Judgment : V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J. The Second Appeal No.194 of 2012 is filed against the decree and judgment passed in A.S.No.241 of 2007, on the file of the V Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), West Godavari, Eluru (“First Appellate Court” for short). The said A.S.No.241 of 2007 is filed against the decree and judgment passed in O.S.No.82 of 1999, on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Eluru (“Trial Court” for short). The Second Appeal No.195 of 2012 is filed against the decree and judgment passed in A.S.No.240 of 2007, on the file of the V Additional District Judge (Fast Track Court), West Godavari, Eluru. The said A.S.No.240 of 2007 is filed against the decree and judgment passed in O.S.No.262 of 2004, on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Eluru (originally, a suit in O.S.No.886 of 2000 is filed before the Junior Civil Judge Court, Eluru, later on it was transferred to Principal Senior Civil Judge, Eluru). On memos filed by both sides counsel before the Trial Court, the Trial Court clubbed both the suits i.e., O.S.No.82 of 1999 and O.S.No.262 of 2004 and common evidence was recorded in O.S.No.82 of 1999 and common judgment was pronounced in both the suits. The learned First Appellate Judge also pronounced a common judgment in both the appeals i.e., A.S.No.241 and 240 of 2007. Therefore, this Court clubbed both the second appeals i.e., S.A.No.194 and 195 of 2012 together for being pronouncement of a common judgment. 2. In S.A.No.194 of 2012, the appellants are defendants and respondents are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.82 of 1999 whereas in S.A.No.195 of 2012, the appellants are plaintiffs and the respondents are defendants in O.S.No.262 of 2004. During the pendency of S.A.No.194 of 2012, the 6 th appellant died and his legal representatives were brought on record as appellant Nos.10 to 13 and the 3 rd respondent in S.A.No.195 of 2012 died and her legal representatives were brought on record as respondent Nos.4 to 7. 3. During the pendency of S.A.No.194 of 2012, the 6 th appellant died and his legal representatives were brought on record as appellant Nos.10 to 13 and the 3 rd respondent in S.A.No.195 of 2012 died and her legal representatives were brought on record as respondent Nos.4 to 7. 3. The plaintiffs initiated action in O.S.No.82 of 1999 before the Trial Court with a prayer for specific performance of sale agreement, dated 10.09.1980 which was resettled under an agreement, dated 11.09.1999 directing the defendant Nos.1, 5 and 6 to execute a sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs and to order defendant Nos.2 to 4 to join them in executing the sale deed for the plaint schedule property and register the same. The plaintiffs initiated action in O.S.No.262 of 2004 before the Trial Court with a prayer for recovery of vacant possession of the plaint schedule site from the defendants and to grant damages for the use and occupation of the plaint schedule site. 4. The Trial Court vide a common judgment decreed the suit in O.S.No.82 of 1999 and dismissed the suit in O.S.No.262 of 2004. Felt aggrieved of the said common judgment, A.S.No.241 of 2007 and A.S.No.240 of 2007 are filed. The learned First Appellate Judge vide a common judgment, dismissed both the first appeals confirming the common judgment passed by the trial Court. Aggrieved thereby, the present second appeals are filed. 5. For the sake of convenience, both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit. 6. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.82 of 1999, is as follows: (i) The plaint schedule property is originally belongs to Kommoju Appala Swamy and he purchased the same under a registered sale deed, dated 27.04.1963. He died in about 1974 leaving behind his wife Seethamma, only son Asirayya and two daughters Potnuri Dalemma and Gottupalli Guravamma (1 st plaintiff). Asirayya died in about 1989 leaving behind his wife and daughter, who are the plaintiff Nos.2 and 3 respectively. The 2 nd plaintiff was married to the eldest son of the 1 st plaintiff. Seethamma died in the year 1982. Even though the 1 st plaintiff was married as her parents became old, as desired by them, she continued to live in the plaint schedule house along with her husband by serving her parents. The 2 nd plaintiff was married to the eldest son of the 1 st plaintiff. Seethamma died in the year 1982. Even though the 1 st plaintiff was married as her parents became old, as desired by