JUDGMENT : Ravi Nath Tilhari, J. Heard Sri G. Raju, learned Government Pleader for Services-I, for the petitioners and Sri Satya Sreenivasa Rao, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was filed by the petitioners, the Superintendent of Police, Krishna District, Machilipatnam and others challenging the Order dated 21.06.2005 passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (in short ‘the Tribunal’) in O.A.No.2628 of 2002. The O.A. was filed by Sri A. Srihari, Ex.PC-807, the respondent herein. The Tribunal disposed of the O.A, setting aside the Orders impugned in O.A. and remanding the matter to the petitioner authorities to take a fresh view in the matter in imposition of punishment. I. Facts: 3. The respondent was initially appointed as police constable on 15.06.1976. After he had put in service of 24 years, an enquiry was initiated against him for his absence from duty from 22.06.1998 unauthorizedly, as misconduct under Rule 3 of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (in short ‘the Conduct Rules’). 4. Article-I of charge reads as under: “PC 807 A. Srihari has been working in Challapalli PS since 02.07.97. While working he was deputed to out-post PS on at Vakkalagadda to attend duties. He absented himself from duty from 22.06.98 FN unauthorisedly without any leave or permission from Vakkalagadda out post PS and completed the period of 21 days absence by 12.07.98 AN. He was declared a deserter from 22.06.98 FN as per Order No.224 of APPM, Volume-I. PC.807 A. Srihari by his above acts exhibited gross neglect of duty, misconduct or misbehavious which is unbecoming of a police officer thereby violated rule 3 of A.P.C.S. (Conduct) Rules, 1964.” 5. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Armed Reserve, Machilipatnam was appointed as Enquiry Officer to conduct oral enquiry. The enquiry was conducted and enquiry report was submitted on 01.06.2000. The Superintendent of Police vide proceedings dated 22.11.2000 dismissed the respondent from service, recording the finding that the charge was proved. The respondent had also absented unauthorizedly from duties on earlier three occasions as well. The departmental appeal was dismissed by the appellate authority on 21.03.2001 and his revision was also dismissed by the revisional authority on 18.10.2001. Challenging the aforesaid orders, the respondent filed O.A.No.2628 of 2002. II. Judgment of Tribunal: 6. The Tribunal affirmed the finding on proof of charge. The departmental appeal was dismissed by the appellate authority on 21.03.2001 and his revision was also dismissed by the revisional authority on 18.10.2001. Challenging the aforesaid orders, the respondent filed O.A.No.2628 of 2002. II. Judgment of Tribunal: 6. The Tribunal affirmed the finding on proof of charge. It observed that on earlier occasions also the respondent absented from duty and was meted out with punishment. However, at the same time, the respondent was also awarded rewards numbering 15. The Tribunal observed that no doubt, the police force was a disciplined force and unauthorized absence was an unpardonable act of misconduct, but being of the view that the punishment of dismissal was extreme punishment and was shockingly disproportionate, it allowed the O.A, with direction to the disciplinary authority to impose some other major penalty which would not result in loss of livelihood. The Tribunal also considered the length of service rendered by the respondent being 24 years. It, however, did not find any fault in conduct of enquiry, but allowed the O.A on the principle that the penalty imposed shall commensurate with the gravity of the charge and the charge was not of any corruption. III (a). Submissions of learned GP: 7. Sri G. Raju, learned Government Pleader submitted that the charge of unauthorized absence from duty, negligence in discharge of duty and so misconduct under the conduct rules was established. It was proved and in view of such finding, formed by the departmental authorities and also by the Tribunal, also considering that the respondent, previously absented on three occasions for which the punishment was imposed, the Tribunal ought not to have interfered with the imposition of penalty of dismissal from service. He submitted that it is the prerogative of the disciplinary authority and his discretion to impose what kind of punishment, on the proof of charge and with such discretion the Tribunal ought not to have interfered, when the finding on the charge could not be interfered with and the previous unauthorized absence from duty was also not disputed. 8. Sri G. Raju, learned Government Pleader placed reliance in (1) Union of India v. Constable Sunil Kumar, (2023) 3 SCC 622 , (2) Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 , (3) Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P., (1983) 2 SCC 442 and (4) Union of India v. Manoj Deswal, (2016) 15 SCC 511. 8. Sri G. Raju, learned Government Pleader placed reliance in (1) Union of India v. Constable Sunil Kumar, (2023) 3 SCC 622 , (2) Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India, (1987) 4 SCC 611 , (3) Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P., (1983) 2 SCC 442 and (4) Union of India v. Manoj Deswal, (2016) 15 SCC 511. III (b) Submissions of learned counsel for Respondent: 9. Sri Satya Sreenivasa Rao, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that mere unauthorized absence does not amount to misconduct under the conduct rules. He submitted that unless the unauthorized absence is voluntary and for no justifiable reasons the charge of misconduct cannot be said to have been proved in the enquiry. He submitted that in the orders of punishment, there is no finding that such unauthorized absence was voluntary. The respondent had stated the compelling reasons for his absence. Consequently, there being justifiable reasons, such unauthorized absence was not voluntary and based thereon the order of penalty could not be passed. 10. Sri Satya Sreenivasa Rao, further submitted that in any case, the Tribunal is right in observing that the extreme major penalty of dismissal from service was shockingly disproportionate to the proved charge. The Tribunal was within its right to interfere with the quantum of punishment and in issuing the direction to the petitioners to impose some other major penalty, not affecting the livelihood of the respondent. He submitted that the order under challenge deserved not to be interfered in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. 11. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance in (1) Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178 , (2) Bhagat Ram v. State of H.P. (supra), (3) Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (supra) and (4) Sanjeev Chaudhary v. Indo Tibetan Border Police Force, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 11574. III (c) Reply submissions of learned GP: 12. In reply, the learned Government Pleader submitted that the respondent cannot question the finding on the proof of charge of misconduct. He submitted that the respondent has not challenged the order of the Tribunal. The finding of proof of charge has attained finality. The only question to be considered is to the extent of challenge made by the petitioners i.e., the aspect of penalty imposed. 13. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record. IV. The finding of proof of charge has attained finality. The only question to be considered is to the extent of challenge made by the petitioners i.e., the aspect of penalty imposed. 13. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsels for the parties and perused the material on record. IV. Consideration: 14. The facts are not in dispute. The unauthorized absence from duty by the respondent for the period from 22.06.1998 FN to 30.10.1998 AN is not in dispute. The police force is a disciplined force is unquestionable. The police force require discipline from the members of the force. Previously also the respondent was absent unauthorizedly for which he was punished thrice. The respondent had also earned 15 rewards in his long service of 24 years and there is no other charge, is also not in dispute. 15. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent is that the defence which the respondent put in the enquiry was that on account of ill-health he abstained from duties. He was suffering from pain in the backbone for about more than three years and was undergoing treatment. On 22.06.1998 there was severe pain on his spinal cord and he was completely laid up and obtained sick passport. After completion of treatment, he reported to duty on 30.10.1998. He was admitted to duty, but the charge memo was issued on 18.11.1998. His submission is that the charge of misconduct itself cannot be said to have been proved, in the absence of any finding that the unauthorized absence was voluntary and for no justifiable cause. The submission of Learned Government Pleader is that the respondent cannot take such a plea as he has not filed writ petition challenging that aspect in the judgment of the Tribunal. The finding on proof of charge is to be the taken as it stands determined by the Judgment of the Tribunal. 1. Scope of Judicial Review: A. When petition is filed only by State: 16. We would first consider the submission of the learned Government Pleader that in a writ petition challenge being made by the State, and no writ petition being filed by the applicant, the limited consideration should be only on the aspect to the extent of challenge made by the State. 17. We would first consider the submission of the learned Government Pleader that in a writ petition challenge being made by the State, and no writ petition being filed by the applicant, the limited consideration should be only on the aspect to the extent of challenge made by the State. 17. We are of the view that even if the respondent has not filed the writ petition and the writ petition has been filed only by the State authorities, still the Order of the Tribunal, in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, would be open for interference on the submission of the respondent’s side, if it is found that the order suffers from a glaring mistake, apparent on record. We are duty bound to look into the entire aspect when before this court, for the cause of justice and cannot confine us only to the extent, the challenge is made by the State. This is to say to impart justice to the respondent as well. Taking the present case as an example, the Respondent has not challenged the order of the Tribunal, to the extent against him, might be considering the nature of the order that the petitioners were directed to impose some other major penalty not effecting his livelihood, and so, might have remained contended with that order. But, if any glaring mistake, on the face of the order, which does not require consideration or appreciation, of any evidence on record or such other factual aspect, but can be decided on the admitted facts, only on the application of law as settled, within the scope of judicial review, this Court, to impart justice would not be reluctant, to invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, in appropriate cases, merely because, the respondent did not file writ petition. All depends on the discretion of this Court, to be exercised judiciously, keeping in view, the utmost consideration of imparting justice. 18. In Maharashtra Chess Association v. Union of India (2020) 13 SCC 285 the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the role of the High Court under the Constitution is crucial to ensuring the rule of law throughout its territorial jurisdiction. In order to achieve these transcendental goals, the powers of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction are necessarily broad. They are conferred in aid of justice. In order to achieve these transcendental goals, the powers of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction are necessarily broad. They are conferred in aid of justice. The case of A. V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506 was referred in which it was held that the nature of power exercised by the High Court under its writ jurisdiction is inherently dependent on the threat to the rule of law arising in the case before it. The judgment in the case of U. P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v. Kamal Swaroop Tondon, (2008) 2 SCC 41 was also referred, in which it was held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is equitable and discretionary. The power under that Article can be exercised by the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. 19. Paragraphs No.12 to 14 of Maharashtra Chess Association (supra) are reproduced as under: “12. Echoing the sentiments of Lord Coke, this Court in U.P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v. Kamal Swaroop Tondon [U.P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. v. Kamal Swaroop Tondon, (2008) 2 SCC 41 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 352] observed that : (SCC p. 53, para 35) “35. … It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is equitable and discretionary. The power under that Article can be exercised by the High Court “to reach injustice wherever it is found”.” 