JUDGMENT : B V L N Chakravarthi, J. This Second Appeal is preferred by the appellants/defendants No.1, 2 and 4 under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 , assailing the decree and judgment, dated 28.09.1999, passed in A.S.No.10 of 1992 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, at Anakapalle. 2. Heard Smt.T.V.Sridevi, learned counsel for the Appellants No.1 and 2. The appellant No.3 died pending appeal. No legal representatives came on record. Heard Sri Y.Sudhakar, learned counsel for the 1 st Respondent. None appeared for the respondent No.2/defendant No.5, who remained exparte before the trial Court, as well 1 st Appellate Court. Perused the material on record. PLEADINGS: 3. The appellants No.1 and 2 are the defendants No.1 and 2 in the suit. The 1 st respondent is the plaintiff in the suit. The parties in the Second Appeal shall hereinafter be referred to as arraigned in the Original Suit, for convenience and clarity. 4. The suit in O.S.224/1984 on the file of Prl.District Munsif, Anakapalle, was instituted seeking the relief of permanent injunction to restrain the defendants from interfering with possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff, over the plaint schedule property. 5. The trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 05.11.1991. The defendants preferred appeal in A.S.10/1992 on the file of Senior Civil Judge at Anakapalle, challenging the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. The Senior Civil Judge at Anakapalle dismissed the appeal vide judgment dated 28.09.1999 confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 6. The trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 05.11.1991. The defendants preferred appeal in A.S.10/1992 on the file of Senior Civil Judge at Anakapalle, challenging the judgment and decree of the learned trial Court. The Senior Civil Judge at Anakapalle dismissed the appeal vide judgment dated 28.09.1999 confirming the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 6. The case of the plaintiff is that the plaint schedule property belongs to Smt.Padathala Appala Narasama; she executed a sale agreement on 08.07.1981 in favour of the plaintiff; later delivered possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff in the evening on the same day; therefore, the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property; the vendor did not execute sale deed; the plaintiff instituted a suit in O.S.594/1981 for specific performance of sale agreement; the vendor did not contest the suit; the suit was decreed on 19.01.1982; the plaintiff filed E.P.38/1983 as the vendor failed to execute the sale deed in terms of the decree; the Court executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff; later, the plaintiff came to know that Smt.P. Appala Narasamma executed a sale deed in favour of the 1 st defendant in March, 1982 pending O.S.594/1981. The plaintiff raised a thatched shed in the plaint schedule property and living there; The plaintiff has been constructing a compound wall on 14.05.1984; the defendants obstructed the plaintiff; hence, the suit for permanent injunction. 7. The case of the defendants is that Smt.P.Appala Narasamma is the owner of the plaint schedule property; she executed a sale agreement in favour of the 1 st defendant on 20.08.1980; later, on 15.02.1982, she executed a sale deed in favour of the 1 st defendant and delivered possession; Later, the 1 st defendant disposed of the property in favour of Smt.Sk.Razia, W/o.Abdul Gafoor, Smt.Sk.Yasin, W/o.Sk.Subhan and Smt.Firani, W/o.Sk.Abdulla, under two separate registered sale deeds dated 02.05.1984 for Ac.0-06 cents each; Pattedar passbook was also issued to the 1 st defendant for Ac.0-12 cents; the 1 st defendant was in possession of the property till she executed of the above sale deeds; After execution of the sale deeds, purchasers are in possession of the said property; The plaintiff was never in possession of the said property; the sale agreement in favour of the plaintiff was brought into existence by forgery without knowledge of Smt.P.Appala Narasamma. The decree in O.S.594/1981 was a collusive decree, and not binding on the 1 st defendant; the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff is not binding on the 1 st defendant; the 1 st defendant is the bon-fide purchaser and in possession of the property till execution of the sale deed in favour of the above persons; Hence, the plaintiff is not entitled to permanent injunction as prayed for. ISSUES: 8. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court settled the following issues for trial: 1. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of plaint schedule lands? 2. Whether the alleged agreement of sale dated 08.0.1981 is true, valid and binding on the defendants? 3. Whether the decree in O.S.594/1981 on the file of this Court is binding on the defendants? 4. Whether the defendants interfered with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff over the schedule lands? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the perpetual injunction as prayed for? 6. To what relief? EVIDENCE: 9. During trial, on behalf of the plaintiff, three witnesses were examined as P.Ws-1 to 3 and four documents were marked as Exs.A-1 to A-4. On behalf of the defendants, four witnesses were examined as D. Ws-1 to 4 and seven documents were marked as Exs.B-1 to B-7. On behalf of third party, two documents were marked as Exs.X-1 and X-2. 