibender Ghosh, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that a false F.I.R. was lodged by the informant. No misrepresentation was made by the petitioner. It was wrongly asserted in the reply that the land is owned by the State of H.P. There was no cheating. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings be quashed. 8. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General submitted that the petitioner made a misrepresentation regarding the land. He showed the land owned by the State to the informant and took Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh) from him. It is not merely a case of breach of contract but a fraud where the petitioner/accused could not have fulfilled the terms of the agreement executed by him. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Mr. Vinod Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.2 adopted the submission advanced by learned Deputy Advocate General on behalf of respondent No.1/State and he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 13 The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. It was specifically mentioned in the F.I.R. that the petitioner/accused had shown the land to Prem Chand who had put the accused in contact with the informant. The petitioner showed the land measuring 12 Biswas at Jail Road, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P and obtained Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs), however, this land was found to be owned by the State of H.P. during the investigation. This shows that the accused made misrepresentation regarding the sale of the land, which was not owned by him and which could not have been sold by him. Hence, the representation was false from the beginning without any intention to honour it and , prima facie, an offence under Section 318 (4) of BNS is made out against the petitioner. 15. Hence, the representation was false from the beginning without any intention to honour it and , prima facie, an offence under Section 318 (4) of BNS is made out against the petitioner. 15. It was submitted that it was a case of a civil nature and a case of breach of contract. This is not correct. The petitioner made representation regarding the sale of the land, which could not have been sold by him. Therefore, the representation was made without any intention to honour it. Hence, it is not a case of a civil nature but a case of cheating simpliciter. 16. It was submitted that a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act ( for short N.I.Act) has been filed by the informant against the petitioner. A person cannot be punished twice for the same act and continuation of the proceedings under Section 138 of N.I. Act and Section 318(4) of BNS amount to abuse of process of the Court. This submission will not help the petitioner. In the present case, the allegations against the petitioner are that he had obtained money from the informant by promising to show him land owned by the government which amounts to cheating. The ingredients of the complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act is that the petitioner had issued a cheque which was dishonoured and he failed to pay the money to the informant. These are two different transactions and the pendency of one will not affect the other. Therefore, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed because of the proceedings pending under Section 138 of the N.I.Act 17. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. This Court cannot determine the truthfulness or falsity of the allegations because it is a matter of trial to be adjudicated by the learned Trial Court where the matter is pending. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 wherein it was held : - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060 “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 19. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 20. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 21. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences, and it cannot be quashed at this stage. 22. No other point was urged. 23. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same stands dismissed. 24. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.