13. The role of the High Court under the Constitution is crucial to ensuring the rule of law throughout its territorial jurisdiction. In order to achieve these transcendental goals, the powers of the High Court under its writ jurisdiction are necessarily broad. They are conferred in aid of justice. This Court has repeatedly held that no limitation can be placed on the powers of the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani [A.V. Venkateswaran v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, (1962) 1 SCR 753 : AIR 1961 SC 1506 ] a Constitution Bench of this Court held that the nature of power exercised by the High Court under its writ jurisdiction is inherently dependent on the threat to the rule of law arising in the case before it : (AIR p. 1510, para 10) “10. … We need only add that the broad lines of the general principles on which the court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and that in a matter which is thus pre-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the court.” The powers of the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot be circumscribed by strict legal principles so as to hobble the High Court in fulfilling its mandate to uphold the rule of law. 14. While the powers the High Court may exercise under its writ jurisdiction are not subject to strict legal principles, two clear principles emerge with respect to when a High Court's writ jurisdiction may be engaged. First, the decision of the High Court to entertain or not entertain a particular action under its writ jurisdiction is fundamentally discretionary. Secondly, limitations placed on the court's decision to exercise or refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction are self-imposed. It is a well-settled principle that the writ jurisdiction of a High Court cannot be completely excluded by statute. If a High Court is tasked with being the final recourse to upholding the rule of law within its territorial jurisdiction, it must necessarily have the power to examine any case before it and make a determination of whether or not its writ jurisdiction is engaged. Judicial review under Article 226 is an intrinsic feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. [Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625 ; L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577]” 20. We are of the view that, when the legality or otherwise of the judgment of the Tribunal is under challenge, may be at the end of one party and the other raises objection to the other part of the judgment against him, this Court cannot be expected to ignore or brush aside consideration of such submissions. We are of the view that, when the legality or otherwise of the judgment of the Tribunal is under challenge, may be at the end of one party and the other raises objection to the other part of the judgment against him, this Court cannot be expected to ignore or brush aside consideration of such submissions. Here, while considering the challenge by the State on the point of interference by the Tribunal with the punishment imposed, to adjudge that aspect, the gravity of the charge, its proof and if in law charge can be said to have been proved, necessarily require to be gone into, within the scope of judicial review. B. With finding on proof of charge: 21. Coming to the proof of charge, the charge was proved in the enquiry. It is not in dispute that the respondent remained unauthorizedly absent from duty. In a disciplined force, like police force, its members have to remain disciplined. They cannot overstep the leave granted. The position in law is settled that in the matters of finding on proof of charge, generally, the finding recorded by the disciplinary authority, in the cases where it has been affirmed in appeal and in revision and also by the Tribunal, the scope of interference with such finding is very limited, in the exercise of judicial review. 22. In Union of India v. Dalbir Singh, (2021) 11 SCC 321 the Hon’ble Apex Court reiterated the broad parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction of judicial review. We consider it apt to reproduce paragraph No.21 as under: “21. This Court in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran [Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 554] had laid down the broad parameters for the exercise of jurisdiction of judicial review. The Court held as under : (SCC pp. 616-17, paras 12-13) “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 23. In Manoj Deswal (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held that the ‘absence’, being a question of fact, it would refrain from interfering with the same, especially when after holding enquiry the 1st respondent was also declared deserter. Based thereon, learned Government Pleader submitted that in the present case also the unauthorized absence of the respondent is a finding fact and is not open to be interfered in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction. Here, also the respondent was declared ‘deserter’. 24. Based thereon, learned Government Pleader submitted that in the present case also the unauthorized absence of the respondent is a finding fact and is not open to be interfered in the exercise of the writ jurisdiction. Here, also the respondent was declared ‘deserter’. 24. The finding on the absence or the unauthorized absence is a finding of fact, and a finding fact if based on evidence, is not open for interference, is the settled position in law. We are also not on the point if there was no unauthorized absence or there was authorized absence, and we take the finding that the respondent was absent unauthorizedly, which has been recorded concurrently and on which factual aspect there is no dispute even raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. 25. The respondent’s plea of violation of the principles of natural justice was not accepted by the Tribunal. The Tribunal recorded that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice in the enquiry and the departmental enquiry was conducted under Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (in short ‘CCA Rules, 1991’). Before us also, learned counsel for the respondent did not complain any violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting enquiry. There is also no argument to challenge the finding on proof of charge on any ground of perversity etc, on which the Judicial Review may be Permissible. 2. Whether finding of voluntary must be recorded for unauthorised absence to constitute misconduct: 26. The only submission is that no finding has been recorded by the departmental authorities that the unauthorized absence was voluntary, placing much emphasis in the cases of Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) and Sanjeev Chaudhary (supra). 27. The question therefore is whether such unauthorized absence amounted to misconduct under the Conduct Rules 1964 and to consider this question, we proceed, based on the finding of unauthorized absence, to determine, if such unauthorized absence amounted to misconduct to enable the petitioners to pass the Order of penalty. We are on the aspect if mere unauthorized absence, in the absence of any finding of it being voluntary and without reasons, can be termed as constituting ‘misconduct’ so as to impose the penalty. 28. We are on the aspect if mere unauthorized absence, in the absence of any finding of it being voluntary and without reasons, can be termed as constituting ‘misconduct’ so as to impose the penalty. 