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2025 DIGILAW 768 (HP)

Shiv Singh v. State of H. P.

2025-04-22

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 10 of 2019 dated 30.01.2019 registered at Police Station Indora, District Kangra, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 354 , 354-C, 504 , 323 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the victim (name being withheld to protect her identity) had gone to her bathroom on 30.01.2019 at about 6 a.m. The bathroom does not have a door and a bedsheet is hung in place of the door. The petitioner started doing obscene acts after standing near the bathroom. He also pelted stones towards the bathroom. The informant got frightened and started screaming. Her husband and her sisters-in-law ran towards the bathroom. The informant narrated the incident to them. The informant’s husband asked the petitioner/accused whether he did not have any mother or sister at home. The petitioner abused the informant’s husband and inflicted injury on him with some sharp edged weapon. The petitioner-accused Anju Devi also came to the spot after hearing the noise. She pushed the informant over the barbed wire. She also gave beatings to the informant. The accused Shiv Singh used to peep into the bathroom whenever the informant used to go inside it on earlier occasions as well. The Police registered the FIR, conducted the investigation, and filed a charge sheet after the completion of the investigation before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, (learned Trial Court), Indora, District Kangra, H.P. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the charge sheet, the petitioners have filed the present petition asserting that petitioner No. 1 had filed a complaint against the informant and other persons in Police Station, Indora, District Kangra, H.P. asserting that the informant, her husband and her son gave beatings to petitioner No.1 on 27.01.2019 when he was sweeping his house. Petitioner No.1 sustained injury and he reported the matter to the Police but the Police did not register any FIR or any entry in the Daily Diary. The Police got the medical examination of petitioner No.1 conducted on 27.01.2019 and referred him to the expert opinion from the Radiologist. Petitioner No.1 sustained injury and he reported the matter to the Police but the Police did not register any FIR or any entry in the Daily Diary. The Police got the medical examination of petitioner No.1 conducted on 27.01.2019 and referred him to the expert opinion from the Radiologist. The Police filed a complaint under Sections 107 , 145 and 150 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Indora, District Kangra, H.P. The Investigating Officer asked petitioner No.1 to give a fresh complaint, as per his own version and sign the same. Subsequently, the Police registered an FIR No.09/2019 dated 28.01.2019 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 325, 323, 504, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ) at Police Station, Indora, District Kangra, H.P. The informant filed a false complaint on 30.01.2019 against the petitioners. The informant also made a statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. which is totally contradictory to the contents of the FIR. Petitioner No.1 also filed a complaint on 29.11.2018 regarding the disposal of garbage and drainage of dirty water into the residential area of petitioner No.2. Civil proceedings are pending between petitioner No.1 and the informant and an interim injunction was also issued by the competent Court. The present FIR has been lodged to wreak vengeance upon the petitioners. The ingredients of Section 354-C of IPC are not satisfied. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by respondent/State by filing a reply making preliminary submissions regarding the lack of maintainability, and the petitioners having not approached the Court with clean hands. The contents of the petition were denied on merits. However, it was admitted that the informant and petitioner No.1 had reported the matter to the Police. It was asserted that the Police conducted the investigation. There was an apprehension of a quarrel between petitioner No.1 and the informant. Hence, a complaint under Sections 107, 145 and 150 of Cr.P.C. was prepared against the informant, her husband and her son. Petitioner No.1 submitted a complaint on 28.01.2019 regarding the wrongful restraint by the informant, her husband and her son. The Police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. Hence, a complaint under Sections 107, 145 and 150 of Cr.P.C. was prepared against the informant, her husband and her son. Petitioner No.1 submitted a complaint on 28.01.2019 regarding the wrongful restraint by the informant, her husband and her son. The Police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation. The Medical Officer certified the injury sustained by petitioner No.1 as grievous. The Police filed a charge sheet before the learned Trial Court and the petitioners have a remedy of seeking their discharge, hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and affirming those of the petition was filed. 6. I have heard Mr Vijay Bir Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State and Ms Vandana Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant. 7. Mr. Vijay Bir Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that petitioner No.1 had sustained grievous injury on 27.01.2019. He reported the matter to the Police. The Police filed a complaint under Sections 107, 145 and 150 of Cr.P.C. and also registered an FIR No.09/2019 on 28.01.2019. The informant lodged the FIR against the petitioners as a counter-blast to the FIR lodged by petitioner No.1. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to abuse of the process of the Court; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and the consequential proceedings be quashed. 8. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State submitted that the Police conducted the investigation into the FIRs lodged by petitioner No.1 and the informant and filed separate charge sheets before the competent Court. The petitioners have a remedy of seeking their discharge before the learned Trial Court and this Court should not exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. when the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. The allegations in the FIR constitute the commission of a cognizable offence, therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Ms Vandana Thakur, learned counsel for respondent No.2/informant adopted the submissions of Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State and submitted that petitioner No.1 had harassed the informant. He used to watch her whenever she would go to the bathroom. He inflicted injury upon the informant’s husband with a sharp-edged weapon. Petitioner No.2 gave beatings to the informant. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State and submitted that petitioner No.1 had harassed the informant. He used to watch her whenever she would go to the bathroom. He inflicted injury upon the informant’s husband with a sharp-edged weapon. Petitioner No.2 gave beatings to the informant. These allegations constitute the commission of a cognizable offence, therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 , wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police Officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police Officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185 , wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 13. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. The allegations in the FIR show that petitioner No.1 used to watch the informant whenever she would go to the bathroom to urinate. This was a private moment for the informant where she was not expected to be watched by any person. The act of the petitioner watching the informant falls within the definition of Voyeurism defined under Section 354-C of IPC . It was wrongly contended in the petition that the offence of voyeurism would be attracted only when the image of the woman is captured. This offence is not only attracted when the image is captured but by watching the woman as well and the submission that no offence punishable under Section 354-C of IPC is made out is not acceptable. 15. The petitioners had given beatings to the informant and her husband which prima facie attracts the provisions of Section 323 read with Section 34 of IPC . The petitioners abused and threatened the informant and her family members, hence the offence punishable under Section 504 of IPC is also made out. Petitioner No.1 had used criminal force to the victim with an intent to outrage her modesty and the offence punishable under Section 354 of IPC is made out. Thus, the allegations in the FIR prima facie constitute the commission of cognizable offences. 16. It was submitted that the FIR is a counter-blast to the complaints made by the petitioners against the informant and her family members. Thus, the allegations in the FIR prima facie constitute the commission of cognizable offences. 16. It was submitted that the FIR is a counter-blast to the complaints made by the petitioners against the informant and her family members. It was filed with an intent to wreak vengeance upon the petitioners. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh vs Amar Kumar Singh 2023(6) SCC 559 that when an investigation was conducted and a charge sheet was filed, the question of mala fide would become meaningless. It was observed: “78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To our mind, whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance. In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of some prima facie worth, would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/complaint. 79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. We can say without fear of contradiction, that it is not in all cases in our country that an individual, who is accused of acts of omission/commission punishable under the PC Act but has the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by the police and made to face prosecution. We can say without fear of contradiction, that it is not in all cases in our country that an individual, who is accused of acts of omission/commission punishable under the PC Act but has the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by the police and made to face prosecution. If, indeed, in such a case (where a prosecution should have been but has not been launched) the succeeding political dispensation initiates steps for launching prosecution against such an accused but he/she is allowed to go scot-free, despite there being materials against him/her, merely on the ground that the action initiated by the current regime is mala fide in the sense that it is either to settle scores with the earlier regime or to wreak vengeance against the individual, in such an eventuality we are constrained to observe that it is criminal justice that would be the casualty. This is because it is dificult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of reading a first information report that the public servant is either in or not in possession of property disproportionate to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is complete. Needless to observe, the first information report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence relating to “criminal misconduct” punishable under the PC Act and to embark upon an investigation.” 17. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P. , 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484 , that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884 . It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 , “If the use of power is of the fulfilment of a legitimate object the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 39. In our considered opinion criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after closure of the earlier criminal case cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue, would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 18. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground of enmity. Moreover, enmity is a double-edged weapon - while it furnishes the motive for false implication, it also furnishes a motive for the commission of the crime; therefore, the submission that F.I.R. has to be quashed due to the enmity cannot be accepted. 19. It was submitted that there are discrepancies in the contents of the FIR and the statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. The allegations made in the FIR are false. This submission will not help the petitioners. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. 19. It was submitted that there are discrepancies in the contents of the FIR and the statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C. The allegations made in the FIR are false. This submission will not help the petitioners. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 wherein it was held : - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060 “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court in a series of judgments has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) “6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 21. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 22. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready to be filed. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating Officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 23. In the present case, the charge sheet has been filed and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. Therefore, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the matter. 24. It was submitted that the petitioners had sustained grievous injuries and it was not possible for him to do the acts attributed to him in the FIR. This submission is not acceptable. A CT Scan of the brain showed a linear fracture of the lateral wall of the right maxillary sinus and mild soft tissue swelling over the right mid-parietal region. Therefore, petitioner No.1 had not sustained any injury which would have prevented him from doing his normal activity. Hence, the submission that petitioner No.1 was unable to do the acts attributed to him in the FIR is not acceptable. 25. No other point was urged. 26. In view of the above, the present petition is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s) if any. 27. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.