them, she continued to live in the plaint schedule house along with her husband by serving her parents. The parents of the 1 st plaintiff were promising to give half portion of the house to her and other to their only son Asirayya. (ii) The plaintiffs further pleaded that late Kommoju Appala Swamy mortgaged the plaint schedule property to one Kakarla Veerraju under a registered mortgage deed, dated 22.08.1972 for a sum of Rs.1,000/- and died in the year 1974 without discharging the said debt. Therefore, the mortgagee filed O.S.No.208 of 1976 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Eluru and obtained preliminary decree and final decree against the 1 st plaintiff, her sister Potnuri Dalemma, their mother Seethamma and brother Asirayya. The said Veerraju transferred the said decree to one Kammula Muneswara Rao on 03.04.1979. The said transferee/decree holder filed E.P.No.255 of 1979 and brought the plaint schedule property to sale. For the purpose of discharge of the said mortgage decree debt and other sundry debts, Seethamma, Asirayya and 1 st plaintiff requested Dalemma to join with them to raise money to discharge the mortgage decree debt and to avert the sale of the property, Dalemma did not come forward and she did not evince any interest, but she expressed inability and helplessness. Under the said circumstances, Seethamma, Asirayya and 1 st plaintiff entered into an agreement with the 1 st defendant and her husband Shaik Mastan on 10.09.1980 and executed a registered sale deed for a sum of Rs.10,500/- in favour of 1 st defendant and her husband in respect of the plaint schedule property on condition that the 1 st defendant and her husband shall re-convey the property to the vendors, if they repay the said amount of Rs.10,500/- within two years with interest at 24% per annum. On the same day i.e., 10.09.1980, 1 st defendant and her husband executed a sale agreement in favour of the vendors to re-convey the property to them. Out of sum of Rs.10,500/-, the vendees kept with themselves a sum of Rs.3,666/- to discharge the mortgage debt in O.S.No.208 of 1976. On the same day i.e., 10.09.1980, 1 st defendant and her husband executed a sale agreement in favour of the vendors to re-convey the property to them. Out of sum of Rs.10,500/-, the vendees kept with themselves a sum of Rs.3,666/- to discharge the mortgage debt in O.S.No.208 of 1976. Further out of the balance sale consideration, a sum of Rs.1,050/- was utilized for the purchase of the general stamps and remaining Rs.5,784/- was paid under the said deed to the vendors. (iii) The plaintiffs further pleaded that by 06.11.1983, the 1 st defendant’s husband Shaik Mastan was out of town and his whereabouts could not be known, as such, the entire balance sale consideration had been paid to the 1 st defendant and obtained endorsement on the back of the agreement and undertaking to execute a conveyance in their favour on demand. In the meantime, Seethamma died in 1982 and Asirayya died in 1989. During their lifetime, the 1 st plaintiff, her mother and brother were always ready and willing to obtain registered re-conveyance from the 1 st defendant. Even after the death of Seethamma, her eldest daughter Dalemma did not claim any right in the plaint schedule property. (iv) The plaintiffs further pleaded that the 1 st defendant and her husband in order to cause wrongful loss to the 1 st plaintiff and her co-vendors nominally mortgaged the plaint schedule property to one Anam Satyanarayana on 16.04.1982 and got filed suit in O.S.No.270 of 1985 against them in the District Munsif Court, Eluru and obtained preliminary decree on 18.02.1986 and final decree on 25.01.1987. Thereafter, the said Satyanarayana got filed E.P.No.159 of 1990 and brought the plaint schedule property for sale. In collusion they got the property sold in the Court auction on 19.01.1993 and Ponna Koteswara Rao figured as an auction purchaser. The plaintiffs having came to know the said auction filed E.A.No.142 of 1993 in E.P.No.159 of 1990 in O.S.No.270 of 1985 to set aside the sale after depositing amount, the said petition was allowed, sale was set aside on 15.03.1996 and the said decree was fully satisfied. The 1 st defendant and her husband did not question the said order, dated 15.03.1996. So, the above conduct of the 1 st defendant and her husband fortified the agreement, dated 10.09.1980. The 1 st defendant and her husband did not question the said order, dated 15.03.1996. So, the above conduct of the 1 st defendant and her husband fortified