28. In Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) Rules 3 (1)(ii) and 3 (1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, which relates to all time maintaining integrity, devotion to duty and to do nothing which was unbecoming of a government servant was for consideration and the question was whether the unauthorized absence from duty by the employee amounted to failure of devotion to duty or such behaviour was unbecoming of a government servant, could not be decided without deciding the question whether absence was willful or because of compelling circumstances. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held that if the absence was the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence could not be held to be willful. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalization, etc., but in such case the employee could not be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty was made, the disciplinary authority was required to prove that the absence was willful, and in the absence of such finding, the absence would not amount to misconduct. 29. In Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra), the enquiry officer on appreciation of evidence had held that the employee therein unauthorizedly absented from duty, but failed to hold that the absence was willful. The disciplinary authority, as also the appellate authority also failed to appreciate the same, but held that the employee was guilty. The Hon’ble Apex Court held that, there was wrong, in so holding. Finally, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) allowed the appeal of the employee after holding that the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority failed to prove that the absence from duty was willful. 30. Paragraphs 15 to 19 of Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) read as under: “15. Finally, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) allowed the appeal of the employee after holding that the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority failed to prove that the absence from duty was willful. 30. Paragraphs 15 to 19 of Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) read as under: “15. Rules 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, relates to all time maintaining integrity, devotion to duty and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a government servant and reads as follows: “3.General.—(1) Every government servant shall at all times— (i) maintain absolute integrity; (ii) maintain devotion to duty; and (iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a government servant.” 16. In the case of the appellant referring to unauthorised absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to maintain devotion to duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a government servant. The question whether “unauthorised absence from duty” amounts to failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant cannot be decided without deciding the question whether absence is wilful or because of compelling circumstances. 17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be wilful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant. 18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct. 19. In the present case the inquiry officer on appreciation of evidence though held that the appellant was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold that the absence was wilful; the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant guilty.” 31. 19. In the present case the inquiry officer on appreciation of evidence though held that the appellant was unauthorisedly absent from duty but failed to hold that the absence was wilful; the disciplinary authority as also the appellate authority, failed to appreciate the same and wrongly held the appellant guilty.” 31. The judgment in Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) was considered in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. T. T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that there may be compelling circumstances, beyond the control of an employee. The employee therein on certain occasions was prevented to sign the attendance register and the absence was intermittent. The Hon’ble Apex Court in T. T. Murali Babu (supra) observed that the view expressed in Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) had to be restricted to the facts of that case, regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge leveled against the employee and the material that had come on record during the enquiry. It could not be stated as an absolute proposition in law that whenever there is a long unauthorized absence, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to record a finding that the said absence is willful even if the employee failed to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent. 32. Paragraph No.3 of T. T. Murali Babu (supra) reads as under: “23. We have quoted in extenso as we are disposed to think that the Court in Krushnakant B. Parmar case [Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 609] has, while dealing with the charge of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant, expressed the aforestated view and further the learned Judges have also opined that there may be compelling circumstances which are beyond the control of an employee. That apart, the facts in the said case were different as the appellant on certain occasions was prevented to sign the attendance register and the absence was intermittent. Quite apart from that, it has been stated therein that it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to come to a conclusion that the absence is wilful. That apart, the facts in the said case were different as the appellant on certain occasions was prevented to sign the attendance register and the absence was intermittent. Quite apart from that, it has been stated therein that it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to come to a conclusion that the absence is wilful. On an apposite understanding of the judgment Krushnakant B. Parmar case [Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 609] we are of the opinion that the view expressed in the said case has to be restricted to the facts of the said case regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge levelled against the employee and the material that had come on record during the enquiry. It cannot be stated as an absolute proposition in law that whenever there is a long unauthorised absence, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to record a finding that the said absence is wilful even if the employee fails to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent.” 33. In Chhel Singh v. MGB Gramin Bank, Pali, (2014) 13 SCC 166 which is also a case of absence from duty, approximately for 10½ months, for which no prior permission was obtained, the plea taken by the employee was, serious illness, beyond his control, and that he never intended to contravene any of the provisions of the Service Regulations. The employee had submitted the copies of medical certificates, though after about 24 days after rejoining, it was observed by the Hon’ble Apex Court that there was no