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2025 DIGILAW 772 (AP)

Pachipala Prabhakara Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2025-06-25

HARINATH N.

body2025
ORDER : Harinath. N, J. The petitioner is seeking quash of SC.Spl.No.15 of 2021 on the file of Special Judge for Trial of Cases, SC ST (POA) Act Court – IV Additional District Judge, Vizianagaram. 2. The petitioner is arraigned as the sole accused in SC.Spl.No.15 of 2021 on the file of Special Judge for Trial of Cases, SC ST (POA) Act Court – IV Additional District Judge, Vizianagaram. The petitioner is facing trial for alleged offence under Section 376 , 420, 354, 354(C)(D), 496, 498-A, 509 IPC, Section 67 of Information Technology Act and Section 3(1)(r)(s), 3(2)(va), 3(2)(v) of SC, ST (POA) Act, 2015. 3. The 2 nd respondent has filed a complaint on 28.03.2019 alleging that she, while undergoing Constable training she met the petitioner who was working as the Reserve Sub Inspector in the Police Training College as an Instructor. It is also stated that the petitioner proposed to marry the 2 nd respondent and expressed his love for her. 4. It is also alleged that the petitioner promised to marry the 2 nd respondent after conversion from Reserve Sub Inspector to Civil Sub Inspector. Thereafter, the petitioner and the 2 nd respondent were moving around closely. It is stated that the 2 nd respondent joined duty as Constable at Parvathipuram Rural Police Station in January, 2010. It is also stated that the petitioner was on leave at that point of time and he started living with the 2 nd respondent for short periods and took the 2 nd respondent to various places. It is stated that the petitioner is used to pressurize the 2 nd respondent for physical relationship and that the 2 nd respondent had to yield to his demands as the petitioner kept on repeating the promise of marriage. The 2 nd respondent’s family members as the elders were looking out for the marriage allegations, she informed her family members of her affair with the petitioner. It is also submitted that on 12.04.2017 the petitioner married the 2 nd respondent in presence of elders and after staying for few days, the petitioner left and used to come once in a month. When the 2 nd respondent insisted the petitioner to take her to the marital home, the petitioner started to avoid her. It is also submitted that on 12.04.2017 the petitioner married the 2 nd respondent in presence of elders and after staying for few days, the petitioner left and used to come once in a month. When the 2 nd respondent insisted the petitioner to take her to the marital home, the petitioner started to avoid her. When the 2 nd respondent insisted the petitioner to take her to the marital home the petitioner started to negotiate with the 2 nd respondent and also intimidated the 2 nd respondent stating that he is a police officer and that he can do anything. It is also stated that the petitioner befriended the 2 nd respondent only for satisfying his lust. It is also stated that the petitioner also shared intimate and nude photos of the 2 nd respondent with B.Ratna Kumar, Head Constable working in Government Railway Police Outpost when the same was questioned, the petitioner stated that he has come to know that the 2 nd respondent was in the process of filing a complaint, as such, the petitioner threatened to send the nude photos and videos of the 2 nd respondent to all others. 5. The police have completed the investigation and filed charge sheet by recording the statements of as many as 29 witnesses apart from the investigation officers. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that admittedly the petitioner and the 2 nd respondent were in consensual physical intimacy from the year 2010 onwards. A complaint was lodged after a period of nine years. As such, the allegations under Section 376 IPC or 420 IPC or for that matter any of the alleged offences cannot be made out against the petitioner. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance on Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra and another , [ (2019) 9 SCC 608 ] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held at paras 9, 10, 14 is as follows ; 9. The present proceedings concern an FIR registered against the appellant under Sections 376 , 417, 504, and 506(2) of the IPC and Sections 3(1) (u), (w) and 3(2) (vii) of SC/ST Act. Section 376 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for the 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3100 offence of rape which is set out in Section 375. Section 375 prescribes seven descriptions of how the offence of rape may be committed. Section 376 of the IPC prescribes the punishment for the 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3100 offence of rape which is set out in Section 375. Section 375 prescribes seven descriptions of how the offence of rape may be committed. For the present purposes only the second such description, along with Section 90 of the IPC is relevant and is set out below. “375. Rape – A man is said to commit “rape” if