the agreement, dated 10.09.1980. The plaintiffs got issued registered notice but not received any reply, as such, they again issued another notice on 03.06.1999. After that only, the 1 st defendant issued a reply with false allegations. (v) The plaintiffs further pleaded that later on 11.07.1999 the 1 st defendant executed a fresh agreement in favour of the plaintiffs ratifying and confirming the original agreement, dated 10.09.1980 for revised price of Rs.1,00,500/- and the earlier agreement was thus merged into the later agreement, dated 11.07.1999. The 1 st defendant having received Rs.15,000/- under Ex.A.1 and also received Rs.75,000/- on 11.07.1999 and plaintiffs agreed to pay the balance consideration of Rs.15,000/- on or before 11.08.1999 and the plaintiffs are ready and willing to perform their part of contract. The defendant Nos.2 to 4 who are fully aware of the re-conveyance agreement, dated 10.09.1980, have obtained three sale deeds from the 1 st defendant and her two sons (defendant Nos.5 and 6) on 15.07.1999 in respect of the part of the plaint schedule property. The defendant Nos.2 to 4 who are set up as purchasers from defendant Nos.1, 5 and 6, who are fully aware and conscious of the obligation of defendant Nos.1, 5 and 6 to execute registered sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs in terms of the agreement, dated 10.09.1980 and 11.07.1999. As such, the defendant Nos.2 to 4 are not bona fide transferees for valuable consideration without notice of the prior agreement of sale, dated 10.09.1980 and 11.07.1999 in favour of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are not bound by three sale deeds, dated 15.07.1999 obtained by the defendant Nos.2 to 4, who were brought into existence fraudulently to defeat the rights of the plaintiffs in the plaint schedule property and that the plaintiffs are constrained to file the suit. 7. The case of the defendants in O.S.No.82 of 1999, in brief, is as follows: The 1 st defendant along with her husband purchased the plaint schedule property from K. Seethamma, Asirayya and 1 st plaintiff on 10.09.1980 under a registered sale deed and since then, they have been enjoying the possession of the plaint schedule property. 7. The case of the defendants in O.S.No.82 of 1999, in brief, is as follows: The 1 st defendant along with her husband purchased the plaint schedule property from K. Seethamma, Asirayya and 1 st plaintiff on 10.09.1980 under a registered sale deed and since then, they have been enjoying the possession of the plaint schedule property. Later, in the year 1982 at request of the plaintiffs, 1 st defendant permitted them to reside in some portion of the plaint schedule property on condition that they have to vacate whenever she demands. Subsequently, in the month of September, 1998, the 1 st defendant required plaint schedule property, as such, they suggested the plaintiffs to seek for another house for their residence as it is likely to be vacated. Taking advantage of the defendants’ request, the plaintiffs got issued a registered notice, dated 03.06.1999 with false allegations. The 1 st defendant got issued a reply notice, dated 07.06.1999 and directing the plaintiffs to hand over the plaint schedule property to her. The alleged sale agreement, dated 11.07.1999 is fabricated, forged one and it is concocted by the plaintiffs for getting wrongful gain to them and wrongful loss to the 1 st defendant. The plaintiffs did not challenge three registered sale deeds because the defendant Nos.2 to 4 are permitted by the 1 st defendant to reside them at some portion of plaint schedule property. Thus, the 1 st defendant executed the registered sale deeds in favour of them in respect of the portion which they are residing, after taking full consideration. Hence, the defendant Nos.2 to 4 become absolute owners for their respective portions of the sites on the western side of the plaint schedule property to an extent of 165 sq. yards and that there is no cause of action for the plaintiffs to file the suit. 8. The case of the plaintiffs, in brief, as set out in the plaint averments in O.S.No.262 of 2004, is as follows: The 1 st plaintiff is mother of the plaintiff Nos.2 and 3. The 1 st defendant is mother-in-law of the 2 nd defendant, the 3 rd defendant is mother of the 2 nd defendant and sister-in-law of the 1 st defendant. The plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the plaint schedule property which is an extent of 109 sq. The 1 st defendant is mother-in-law of the 2 nd