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2025 DIGILAW 781 (HP)

Kundan Lal v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-04-22

AJAY MOHAN GOEL

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JUDGMENT : Ajay Mohan Goel, J. By way of this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the appellate order passed by Assistant Registrar Cooperative Societies, Una, District Una, H.P., dated 29.10.2019, in an Appeal preferred under Section 93 of the H.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1968, against the order dated 22.04.2019, passed by Arbitrator-cum-Retired District AuditOfficer, Cooperative Societies, Una. 2. This writ petition, in terms whereof the appellate order that was passed on 29.10.2019 stands challenged, was filed in this Court on 20.07.2023. 3. When this Court asked the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as to what is the justification in assailing the order that was passed in the year 2019 after 3 ½ years, learned counsel drew the attention of the Court to Paragraph No.14 of the writ petition and submitted that in terms of the averments made therein, the petitioner, who was being represented by his counsel namely Mr. Vikas Kashyap, was not apprised by Mr. Vikas Kashyap of the passing of the order by the Appellate Authority. When the petitioner contacted his counsel for taking his brief back on 30.05.2023, he was asked to come again as on account of the shifting of the office by learned counsel, locating the brief was likely to take some time. Thereafter, the petitioner collected the brief from his counsel on 22.06.2023. The petitioner could not contact his counsel in between, after the filing of the Appeal till the month of May, 2023, as he was suffering from Cancer as well as COVID-19 breakdown. On the strength of this explanation given in the writ petition, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as the delay is bona fide, therefore, the same be condoned. He also submitted that the counsel, who was earlier representing the petitioner, was asked by the petitioner to file his affidavit, but he refused to do so. On a query put to the learned counsel as to whether any action was initiated by the petitioner against said counsel for deficiency in service or unfair trade practice, the Court stands informed that no such action was taken. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, to substantiate his arguments that the petition should not be dismissed on account of delays and latches :- (i) B.T. Purushothama Rai Vs. K.G. Uthaya and others, (2011) 14 SCC 86 . 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the following judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, to substantiate his arguments that the petition should not be dismissed on account of delays and latches :- (i) B.T. Purushothama Rai Vs. K.G. Uthaya and others, (2011) 14 SCC 86 . (ii) Sushila Narahari and others Vs. Nandakumar and another, (1996) 5 SCC 529 . 5. This Court is of the considered view that the explanation which has been given in paragraph No. 14 of the writ petition, does not justifies the delay of almost 3 ½ years in approaching the High Court, against the order passed by the Appellate Authority. In fact, a perusal of the appellate order demonstrates that the Award which was assailed by way of the Appeal, was passed on 22.04.2019. Thereafter, the Appeal was preferred and the same was decided by the Authority on 29.10.2019 i.e. within a period of 4-5 months of the Award, as is being passed by the learned Arbitrator. The contention of the petitioner that on account of his illness, he could not contact his counsel, does not satisfies the judicial conscious of the Court because we are not living in a primitive era, wherein, it was only physical exertion on the part of the litigant which allowed him to get in touch with his counsel. Further it is not the case of the petitioner that neither he nor his counsel were having any telephone facilities, be it landline or mobile phone. Otherwise also, the act of the petitioner of not ascertaining the fate of his Appeal for almost 3 ½ years, does not demonstrates prudence on his part. The party which is the beneficiary of the appellate order, legitimately expects the order to be assailed either within the period of limitation, if any, prescribed or within some reasonable period. With the passage of time, when no challenge is laid to the order, the other party has a legitimate expectation that now the order has attained finality. Such party cannot be taken by the surprise by the High Court by entertaining belated writ petitions, because if this is allowed, then the very purpose of due diligence to be exercised by the litigants would be defeated. 6. At this stage, this Court would refer to the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner. In B.T. Purushothama Rai Vs. 6. At this stage, this Court would refer to the judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner. In B.T. Purushothama Rai Vs. K.G. Uthaya and others (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with the issue of delay in the backdrop of the fact that though the litigant was pursuing his remedy but the same was being pursued before wrong jurisdiction on the basis of erroneous advise. It is in this backdrop that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold that as the litigant had spent nearly two decades, pursuing the wrong proceedings based on wrong advise, the condonation of delay by the Court concerned was justified as the object of providing legal remedy is to repair the damage caused as a result of legal injury. 7. This Court is of the considered view that this judgment does not furthers the cause of the petitioner for the reason that therein the Hon’ble Supreme was dealing with a case wherein the parties were not sleeping over their rights, but were unfortunately pursuing the remedy before Court(s), having no jurisdiction, based on wrong advise. 8. Similarly, in the second judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner i.e. Sushila Narahari and others Vs. Nandakumar and another (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with a case wherein the prayer was for condonation of 40 days delay in filing the case. It is in this backdrop that the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to condone the delay and it was not a case wherein the delay was of 3 ½ years. 9. In view of the above discussion, as the petitioner has not been able to satisfactorily explain the delay in filing the petition, this writ petition is dismissed on the ground of delays and latches. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of accordingly.