JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This revision petition has been preferred by the State against the order passed by the Himachal Pradesh Tax Tribunal, Dharamshala, camp at Shimla (for short ‘ Tribunal ’) on 16.03.2024, whereby the learned Tribunal accepted the appeal of the appellant (respondent herein) and set aside the order of the appellate authority of not granting the appropriate rate of CST benefit and also set aside the interest and penalty, as was imposed by the authorities below. 2. The facts are not in dispute. 3. The respondent is registered under the H.P. Value Added Tax Act (for short ‘ VAT Act ’) and Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (for short ‘ CST Act ’) w.e.f. 24.07.2009. The respondent was earlier known as B. R. Ferro Steel and renamed as M/s Radiant Cement Company Pvt. Ltd., w.e.f. 18.12.2019 and is registered for manufacture of Non Alloys, Steel Hot Rolled Products, S.S. Flats, S.S. Ingots and M. S. Flats and Rounds and S. S. Rounds and was assessed for the year 2014-15 by creating an additional demand of Rs. 15,31,304/- under the CST Act by according following reasons:- “(i) "As per Government of Himachal Pradesh Excise and Taxation department vide notification No. EXN-F(1) 2/2004 (iii) dated 30-03-2005 had notified the industrial units not eligible for the central sales tax incentives. According to the above notification Sr. No. 22 mentioned is as under:- Sr. No. 22 "Mini Steel Plants Induction/Arc/Submerged, furnaces and or rolling Mills. And Subsequent notification EXN-F(5)-6/2006-Vol-l dated 01-04-2013 provides that in respect of the sale in the course of interstate trade or commerce of the goods (other than) those manufactured by the breweries, distilleries, non-fruits/vegetables based wineries and bottling plants (both of country Liquor. Indian made foreign liquor) and industrial units specified in negative list) manufacture by the dealers running any existing industrial unit in the state of Himachal Pradesh, the tax levied under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the Act ibid, shall be calculated and payable at the concessional rate of 1.5% of the taxable turnover of such goods with effect from 1st April, 2013 for a period of five years or till the implementation of the goods and services Tax, whichever is earlier. But, the dealer has deposited the CST at the rate 1.5%, though he was included in the negative list, and did not entitle for concessional rate of tax and required to be deposit CST at the rate 2%. Thus, the dealer was assessed by the authority on the CST at the rate 2%.” 4. Aggrieved by the order dated 14.01.2022 passed by the Assessing Authority, the respondent filed an appeal before the appellate authority, which dismissed the appeal vide order dated 24.06.2022. 5. Thereafter being aggrieved by the orders passed by both the authorities below, the respondent filed an appeal before the learned Tribunal, who vide its order dated 16.03.2024, allowed the same and the orders passed by both the authorities below were ordered to be quashed and set aside. 6. Aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Tribunal, the State has filed the instant revision petition. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 7. At the outset, it needs to be noticed that the sole ground on which the learned Tribunal allowed the appeal filed by the respondent was that the authorities below had failed to take into consideration the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lloyd Electric and Engineering Limited vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors, (2015) 10 SCR 382 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the State Government cannot speak in two voices. 8. It was further observed by the learned Tribunal that once the Hon’ble Supreme Court had clearly emphasized on one policy, then this aspect should have been necessarily considered by the appellate authority while deciding the appeal and concluded that the assessment done in this case should have not been done in a perfunctory manner and was warranted upon proper adjudication as to willful default and the presence of mens rea, and allowed the appeal. 9. The reasoning as accorded by the learned Tribunal is as under:- “The Hon'ble Supreme court of India in the case of Lloyd Electric and Engineering... vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors on 3 September, 2015 held that:- “The State Government cannot speak in two voices. 