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2025 DIGILAW 782 (HP)

Babli Thakur v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2025-04-23

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 123/2016 dated 28 th April 2016, registered at Police Station, Dhalli, Shimla for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), consequential criminal proceedings arising out of the FIR and charges framed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court no. 1, Shimla (learned Trial Court) on 7 th June 2024, in a casetitled State versus Babli. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner in which they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that a complaint was filed before the police against the petitioner/accused asserting that the High Court of Himachal Pradesh had directed the registration of the FIR in cases of encroachment of Forest land in CWPIL No. 17/2014 titled Court on its own motion versus the State of HP vide order dated 27 th February 2016. The petitioner had encroached upon 10 Biswas of Forest land in U-257 Kumahali bearing Khasra Nos. 135/1 and 135/2. She constructed a house in three Biswas of land bearing Khasra No.135/2 and encroached 7 Biswas of land in Khasra No. 135/1. Eight weeks were given to her to vacate the land and remove the encroachment but she failed to do so; hence it was requested that an FIR be registered against her. The police registered the FIR and conducted an investigation. The police found that the petitioner had committed an offence punishable under Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) by encroaching upon the Forest land. Hence the police filed a charge sheet against the accused before the Competent Court. Learned Trial Court ordered the framing of charges against the accused. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, filing of charge sheet and framing of charges, the petitioner has filed the present petition seeking their quashing. It is asserted that paternal relatives of the petitioner executed a Will in her favour on 4 th April 1986 and bequeathed the land in village Chanana and Nehra Kumahali to her. A mutation was sanctioned in her favour on 22 nd May 1987. The petitioner was told in the year 2002 that the land bequeathed to her was forest land. The petitioner disputed this claim. A mutation was sanctioned in her favour on 22 nd May 1987. The petitioner was told in the year 2002 that the land bequeathed to her was forest land. The petitioner disputed this claim. No demarcation was conducted in her presence. The petitioner filled up a form for the regularization of land as per the scheme formulated by the State Government. The State Government initiated the proceedings under HP Public Premises and Land Eviction and Rent Recovery Act, 1971 by serving a show cause notice dated 19 th September 2006 upon the petitioner. The petitioner contested the proceedings. The collector passed an order of eviction on 1 st August 2016 against the petitioner. The petitioner filed an appeal, which was dismissed on 9 th March 2017. The petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court, which was registered as CWP No. 1348 of 2017 titled Smt. Babli Thakur versus State of HP. The High Court stayed the operation of the eviction order. The matter is pending before the High Court. The initiation of criminal proceedings was barred by limitation. The contents of the FIR and the statements of witnesses do not show the date of the commission of the offence. No prima facie case is made out against the petitioner. The ingredients of Section 441 were not alleged in the complaint. The allegations in the FIR are contradictory and do not constitute the commission of any cognizable offence. The matter is pending before the High Court and the continuation of proceedings before the Criminal Court is an abuse of the process of law. There is no chance of conviction of the petitioner. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed, FIR, consequential proceedings and the charge framed by the Court be quashed. 4. I have heard M/s Chandranarayan Singh and Devender Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondents/state. 5. Mr. Chandranarayan Singh learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the chargesheet is barred by limitation. The allegations in the FIR do not show the commission of a cognizable offence. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed, FIR, consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR and the charge framed by the learned Trial Court be quashed. The allegations in the FIR do not show the commission of a cognizable offence. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court; hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed, FIR, consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR and the charge framed by the learned Trial Court be quashed. He relied upon B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7, Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 268, Jit Vinayak Arolkar v. State of Goa, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 31, Ravi Kapoor v. State of H.P., 2019 SCC OnLine HP 642, Jothiragawan v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 628, Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591 , Varala Bharath Kumar v. State of Telangana, (2017) 9 SCC 413 , and Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641 in support of his submission. 6. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondents/State submitted that the trespass is a continuing wrong and the limitation does not apply to it. The allegations in the FIR show that the petitioner has encroached on the Government’s land. She was asked to remove the encroachment but she continued to remain in it with the intent to annoy the owner. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. It was specifically mentioned in the FIR that the petitioner had encroached upon the forest land bearing Khasra Nos. 135/1 and 135/2. She was asked to vacate the same by serving eight weeks’ notice, but she continued to remain in possession. These allegations prima facie constitute the commission of a cognizable offence. 12. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false and the land was bequeathed to her by her paternal relatives. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held : - “13. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held : - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060 “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 14. A similar view was taken in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat , (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 6 wherein it was observed at page 111: “29 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1-2018.]. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possesses to exercise while examining the legality of any FIR complaining commission of several cognizable offences by the accused persons. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possesses to exercise while examining the legality of any FIR complaining commission of several cognizable offences by the accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. The question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. 30 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1-2018.] . At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence nor could draw its own inferences from the contents of the FIR and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the complainants and vice versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine the questions once the charge sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 31. In our considered opinion, once the court finds that the FIR does disclose the prima facie commission of any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and allow the investigating machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth the crime in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code. 32. The very fact that the High Court in this case went into the minutest details in relation to every aspect of the case and devoted 89 pages judgment to quash the FIR in part led us to draw a conclusion that the High Court had exceeded its powers while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. We cannot concur with such an approach of the High Court. 33. The inherent powers of the High Court, which are obviously not defined being inherent in its very nature, cannot be stretched to any extent and nor can such powers be equated with the appellate powers of the High Court defined in the Code. We cannot concur with such an approach of the High Court. 33. The inherent powers of the High Court, which are obviously not defined being inherent in its very nature, cannot be stretched to any extent and nor can such powers be equated with the appellate powers of the High Court defined in the Code. The parameters laid down by this Court while exercising inherent powers must always be kept in mind else it would lead to committing a jurisdictional error in deciding the case. Such is the case here. 34. On perusal of the three complaints and the FIR mentioned above, we are of the considered view that the complaint and FIR, do disclose a prima facie commission of various cognizable offences alleged by the complainants against the accused persons and, therefore, the High Court instead of dismissing the application filed by the accused persons in part should have dismissed the application as a whole to uphold the entire FIR in question.” 15. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 16. In any case, the petitioner specifically asserted in her petition that she had filled up a form for the regularization of the land, which clearly shows that she was in possession of the Government land, and that is why she had sought the regularization of her possession, hence her submission that no encroachment was made by her is not acceptable. 17. A heavy Reliance was placed upon the photocopies of various documents to show the pendency of proceedings before various forums and the pleas taken by the petitioner before those forums. It is not permissible to look into the documents annexed to the petition for quashing the FIR. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed: “10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code.” 18. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018 , that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed: “Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C.” 19. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP , and held: “9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192 . The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192 . The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows: "The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings". 20. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129 : (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was observed at page 142: “16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial.” 21. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held: 13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 22. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents. 22. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed: “63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand.” (Emphasis supplied) 23. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material filed by the petitioner with the petition and the Court has to rely upon the material brought before the learned Trial Court. The authenticity of the documents filed with the petition has not been established and it is impermissible to rely upon them to quash the FIR. 24. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material filed by the petitioner with the petition and the Court has to rely upon the material brought before the learned Trial Court. The authenticity of the documents filed with the petition has not been established and it is impermissible to rely upon them to quash the FIR. 24. It was submitted that the chargesheet was filed after the period of limitation and learned Trial Court erred in taking cognizance of the same. This submission is not acceptable. It was rightly submitted on behalf of the respondents that trespass is a continuing wrong and the period of limitation does not apply to it. This proposition was laid down by this Court in Jasbir Singh v. State of H.P., 2012 SCC OnLine HP 1297 wherein it was observed: “6. The maximum sentence provided under Section 447 IPC is three months with a fine. Clause (b), sub-section (2) of Section 468 Cr.P.C. provides one year for taking cognizance if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. Section 472 Cr.P.C. provides that in the case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. Section 473 Cr.P.C. provides that the Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts that in the circumstances of the case the delay has been properly explained or it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. It is thus clear that under Section 472 Cr.P.C., a fresh period of limitation starts every moment during which the offence continues. 