defendant, the 3 rd defendant is mother of the 2 nd defendant and sister-in-law of the 1 st defendant. The plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the plaint schedule property which is an extent of 109 sq. yards, which is part and parcel of site in an extent of 274.2 sq. yards, the same was originally belonged to Kommoju Appala Swamy. Appala Swamy purchased the same under a registered sale deed, dated 27.04.1963. He died in about 1974 leaving behind his wife Seethamma, son Asirayya and two daughters P. Dalemma and 1 st defendant. Asirayya died in the year 1989 leaving behind his wife, who is the 3 rd defendant and only daughter, who is the 2 nd defendant. Seethamma died in the year 1982. During the lifetime, Appala Swamy mortgaged 274.2 sq. yards site including plaint schedule property to one K. Veerraju under a registered mortgage deed, dated 22.08.1972 but died in 1974 without discharging the debt. The said mortgagee filed O.S.No.208 of 1976 and obtained preliminary and final decree against K. Seethamma, his son Asirayya, 1 st defendant and her sister Dalemma. Later, the said decree was transferred to Kammula Muneswara Rao on 03.04.1979 who in turn filed E.P.No. 250 of 2009 and brought the entire site of 274.2 sq. yards for sale. At this juncture, the 1 st defendant, her brother Asirayya and their mother Seethamma sold away the entire site to the 1 st plaintiff and her husband under a registered sale deed, dated 10.09.1980 for valuable consideration of Rs.10,500/- and delivered the possession of entire site of 274.2 sq. yards including plaint schedule property. As per the terms of the sale deed, the 1 st plaintiff and her husband fully discharged the debt in E.P.No.255 of 1979 to the transferee of the decree holder by paying Rs.3,666/- and remaining amount of Rs.6,834/- was paid to the vendors at the time of execution of the registered sale deed. Subsequently, the 1 st plaintiff’s husband was out of tow and his whereabouts could not be known to the plaintiffs since 1981. The plaintiffs became absolute owners of the entire site of 274.2 sq. yards including the plaint schedule property. Subsequently, the 1 st plaintiff’s husband was out of tow and his whereabouts could not be known to the plaintiffs since 1981. The plaintiffs became absolute owners of the entire site of 274.2 sq. yards including the plaint schedule property. In the year 1992, the 1 st defendant and her sister Dalemma are permitted to erect a small thatched hut in the plaint schedule property to reside along with her family members including defendant Nos.2 and 3 as they are close friends to 1 st plaintiff. The defendants agreed to evict and hand over the plaint schedule property whenever the plaintiffs demanded them. In the year, 1996 there were some disputes in between the 1 st plaintiff and 1 st defendant as she insisted the plaintiffs to sell the plaint schedule property. Then, the 1 st plaintiff asked defendants on 01.09.1998 to vacate the plaint schedule property as it is required to take up construction of residential house. The defendants asked the 1 st plaintiff to give some time for searching alternative accommodation. In the meantime, on 03.06.1999, the defendants got issued legal notice to the 1 st plaintiff claiming ownership over the plaint schedule property by setting up a false sale agreement, dated 10.09.1980. The 1 st plaintiff got issued reply with a demand to evict the plaint schedule property and hand over the same to the plaintiffs by revoking their permission over the plaint schedule property. Having received eviction notice, the defendants did not choose to vacate the site and further they went to an extent of setting up false plea that the 1 st plaintiff executed afresh sale agreement, dated 11.07.1999 with regard to plaint schedule property and the site under the occupation of her sister Dalemma. They sold an extent of 165 sq. yards of site from out of 274.2 sq. yards in favour of Potnuri Venkateswara Rao, Appa Rao, Alajingi Chinnamma under a registered sale deed, dated 14.07.1999. The defendants have no manner of right to continue in possession of the plaint schedule property. Without any right, they are simply squatting over the plaint schedule property and that the plaintiffs are constrained to file the suit. 9. yards in favour of Potnuri Venkateswara Rao, Appa Rao, Alajingi Chinnamma under a registered sale deed, dated 14.07.1999. The defendants have no manner of right to continue in possession of the plaint schedule property. Without any right, they are simply squatting over the plaint schedule property and that the plaintiffs are constrained to file the suit. 9. The brief facts in the written statement filed by the defendants before the trial Court in O.S.No.262 of 2004 are as follows: The defendant Nos.1 to 3 in this case pleaded the material averments mentioned in the plaint in O.S.No.82 of 1999. Further the defendants submit that they filed O.S.No.82 of 1999 seeking performance of agreement, dated 10.09.1980 executed by the 1 st plaintiff herein and her husband and in view of the averments mentioned in the plaint in O.S.No.82 of 1999, the plaintiffs herein are not entitled to recover the possession of the plaint schedule property or to recover the damages for use and occupation. 10. On the basis of above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues in O.S.No.82 of 1999 for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for specific performance of suit agreement of sale as prayed for? (2) To what relief? The trial Court framed the following issues in O.S.No.262 of 2004 for trial: (1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for recovery of possession as prayed for? (2) Whether the suit is filed as counter-blast to O.S.No.82 of 1999 filed by the defendants and the suit is not maintainable? (3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the damages for use and occupation as prayed for? (4) To what relief? 11. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.W.1 to P.W.8 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.18 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.W.1 to D.W.4 were examined and Exs.B.1 to Ex.B.11 and Ex.X.1 were marked. 12. The learned Trial Judge, after conclusion of trial, on hearing the arguments of both sides and on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, decreed the suit in O.S.No.82 of 1999 and dismissed the suit in O.S.No.262 of 2004 vide common judgment. Felt aggrieved thereby, the appeal suits in A.S.No.241 of 2007 and A.S.No.240 of 2007 are filed before the First Appellate Court, wherein, the following point came up for consideration. Felt aggrieved thereby, the appeal suits in A.S.No.241 of 2007 and A.S.No.240 of 2007 are filed before the First Appellate Court, wherein, the following point came up for consideration. Whether the common judgment and decree of Trial Court in O.S.No.82 of 1999 and O.S.No.262 of 2004 is against law, evidence on record, probabilities of the case and liable to be set aside or not? 13. The learned First Appellate Judge, after hearing the arguments, answered the point, as above, and dismissed the appeals filed by the respective parties confirming the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court vide common judgment. Felt aggrieved of the same, the present second appeals are filed before this Court. 14. On hearing both sides counsel at the time of admission of both the appeals i.e., S.A.No.194 of 2012 and S.A.No.195 of 2012, on 09.07.2012, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad framed the following substantial questions of law: S.A.No.194 of 2012: (1) Whether the Courts below are granted specific performance of sale agreement dated 11.07.1999 in favour of the respondents and it has become unenforceable and the evidence on record shows that it is surrounded by suspicious circumstances? (2) Whether the Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence adduced by both parties and coming to a conclusion that it is to be presumed that the respondents are in possession of the suit schedule property, which is not tenable? S.A.No.195 of 2012 Whether the dismissal of the suit for recovery of vacant possession of the plaint schedule property from the defendants is enforceable and valid conclusion? 15. Heard Sri Rajareddy Koneti, learned counsel for the appellants and heard Sri P. Rajasekhar, learned counsel, representing Sri E.V.V.S. Ravi Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents. 16. Law is well settled that under Section 100 of CPC the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the First Appellate Court which is the final Court of facts except in such cases where such findings were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law, or its settled position on the basis of the pronouncement made by the Apex Court or based upon inadmissible evidence or without evidence. In a case of Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh , [ AIR 1993 SC 398 ] , the Apex Court held as follows: “The High Court was certainly entitled to go into the question as to whether the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court which was the final Court of fact were vitiated in the eye of law on account of non-consideration of admissible evidence of vital nature.” In a case of Kondira Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan Gujar , [AIR 1999 SC 471] , the Apex Court held as follows: “The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the First Appellate Court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence.” 17. In a second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court is normally not expected to re-appreciate the evidence on record. It shall not reverse the findings of both the Courts below except under few situations. If it is found that the material and relevant evidence are not considered by the First Appellate Court and if considered it would have lead to an opposite conclusion, is one instance where this Court is entitled to interfere. The other situation is when the findings of the facts were arrived by the First Appellate Court by placing reliance on inadmissible evidence, which if it was omitted, an appropriate conclusion was possible. It is on such occasions also this Court can interfere. It is also relevant to say that if the judgment of both the Courts below are contrary to mandatory provisions of the law applicable to the case, then also an interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is permissible. S.A.No.194 of 2012 connected with O.S.No.82 of 1999 connected with A.S.No.241 of 2007: 18. The undisputed facts of both the parties are the plaint schedule property in O.S.No.82 of 1999 is an extent of 274.2 sq. yards which includes the plaint schedule property in another suit in O.S.No.262 of 2004, which is an extent of 109.2 sq. yards. The total extent of 274.2 sq. The undisputed facts of both the parties are the plaint schedule property in O.S.No.82 of 1999 is an extent of 274.2 sq. yards which includes the plaint schedule property in another suit in O.S.No.262 of 2004, which is an extent of 109.2 sq. yards. The total extent of 274.2 sq. yards originally belongs to one Kommoju Appala Swamy and the said Appala Swamy mortgaged the same to one Kakarla Veerraju under a registered mortgage deed, dated 22.08.1972. He died leaving behind his wife Seethamma, son Asirayya and two daughters viz., Potnuri Dalemma and Gottupalli Guravamma (1 st plaintiff herein) without discharging the debt. It is also undisputed by both the parties mortgagee filed suit in O.S.No.208 of 1976 before the District Munsif Magistrate Court, Eluru and execution proceedings vide E.P.No.255 of 1979 is filed to execute the decree and Seethamma, Asirayya and 1 st plaintiff requested Dalemma to join with them to raise money to discharge the mortgage decree debt, but Dalemma did not come forward and did not show any interest. It is also not in dispute that under the aforesaid circumstances, Seethamma, 1 st plaintiff and Asirayya executed original of Ex.B.2 registered sale deed, dated 10.09.1980 in respect of the plaint schedule property which is an extent of 274.2 sq. yards in favour of the 1 st defendant and her husband. It was pleaded that out of total consideration of Rs.10,500/-, the 1 st defendant Shaik Bibijan and her husband kept a sum of Rs.3,666/- with them to discharge the debt due under the mortgage decree in O.S.No.208 of 1976 and the remaining amount was paid to the vendors. 19. The material on record goes to show that the plaint schedule property in O.S.No.82 of 1999 is an extent of 274.2 sq. yards, which is originally belongs to Kommoju Appala Swamy, he mortgaged the said property to one Kakarla Veerraju under a registered mortgage deed, dated 22.08.1972 and the said Appala Swamy died without discharging the debt, as such, the mortgagee filed a suit in O.S.No.208 of 1976 and obtained preliminary decree and final decree and subsequently, the same has been transferred to one Kammula Muneswara Rao and transferee filed execution proceedings before the Executing Court to bring the plaint schedule property for sale. The material on record further reveals in order to discharge the mortgage decree debt, the legal representatives of Appala Swamy viz., Asirayya and 1 st plaintiff requested their sister Dalemma to join with them to raise money to discharge mortgage decree debt, but she did not evince any interest and that except Dalemma, the other family members of Appala Swamy executed a sale deed in favour of 1 st defendant and her husband on 10.09.1980. The material on record also