9. The reasoning as accorded by the learned Tribunal is as under:- “The Hon'ble Supreme court of India in the case of Lloyd Electric and Engineering... vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors on 3 September, 2015 held that:- “The State Government cannot speak in two voices. Once the cabinet takes a policy decision to extend its 2004 Industrial Policy in the matter of CST concession to the eligible units beyond 31-03-2009, up to 31.03.2013, and the Notification dated 29-05-2009, accordingly, having been issued by the Department concerned, viz., Department of Industries, thereafter, the Excise and Laxation Department cannot take a different stand. What is given by the right hand cannot be taken by the left hand. The Government shall speak only in one voice. It has only one policy. The departments are to implement the Government policy and not their own policy'”. In view of the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court I am of the view that any industry which is cover under the concessional benefits of Industrial policy should be following one policy which is primarily industrial policy. Such incentives are provided to industrial enterprises to encourage and facilitate industrial set up. The boost the confidence of industrial enterprises harmonizing of all policy directions into one policy is must for continued relevance. The State Government at its own consideration has given this form of tax incentive. Independent policy direction by separate departments creates dilemma in the minds of Industrial Entrepreneurs. As per the admission of the appellant he is agreeing to levy 1.5% on sales made against Form C rather than 2% rate of tax which shows that there is no willful act of omission. It is expounded that no default penalty could be imposed in the manifest absence of demonstrable intent not pay tax or a refusal to pay tax. iii) The law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lloyed Electric and Engineering V/s State of Himachal Pradesh & ors. Dated 03-09-2015 (Supra) and the decision of Suprabhat Steel Limited High Court of Patna speak clearly to emphasize on one policy. This aspect should had been necessarily considered by the Appellate Authority while deciding the appeal. The Assessment done in this case should had not been done in a perfunctory manner and is warranted upon proper adjudication as to willful default and the presence of mens rea. This aspect should had been necessarily considered by the Appellate Authority while deciding the appeal. The Assessment done in this case should had not been done in a perfunctory manner and is warranted upon proper adjudication as to willful default and the presence of mens rea. (iv) I am convinced by the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Lloyd Electric and Engineering Vs State of Himachal Pradesh and by the Hon'ble Patna High Court in the case of State of Bihar Vs. Suprabhat Steel Limited and Ors. The collateral reading of the above stated judgments and in view of the discussions made hereinabove, I find that the appeal should be allowed and hence accepted and the impugned order dated 17-07-2023 of Appellate Authority is set aside. It is also declared that the appellant shall be entitled to the concessional CST rate of 1.5% instead of 2% for the period thereof.” 10. The manner in which the learned Tribunal has decided the appeal, leaves much to desire. It would have been more appropriate for the learned Tribunal to have considered the facts before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lloyds case (supra) rather than commenting upon the orders passed by the assessing as well as appellate authority that the same has been passed in a perfunctory manner. We are at complete loss to understand as to what the learned Tribunal meant when it observed as under:- “The assessment done in this case should not had been done in a perfunctory manner and is warranted upon proper adjudication as to willful default and the presence of mens rea.” 11. It is more than settled that it is the ratio of a case which is applicable and not what logically flows therefrom. A case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not logically flows from it. Observations of court are not to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statutes. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear and judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. 12. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn vs. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 “Now before discussing the case of Allen Vs. These observations must be read in the context in which they appear and judgments of courts are not to be construed as statutes. 12. On the subject of precedents Lord Halsbury, L.C., said in Quinn vs. Leathem, 1901 AC 495 “Now before discussing the case of Allen Vs. Flood (1898) AC1 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” 13. Lord Mac Dermot in London Graving Dock Co. Ltd. V. Horton ( 1951 AC 737 at P.761 ), observed: “The matter cannot, of course, be settled merely by treating the ipsissima vertra of Willes, J. as though they were part of an Act of Parliament and applying the rules of interpretation appropriate thereto. This is not to detract from the great weight to be given to the language actually used by that most distinguished Judge.” 14. Lord Reid in Home Office. V. Dorset Yatch Co. (1970 (2) All ER 294) said: “Lord Atkin’s speech..is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.” Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: “One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.” 