JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 43 of 2021 dated 29 th July 2021, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station, Sangla District Kinnaur and the proceedings in police challan No. 24/2023, titled State of H.P. versus Vidya Bhagat and another pending before learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, District Kinnaur, H.P. (learned Trial Court). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner in which they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that Tehsildar/Executive Magistrate, Sangla filed a complaint before Station House Officer (SHO), Sangla stating that it was brought to his notice by Tehsil Welfare Officer Sangla that the accused-Vidya Bhagat had submitted two different income certificates dated 26 th February 2021 with same unique ID number INC 2021224121581656, showing different incomes of Rs.45,000/- and Rs. 35,000. Vidya Bhagat was called telephonically on 7 th July 2021. He stated that he had only passed 4 th class and had no knowledge of mobile/computer. He got two income certificates from Lok Mitra Kendra, Sangla run by petitioner Hari Singh, a Document Writer. The police registered the FIR and conducted an investigation. The police recorded the statements of the witnesses and seized the hard disk of the petitioner’s computer and other records. The documents and hard disk were sent to FSL, Junga. A report was received that the printout of the certificates matched each other and a soft copy of the certificates could not be found on the hard disk. The police filed a charge sheet before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of FIR and the filing of chargesheet, the petitioner filed the present petition asserting that the allegations in the FIR and the evidence produced on record are not sufficient to implicate the petitioner for the commission of the cognizable offences. The main accused-Vidya Bhagat has expired and the statement made by him before the Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate cannot be proved as per the law. There is no other material to implicate the petitioner. The report of FSL, Junga is not specific regarding this fact. The conduct of the informant is suspicious.
The main accused-Vidya Bhagat has expired and the statement made by him before the Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate cannot be proved as per the law. There is no other material to implicate the petitioner. The report of FSL, Junga is not specific regarding this fact. The conduct of the informant is suspicious. He destroyed the entire record of the office and a departmental enquiry was conducted against him for the destruction of the record. The record would have been relevant for the determination of the lis. The investigations were not conducted fairly. Vidya Bhagat had also submitted one certificate in the year 2015 showing his income as Rs.32,000. This certificate was not prepared at the petitioner’s Lok Mitra Kendra. Vidya Bhagat came to the petitioner’s Lok Mitra Kendra on 26 th February 2021 and disclosed his income as Rs.45,000. This certificate was approved by the competent authority. He again visited the petitioner’s Lok Mitra Kendra on the 4 th of May, 2021 and disclosed his income as Rs.35,000. This was rejected by the concerned authority. The allegations in the FIR do not disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The FIR was lodged with mala fide intention to wreak vengeance upon the petitioner. The investigating agency did not check the hard disk of the computers of other Lok Mitra Kendra, Tehsil Office or Tehsil Welfare Officer. The agency targeted the petitioner and his Lok Mitra Kendra. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed, and the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed. 4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply. It was asserted that allegations in the FIR constituted the commission of a cognizable offence. The police conducted an investigation and filed a chargesheet before the competent court of law. The death of accused Vidya Bhagat does not provide any ground to exonerate the petitioner for the wrong/offence committed by him. It was found after the investigation that the petitioner had forged the income certificate by editing the original income certificate of Rs.45,000 in connivance with accused-Vidya Bhagat. The documents were handed over to the police during the investigation by a responsible Gazetted Officer, who was cited as a witness. There was no necessity to check the computers of other Lok Mitra Kendra or Tehsil Office because the complaint was made against the petitioner’s Lok Mitra Kendra.
The documents were handed over to the police during the investigation by a responsible Gazetted Officer, who was cited as a witness. There was no necessity to check the computers of other Lok Mitra Kendra or Tehsil Office because the complaint was made against the petitioner’s Lok Mitra Kendra. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed 5. I have heard Mr. Ram Lal Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutleharia, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent no. 1 to 3/State. 6. Mr. Ram Lal Thakur, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the contents of the FIR are false. The petitioner was targeted by the investigating agency to make a false case against him. The informant destroyed the record of the Tehsil Office. A departmental inquiry was conducted against him and he was held guilty. The petitioner did not commit any offence. The FIR was lodged against him with mala fide intention to wreak vengeance upon him. The petitioner cannot be criminally prosecuted and a penalty can be imposed upon him as per the user manual of the Department of Revenue. The continuation of the criminal proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings be quashed. 7. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondents No. 1 to 3/State submitted that the contents of the FIR show that the petitioner had forged the income certificate of Vidya Bhagat. The police conducted the investigation and found that the petitioner had edited the income in the original income certificate. The chargesheet has been filed before the competent court of law and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction in the present matter. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court.
9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 11. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. It was asserted in the FIR that the petitioner had altered the income in the income certificate of Vidya Bhagat from Rs.45,000 to Rs. 35,000 at his instance. It was submitted that the statement made by Vidya Bhagat before Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate is not admissible. This submission is not acceptable. The statement is in the nature of extra-judicial confession and is admissible in evidence.
35,000 at his instance. It was submitted that the statement made by Vidya Bhagat before Tehsildar-cum-Executive Magistrate is not admissible. This submission is not acceptable. The statement is in the nature of extra-judicial confession and is admissible in evidence. The police conducted the investigation and found that the petitioner had altered the income of Rs.45,000 to Rs.35,000. This shows the commission of forgery. 13. It was submitted that the penalty can be imposed upon the petitioner as per the user manual and he cannot be held criminally liable. This submission is not acceptable. The user manual imposes the penalty for the violation of the conditions of the license and cannot take away the effect of the criminal law. Hence, the submission that only a penalty can be imposed upon the petitioner and no criminal proceedings can be taken against him is not acceptable. 14. It was submitted that the conduct of the informant was suspicious. He had destroyed the record and a departmental enquiry was conducted against him in which he was held guilty. This submission will not help the petitioner. The destruction of the record by the informant will not exonerate him from altering the original income certificate of Vidya Bhagat. The informant’s act of destruction of the record was an independent act for which, he was held departmentally liable and it would have no impact upon the pendency of the criminal proceedings before the Court. 15. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false. This submission will not help the petitioner. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held :- “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused.
P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060 “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 16.
Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 16. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 17. A similar view was taken in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat , (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 6 wherein it was observed at page 111: “29 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1-2018.]. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possesses to exercise while examining the legality of any FIR complaining commission of several cognizable offences by the accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court.
In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can exercise the powers like an appellate court. The question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. 30 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide Official Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1-2018.] . At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence nor could draw its own inferences from the contents of the FIR and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the complainants and vice versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine the questions once the charge-sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 31. In our considered opinion, once the court finds that the FIR does disclose the prima facie commission of any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and allow the investigating machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth the crime in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code. 32. The very fact that the High Court, in this case, went into the minutest details in relation to every aspect of the case and devoted 89 pages of judgment to quash the FIR in part led us to draw a conclusion that the High Court had exceeded its powers while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. We cannot concur with such an approach of the High Court. 33. The inherent powers of the High Court, which are obviously not defined being inherent in its very nature, cannot be stretched to any extent and nor can such powers be equated with the appellate powers of the High Court defined in the Code. The parameters laid down by this Court while exercising inherent powers must always be kept in mind else it would lead to committing the jurisdictional error in deciding the case. Such is the case here. 34.
The parameters laid down by this Court while exercising inherent powers must always be kept in mind else it would lead to committing the jurisdictional error in deciding the case. Such is the case here. 34. On perusal of the three complaints and the FIR mentioned above, we are of the considered view that the complaint and FIR, do disclose a prima facie commission of various cognizable offences alleged by the complainants against the accused persons and, therefore, the High Court instead of dismissing the application filed by the accused persons in part should have dismissed the application as a whole to uphold the entire FIR in question.” 18. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 19. It was submitted that the FIR was lodged by the informant with a mala fide intention to wreak vengeance upon the petitioner. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh vs Amar Kumar Singh 2023(6) 559 that when an investigation was conducted and a charge sheet was filed, the question of mala fide would become meaningless. It was observed: “78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To our mind, whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance. In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of some prima facie worth, they would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/complaint. 79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives.
79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. We can say without fear of contradiction that it is not in all cases in our country that an individual, who is accused of acts of omission/commission punishable under the PC Act but has the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by the police and made to face prosecution. If, indeed, in such a case (where a prosecution should have been but has not been launched) the succeeding political dispensation initiates steps for launching prosecution against such an accused but he/she is allowed to go scot-free, despite there being materials against him/her, merely on the ground that the action initiated by the current regime is mala fide in the sense that it is either to settle scores with the earlier regime or to wreak vengeance against the individual, in such an eventuality we are constrained to observe that it is criminal justice that would be the casualty. This is because it is difficult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of reading a first information report that the public servant is either in or not in possession of property disproportionate to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is complete. Needless to observe, the first information report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence relating to “criminal misconduct” punishable under the PC Act and to embark upon an investigation.” 20. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884 .
It was observed: “30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated because of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 2884 . It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471 , “If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal.” Xxxx 39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 21. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground of mala fide. 22. It was submitted that there is insufficient material to convict the petitioner. This will not help the petitioner.
The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.” 21. Thus, it is impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground of mala fide. 22. It was submitted that there is insufficient material to convict the petitioner. This will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti, (2023) 4 SCC 298 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed: 21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufficiency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra. 22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [ M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita , ( 2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89] , this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC. 23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51] , a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC, being wholly inadmissible in evidence, could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC.
It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC, being wholly inadmissible in evidence, could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC.” 23. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR and the proceedings on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 24. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet.
We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 25. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences, and it cannot be quashed at this stage. 26. No other point was urged. 27. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 28. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.