7. In Ram Narain v. The State 17 (1980) DLT 230 on 19.04.1975 a report was lodged by the complainant that the petitioner had broken open the locks of the main gate as well as store-cum-office where the complainant was running business. The learned Magistrate put notice of accusation to the petitioner on 05.10.1977 for an offence punishable under Section 448 IPC. This was challenged in the High Court. The High Court held that it cannot be gains said that the petitioner is perpetuating his illegal possession to the great chagrin and helplessness of the complainant. The learned Magistrate put notice of accusation to the petitioner on 05.10.1977 for an offence punishable under Section 448 IPC. This was challenged in the High Court. The High Court held that it cannot be gains said that the petitioner is perpetuating his illegal possession to the great chagrin and helplessness of the complainant. The fact that civil remedy is available to him is hardly a ground to throw away the prosecution of the petitioner for the criminal offence under Section 448 IPC.The discretion exercised by the trial Court cannot be considered to be arbitrary or injudicious. 8. In Shyam Sunder Sarma v. State of Assam 1988 (2) Cri. L.J. 1560 , it was found that there is nothing in the FIR to show that trespass continued even after the alleged incident. In the present case, there is no material on record to record a finding that the alleged wall constructed on 23.01.2009 was removed by petitioners at any time thereafter. Shyam Sunder Sarma is not applicable in the facts of the present case. 9. Gokak Patel Volkart Ltd. v. Dundayya Gurushiddaiah Hiremath (1991) 2 SCC 141 ) is a case where Magistrate held that appellants' complaints against the respondents alleging offence under Section 630(1)(b) of the Companies Act by not vacating the company's quarters as required by it even more than six months after retirement of the respondents, were barred by limitation and the same could not be taken into consideration. The Supreme Court noticed Section 468 and Section 472 Cr.P.C and held that the concept of continuing offence does not wipe out the original guilt, but it keeps the contravention alive day by day. The Courts when confronted with the provisions which lay down a rule of limitation governing prosecutions, in cases of this nature, should give due weight and consideration to the provisions of Section 473 of the Code which is in the nature of an over-riding provision and according to which, notwithstanding anything contained in the provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, any Court may take cognizance of an offence after the expiration of the period of limitation if, inter alia, it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned orders. 10. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the impugned orders. 10. Beguram v. Jaipur Udhyog Ltd. 1988 (2) Cri.L J. 1452 is also a case under Section 630 of the Companies Act. Beguram was an employee of M/s Jaipur Udhyog Sawai Madhopur, he retired on 07.08.1978 but did not vacate the free quarter of the Company allotted to him while he was in service. The criminal complaint against the petitioner was filed for an offence under Section 630(1)(b) of the Companies Act. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sawai Madhopur, on 11.09.1986 held the petitioner guilty for the said offence and punished him with a fine of Rs. 200/- with further direction to deliver up the quarter to M/s Jaipur Udhyog Ltd. within three months, in default the petitioner was to undergo simple imprisonment for a term up to two months. The High Court held that on 01.09.1978 the occupation of the petitioner of the quarter was in the capacity of the trespasser. Trespass is a continuing offence and the matter is covered by Section 472 Cr.P.C. 11. The petitioners in the petition have not projected the case that they had removed the alleged wall any time after 23.01.2009. Thus, it is a continuing offence under Section 472 Cr.P.C. In these circumstances, no fault can be found in the order dated 24.08.2011 whereby the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence. There is no merit to the petition.” 25. Therefore, the submission that the chargesheet was barred by limitation cannot be accepted and the judgment of this Court in Ravi Kapoor (supra) does not apply to the present case. 26. It was submitted that the civil proceedings are pending for the ejectment of the petitioner and the continuation of the criminal proceedings is not permissible. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down in Radio Corner (Bally) v. Allwyn-A unit of Voltas Ltd. , 2002 SCC OnLine AP 1103: (2003) 1 AP LJ 345: 2003 Cri LJ 3319 that there is no bar in the continuation of the criminal case during the pendency of the civil proceedings. It was observed: “4. The concept of subjudice is prevalent only in civil proceedings. It was observed: “4. The concept of subjudice is prevalent only in civil proceedings. Section 10 of CPC puts a bar on a civil Court to proceed with the trial of a suit in which the matter in issue is directly and substantially is in issue in a previously instituted suit between the 35 same parties or someone claiming through them. The stay of trial of a subsequent suit is not a matter of course. Several conditions, such as, there being two suits, one filed previously and the other at a subsequent stage, the subject matter in the suit subsequently filed being substantially in issue in the one which is previously filed, both the suits have the same parties or the representatives, the Court in which the previous suit is pending having jurisdiction to try the subsequent suit also, etc., need to be established. The underlying object is to avoid conflicting decisions on the same subject matter between the same parties. 