15. (1970 (2) All ER 294) said: “Lord Atkin’s speech..is not to be treated as if it was a statute definition. It will require qualification in new circumstances.” Megarry, J. in (1971) 1 WLR 1062 observed: “One must not, of course, construe even a reserved judgment of even Russell L.J. as if it were an Act of Parliament.” 15. Lord Morris in Herrington v. British Railways Board, (1972) 2 WLR 537 said: “There is always peril in treating the words of a speech or judgment as though they are worlds in a legislative enactment, and it is to be remembered that judicial utterances made in the setting of the facts of a particular case.” 16. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying precedents have become locus classicus:- “Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. In deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide, therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.” xxx xxx xxx “Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.” 17. In Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and others (1987) 1 SCC 213 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case. Relying on Quinn v. Leathem (1901) AC 495 , it has been held that the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically flows from it. 18. In Krishena Kumar v. Union of India and others (1990) 4 SCC 207 , the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the concept of ratio decidendi, has referred to Caledonian Railway Co. 18. In Krishena Kumar v. Union of India and others (1990) 4 SCC 207 , the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the concept of ratio decidendi, has referred to Caledonian Railway Co. v. Walker’s Trustees (1882) 7 App Cas 259:46 LT 826 (HL) and Quinn (supra) and the observations made by Sir Frederick Pollock and thereafter proceeded to state as follows:- “The ratio decidendi is the underlying principle, namely, the general reasons or the general grounds upon which the decision is based on the test or abstract from the specific peculiarities of the particular case which gives rise to the decision. The ratio decidendi has to be ascertained by an analysis of the facts of the case and the process of reasoning involving the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law, either statutory or judge- made, and a minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. If it is not clear, it is not the duty of the court to spell it out with difÏculty in order to be bound by it. In the words of Halsbury (4 th edn., Vol.26, para 573).” “The concrete decision alone is binding between the parties to it but it is the abstract ratio decidendi, as ascertained on a consideration of the judgment in relation to the subject matter of the decision, which alone has the force of law and which when it is clear it is not part of a tribunal’s duty to spell out with difÏculty a ratio decidendi in order to bound by it, and it is always dangerous to take one or two observations out of a long judgment and treat them as if they gave the ratio decidendi of the case. If more reasons than one are given by a tribunal for its judgment, all are taken as forming the ratio decidendi.” (Emphasis added) 19. In Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka (2003) 6 SCC 697 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has made the following observations:- “2.....The ratio decidendi of a judgment has to be found out only on reading the entire judgment. Infact, the ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgment itself. The answer to the question would necessarily have to be read in the context of what is set out in the judgment and not in isolation. Infact, the ratio of the judgment is what is set out in the judgment itself. The answer to the question would necessarily have to be read in the context of what is set out in the judgment and not in isolation. In case of any doubt as regards any observations, reasons and principles, the other part of the judgment has to be looked into. By reading a line here and there from the judgment, one cannot find out the entire ratio decidendi of the judgment.” 20. In Union of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda and another (2004) 3 SCC 75 , it has been stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid’s theorems nor as provisions of the statute and that too taken out of their context. The observations must be read in the context in which they appear to have been stated. To interpret words, phrases and provisions of a statute, it may become necessary for judges to embark into lengthy discussions but the discussion is meant to explain and not to define. Judges interpret statutes, they do not interpret judgments. They interpret words of statutes; their words are not to be interpreted as statutes. 21. In State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas (2006) 1 SCC 275 , it has been stated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court thus:- “12......According to the well-settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates: (i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct, or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment.” 22. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Raj Kumari and Ors.; 2007 (13) SCALE 113 , the well known proposition, namely, it is ratio of a case which is applicable and not what logically flows therefrom is enunciated in a lucid manner by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it was observed thus: “10. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Raj Kumari and Ors.; 2007 (13) SCALE 113 , the well known proposition, namely, it is ratio of a case which is applicable and not what logically flows therefrom is enunciated in a lucid manner by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it was observed thus: “10. Relinace on the decision without looking to the factual background of the case before it is clearly impermissible. A decision is a precedent on its own facts. Each case presents its own features. It is not everything said by a Judge while giving a judgment that constitutes a precedent. The only thing in a Judge’s decision binding a party is the principle upon which the case is decided and for this reason it is important to analyse a decision and isolate from it the ratio decidendi. According to the well- settled theory of precedents, every decision contains three basic postulates –(i) findings of material facts, direct and inferential. An inferential finding of facts is the inference which the Judge draws from the direct,” or perceptible facts; (ii) statements of the principles of law applicable to the legal problems disclosed by the facts; and (iii) judgment based on the combined effect of the above. A decision is an, authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically flows from the various observations made in the judgment. The enunciation of the reason or principle on which a question before a Court has been decided is alone binding as a precedent. (See:State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra and Ors. (1970) ILLJ 662 SC and Union of India and Ors. V. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. (1966) 6 SCC 44. A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. (1970) ILLJ 662 SC and Union of India and Ors. V. Dhanwanti Devi and Ors. (1966) 6 SCC 44. A case is a precedent and binding for what it explicitly decides and no more. The words used by Judges in their judgments are not to be read as if they are words in Act of Parliament. In Quinn v. Leathern (1901) AC 495 (H.L.), Earl of Halsbury LC observed that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which are found there are not intended to be exposition of the whole law but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in wich such expressions are found and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides.” 23. In Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka (2008) 3 SCC 574 the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that judgments are not to be construed as statutes. Nor words or phrases in judgments to be interpreted like provisions of a statute. Some words used in a judgment should be read and understood contextually and are not intended to be taken literally. Many a time a judge uses a phrase or expression with the intention of emphasizing a point or accentuating a principle or even by way of a flourish of writing style. 24. Ratio decidendi of a judgment is not to be discerned from a stray word or phrase read in isolation ( See : Arasmeta Captive Power Company Private Limited and another v. Lafarge India Private Limited AIR 2014 SC 525 .) 25. The simple question before the learned Tribunal was whether the respondent despite falling in the negative list would still be entitled to the tax rebate as set out in the notification dated 01.04.2013, that too, for the period 2015-16, especially, when it was not disputed before the authorities below that the industrial unit of the respondent falls in the ‘negative list’. 26. 26. Adverting to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which formed the sole basis of allowing the claim of the respondent by the learned Tribunal, it needs to be noticed that the facts therein were that Industrial Policy 2004 was notified by the State of Himachal Pradesh providing for inter alia at Clause 10.3 concessional rate in Central Sales Tax, which reads as under:- “10.3 Central Sales Tax at a concessional rate of 1% shall be leviable on the goods manufactured by new and existing industrial units (as defined under these Rules) unless provided otherwise elsewhere under these Rules, upto 31-03-2009. This incentive will not be provided to industrial unit engaged in the production of breweries, distilleries, non-fruit based wineries and bottling plants (both for country liquor and Indian made foreign Liquor).” It is not in dispute that the appellant was found eligible for the said concession since it satisfied the parameters prescribed in the notification till 31.03.2009. It is seen from the Cabinet Note on extension of the incentive of concessional rate of CST @ 1 per cent beyond 31.03.2009 to industrial enterprises of the State of Himachal Pradesh prepared on 19.05.2009, the issue whether the concession should be extended beyond 31.03.2009 