JUDGMENT : 1. Instant criminal appeal under Section 374 Cr.P.C. has been filed by the appellants challenging the judgment dated 21.11.2014 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Prevention of Women Atrocities, Jodhpur Metropolitan, in Sessions Case No.89/2013 by which the learned trial court convicted the appellants for offence under Section 498A IPC and sentenced them to undergo three years SI along with fine of Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine to further undergo two months SI. 2. Brief facts of the case are that on 09.12.2010, complainant Santosh Kumar submitted a first information report at Police Station Soorsagar to the effect that two years ago, marriage of his sister Akta was solemnized with appellant No.1 Ramswaroop. After the marriage, the accused-appellants started harassing the complainant’s sister for bringing less dowry. The complainant further alleged that on 09.12.2010, the accused appellants murdered his sister Akta for dowry. On the said complaint, Police registered an FIR against the accused appellants and started investigation. 3. On completion of investigation, the police filed the challan for offence under Sections 304B & 498A IPC. Thereafter, the trial court framed the charge against the accused-appellants, who denied the charges and claimed trial. 4. During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many as sixteen witnesses and also exhibited certain documents. Thereafter, statements of the accused-appellants were recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C. In defence, three witnesses were produced by the appellants. 5. Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court vide impugned judgment dated 21.11.2014 convicted and sentenced the accused-appellants for offence under Section 498A of IPC. 6. Hence, this criminal appeal. 7. Learned Public Prosecutor has submitted a custody report dated 04.11.2022 received from the Central Jail, Jodhpur, according to which, the appellant No.1 Ramswaroop has already served total sentence of three years and has been released from jail. The said report is hereby taken on record. 8. Since the appellant No.1 has already served the total sentence of three years and has already been released from jail, therefore, the criminal appeal qua appellant No.1 Ramswaroop is dismissed. 9. The said report is hereby taken on record. 8. Since the appellant No.1 has already served the total sentence of three years and has already been released from jail, therefore, the criminal appeal qua appellant No.1 Ramswaroop is dismissed. 9. So far as appellant No.2 is concerned, counsel submits that she is a lady, aged about 75 years and she remained in custody for some time and she has no other criminal antecedents and she has been sentenced to three years imprisonment for offence under Section 498A IPC, therefore, appellant No.2 may be granted benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. To buttress his contentions, counsel has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Dalla Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan, 2022 (2) Cri. LR (Raj.). 10. Learned counsel for the accused-appellants however, makes a limited prayer that the accused-appellant No.2 may be granted benefit under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'): "4. Power of court to release certain offenders on probation of good conduct:- (1) When any person is found guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and the character of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the peace and be of good behaviour: Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any, has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond. (2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in relation to the case. (3)... (4)... (5)... " 11. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the appeal and submits that looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the case and the well reasoned speaking order passed by the learned court below, the accused-appellant No.2 is not entitled for any indulgence by this Court. 12. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case. 13. In Arvind Mohan Sinha Vs. Amulya Kumar Biswas, (1974) 4 SCC, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:- "The Probation of Offenders Act is a reformative measure and its object is to reclaim amateur offenders who, if spared the indignity of incarceration, can be usefully rehabilitated in society. In recalcitrant cases, punishment has to be deterrent so that others similarly minded may warn themselves of the hazards of taking to a career of crime. But the novice who strays into the path of crime ought, in the interest of society, be treated as being socially sick. Crimes are not always rooted in criminal tendencies and their origin may lie in psychological factors induced by hunger, want and poverty. The Probation of Offenders act recognises the importance of environmental influence in the commission of crimes and prescribes a remedy whereby the offender can be reformed and rehabilitated in society." 14. In Brij Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan, RLW 2022 Raj 945, a Coordinate Bench of this Court observed as under:- "Under Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act nature of offence is one of the major-criteria for determining whether benefit of this provision should be given to the concerned offender or not. His age would be another relevant factor and the circumstance in which the offence was committed may be 3rd important consideration... " 15. In Mohd. Hashim Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2017) 2 SCC 198 , while reiterating the ratio decidendi laid down in Dalbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under: "... " 15. In Mohd. Hashim Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2017) 2 SCC 198 , while reiterating the ratio decidendi laid down in Dalbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana, (2000) 5 SCC 82 , the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under: "... The Court has further opined that though the discretion as been vested in the court to decide when and how the court should form such opinion, yet the provision itself provides sufficient indication that releasing the convicted person on probation of good conduct must appear to the Court to be expedient..." In Lakhvir Singh and Ors. Vs. The State of Punjab and Ors., (2021) 2 SCC 763 wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court of India, with regard to the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 vis-a-vis those Acts wherein a minimum sentence of imprisonment has been prescribed by the legislature, observed as under:- "Even though, Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the PC Act') prescribes a minimum sentence of imprisonment for not less than 1 year, an exception was carved out keeping in mind the application of the Act. In Ishar Das (supra), this Court noted that if the object of the legislature was that the Act does not apply to all cases where a minimum sentence of imprisonment is prescribed, there was no reason to specifically provide an exception for Section 5(2) of the PC Act. The fact that Section 18 of the Act does not include any other such offences where a mandatory minimum sentence has been prescribed suggests that the Act may be invoked in such other offences. A more nuanced interpretation on this aspect was given in CCE v. Bahubali, (1979) 2 SCC 279 . It was opined that the Act may not apply in cases where a specific law enacted after 1958 prescribes a mandatory minimum sentence, and the law contains a non-obstante clause. Thus, the benefits of the Act did not apply in case of mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by special legislation enacted after the Act.5 It is in this context, it was observed in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das (Supra) that the court cannot award a sentence less than the mandatory sentence prescribed by the statute. Thus, the benefits of the Act did not apply in case of mandatory minimum sentences prescribed by special legislation enacted after the Act.5 It is in this context, it was observed in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das (Supra) that the court cannot award a sentence less than the mandatory sentence prescribed by the statute. We are of the view that the corollary to the aforesaid legal decisions ends with a conclusion that the benefit of probation under the said Act is not excluded by the provisions of the mandatory minimum sentence Under Section 397 of Indian Penal Code, the offence in the present case. In fact, the observation made in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, ILR (1981) P&H 1 are in the same context." 16. This Court observes that there is no material on record that the accused-appellant No.2 has any criminal antecedents. Thus, this Court, after taking into due consideration the legislative intent of the Act and the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Arvind Mohan (supra), Mohd. Hashim (supra) and in Lakhvir Singh, and by this Hon'ble Court in Brij Lal (supra), deems it appropriate to extend the benefit of the Act to the accused-appellant No.2. 17. Resultantly, the present appeal is partly allowed. While maintaining the conviction of the present accused-appellant No.2 Smt. Koyali @ Kaushalya for the offence under Section 498-A IPC, as recorded by the learned Court below in the impugned judgment, this Court interferes only with the sentence part of the said judgment, and directs that the appellant no.2 shall be released on probation, under Section 4 of the Act, upon her furnishing a personal bond in the sum of Rs.50,000/- and two sureties in the sum of Rs.25,000/- each to the satisfaction of the learned trial court with a further undertaking that she shall maintain peace and good behaviour for a period of two years and shall not repeat the offence. 18. The fine amount is hereby maintained. Two months’ time is granted to deposit the fine amount before the trial court. The fine amount, if any, already deposited by the appellant No.2 shall be adjusted. If the appellant No.2 fails to deposit the fine amount, she shall undergo the default sentence. The appellant no.2 is on bail. She need not surrender. Her bail bonds stand discharged accordingly. All pending applications stand disposed of. The fine amount, if any, already deposited by the appellant No.2 shall be adjusted. If the appellant No.2 fails to deposit the fine amount, she shall undergo the default sentence. The appellant no.2 is on bail. She need not surrender. Her bail bonds stand discharged accordingly. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the learned court below be sent back forthwith.