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2025 DIGILAW 770 (HP)

Ganesh Dutt v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-04-22

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 153 of 2024, dated 01.09.2024, registered at Police Station Sadar, District Solan, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 , 465 , 471 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code ( IPC ) and consequential proceedings arising out of the F.I.R. 2. Briefly stated, the brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that informant/respondents No. 2 and 3 made a complaint to the police asserting that a civil dispute was pending between the informants and the petitioner No.1/accused Ganesh Dutt regarding the land located in Mohal Ber Ki Ser and Barse, Tehsil and District Solan, H.P. Accused No.1 had filed a civil suit for declaration before the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Solan, H.P. which was decreed. The complainant filed an appeal, which was assigned to learned Additional District Judge, Solan, H.P. who accepted the appeal and dismissed the suit filed by accused No.1. No further proceedings were taken and the judgment attained finality. Accused No.2, Mahidner Dutt Sharma was posted as Village Revenue Officer and accused No. 3 Sudhir Thakur was posted as Field Kanungo. Accused No. 2 and 3 entered mutation No. 274 and 708 based on the judgment passed by learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Solan, H.P. to give an undue advantage to accused No.1. The mutation was attested behind the complainant’s back. Accused No. 2 and 3 did not summon the complainant and other persons as per the provisions of the H.P. Land Revenue Act. Accused No.1 grabbed the compensation from the National Highways Authority of India. All the accused hatched a conspiracy to manipulate the revenue record. Regular Second Appeals are also pending before this High Court. The entire exercise was carried out to benefit accused No.1. The complainant also filed an application before the Human Rights Commission and Tehsildar; Solan submitted a status report stating that the mutation was wrongly entered. The application was subsequently dismissed by the Human Rights Commission. The Police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the F.I.R., the petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the same. It was asserted that F.I.R. and criminal proceedings arising out of the same amount to an abuse of the process of the law. The Police registered the F.I.R. and conducted the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the F.I.R., the petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the same. It was asserted that F.I.R. and criminal proceedings arising out of the same amount to an abuse of the process of the law. Learned Additional District Judge, Solan, H.P. held that a decree of joint possession was already passed by this High Court in Regular Second Appeal (RSA). The predecessor-in-interest of the accused and the informant were held to be co-owners in RSA No. 183 of 1987. The petitioner filed objections to the application filed by the informant. It was ordered that an appeal should be filed against the order, if permissible under law. There is no wrong or illegality in sanctioning the mutation; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings arising out of the same be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by respondent No.1 by filing a reply making preliminary submissions regarding lack of maintainability and the petitioners having not come to the Court with clean hands. The contents of the petition were denied on merits; however, it was asserted that F.I.R. was registered against the petitioners. The investigation is continuing and documents are to be collected. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 5. A rejoinder denying the contents of the reply and affirming those of the petition was filed. 6. I have heard Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr Karun Negi, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent No.1/State and Mr. Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3. 7. Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners submitted that a false F.I.R. was lodged against the petitioners. The rights of the parties were settled in RSA No. 183 of 1987. Learned Additional District Judge, Solan, H.P. had also reiterated this fact in the judgment passed by him. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of law. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceeding arising out of the same be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harshendra Kumar D. vs Rebatilata Koley and Ors. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of law. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceeding arising out of the same be quashed. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harshendra Kumar D. vs Rebatilata Koley and Ors. AIR2011 SC 1090 and judgment of this Court in Laxmi Singh vs. State of H.P. & others 2023:HHC13467 in support of his submission. 8. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State submitted that the petitioner had concealed the fact that the judgment and decree passed by learned Civil Judge, Solan was set aside by learned Additional District Judge, Solan, H.P. This amounts to fraud upon the revenue authorities. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 9. Mr. Anirudh Shrama, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 adopted the submissions advanced by the learned Deputy Advocate General on behalf of respondent No.1/State and he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 , wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 , wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 12. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 13. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners heavily relied upon various documents annexed to the petition. He submitted that it is impermissible to look into. The documents which are beyond suspicion or in the public domain. He relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harshendra Kumar D (supra) :- 25. 14. Mr. Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners heavily relied upon various documents annexed to the petition. He submitted that it is impermissible to look into. The documents which are beyond suspicion or in the public domain. He relied upon the following observations made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harshendra Kumar D (supra) :- 25. In our judgment, the above observations cannot be read to mean that in a criminal case where trial is yet to take place and the matter is at the stage of issuance of summons or taking cognizance, materials relied upon by the accused which are in the nature of public documents or the materials which are beyond suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 or for that matter in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. It is fairly settled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 or revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where the complaint is sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the defence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the accusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents — which are beyond suspicion or doubt — placed by the accused, the accusations against him cannot stand, it would be a travesty of justice if the accused is relegated to trial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a matter, for the promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process, the High Court may look into the materials which have a significant bearing on the matter at the prima facie stage. 15 . In the present case, the petitioner have relied upon the photocopies of the judgment passed by learned Additional District Judge, Solan, order dated 08.09.1987 passed by this Court, the application made to Tehsildar Solan, order dated 02.04.2024, final order passed by Human Rights Commission, application for deletion of entry and application for issuance of direction. These documents are merely photocopies and they are not of unimpeachable character. These are the photocopies of the proceedings before different courts whose certified copies are admissible. These documents are merely photocopies and they are not of unimpeachable character. These are the photocopies of the proceedings before different courts whose certified copies are admissible. Hence, the petitioners were required to file certified copies and not the photocopies of these documents and no reliance can be placed on the photocopies of the documents. 