10. P.W-1 is the plaintiff. P.W-2 is the husband of the plaintiff and P.W-3 is the attestor of Ex. A-2. The 2 nd defendant was examined as D.W-1 and 4 th defendant was examined as D.W-2. The ex-village Karanam of Nagavaram village was examined as D.W-3, scribe of Ex.B-2 was examined as D.W-4, and a third-party witness was examined as D.W-5 to prove Ex.B-7 receipt. Ex.A-1 is certified copy of decree in O.S.594/1981. Ex.A-2 is the certified copy of sale agreement dated 08.07.1981. Ex.A-3 is sale deed executed by Prl.District Munsif and Ex.A-4 is certified copy of plaint in O.S.No.594/1981 on the file of Prl.District Munsif, Anakapalle. Ex.B-1 is the agreement of sale executed in favour of the 1 st defendant dated 20.08.1980. Ex.B-2 is the sale deed executed in favour of the 1 st defendant dated 15.02.1982. Ex.B-3 is the ryotwari passbook issued in favour of the 4 th defendant. Ex.B-4 is the sale deed executed by 1 st defendant in favour of Sk.Yasmin dated 02.05.1984. Ex.B-1 is the agreement of sale executed in favour of the 1 st defendant dated 20.08.1980. Ex.B-2 is the sale deed executed in favour of the 1 st defendant dated 15.02.1982. Ex.B-3 is the ryotwari passbook issued in favour of the 4 th defendant. Ex.B-4 is the sale deed executed by 1 st defendant in favour of Sk.Yasmin dated 02.05.1984. Ex.B-5 is sale deed in favour of Sk.Raziya. Ex.B-6 is encumbrance certificate dated 23.01.1982 and Ex.B-7 is receipt given by D.W-5 with regard to supply of material dated 06.05.1984. FINDING OF THE TRIAL COURT: 11. The trial Court on consideration of the above oral and documentary evidence, found that the plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property on the date of filing of the suit and decreed the suit. FINDING OF THE FIRST APPELLATE COURT: 12. The Senior Civil Judge at Anakapalle, on consideration of the evidence in the suit, held that Smt.P.Appala Narasamma delivered possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff, and since then the plaintiff has been in possession of the same. The Senior Civil Judge, Anakapalle concurred with the findings of the trial Court. Therefore, dismissed the appeal. 13. Challenging the above judgment of the First Appellate Court, the Second Appeal is preferred by the defendants No.1, 2 and 4. The Second Appeal was admitted on 09.02.2001. SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW: 14. The following substantial questions of law are raised in the Second Appeal for consideration: 1. “Whether the Courts below are correct in decreeing the suit for permanent injunction, when the Ex.A-2 agreement of sale and Ex.A-3 sale deed are silent regarding delivery of possession”? 2. “Whether the Courts below are correct in ignoring Ex.B-1 sale agreement, Exs.B-2 to B-5 sale deeds, which are contrary to Ex. A-2 sale deed”? 15. CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPECTIVE COUNSEL IN THE SECOND APPEAL: The learned counsel for the appellant/1 st defendant would submit that the trial Court and the First Appellate Court erroneously decreed the suit, though there is no evidence to prove the possession of the plaintiff on the date of suit. He would further argue that the sale agreement dated 08.07.1981 vide Ex.A-2 is silent about delivery of possession to the plaintiff. No execution petition was filed for delivery of possession by the plaintiff after execution of sale deed by the Court on 28.09.1984. He would further argue that the sale agreement dated 08.07.1981 vide Ex.A-2 is silent about delivery of possession to the plaintiff. No execution petition was filed for delivery of possession by the plaintiff after execution of sale deed by the Court on 28.09.1984. There are contradictions in the oral testimony of witnesses examined by the plaintiff regarding possession. On the other hand, Ex.B-2 sale deed executed in favour of the 1 st defendant by Smt.P.Appala Narasamma would show that she delivered possession to the 1 st defendant and later, the 1 st defendant delivered possession to the vendees under Exs.B-4 and B-5 sale deed. Ex.B-3 pattedar passbook was also issued in favour of the 1 st defendant; it would corroborate the case of the 1 st defendant. In those circumstances, the findings of both the Courts below that the plaintiff is in possession of the plaint schedule property is erroneous in law. 16. Learned counsel for the 1 st respondent/plaintiff would argue that it is the specific case of the plaintiff in O.S.594/1981 that Smt.P.Appala Narasamma executed agreement of sale on 08.07.1981 and on the same day evening, she delivered possession to the plaintiff, and since then the plaintiff has been in possession of the property. Therefore, the plaintiff did not file any execution petition for delivery of possession after execution of Ex.A-4 sale deed by the Court. He would further argue that the trial Court and 1 st Appellate Court concurrently found that Ex.B-1 sale agreement was brought into existence pending O.S.594/1981 filed by the plaintiff, and Ex.B-2 was executed pending suit by Smt.P.Appala Narasamma, in the said suit in favour of the 1 st defendant. Therefore, the decree in O.S.594/1981 is binding on the 1 st defendant. No steps taken to challenge the decree in the said suit either by Smt.P.Appala Narasamma or the 1 st defendant. The decree