JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for cancellation of the bail granted by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Nurpur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) to respondents No.2 and 3 in Case No. 243/2024. It has been asserted that the petitioner is a businessman. The respondents Nos. 2 and 3 lodged an FIR No.326 of 2017 dated 22.10.2017 against the petitioner for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ). The matter was compromised, and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 agreed to pay Rs.1,80,00,000/- as consideration for the property to the petitioner. A cancellation report was filed before the Court. Subsequently, the amount was not paid, and the petitioner lodged FIR No. 206 of 2021 and FIR No. 12/2022 against the respondents. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 also filed a petition before this Court, which was registered as Cr.MMO No. 677 of 2023. The petition was dismissed by this Court on October 25, 2024. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 filed a petition for granting pre-arrest bail, which was allowed, and the learned Trial Court granted interim bail to the respondents on 03.12.2024, which was confirmed on 11.12.2024. The learned Trial Court did not notice the gravity of the offence. Signatures of the petitioner, his wife, his son and his brother were forged by respondents Nos 2 and 3. This aspect was ignored by the learned Trial Court; therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted to respondents nos. 2 & 3 be cancelled. 2. I have heard Mr. Vikas Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioner, who has submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in granting bail to respondents No.2 and 3 without considering the gravity of the offence. The bail was granted hurriedly. The learned Trial Court held that the investigation was almost complete and respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were not required by the police for interrogation. However, the report of FSL is awaited, and the investigation cannot be said to be complete; hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted to respondents Nos. 2 and 3 be cancelled. 3. Mr. 2 and 3 were not required by the police for interrogation. However, the report of FSL is awaited, and the investigation cannot be said to be complete; hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the bail granted to respondents Nos. 2 and 3 be cancelled. 3. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that the State has not filed any petition for cancellation of the bail, and this Court may pass any appropriate order in the facts and circumstances of the case. 4. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 5. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974 that the bail, once granted, should not be cancelled mechanically; however, an unreasoned and perverse order is open to interference by the Superior Court. The bail can be cancelled if there are serious allegations against the accused. It was observed at page 783: “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [ Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 525 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [ Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar , (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] .] 27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse bail order is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on society, resulting in such an order. In P v. State of M.P. [ P v. State of M.P. , (2022) 15 SCC 211 ] decided by a three- judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1)CrPC in the following words : (SCC p. 224, para 24) “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [ Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237 ]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” Considerations for Setting Aside Bail Orders 28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided. Suffice it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused. 29. In Jagjeet Singh [ Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra , (2022) 9 SCC 321: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 560] , a three-judge Bench of this Court has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439 CrPC is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding a bail application. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well-established principles of law. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well-established principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Rambilas [Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124]; Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat [Narendra K. Amin v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 13 SCC 584: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 813] .) 6. Similar is the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manik Madhukar versus Vitthal Damuji Meher and Ors. 2024: INSC:636 wherein it was observed as under: - “ 19. Courts, while granting bail, are required to consider relevant factors such as the nature of the accusation, the role ascribed to the accused concerned, possibilities/chances of tampering with the evidence and/or witnesses, antecedents, flight risk, et al. Speaking through Hima Kohli, J., the present coram in Ajwar v. Waseem , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974 , apropos relevant parameters for granting bail, observed: “ 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. (Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 525; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav (supra) (2004) 7 SCC 528 ; Masroor v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2009) 14 SCC 286 ; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496 ; Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 16 SCC 508 ; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2018) 12 SCC 129 ; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar @ Polia (supra) (2020) 2 SCC 118 27. It is equally well settled that bail, once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the Superior Court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a Superior Court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on society, resulting in such an order. In P v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) (2022), 15 SCR 211 decided by a three- judge bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J)] has spelt out the considerations that must be weighed with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) of the CrPC in the following words: “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” (emphasis supplied) 20. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail, but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” (emphasis supplied) 20. In State of Haryana v. Dharamraj, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1085 , speaking through one of us (Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.), the Court, while setting aside an order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court granting (anticipatory) bail, discussed and reasoned: “ 7. A foray, albeit brief, into relevant precedents is warranted. This Court considered the factors to guide the grant of bail in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh (2002) 3 SCC 598 and Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan (2004) 7 SCC 528 . In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496 , the relevant principles were restated thus: ‘9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by the grant of bail.’ 8. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia (2020) 2 SCC 118 this Court opined as under: ‘16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar alias Polia (2020) 2 SCC 118 this Court opined as under: ‘16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. …’ 9. In Bhagwan Singh v. Dilip Kumar @ Deepu @ Depak, 2023 INSC 761 , this Court, in view of Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 ; Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh, (1996) 4 SCC 693 and X v. State of Telangana, (2018) 16 SCC 511 , held as follows: ‘13. It is also required to be borne in mind that when a prayer is made for the cancellation of the grant of bail, cogent and overwhelming circumstances must be present, and bail, once granted, cannot be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it in conducing to allow fair trial. This proposition draws support from the Judgment of this Court in Daulat Ram v. State of Haryana (1995) 1 SCC 349 , Kashmira Singh v. Duman Singh (1996) 4 SCC 693 and XXX v. State of Telangana (2018) 16 SCC 511 .’ 10. In XXX v. Union Territory of Andaman & Nicobar Islands, 2023 INSC 767 , this Court noted that the principles in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar (supra) stood reiterated in Jagjeet Singh v. Ashish Mishra (2022) 9 SCC 321 11. The contours of anticipatory bail have been elaborately dealt with by 5-Judge Benches in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 and Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 is worthy of mention in this context, despite its partial overruling in Sushila Aggarwal (supra) . We are cognizant that liberty is not to be interfered with easily. Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 1 SCC 694 is worthy of mention in this context, despite its partial overruling in Sushila Aggarwal (supra) . We are cognizant that liberty is not to be interfered with easily. More so when an order of pre-arrest bail already stands granted by the High Court. 12. Yet, much like bail, the grant of anticipatory bail is to be exercised with judicial discretion. The factors illustrated by this Court through its pronouncements are illustrative and not exhaustive. Undoubtedly, the fate of each case turns on its own facts and merits.” (emphasis supplied) 21. In Ajwar (supra), this Court also examined the considerations for setting aside bail orders in terms below: “ 28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate Court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined, and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused ought to be avoided. Suffice it to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused. 29. In Jagjeet Singh (supra) (2022) 9 SCC 321 , a three- judge bench of this Court has observed that the power to grant bail under Section 439 Cr. P.C. is of wide amplitude and the High Court or a Sessions Court, as the case may be, is bestowed with considerable discretion while deciding an application for bail. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well-established principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But this discretion is not unfettered. The order passed must reflect the due application of the judicial mind following well-established principles of law. In the ordinary course, courts would be slow to interfere with the order where bail has been granted by the courts below. But if it is found that such an order is illegal or perverse or based upon utterly irrelevant material, the appellate Court would be well within its power to set aside and cancel the bail. (Also refer: Puran v. Ram Bilas (2001) 6 SCC 338 ; Narendra K. Amin (Dr.) v. State of Gujarat (2008) 13 SCC 584) ” (emphasis supplied) 7. A similar view was taken in Kailash Kumar versus State of H.P. , in Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2025 decided on 20.02.2025 (SC) wherein it was observed: “10. The decision of this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem and Anr. (2024) 10 SCC 768 , relied on by the High Court, has been perused. In terms of such decision, while seized of an application for cancellation/revocation of bail, the considerations (illustrative, not exhaustive) which ought to weigh with the courts are whether: (i) the accused has misused the concession of liberty; (ii) he has been delaying the trial; (iii) he has been influencing/threatening the witnesses; (iv) he has been tampering evidence in any manner; and (v) there has been any supervening circumstance after grant of bail warranting a relook. The decision also lays down that orders granting bail could be interfered with if the same is found to be perverse or illegal in the sense that the Court’s conscience is shocked or extraneous material has been considered.” 8. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 9. The allegations in the FIR show that the disputes are pending between the parties, which were compromised. When the terms of the compromise were not honoured, the present FIR was registered. As per the petitioner, his signatures, and the signatures of his wife, son and brother were forged. The police have already sent the signatures for comparison, and the report from FSL is awaited. The petitioner cannot tamper with the report of the FSL; therefore, releasing respondents No.2 and 3 on bail will not affect the investigation adversely. As per the petitioner, his signatures, and the signatures of his wife, son and brother were forged. The police have already sent the signatures for comparison, and the report from FSL is awaited. The petitioner cannot tamper with the report of the FSL; therefore, releasing respondents No.2 and 3 on bail will not affect the investigation adversely. Hence, the submission that granting bail to the petitioner during the investigation will affect the investigation adversely is not acceptable. 10. There is no allegation in the petition that the petitioner had misused the liberty extended to them by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, the bail cannot be cancelled due to the supervening circumstance. 11. It was submitted that the order passed by the learned Trial Court is not detailed and does not contain any reason. It is true that the order dated 11.12.2024 does not contain any reason, but it confirms the order dated 03.12.2024, which is not brought on record; therefore, it cannot be said that the bail is liable to be cancelled because of inadequate reasons assigned in the order granting the bail. 12. It was submitted that the offences are heinous and the learned Trial Court erred in granting bail. This is not acceptable. The allegations pertain to cheating and forgery, which are triable by a Magistrate and cannot be said to be heinous. 13. Therefore, there is no reason to interfere with the discretion exercised by the learned Trial Court while granting the bail. 14. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 15. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits.