Order : (DINESH MEHTA, J.) 1. By way of present writ petition, the petitioner has impugned the judgment and award dated 26.02.2003 passed by the learned Labour Court, Bikaner (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Labour Court’), whereby reference made by the State vide notification dated 22.03.2002 was negated. 2. The pertinent facts of the case at hands are that the petitioner was appointed as daily wages employee by the respondent-Board on 15.02.1998 for operating Electric Pumpset. According to the petitioner’s pleading, he had served the respondents up to 31.05.1999 when his services were retrenched without following the mandatory requirement of Chapter VA of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act of 1947’). 3. Feeling aggrieved of such retrenchment, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute and a reference came to be made by the State Government vide notification dated 22.03.2002, requiring the Labour Court to answer as to whether the petitioner was an employee in the Municipal Board, Ratangarh, District Churu and if yes, then whether his retrenchment on 31.05.1999 was valid or not? If not then, the claimant was entitled to what relief. 4. Though the petitioner asserted that he had served the respondent-Board from 15.02.1998 to 31.05.1999, however, he could produce the evidence of his serving the respondent-Board from 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999 only. 5. The Labour Court on the basis of pleadings and evidence on record came to a conclusion that since the petitioner could prove the factum of serving the respondent-Board for the period between 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999, he cannot be said to be an employee rendering continuous service, as the total period he served was less than 240 days. 6. Mr. Saluja, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the Labour Court has erred in answering the reference made by the State against the petitioner. 7. While contending that the muster roll and other evidence/documents were with the respondent-Board, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner’s oral assertion that he had served the respondent-Board from 15.02.1998 to 31.05.1999 ought to have been accepted by the Labour Court, as the burden to produce relevant evidence lay upon the respondent-Board, as entire record was in its possession. 8. Regardless of the aforesaid argument, Mr. 8. Regardless of the aforesaid argument, Mr. Saluja, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that there is no requirement of completing 240 days’ of service for the purpose of invoking provision of sections 25F and 25G of the Act of 1947. 9. In support of his argument aforesaid, learned counsel relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Samishta Dube vs. City Board, Etawah & Anr., reported in (1999) 3 SCC 14 . Inviting Court’s attention towards Para No.7 of the judgment ibid, learned counsel argued that Hon’ble the Supreme Court has categorically held that a workman is not required to work for 240 days; and if a workman has been retrenched without following due procedure provided under section 25F of the Act of 1947, his retrenchment is liable to be held illegal. 10. Mr. Madhav Soni, associate to Mr. Paramveer Singh Champawat, learned counsel for the respondents argued that the petitioner had led evidence documentary and oral and according to such evidence, he had worked from 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999 and total number of days he worked, if added comes to 99 days, which are admittedly lesser than the requisite period of 240 days. 11. Learned counsel argued that the petitioner’s reliance upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Samishta Dube (supra) is misplaced inasmuch as the provisions involved in the said case were that of UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in which, provision may be analogous but not exactly the same. 12. Learned counsel further invited Court’s attention towards the additional affidavit which the petitioner had filed and submitted that even according to the documents filed with the additional affidavit dated 11.02.2025, the total period during which the petitioner had worked was 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999. He therefore, submitted that the judgment and award dated 26.02.2003 passed by the Labour Court is perfectly just and valid and no interference is warranted. 13. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 14. The principle that onus lies upon the employer to produce the relevant record is not an abstract principle. It has to be seen in the backdrop of the facts involved in each case. 13. Heard learned counsel for the parties. 14. The principle that onus lies upon the employer to produce the relevant record is not an abstract principle. It has to be seen in the backdrop of the facts involved in each case. In the instant case though the petitioner had orally asserted to have worked from 15.02.1998 to 31.05.1999 but his oral evidence was belied by the documentary evidence according to which the petitioner had worked from 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999. 15. The petitioner has failed to make any assertion or move an application before the Labour Court to call for any particular document by which he could prove his claim of having worked up to 31.05.1999. 16. The petitioner’s plea that he could produce copies of the muster roll only which he had is untenable. Such assertion or plea cannot be accepted. 17. One cannot accept the proposition that the petitioner had worked for the period claimed. One would keep on wondering that how he would not have the muster roll of the remaining period, if he had copies of the muster roll evincing his attendance from 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999. 18. In absence of any specific pleading, neither any direction could be issued to the respondent to produce the muster roll nor could any inference be drawn in favour of the petitioner. 19. Resultantly, the finding arrived by the Labour Court that the petitioner had worked for 240 days is ex-facie erroneous, because his total period of service (from 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999), if counted, comes to be 99 days. 20. So far as reliance upon the judgment of Samishta Dube (supra) is concerned, according to this Court, the facts and statutory provisions are clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the provisions involved therein were the provisions of UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and not of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 21. Learned Labour Court has observed that provisions contained in section 6N of the UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is corresponding to section 25F of the Act of 1947. 22. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held that section 6P does not require any particular period of continuation of service as required by section 6N of the UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Learned Labour Court has observed that provisions contained in section 6N of the UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is corresponding to section 25F of the Act of 1947. 22. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held that section 6P does not require any particular period of continuation of service as required by section 6N of the UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Since, the case of the petitioner therein related to section 6N of the Act of 1947, whereas applicable provision in the present case is section 25 of the Act of 1947, which is pari materia to section 6N of the UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 23. This Court is of the considered view that the judgment of Samishta Dubey (supra) is not applicable in the present case. That apart, provision contained under section 25F clearly prescribes that the requirement mentioned in the proviso is applicable if the workman has been in continuous service for not less than one year. 24. The expression continuous service of one year has been defined in section 25B of the Act of 1947 and accordingly person shall be deemed to have continuously worked for one year, if he has completed 240 days of his service in one calender year. 25. In view of the what has been discussed hereinabove and in light of the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Surendra Nagar District Panchayat vs. Dahyabhai Amarsingh, reported in 2005 (8) SCC 750 , this Court does not find any merit or substance in the present writ petition. The petition is thus, dismissed.