5. The parameters of the trial of criminal proceedings are altogether different. The main object of the proceedings is to bring the accused to justice. The law is mainly between the State and the accused, except where the trial is on the basis of a private complaint. The expeditious disposal of the criminal proceedings is provided for, for the reason that if the accused is found guilty, he should be dealt with by law at the earliest, so that he may not continue to be a menace to the Society. On the other hand, if he is found not guilty, he is relieved of the accusations against him and not put to inconvenience and embarrassment for an unduly long period. There does not exist any provision in Cr. P.C., providing for a stay of trial of the cases on the ground of pendency of civil matters in other courts. The fact that the subject matter involved in the suit has some relation or bearing on the criminal matter is of no consequence. 6. Way back in 1954, Justice Vivian Bose, in his inimitable style, explained the philosophy, underlying the separation of civil and criminal proceedings, in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, (1) AIR 1954 SC 39 7 7. To put it in his own words— “As between the civil and the criminal proceedings the criminal matters should be given precedence. 6. Way back in 1954, Justice Vivian Bose, in his inimitable style, explained the philosophy, underlying the separation of civil and criminal proceedings, in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, (1) AIR 1954 SC 39 7 7. To put it in his own words— “As between the civil and the criminal proceedings the criminal matters should be given precedence. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal Courts is not a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one Court binding on the other or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration is the likelihood of embarrassment. Another factor which weighs with the Court is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial.” 8. A similar view was taken by the Bombay High Court in Babulal Mishrimal Vardhan v. Sudarshan Wadia, (2) 1991 Crl. L.J. 298 . If the request of the petitioners is to be acceded to, the easiest thing for an accused in any criminal case will be to file a suit relating to the subject matter involved in the criminal proceedings and seek a stay of all further proceedings in the criminal proceedings. Such a course of action would prove fatal to the entire criminal justice system.” 27. A similar view was taken in Prem Raj v. Poonamma Menon, (2024) 6 SCC 143 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 483 wherein it was observed at page 147: “17. The issue has been laid to rest by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah , (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] : “32. The issue has been laid to rest by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah , (2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] : “32. Coming to the last contention that an effort should be made to avoid conflict of findings between the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point out that the standard of proof required in the two proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence, while in a criminal case, the entire burden lies on the prosecution, and proof beyond reasonable doubt has to be given. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in the other, as both cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. While examining a similar contention in an appeal against an order directing the filing of a complaint under Section 476 of the old Code, the following observations made by a Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras [M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras, (1954) 1 SCC 524: AIR 1954 SC 39 7] give a complete answer to the problem posed : (AIR p. 399, paras 15-16: SCC pp. 529-30, paras 12-13) ‘12. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings, we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment. 13. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment. 13. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.’ This, however, is not a hard-and-fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this case, we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished.”(emphasis supplied) 28. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR show the civil wrong and a civil wrong cannot be converted into criminal proceedings. There can be no dispute with the proposition of law that the civil dispute cannot be turned into criminal proceedings, however, it does not mean that no civil action can give rise to a criminal action. Professor Glanville Williams explained in his celebrated book Learning the Law ( Tenth Edition Steven and Sons) that the facts by themselves cannot determine civil or criminal liability. The same set of facts may give rise to criminal or civil liability. The distinction between the two is not the nature of the act but the nature of proceedings that are taken to seek the redressal. It was observed: “The distinction between a crime and a civil wrong, though capable of giving rise to some difficult legal problems, is in essence quite simple. The first thing to understand is that the distinction does not reside in the nature of the wrongful act itself. This can quite simply be proved by pointing out that the same act may be both a crime and a civil wrong. The first thing to understand is that the distinction does not reside in the nature of the wrongful act itself. This can quite simply be proved by pointing out that the same act may be both a crime and a civil wrong. Occasionally at a bus station, there is someone who makes a living by looking after people’s impedimenta while they are shopping. If I entrust my bag to such a person, and he runs off with it, he commits the crime of theft and also two civil wrongs—the tort of conversion and a breach of his contract with me to keep the bag safe. The result is that two sorts of legal proceedings can be taken against him; a prosecution for the crime, and a civil action for the tort and the breach of contract. (Of course, the plaintiff in