he – … under the circumstances falling under any of the following seven descriptions- Firstly … Secondly. – Without her consent. … Explanation 2. – Consent means an unequivocal voluntary agreement when the woman by words, gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal communication, communicates willingness to participate in the specific sexual act: Provided that a woman who does not physically resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the sexual activity.” “90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception - A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception; or…” 10. Where a woman does not “consent” to the sexual acts described in the main body of Section 375, the offence of rape has occurred. While Section 90 does not define the term “consent”, a “consent” based on a “misconception of fact” is not consent in the eyes of the law. 14 In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged by the complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry her. Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court has observed that there is a distinction between a false promise given on the understanding by the maker that it will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled. In Anurag Soni v State of Chhattisgarh9, this Court held: “37. In Anurag Soni v State of Chhattisgarh9, this Court held: “37. The sum and substance of the aforesaid decisions would be that if it is established and proved that from the inception the accused who gave the promise to the prosecutrix to marry, did not have any intention to marry and the prosecutrix gave the consent for sexual intercourse on such an assurance by the accused that he would marry her, such a consent can be said to be a consent obtained on a misconception of fact as per Section 90 of the IPC and, in such a case, such a consent would not excuse the offender and such an offender can be said to have committed the rape as defined under Sections 375 of the IPC and can be convicted for the offence under Section 376 of the IPC.” Similar observations were made by this Court in Deepak Gulati v State of Haryana  (“Deepak Gulati”): “21. … There is a distinction between the mere breach of a promise, and not fulfilling a false promise. Thus, the court must examine whether there was made, at an early stage a false promise of marriage by the accused…” 8. Madhiri Satish Vs. State of A.P. , [2021 SCC Online AP 1913] , this Court held at paras 39, 40 is as follows ; 39. Further, ingredients constituting an offence under Section 411 I.P.C. are also not made out. The articles of PW1 found with the accused are not stolen properties but were retained by him to the knowledge of PW1. Therefore, possessing them may not amount to an offence under Section 411 I.P.C. 40. Having regard to above, I feel that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are not proved beyond reasonable doubt. May be PW1 must have moved with the accused and the accused had forced her to love with him, but the act of sexual intercourse even assuming it to be there, in my view, is not by deceit. Thus, considering the judgments referred to above and in the absence of any cogent and convincing evidence to that effect, I am inclined to acquit the appellant on all counts, extending benefit of doubt. 9. Ramanjanya Raju and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, CRLP Nos.5627 & 5742 of 2022, decided on 31.08.2023 this Court held at para 6 is as follows ; “ This Court perused the docket order. 9. Ramanjanya Raju and others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, CRLP Nos.5627 & 5742 of 2022, decided on 31.08.2023 this Court held at para 6 is as follows ; “ This Court perused the docket order. The Court below has not even applied its mind and even not taken the cognizance of the case. The order simply states that the complainant present. Hear. Number the C.C. Issue summons to the accused on payment of costs. It indicates the total non application of mind by the Court below and as such, the docket order dated 05.07.2022 passed in C.F.No.1629 of 2021, is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Court below for passing appropriate orders in accordance with the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pradeep S.Wodeyar’s case, as expeditiously as possible”. 10. Rajnish Singh @ Soni Vs. State of U.P. and another , [2025 LiveLaw (SC) 279] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held at paras 7, 12, 21 is as follows ; 7. The appellant initially, was working as a constable in the police department. Later, in 2009, he joined as a Clerk in the State Bank of India in Dhani branch of Maharajganj district. In the intervening period, the intimacy between the appellant and the complainant continued to flourish. The appellant had once called the complainant to Maharajganj, where he made her to consume some intoxicant mixed with ENO, without her knowledge, which made her semi-conscious. Taking advantage, the appellant subjected her to forcible sexual intercourse. He not only video- graphed the offending acts but later, showed it to the complainant when she regained consciousness. The complainant, fearing retribution in society, did not share information about the said incident with anyone. Subsequently, the complainant became pregnant which was confirmed with a pregnancy detection kit. When this information came to the knowledge of the appellant, he mixed some medication in water and made the complainant to drink it in order to cause miscarriage. Since the appellant continuously blackmailed and threatened the complainant using the obscene video, she did not tell anyone about the abortion. 11. Consequent to the completion of the investigation, the police submitted a report under Section 173(2) CrPC dated 29th September, 2022, against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376 , 384, 323, 504 and 506 IPC in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.-04, Etawah. 11. Consequent to the completion of the investigation, the police submitted a report under Section 173(2) CrPC dated 29th September, 2022, against the appellant for the offences punishable under Sections 376 , 384, 323, 504 and 506 IPC in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.-04, Etawah. Vide order dated 10th November, 2022, the learned Magistrate took cognizance for the above offences and issued summons to the appellant. Aggrieved, the appellant filed a criminal petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 1246 of 2022 in the High Court. The quashing petition stands rejected vide order dated 24th April, 2023, which is assailed in this appeal by special leave. 21. There is no dispute that the complainant, a highly qualified female, was major at the time when her relationship with the appellant sprouted. The first act of sexual intercourse between the appellant and the complainant is alleged to have taken place in the year 2006 and that too in her own house. However, at that time, the complainant did not make any complaint to anyone, including her own family members, that the appellant had established sexual relations with her based on an express promise to marry her in future. It needs to be highlighted that the complainant categorically came out with a case in the FIR that the first act of sexual relation between her and the appellant (albeit forcible as per the complainant) took place in her own house where her parents were also present. The very manner in which this incident is said to have taken place, puts the case of the complainant under serious doubt. It is difficult to swallow that the complainant, a well-qualified major girl, was subjected to forcible sexual intercourse by an outsider in her own house where her parents were present and still, they did not get a whiff about the incident. Thus, the complainant’s allegations seem to be a well-orchestrated story and nothing beyond that. 11. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State and there is no representation for the 2 nd respondent. Perused the material available on record. 12. It is not in dispute that the petitioner and the 2 nd respondent were maintaining physical intimacy for over nine years prior to the date of complaint. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State and there is no representation for the 2 nd respondent. Perused the material available on record. 12. It is not in dispute that the petitioner and the 2 nd respondent were maintaining physical intimacy for over nine years prior to the date of complaint. The allegations under Section 376 IPC may not be made out. However, the petitioner is said to have married the 2 nd respondent on 12.04.2017 and the charge sheet would reveal the statements of independent witnesses apart from family members who attended the marriage of the petitioner with 2 nd respondent. 13. The marriage is also stage managed by the petitioner to exploit the 2 nd respondent. In such circumstances the other provisions of law for which the petitioner is facing trial would have to be tested before the trial Court. These are all questions of fact which this Court cannot go into at this stage. Considering the statement in the charge sheet and after perusing the statements of the other witnesses this case is certainly not a fit case for quashing the SC.Spl.No.15 of 2021, as a prima facie case against the petitioner is made out for other offences. 14. However, in so far as Section 376 of IPC is concerned the same deserves to be quashed as the relationship between the petitioner and the 2 nd respondent is evidently a consensual relationship and the physical intimacy between the petitioner and the 2 nd respondent started as early as 2010. The marriage with the 2 nd respondent is stated to be performed on 12.04.2017 at a temple in presence of elders and other witnesses. In these circumstances, this Court is inclined to quash Spl.SC.No.15 of 2021 to the extent of Section 376 of IPC. The trial shall continue against the petitioner for all other alleged offences. 15. Accordingly, the criminal petition is partly allowed. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stands closed.