allegation that the employee’s unauthorized absence from duty was willful and deliberate. The enquiry officer had also not held that the employee’s absence from duty was willful and deliberate. It was not a case of disciplinary authority nor the enquiry officer that the medical reports submitted by the employee were forged or were fabricated or obtained for any consideration though he was not ill during that period. In absence of such evidence and finding, it was held that it was not open to the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority to disbelieve the medical certificates issued by the doctors without any valid reason and on the ground of 24 days of delay in filing the same. 34. In absence of such evidence and finding, it was held that it was not open to the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority to disbelieve the medical certificates issued by the doctors without any valid reason and on the ground of 24 days of delay in filing the same. 34. In Chhel Singh (supra), however, we find that the learned single Judge had allowed the writ petition recording that there was violation of the principles of natural justice and 5 important witnesses were not summoned in enquiry in spite of the prayer of the delinquent employee. So, the enquiry stood vitiated. The Division Bench of the High Court in the writ appeal did not disturb that finding, but had set aside the Order of the learned single Judge. The Hon’ble Apex Court upheld the order of the learned single Judge. So, in Chhel Singh (supra) there was violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the enquiry and also that no finding was recorded that, the absence from duty was willful and deliberate. There was justifiable reasons beyond the control of the delinquent and in support thereof, the medical certificates were also filed, which were disbelieved on the ground that they were filed belatedly after 24 days, which reason was not found to be a valid reason to disbelieve the medical certificates. 35. In the present case, the stand of the petitioners in the counter affidavit filed in O.A. before the Tribunal was that the case of the applicant that, he had been suffering from pain in the back since 3 years and undergone treatment and for that reason had absented from duty and could not go to the police station to obtain sick passport was quite contrary to his earlier version when he appeared before the Superintendent of Police, Krishna and submitted his representation on 21.10.1998. In the said counter, the petitioners also submitted that the applicant’s case that he was suffering from ‘Kocks Sprine disease’ was completely false, and if it was so, then the applicant could obtain sick passport from the police station and could go on medical leave. The petitioners’ further stand in the counter was that the applicant did not produce the doctor’s certificate about his ill-health when he appeared before the Superintendent of Police, Krishna on 21.10.1998. The petitioners’ further stand in the counter was that the applicant did not produce the doctor’s certificate about his ill-health when he appeared before the Superintendent of Police, Krishna on 21.10.1998. He did not submit anything, except his representation, wherein he had mentioned about the ill-health and treatment of his wife only. The Order of dismissal dated 22.11.2000 also clearly shows that during the enquiry, the Enquiry Officer examined 4 witnesses and marked Exs.P1 to P6. The charged Officer/applicant did not choose to cross examine any of the prosecution witnesses nor produced any of the defence witnesses on his behalf. He also did not produce any document before the enquiry officer. So, with respect to the contention of the learned counsel for the applicant/respondent that there was justifiable cause for unauthorized absence which was not willful, we find from the record, that the applicant might have taken the plea in his representation before the enquiry officer of his illness and the treatment of his wife, but in the enquiry neither any witness was produced by him nor any document was filed in support of the said cause. So, we are of the view that in the absence of any justifiable reason or cause being stated in the enquiry supported with any evidence, in the form of medical certificates/medical reports before the enquiry officer, there would be no occasion for the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority nor any mandatory requirement, to record, if the unauthorized absence was voluntary or otherwise. 36. In our view, the judgment in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) is not attracted to the facts of the present case, for what has been held in the judgment in T. T. Murali Babu (supra), after considering Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra), that it cannot be stated as an absolute proposition in law that whenever there is a long unauthorized absence, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to record a finding that the said absence is willful, even if the employee fails to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent. We are of the considered view that the applicant failed to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent, during the enquiry. We are of the considered view that the applicant failed to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent, during the enquiry. Consequently, it was not obligatory for the disciplinary authority to have recorded a finding that the unauthorised absence of the applicant was willful or not and in the absence of any such finding, it cannot be said that the order of punishment was or contrary to the law laid down in Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra). 37. Further, the distinguishing feature in the present case for non-application of Chhel Singh (supra), is that in Chhel Singh (supra) there was violation of the principles of natural justice in the enquiry, whereas in the present case, specific finding is recorded, which remains unchallenged, that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice in holding enquiry against the applicant/respondent. 38. In Sanjeev Chaudhary (supra) also which was also a case of dismissal from service of a Head Constable/GD in ITBP, wherein the petitioner sought leave due to the ill health of his mother and she died later on. The same was considered as a genuine reason which continued even after the expiry of period of sanctioned leave granted to that petitioner. In the said case, it was held that given the reasons for overstay which of course were beyond the petitioner’s control, the imposition of extreme form of penalty of dismissal, was definitely disproportionate. We do not however find that on such ground or reasons given, the finding on proof of charge was disturbed by the Delhi High Court. 