became final. Further, Exs.X-1 and X-2 registered sale deeds in favour of B.V.Apparao and P.W-3 respectively, who are neighbours to the suit property would disclose the name of the plaintiff as owner of the plaint schedule property. On evidence, it is found that Ex.B-3 Pattedar passbook was issued in favour of the 1 st defendant even before Ex.B-2 sale deed for the reasons best known to the 1 st defendant, and revenue authorities. On evidence, it is found that Ex.B-3 Pattedar passbook was issued in favour of the 1 st defendant even before Ex.B-2 sale deed for the reasons best known to the 1 st defendant, and revenue authorities. Hence, both the Courts below did not consider Ex.B-3 to believe the case of the 1 st defendant. Both the Courts below on facts concurrently found that the plaintiff has been in possession of the said property on the date of suit. There are no grounds to interfere with the said findings of the Courts blow. The appeal was preferred by the 1 st defendant, though there is no substantial question of law involved. Hence, it is liable to be dismissed. ANALYSIS: 17. The case of the plaintiff is that she purchased the suit schedule property from Smt.P.Appala Narasamma under a sale agreement dated 08.07.1981. Possession was delivered to her on the evening of 08.07.1981. Since then, the plaintiff has been in possession of the plaint schedule property. The vendor did not execute sale deed. Hence, the plaintiff filed a suit in O.S.594/1981 on the file of Prl.District Munsif, Anakapalle for specific performance of sale agreement. The suit was decreed on 19.01.1982. The plaintiff filed Execution Petition No.38/1983 for execution of the sale deed. The Court executed the sale deed. The plaintiff in support of her case, filed Ex.A-1 copy of decree dated 19.01.1982 in O.S.594/1981. The plaintiff also filed. Ex.A-3 copy of sale deed dated 28.09.1984 executed by the Court in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the plaint schedule property. The plaintiff also filed certified copy of plaint in O.S.594/1981 vide Ex.A-4. Ex.A-4 to show that the plaintiff pleaded, possession was delivered to her in the evening of the sale agreement. 18. The case of the 1 st defendant is that she purchased the said property from Smt.P.Appala Narasamma vide Ex.B-1 sale agreement dated 20.08.1980. Later, Smt.P.Appala Narasamma executed sale deed in favour of the 1 st defendant on 15.02.1982 and delivered possession. Subsequently, the 1 st defendant executed Exs.B-4 and B-5 sale deeds in favour of Smt.Sk.Yasmin and Smt.Sk.Raziya respectively and delivered possession. 19. Both the Courts below i.e., trial Court and the 1 st Appellate Court basing on oral and documentary evidence placed by the plaintiff and the defendants, concurrently found that the plaintiff has been in possession of the plaint schedule property. 19. Both the Courts below i.e., trial Court and the 1 st Appellate Court basing on oral and documentary evidence placed by the plaintiff and the defendants, concurrently found that the plaintiff has been in possession of the plaint schedule property. Ex.A-4 certified copy of plaint in O.S.594/1981 on the file of Prl.District Munsif Court at Anakapalle, would show that the plaintiff took a plea that possession was delivered to her on the evening of Ex.A-2 sale agreement executed by the vendor, and it was not challenged by Smt.P.Appala Narasamma. The 1 st defendant contended that the plaintiff colluded with Smt.P.Appala Narasamma. But, surprisingly, the same person i.e., Smt.P.Appala Narasamma executed sale deed in favour of the 1 st defendant pending suit for specific performance of sale agreement. In spite of the same, the 1 st defendant or Smt.P.Appala Narasamma did not choose to challenge the decree in O.S.594/1981. Hence, the decree in O.S.594/1981 became final. Undisputedly, Ex.B-2 sale deed was executed by Smt.P.Appala Narasamma in favour of the 1 st defendant pending suit in O.S.594/1981. Therefore, in the light of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the decree in O.S.594/1981 is binding on the 1 st defendant also. Further, both the Courts below found that Exs.X-1 and X-2 would support the case of the plaintiff that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property on the date of suit. Both the Courts below did not rely on Ex.B-3, as it was issued even before Ex.B-2 sale deed executed in favour of the 1 st defendant. Therefore, both the Courts basing on the oral and documentary evidence placed by the plaintiff and the defendants, concurrently found that the plaintiff is in possession of the suit property on the date of suit. In those circumstances, the contention of the appellant/1 st defendant that the Courts below are not correct in decreeing the suit for permanent injunction, when the agreement of sale does not disclose delivery of possession, is not tenable in law. The contention of the appellants that both the Courts below are not correct in ignoring Ex.B-1 sale agreement, is also not tenable in law in the absence of evidence of the vendor. 20. The contention of the 1 st defendant is that, Ex.B-1 sale agreement is prior to the sale agreement executed in favour of the plaintiff. The contention of the appellants that both the Courts below are not correct in ignoring Ex.B-1 sale agreement, is also not tenable in law in the absence of evidence of the vendor. 20. The contention of the 1 st defendant is that, Ex.B-1 sale agreement is prior to the sale agreement executed in favour of the plaintiff. The appellant did not examine her vendor to speak that she executed Ex.B-1. On the other hand, O.S.594/1981 was filed by the plaintiff, for specific performance of sale agreement, against same vendor Smt.P.Appala Narasamma, she did not challenge the suit. On the other hand, she executed sale deed in favour of the 1 st defendant, pending suit. It shows the collusion between the 1 st defendant and Smt.P.Appala Narasamma. The decree in the said suit was not challenged by Smt.P.Appala Narasamma or the 1 st defendant. It became final. It is the specific case of the plaintiff, in that suit i.e., O.S.594/1981, possession was delivered to her on the evening of sale agreement i.e., 08.07.1981. The said suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff was decreed. 21. The learned counsel for appellants would submit that in view of sections 91 and 92 of the Indian Evidence Act , the oral evidence placed by the plaintiff regarding delivery of possession under Ex. A-2 sale agreement is not admissible in law. The learned counsel for the 1 st respondent/plaintiff would contend that the plaintiff never contended that the possession was delivered under Ex.A-2 sale agreement. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that possession was delivered later in the evening on that day. Therefore, the contention of the 1 st defendant is not tenable. The 1 st Appellate Court considered the above aspect and found that the contention of the 1 st defendant regarding oral evidence, on admissibility of possession is not tenable in law in the light of specific plea of the plaintiff in the suit for specific performance, which was decreed and became final. 22. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, would come into existence from the point of the institution of the suit, and continues to survive till the satisfaction of the decree. The decree passed in the suit is binding on the transferee, if he happens to be third party person, even if he is not a party to it. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, would come into existence from the point of the institution of the suit, and continues to survive till the satisfaction of the decree. The decree passed in the suit is binding on the transferee, if he happens to be third party person, even if he is not a party to it. The doctrine of Lis pendens stipulates that during the pendency of any suit or proceeding in which any right to immovable property is, directly or specifically, in question, the property, which is the subject-matter of such suit or proceeding cannot be “transferred or otherwise dealt with”, so as to affect the rights of any other party to such suit or proceeding. Such transfers are subservient to the rights of the parties to such suit, as may be, eventually, determined in the suit. Therefore, pendente lite purchaser would be entitled to or suffer the same legal rights and obligations as his vendor as may be eventually determined by the Court. 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of A.Nawab John Vs. V.N.Subramaniyam , 2012 (7) SCC 738 and T.G.Ashok Kumar Vs.Govindammal , AIR 2011 SCW 551 considered the doctrine of Lis pendens, enunciated by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and held that “ Section 52 of Act does not declare a pendente lite transfer by a party to the suit as void or illegal, but only makes the pendente lite purchaser bound by the decision in the pending litigation. If ultimately the title of the pendente lite transferor is upheld in regard to the transferred property, the transferee's title will not be affected.” 24. In the case on hand, admittedly, the vendor of the 1 st defendant is a party to the proceedings in O.S.594/1981 filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of sale agreement vide Ex.A-2 dated 08.07.1981. The vendor of the 1 st defendant pending the said suit, executed sale deed in favour of the 1 st defendant. Later, the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of sale agreement was decreed by the Court. It was not challenged by either by the vendor of the 1 st defendant or the 1 st defendant. The vendor of the 1 st defendant pending the said suit, executed sale deed in favour of the 1 st defendant. Later, the suit filed by the plaintiff for specific performance of sale agreement was decreed by the Court. It was not challenged by either by the vendor of the 1 st defendant or the 1 st defendant. Hence, the said decree became final and binding on the vendor as well the 1 st defendant in the light of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 25. It is also an admitted fact that the plaintiff filed E.P.38/1983 basing on the suit proceedings. The Court executed Ex.A-3 sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. In those circumstances, the 1 st defendant cannot claim any rights in the property basing on Ex.B-2 sale deed executed by Smt.P.Appala Narasamma. In that view of the matter, the Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed. CONCLUSION: 26. In the light of foregoing discussion, the Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed. RESULT: 27. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. As a sequel, Interlacutory applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.