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2025 DIGILAW 779 (HP)

Badardeen v. State of H. P.

2025-04-22

G.S. SANDHAWALIA, RANJAN SHARMA

body2025
JUDGMENT : G.S. Sandhawalia , C.J. CMP (M) 1259 of 2024 has been filed for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal, since the judgment was passed by the learned Single Judge on 21.12.2023 in CWPOA No. 3319 of 2020. 2. In the application, it is mentioned that the appeal could not be filed within time as there was vacation in the Court and mother-in-law of the appellant, who was residing in Kishtwar District, was suffering from geriatric disease, but later on she was detected with malignancy of cervix, due to which he had to visit different hospitals for the treatment of his mother-in-law. 3. The application was contested by the respondents-State by filing reply, wherein the averments made in the application were denied. 4. Keeping in view the settled principles of law laid down in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Smt. Katiji and others, (1987) 2 SCC 107 , that each and every day’s delay is not to be explained, we are of the considered opinion that the application is liable to be allowed as sufficient cause has been made out. Accordingly, the application is allowed and delay in filing the appeal is condoned. 5. However, we are not inclined to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge on merits, whereby the original application/writ petition was dismissed, since there was inordinate delay in approaching the H.P. State Administrative Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal) as such. 6. The learned Single Judge had noticed that there was a delay of seven years in challenging the impugned order (Annexure A-11) pertaining to compulsory retirement of the appellant. The impugned order was passed on 03.11.2010 which was sought to be challenged before the Tribunal by filing the Original Application. The said application was transferred to this Court which was registered as CWPOA No. 3319 of 2020 and the same was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 21.12.2023. 7. The learned Single Judge had relied upon the Seven Judges Bench judgment of the Apex Court rendered in S.S. Rathore Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh , (1989) 4 SCC 582. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Union of India & others Vs. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 to submit that it was recurring cause of action. 9. State of Madhya Pradesh , (1989) 4 SCC 582. 8. Learned Counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Union of India & others Vs. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 to submit that it was recurring cause of action. 9. We have gone through the aforesaid judgment, which is not applicable in the present case as that was a case of disability pension and the writ petitioner therein was invalidated out of army service, in medical category. There was delay in approaching the High Court and limited relief had been granted by the learned Single Judge. Thereafter, the matter was taken to the Division Bench of the High Court, since the employee was not satisfied by the decision of the Single Judge as arrears were not released beyond 38 months. The appeal was allowed by the High Court and it was held that the employee was entitled to disability pension from the date it fell due and the same would not have been restricted to a period of three years and two months prior to the filing of the writ petition and the interest was also granted. 10. In such circumstances, Union of India had taken the matter to the Apex Court, wherein the appeals of the Union of India were allowed, limiting the relief only for three years years before the date of writ petition. In such circumstance, the observations flowed that principles regarding recurring wrongs would be applicable and the High Court would have restricted the arrears and consequential relief. Therefore, the said judgment is not applicable to the present case. 11. In the present case, the issue was regarding the penalty of reduction to a lower stage by order dated 17.08.2009. An appeal had been preferred by the present appellant before the Appellate Authority and during the pendency of the same, the Appellate Authority had issued a show cause notice to the appellant-petitioner stating therein that the punishment imposed upon him was on the lessor side, as the allegation against the petitioner-appellant was that he was under the influence of liquor while performing his duty as a driver, and he was compulsorily retired on 08.11.2010. 12. 12. Apparently, the appellant was satisfied with the order of the Appellate Authority and chose not to challenge the same within the statutory period provided and after seven years, filed the Original Application in the year 2017, saying that the penalty imposed upon him was a harsh penalty. 13. The learned Single Judge has relied upon the judgment in S.S. Rathore’s case (supra) and come to the conclusion that the order passed by the Appellate Authority ought to have been challenged within the statutory period as envisaged under the Administrative Tribunals Act and the original application/writ petition was dismissed on the ground of period of limitation. It is settled principle that the initial period of limitation as such cannot be condoned beyond the period prescribed and it is also specifically provided under the Statute under which the petitioner had to seek relief before the Tribunal. Reference can be made to Section 21 of Administrative Tribunals Act :- “21. Limitation . - (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,- (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where- (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub- section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.” 14. The judgment in S.S. Rathore’s case (supra) also elaborates this issue. The Apex Court in the said judgment was dealing with the issue whether the limitation has to be calculated from the date when the cause of action first arose. The petitioner in that case, had been non-suited. Resultantly, it was held that in service matters, the order of the higher Authority would give cause of action. Accordingly, the issue of limitation was decided in favour of the petitioner and the matter was remanded to be decided accordingly. 15. The observations were also made regarding provisions of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act , whereby the period for making an application for condonation of delay has been prescribed one year and the period for exercising power of condonation of delay of a total period has been prescribed as six months. 16. 15. The observations were also made regarding provisions of Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act , whereby the period for making an application for condonation of delay has been prescribed one year and the period for exercising power of condonation of delay of a total period has been prescribed as six months. 16. Resultantly, the aforesaid judgment as such has been rightly relied upon as it is the settled principle that the person who is negligent as such and has chosen not to litigate within the prescribed period of limitation cannot, at the belated stage, be permitted to raise the dispute, otherwise Courts would be flooded with litigation at the hands of indolent litigants. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that there was considerable delay of seven years in approaching the Tribunal and the view taken by the learned Single Judge, does not suffer from any illegality to persuade us to entertain the appeal and take a different view. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. 17. Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.