3. On proportionality of punishment: 39. On the point of penalty, in Bhagat Ram (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the penalty imposed must be commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct, and any penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 40. In Ranjit Thakur (supra) which was a case under the Army Act, 1950, it was observed and held by Hon’ble the Apex Court that the question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognized grounds of judicial review. 41. Paragraph-25 of Ranjit Thakur (supra) reads as under: “25. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a decision, but is directed against the “decision-making process”. The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the jurisdiction and discretion of the court-martial. But the sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within the exclusive province of the court-martial, if the decision of the court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [ (1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL) : (1984) 3 All ER 935, 950] Lord Diplock said: “Judicial review has I think developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call ‘illegality’, the second ‘irrationality’ and the third ‘procedural impropriety’. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’ which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community;. That is not to say that further development on a case by case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of ‘proportionality’ which is recognised in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community;. . .” 42. In Coal India Ltd. v. Mukul Kumar Choudhuri, (2009) 15 SCC 620 on the question of the proportionality of punishment, where the punishment of removal was imposed for the proved charge of unauthorized absence for more than 6 months, the Hon’ble Apex Court observed and held that the doctrine of proportionality is well recognized concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. The award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. It was further held that one of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be; would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? It was held that the order of removal could not be justified. Such punishment was not only unduly harsh but was also grossly in excess to the allegations. 43. Paragraphs No.19 to 21 of Coal India Ltd.(supra) deserve reproduction which are as under: “19 [Ed.: Para 19 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./9/2010 dated 11-1-2010.] . The doctrine of proportionality is, thus, well-recognised concept of judicial review in our jurisprudence. What is otherwise within the discretionary domain and sole power of the decision-maker to quantify punishment once the charge of misconduct stands proved, such discretionary power is exposed to judicial intervention if exercised in a manner which is out of proportion to the fault. Award of punishment which is grossly in excess to the allegations cannot claim immunity and remains open for interference under limited scope of judicial review. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be: would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. 20. One of the tests to be applied while dealing with the question of quantum of punishment would be: would any reasonable employer have imposed such punishment in like circumstances? Obviously, a reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration measure, magnitude and degree of misconduct and all other relevant circumstances and exclude irrelevant matters before imposing punishment. 21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorised absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company's rules and regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations.” 44. In T. T. Murali Babu (supra), on the aspect of unauthorized absence, the Hon’ble Apex Court also referred to its previous pronouncements and held that the unauthorized absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straitjacket formula for imposition of punishment. 45. Paragraphs No.24 to 27 of T. T. Murali Babu (supra) are reproduced as under: “24. In this context, it is seemly to refer to certain other authorities relating to unauthorised absence and the view expressed by this Court. In State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla [State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla, (2008) 8 SCC 469 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] the Court, dealing with unauthorised absence, has stated thus : (SCC p. 473, para 11) “11. Unauthorised absence (or overstaying leave), is an act of indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorised absence by an employee, two courses are open to the employer. The first is to condone the unauthorised absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorised absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorised absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct.” 25. The first is to condone the unauthorised absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorised absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorised absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct.” 25. Again, while dealing with the concept of punishment the Court ruled as follows : (P.L. Singla case [State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla, (2008) 8 SCC 469 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] , SCC pp. 473-74, para 14) “14. Where the employee who is unauthorisedly absent does not report back to duty and offer any satisfactory explanation, or where the explanation offered by the employee is not satisfactory, the employer will take recourse to disciplinary action in regard to the unauthorised absence. Such disciplinary proceedings may lead to imposition of punishment ranging from a major penalty like dismissal or removal from service to a minor penalty like withholding of increments without cumulative effect. The extent of penalty will depend upon the nature of service, the position held by the employee, the period of absence and the cause/explanation for the absence.” 26. In Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat [ (2009) 11 SCC 678 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 668] , the appellant therein had remained unauthorisedly absent for a period of six months and further had also written threatening letters and conducted some other acts of misconduct. Eventually, the employee was visited with order of dismissal and the High Court had given the stamp of approval to the same. Commenting on the conduct of the appellant the Court stated that he was not justified in remaining unauthorisedly absent from official duty for more than six months because in the interest of discipline of any institution or organisation such an approach and attitude of the employee cannot be countenanced. 27. Thus, the unauthorised absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straitjacket formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as has been laid down in P.L. Singla [State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla, (2008) 8 SCC 469 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] .” 