for some more time, was specifically addressed. To quote the relevant discussion: “3. … The State Government has been vigorously pursuing at various levels with Government of India the case for the extension of the Special Package for our State announced in January 2013 till at least March 2013 as it expires in March 2010. In the absence of any decision or any positive indications so far, it is imperative that the State Government also at its own level considers taking such initiatives by way of which Industrial Enterprises being set up in our State could be provided some basic attraction in the form of tax incentives and a facilitating environment. Availability of such incentives in the neighbouring State such as Uttarakhand where the incentive of 1% CST is available to the industrial units till March, 2014 renders our State uncompetitive and Unattractive to industrial investors. During the year 2007-08 the Industrial Enterprises of the Ste had contributed a sum of Rs.113.47 Crores to State exchequer through 1% CST. Availability of such incentives in the neighbouring State such as Uttarakhand where the incentive of 1% CST is available to the industrial units till March, 2014 renders our State uncompetitive and Unattractive to industrial investors. During the year 2007-08 the Industrial Enterprises of the Ste had contributed a sum of Rs.113.47 Crores to State exchequer through 1% CST. In case the incentive of 1% CST is not restored till the time the CST is phased out by Central Government it will affect the viability of units adversely and majority of big Enterprises may resort to branch transfer/consignment sales outside the State to avoid 2% CST to maintain their competitiveness. It is therefore proposed that the incentive of concessional rate of Central Sales Tax @ 1% be allowed to be continued beyond 31st March, 2009 till March 2013 or till the time CST is phased out.” 27. It was not disputed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the appellant therein was found eligible for said concession since it satisfied the parameters prescribed in the notification till 31.03.2009. These incentives were thereafter extended not only for five years up to 19.05.2009 but were thereafter extended vide notification dated 29.05.2009 upto 31.03.2013 or till the time CST is phased out or whichever is earlier. 28. It shall be apt to reproduce the notification, which reads as under:- “Notification In partial modification of this department notification No. Ind.A(F)6-7/2004 dated 30 th December, 2004 notifying Industry Policy 2004 regarding grant of Incentives Concessions and Facilities to Industrial Units Himachal Pradesh-2004, the Governor, Himachal Pradesh is pleased to extend the incentive of validity of concessional rate of CST @ 1% upto 31.03.2013 in Rules 10.3 of Industry Policy, 2004 or till the time CST is phased out, whichever is earlier.” 29. Thereafter, the Excise and Taxation Department of the State Government issued statutory Notification under Section 8(5)(b) of the CST Act, which reads as under:- “2. Thereafter, the Excise and Taxation Department of the State Government issued statutory Notification under Section 8(5)(b) of the CST Act, which reads as under:- “2. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) of sub-section (5) of section “8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Central Act No. 74 of 1956), the Governor of Himachal Pradesh is pleased to direct that in respect of the sale in the courses of inter-State trade or commerce of the goods (other than those manufactured by the breweries, distilleries, nonfruit/vegetable based wineries and bottling plants (both of country liquor and Indian made foreign liquor) manufactured by the dealers running any existing industrial unit or new industrial unit (other than those new industrial units which are located in the tax free industrial zone) in the State of Himachal Pradesh, and are registered as dealer with Excise and Taxation Department, Himachal Pradesh, the tax levied under sub-section (1) of section 8 of the said Act shall be calculated and payable at the rate of 1% of the taxable turnover of such goods with immediate effect for the period ending 31.03.2013.” 30. The question that arose before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether the appellant therein was liable to pay CST at 2% interest on the inter-State trade for the period 01.04.2009 to 17.06.2009 or at 1% in view of the Industrial Policy of the State Government. It was contended before the Hon’ble Supreme Court by the State that since notification under the Act providing for tax concession was issued only on 18.06.2009, wherein it was specifically mentioned that notification would have immediate effect and would operate from the period ending on 31.03.2013. Therefore, the appellant therein was not entitled to CST concession at the rate of 1% for the intervening period between 01.04.2009 to 18.06.2009, whereas it was contended by the appellant that in view of the policy decision already taken by the State Government extending the tax concession beyond 31.03.2009 to 31.03.2013, the Excise and Taxation Department of the State Government cannot take a different view and deny the tax concession for the period 01.04.2009 to 18.06.2009-the date of the notification under Section 8(5)(b) of the Act. It was in this factual background that the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the aforesaid observations. 