the latter action will not get damages twice over merely because he has two causes of action; he will get only one set of damages.) To take another illustration, if a railway signalman, to dumb forgetfulness a prey, fails to pull the lever at the right moment, and a fatal accident occurs on the line, his carelessness may be regarded as sufficiently gross to amount to the crime of manslaughter, and it is also the tort of negligence towards the victims of the accident and their dependents and a breach of his contract with the Railway Executive to take due care in his work. It will be noticed that this time, the right of action in tort and the right of action in a contract are vested in different persons. These examples show that the distinction between a crime and civil wrong cannot be stated as depending upon what is done, because what is done may be the same in each case. The true distinction resides, therefore, not in the nature of the wrongful act but in the legal consequences that may follow. If the wrongful act is capable of being followed by what are called criminal proceedings, that means that it is regarded as a crime (otherwise called an offence). If it is capable of being followed by civil proceedings that means that it is regarded as a civil wrong. If it is capable of being followed by both, it is both a crime and a civil wrong. If it is capable of being followed by civil proceedings that means that it is regarded as a civil wrong. If it is capable of being followed by both, it is both a crime and a civil wrong. Criminal and civil proceedings are (in the normal case) easily distinguishable: the procedure is different, the outcome is different, and the terminology is different.” 29. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also held in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P. , (2021) 14 SCC 626 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 942 , that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong, as well as, the criminal offence and mere availability of civil remedies is no ground to quash the criminal proceedings. It was observed: “34. The given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as well as a criminal offence. Only because a civil remedy is available may not be a ground to quash criminal proceedings. But as observed above, in this case, no criminal offence has been made out in the FIR read with the chargesheet so far as this appellant is concerned. The other accused Rajan Kumar has died.” 30. A similar view was taken in V.R. Dalal v. Yougendra Naranji Thakkar, (2008) 15 SCC 625 , wherein it was observed: - “13. It may be true that in the event the court finds that the dispute between the parties is civil in nature, it may not allow the criminal proceedings to go on. But, no law, in our opinion, as such can be laid down as in a given case both civil suit and criminal complaint would be maintainable although the cause of action for both the proceedings is the same.” 31. In the present case, the allegations in the FIR show the commission of cognizable offence and the continuation of criminal proceedings is not bad. Hence, the judgments in Jit Vinayak Arolkar (supra) and Naresh Kumar (supra) do not apply to the present case. 32. It was submitted that there is insufficient material to convict the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed: “21. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed: “21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra. 22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [ M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita , ( 2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89] , this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC. 23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51] , a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC, being wholly inadmissible in evidence, could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC.” 33. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR and the proceedings on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 34. It is undisputed that the learned Trial Court has framed the charges against the petitioner. It was laid down in Minakshi Bala v. Sudhir Kumar, (1994) 4 SCC 142 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1181 that once the Competent Court has framed the charges, the person aggrieved may invoke the revisional jurisdiction and the High Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., except in the rare cases. It was observed on page145: - “7. If charges are framed in accordance with Section 240 CrPC on a finding that a prima facie case has been made out — as has been done in the instant case — the person arraigned may, if he feels aggrieved, invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or the Sessions Judge to contend that the charge-sheet submitted under Section 173 CrPC and documents sent with it did not disclose any ground to presume that he had committed any offence for which he is charged and the revisional court if so satisfied can quash the charges framed against him. To put it differently, once charges are framed under Section 240 CrPC the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction would not be justified in relying upon documents other than those referred to in Sections 239 and 240 CrPC; nor would it be justified in invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the same except in those rare cases where forensic exigencies and formidable compulsions justify such a course. We hasten to add even in such exceptional cases the High Court can look into only those documents which are unimpeachable and can be legally translated into relevant evidence.” (Emphasis supplied) 35. It was submitted that the High Court should quash the FIR and the criminal proceedings if no case is made out. Reliance was placed upon Jothiragawan (supra) , Umesh Kumar (supra) Varala Bharath Kumar (supra) , and Parbatbhai Aahir (supra). There can be no dispute with this proposition of law, however, it has been found that in the present case, a cognizable offence is made out. Hence this proposition does not apply to the present case. 36. No other point was urged. 37. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 38. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.