46. 27. Thus, the unauthorised absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straitjacket formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as has been laid down in P.L. Singla [State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla, (2008) 8 SCC 469 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] .” 46. In Constable Sunil Kumar (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court referring to the judgment in the case of Commandant, 22nd Battalion, CRPF v. Surinder Kumar, (2011) 10 SCC 244 reiterated that the High Court in exercise of powers of judicial review, should be slow in interfering with the punishment of dismissal on the ground that it was disproportionate. The punishment should not be merely disproportionate but should be strikingly disproportionate to warrant interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and it is only in an extreme case, where on the face of it there was perversity or irrationality that there can be judicial review under Articles 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 47. In Constable Sunil Kumar (supra), the penalty of dismissal was passed on proved charges and misconduct of indiscipline and insubordination and giving threats to superior on dire consequences. That was a case of delinquent under CRPF. There is no dispute on the proposition of law as laid down in the aforesaid cases and argued by the learned Government Pleader that in a disciplined force the interference with the order of punishment on the ground of proportionality can be made rarely and not only because the punishment is disproportionate. It must be shockingly disproportionate. However, that is also considering the nature of the misconduct, the nature of indiscipline or insubordination. If the charge is unauthorized absence of duty as in the present case, the penalty cannot be equated with the charge of misconduct of indiscipline, insubordination and giving threats to the superior officers of dire consequences, merely because, the delinquent in both kinds of cases is part of a disciplined force. In our view, it depends upon the gravity of the charge and its proof as to what kind of punishment should be imposed. There cannot be straight jacket formula that basing on the delinquent being in disciplined force, the penalty of dismissal is to be imposed in all such cases. 48. In our view, it depends upon the gravity of the charge and its proof as to what kind of punishment should be imposed. There cannot be straight jacket formula that basing on the delinquent being in disciplined force, the penalty of dismissal is to be imposed in all such cases. 48. In Sanjeev Chaudhary (supra), the Delhi High Court observed that no doubt the petitioner belonged to a force of which discipline was the backbone, but further observed that one should not forget the fact that these personnel work in formidable terrains and most of the times remain away from their families for long periods. Considering the difficulties and the miseries of life these personnel of disciplined forces suffer, the services of such personnel are required to be dealt with compassion and understanding. While maintaining the discipline in the cadre, it is also necessary that the difficulties of individual personnel be understood with an open mind and a human approach be adopted. With respect to the punishment it was observed that as per the settled proposition of law though the powers with the disciplinary authority in the matter of imposition of punishment is discretionary, but such discretionary power has to be exercised wisely and reasonably, and such discretionary power is also open to judicial review. 49. The relevant part of para-9 of Sanjeev Chaudhary (supra) is reproduced as under: “9. There is no doubt that the petitioner belongs to a force of which discipline is the backbone. However, one should not forget the fact that these personnel work in formidable terrains and most of the times remain away from their families for long periods. They mostly come from the villages and their wives are generally uneducated and homely and the wives as well as old parents are totally dependent on them. On leave when they reach home, have to complete all the tasks ranging from showing old parents to good hospitals, to repair of house, to taking care of children's education including their school admission etc. within that limited period of leave which a civilian living with his family discharges on day to day basis. The personnel of such services therefore are required to be dealt with compassion and understanding. It is necessary that while maintaining the discipline in the cadre, the difficulties of an individual personnel be understood with an open mind and a human approach be adopted. The personnel of such services therefore are required to be dealt with compassion and understanding. It is necessary that while maintaining the discipline in the cadre, the difficulties of an individual personnel be understood with an open mind and a human approach be adopted. It is apparent from the record that petitioner had sought leave due to the ill health of his mother. The fact that she could not recover and ultimately succumbed to her illness on 17.04.2013 certifies that the leaves were sought for a genuine reason, which continued even after the expiry of period of sanctioned leave. There is no doubt that his absence from duty beyond the period of sanctioned leave is an unauthorized absence but the nature of punishment depends on various factors.” 50. In the result, we are of the view that the punishment of dismissal from service on the proved charge of unauthorized absence from duty is highly disproportionate. The respondent had completed 24 years of service. For the previous unauthorized absence, he had already been awarded with punishment. A reasonable employer is expected to take into consideration before imposing punishment the length of service of the employee put in and the nature of misconduct and other relevant circumstances. The punishment of dismissal from service was extreme punishment; not only unduly harsh, but grossly in excess of the proved charge of unauthorized absence for which it has also not been held that it was voluntary. If the Tribunal has taken such a view that the punishment of dismissal from service is disproportionate, and directed to impose such other major penalty not taking the livelihood of the applicant, we find no justifiable reason to interfere with the Order of the Tribunal that some other major penalty, which would not take away the livelihood of the applicant, be imposed. 