31. It was in this factual background that the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the aforesaid observations. 31. However, the fact situation obtaining in the instant case is entirely different because after the policy of 2009, as taken note of by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, that came to an end on 31.03.2013, the Government of Himachal Pradesh issued fresh notification on 01.04.2013, the relevant portion whereof reads as under:- “2. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers vested in her under clause (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (Act No. 74 of 1956), the Governor of Himachal Pradesh, is pleased to direct that in respect of the sale in the course of inter-state trade or commerce of the goods (other than those manufactured by the breweries, distilleries, non-fruits/vegetables based wineries and bottling plants (both of country liquor, Indian made foreign liquor) and industrial units specified in negative list) manufactured by the dealers running any existing industrial unit in the State of Himachal Pradesh, the tax levied under sub-section (1) of Section 8 of the Act ibid, shall be calculated and payable at a concessional rate of 1.5% of the taxable turnover of such goods with effect from 1st April, 2013 for a period of five years or till the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax, whichever is earlier.” 32. This notification clearly excluded the industrial units specified in the negative list from the concessional rate of 1.5% of the taxable turnover of such goods w.e.f. 01.04.2013 for a period of five years or till the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax Act, whichever is earlier. 33. Admittedly, at the relevant period, the Goods and Services Tax Act had not been implemented as it came to be implemented only in the year 2017 and, therefore, it was this notification dated 01.04.2013, which was to govern the case of the respondent. 34. As regards the expression ‘Negative List’, the same was to be assigned the meaning as given in the department notification dated 30.03.2005 and further amended vide notification dated 23.10.2009. The unit of the respondent falls in Entry No. 22 which reads as under:- “22. Mini steel plants induction/Arc/Submerged furnances and/or rolling mills.” 35. Once the industrial unit of the respondent was specified in the ‘Negative List’, obviously it could not have been held entitled to concessional rate of tax. 36. The unit of the respondent falls in Entry No. 22 which reads as under:- “22. Mini steel plants induction/Arc/Submerged furnances and/or rolling mills.” 35. Once the industrial unit of the respondent was specified in the ‘Negative List’, obviously it could not have been held entitled to concessional rate of tax. 36. Confronted with this, learned counsel for the respondent would as a last ditch effort urge that since the notification dated 01.04.2013 had been issued under the CST Act, therefore, the State was not competent to import the meaning of ‘Negative List’ from the notifications dated 30.03.2005 or 23.10.2009, which had been issued under entirely a different statute i.e. under the H.P. General Tax Act, 1968. 37. At first blush, the argument does appear to be attractive, however, it needs to be noticed that normally word or expression defined in one statute as judicially interpreted does not afford a guide to construction of the same word(s) or expression(s) in another statute, unless both the statutes are pari materia legislation, but then there is one exception that if it is so provided in one statute to give same meaning to the words as defined in another statute. 38. Reference in this regard can conveniently be made to the decision of the three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jagat Ram Ahuja vs. Commissioner of Gift Tax, Hyderabad (2000) 8 SCC 249 39. Even otherwise, the State was well within its competence to rely upon the expression in ‘Negative List’ as assigned in the departmental notification referred to above when the notification was dealing with a cognate subject. 40. It is rather unfortunate that the learned Tribunal did not care to go through the judgment in Lloyd’s case (supra) and unnecessarily commented upon the working of the Assessing Authority as well as the first Appellate Authority and allowed the appeal that too without giving any cogent reasons. 41. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the reasons stated above, we find merit in this petition and the same is accordingly allowed and the order passed by the learned Tribunal on 16.03.2024 is quashed and set aside and the Assessment order dated 14.01.2021 is affirmed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.