16. The grievance of the complainant is that petitioners/ accused had produced a copy of the judgment and decree passed by learned Senior Civil Judge, Solan, H.P., which was set aside and in this manner, the revenue authorities were misled to pass a mutation order. It is undisputed that revenue authorities had the jurisdiction to sanction the mutation. If they had the jurisdiction to sanction the mutation, they had the jurisdiction to sanction it rightly or wrongly. They were not divested of the jurisdiction merely because a wrong order was passed or it was misled to pass a wrong order. Permitting a person to make a complaint to the police that a competent authority had passed a wrong order will make the orders passed by every authority subject to scrutiny by the police, which is not permissible. The remedy of the person aggrieved by the order is the appeal to a higher form to set aside the wrong order and not to file an application before the police. Therefore, the police cannot be permitted to investigate the validity of the order passed by the competent authority. 17. It was submitted that revenue authorities were misled and withholding of the document amounts to cheating. This submission means that a false claim was made before the Court, which would be covered under Section 209 of IPC and such an offence is non-cognizable because of Section 195(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the police cannot be permitted to carry out the investigation on the premise that a false claim was made before the Court. 18. The F.I.R. was registered for the commission of forgery punishable under Sections 465 and 471 of IPC . The term forgery has been defined in Section 463 of IPC as under: "463. 18. The F.I.R. was registered for the commission of forgery punishable under Sections 465 and 471 of IPC . The term forgery has been defined in Section 463 of IPC as under: "463. Forgery.--Whoever makes any false documents or electronic record part of a document or electronic record with, intent to cause damage or injury], to the public or any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed, commits forgery." 19. It is apparent from the definition that a person has to make a false document before he can be said to have committed forgery. Making a false document is defined in Section 464 of IPC . It reads as under: 464. Making a false document .—A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record— First.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently— (a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document; (b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record; (c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record; (d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the electronic signature, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or Secondly.—Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with electronic signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration. 20. 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar , (2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929: 2009 SCC OnLine SC 1594 that the prosecution is required to prove that the accused had forged a document by creating a false document to establish the offence of forgery. A false document is when a document is executed claiming to be executed by someone else or authorised by someone else or a document is tempered or signatures are obtained by practising deception. It was observed at page 756:- “14. An analysis of Section 464 of the Penal Code shows that it divides false documents into three categories: 1. The first is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently makes or executes a document with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document was made or executed by some other person, or by the authority of some other person, by whom or by whose authority he knows it was not made or executed. 2. The second is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document in any material part, without lawful authority, after it has been made or executed by either himself or any other person. 3. The third is where a person dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, execute or alter a document knowing that such person could not by reason of (a) unsoundness of mind; or (b) intoxication; or (c) deception practised upon him, know the contents of the document or the nature of the alteration. In short, a person is said to have made a “false document”, if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses. 15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant, clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of “false documents”. 15. The sale deeds executed by the first appellant, clearly and obviously do not fall under the second and third categories of “false documents”. It therefore remains to be seen whether the claim of the complainant that the execution of sale deeds by the first accused, who was in no way connected with the land, amounted to committing forgery of the documents with the intention of taking possession of the complainant's land (and that Accused 2 to 5 as the purchaser, witness, scribe and stamp vendor, colluded with the first accused in execution and registration of the said sale deeds) would bring the case under the first category.” 21. In the present case, the revenue authorities had jurisdiction to sanction the mutation and merely because a wrong mutation was passed, according to the informant, the case would not become one of the forgery. Hence, offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 of IPC are not made out. 22 It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vesa Holdings Private Limited and Anr. vs. State of Kerala and Ors. , (2015) 8 SCC 293 that where the FIR does not disclose the criminal intention, the criminal proceedings cannot continue. It was observed: - "13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception, there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC . In our view, the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In our view, the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and the High Court committed an error in refusing to exercise the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings." 23. It was laid down in Kapil Agarwal vs. Sanjay Sharma , (2021) 5 SCC 524 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 154 that Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is designed to ensure that criminal proceedings are not permitted to generate weapons of harassment. It was observed: “18.1. As observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions, inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution is designed to achieve a salutary purpose that criminal proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into weapons of harassment. When the Court is satisfied that criminal proceedings amount to an abuse of process of law or that it amounts to bringing pressure upon the accused, in the exercise of inherent powers, such proceedings can be quashed.” 24. It is apparent from the allegations made in the complaint that the civil dispute is being given the colour of criminal litigation, which is not permissible as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in R.K. Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam , (2019) 16 SCC 739 and Usha Chakraborty v. State of W.B., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90. 25. Therefore, in the present case, the F.I.R. does not disclose cognizable offence and continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. 26. In view of the above, the present petition is allowed and F.I.R. No. 153 of 2024 dated 01.09.2024, registered at Police Station Sadar, District Solan, H.P. for the commission of offences punishable under Section 420 , 465 , 471 and 120-B of IPC and consequential proceedings arising out of the same are ordered to be quashed qua the petitioners. 27. The present petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms along with pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.