4. Power of the Court to impose punishment: 51. We also consider that the punishment was imposed and the respondent was dismissed from service in the year 2000. After appeal and revision, the O.A. was filed in the year 2002 which was disposed of in the year 2005, directing the petitioners to impose some other major penalty not taking the livelihood of the applicant. Since then, almost 20 years passed and since the date of punishment more than 24 years. After appeal and revision, the O.A. was filed in the year 2002 which was disposed of in the year 2005, directing the petitioners to impose some other major penalty not taking the livelihood of the applicant. Since then, almost 20 years passed and since the date of punishment more than 24 years. Learned counsel for the respondent stated that the respondent is suffering from and undergoing the treatment for ‘cancer’ but due to that reason, could not file the document (s) relating thereto on affidavit, in this writ petition, we have no reason to disbelieve such statement. The petitioner by the date of dismissal had completed 24 years of service. 52. We are not oblivious that the Courts should not, ordinarily, impose punishment and it should be left to the discretion of the disciplinary authority, generally, except in rare and exceptional cases to shorten the litigation when the Courts can impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons. 53. We refer to B. C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 in which the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under in paragraph 18; “18. A review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with a view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” 54. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.” 54. In the present case, for the reasons, we have recorded in the paragraph-51 supra, we are of the view that the present case is an exceptional case, where instead of directing the petitioners to choose the penalty for the respondent, pursuant to the direction of the Tribunal, as that may give raise to further litigation at the old age of the respondent, suffering from cancer to meet the ends of justice, we, ourselves, proceed to impose the punishment, for the proved charge of misconduct of unauthorized absence, keeping in view that the punishment of dismissal from service was highly disproportionate, which shocked the consciousness of the Tribunal, as also ours, and also keeping in view the direction of the Tribunal, which we have not interfered with, that some other major penalty, not taking the livelihood of the respondent, deserves to be imposed. 55. In Bhagat Ram (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court keeping in view the nature of misconduct, gravity of charge and no consequential loss, imposed a penalty withholding his increments with future effect, observing the same will meet the ends of justice. Two increments with future effect were withheld but providing that the payment of 50% of the arrears from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement shall be paid. Relevant part of paragraph-15 of Bhagat Ram (supra) reads as under: “15. ………This Court in such circumstances proceeded to make an appropriate order by awarding compensation. We may adopt the same approach. Keeping in view the nature of misconduct, gravity of charge and no consequential loss, a penalty of withholding his increments with future effect will meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, two increments with future effect of the appellant be withheld and he must be paid 50 percent of the arrears from the date of termination till the date of reinstatement.” 56. In Mukul Kumar Choudhuri (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the Order of removal was not justified, as no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. In Mukul Kumar Choudhuri (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the Order of removal was not justified, as no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The delinquent therein was denied back wages for the entire period by way of punishment for the proved misconduct of unauthorized absences for six months. Paragraph-21 of Mukul Kumar Choudhuri (supra) reads as under: “21. In a case like the present one where the misconduct of the delinquent was unauthorised absence from duty for six months but upon being charged of such misconduct, he fairly admitted his guilt and explained the reasons for his absence by stating that he did not have any intention nor desired to disobey the order of higher authority or violate any of the Company's rules and regulations but the reason was purely personal and beyond his control and, as a matter of fact, he sent his resignation which was not accepted, the order of removal cannot be held to be justified, since in our judgment, no reasonable employer would have imposed extreme punishment of removal in like circumstances. The punishment is not only unduly harsh but grossly in excess to the allegations.” 57. In Sanjeev Chaudhry (supra), after holding that the penalty of dismissal for unauthorized absence was extreme and disproportionate, the Delhi High Court substituted it to reduction to the induction level of the pay scale/initial stage of pay enjoyed by the Head Constable, providing further that the period of service spent by him in the cadre of Head Constable shall be taken into consideration for all other consequential benefits. Paragraph-12 of Sanjeev Chaudhry (supra) reads as under: “12. For the reasons discussed above, the petition has to succeed in part. The impugned order whereby the petitioner was declared a deserter is hereby quashed. We are of the opinion that the penalty of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner be substituted and should be one of reduction to the induction level of the pay scale/initial stage of pay enjoyed by him as Head Constable. However, the period of service spent by him in the cadre of Head Constable shall be taken into consideration for all other consequential benefits.” V. Penalty by Court: 58. However, the period of service spent by him in the cadre of Head Constable shall be taken into consideration for all other consequential benefits.” V. Penalty by Court: 58. To meet the ends of justice, we impose the penalty of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect {as per Rule 9 (vi) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964}. The respondent shall be treated to have retired on attaining the age of superannuation. The arrears of salary and other benefits shall be calculated and 50% thereof shall be paid to the respondent. The retiral benefits as permissible under rules shall however be released to the respondent. VI. Result: 59. In view of the consideration made by us, as aforesaid, though we are not interfering with the finding of the Tribunal and also that the respondent deserves punishment, other than taking his livelihood, we, by imposing the aforesaid punishment, as in para-58 (supra), modify the judgment of the Tribunal to that effect. 60. The Writ Petition is dismissed, subject to the aforesaid observations and directions. 61. The entire exercise, as stated in para-58 (supra), shall be completed within a period of two months from today. 62. No order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed in consequence.