proves the 1 st defendant and her husband executed Ex.A.1 agreement on the same day i.e., on 10.09.1980 with a promise that they should re-convey the property to them, if they repaid the said amount of Rs.10,500/- within two years i.e., on or before 09.09.1982 with interest at 24% per annum. Ex.A.2 goes to show that on 08.09.1982 the plaintiffs paid Rs.6,000/- to 1 st defendant and her husband under Ex.A.2 endorsement and time is further extended till 08.09.1983 and on 08.09.1983, the 1 st defendant and her husband made an endorsement under Ex.A.3 that time is extended till 07.11.1983 and further they paid balance sale consideration with interest under Ex.A.4 to the 1 st defendant and obtained Ex.A.4 endorsement on the back of Ex.A.1 on 06.11.1983, since whereabouts the husband of 1 st defendant are not known. It is also admitted fact that whereabouts the husband of 1 st defendant are not known since 1983. 20. It is the specific case of the 1 st defendant-Shaik Bibijan that they did not execute Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 documents and those are concocted with an intention to grab the total property of 274.2 sq. yards. Admittedly, P.W.4, who is the son of P.W.1, supported P.W.1 on all crucial aspects. P.W.2 and P.W.3 identified handwriting of scribe of Ex.A.1. The scribe of Ex.A.1 is no more. Ex.A.5 is another crucial document under which the 1 st defendant executed another agreement in favour of the plaintiffs ratifying and confirming Ex.A.1, dated 10.09.1980 for revised price of Rs.1,00,500/- as per the mediation made by the elders and 1 st defendant acknowledged the receipt of Rs.10,500/- under Ex.A.1 and also received Rs.75,000/- and the plaintiffs have to pay remaining balance amount of Rs.15,000/- on or before 11.08.1999 and also made an endorsement to that effect. 21. 21. The specific case of plaintiffs is that the 1 st defendant and her husband mortgaged the plaint schedule property in favour of Anam Satyanarayana who filed mortgage suit in O.S.No.270 of 1985 and obtained preliminary decree and final decree and later execution petition vide E.P.No.159 of 1990 is filed for sale of total plaint schedule property. Furthermore, the documentary evidence goes to show that the plaintiffs herein filed a petition for setting aside the sale and deposited the entire amount. The 1 st defendant in her evidence in cross examination itself admitted that herself and her husband created equitable mortgage over the plaint schedule property in the month of April, 1982 in favour of one Anam Satyanarayana and borrowed Rs.1,500/- and subsequently the said Satyanarayana obtained a preliminary decree and final decree as they failed to repay the mortgage debt. She further admits that when Satyanarayana filed execution petition and brought the entire schedule site for sale and the same was knocked down in favour of one Ponna Koteswara Rao. The 1 st defendant admitted that P.W.1 after receiving the amount from her sister Dalemma, filed a petition for setting aside the same by depositing required amount into the Court and succeeded in setting aside the auction held by the Court. As per the evidence of P.W.1, the 1 st defendant executed Ex.A.5 agreement, dated 11.07.1999 in favour of the plaintiffs by ratifying and confirming Ex.A.1 sale agreement, dated 10.09.1980 for enhanced price of Rs.1,00,500/- under Ex.A.5. The 1 st defendant ratified the receipt of amount of Rs.10,500/- under Ex.A.1 and received an amount of Rs.75,000/- on that day and balance sale consideration of Rs.15,000/- has to be paid on or before 11.08.1989 and later the 1 st defendant along with her two sons also executed Ex.B.3 to Ex.B.5 on 14.07.1999 in favour of defendant Nos.2 to 4 to defeat the rights of the plaintiffs by suppressing Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 transactions. 22. In order to prove Ex.A.5 agreement, the plaintiffs relied on the evidence of P.W.6 to P.W.8. P.W.6 is the scribe of Ex.A.5. As per his evidence, he is the scribe of Ex.A.5 sale agreement executed by Shaik Bibijan in favour of the plaintiffs and on the date of Ex.A.5, the parties to the agreement accompanied by P.W.7 and P.W.8, came to his residence and requested him to scribe Ex.A.5. P.W.6 is the scribe of Ex.A.5. As per his evidence, he is the scribe of Ex.A.5 sale agreement executed by Shaik Bibijan in favour of the plaintiffs and on the date of Ex.A.5, the parties to the agreement accompanied by P.W.7 and P.W.8, came to his residence and requested him to scribe Ex.A.5. He further deposed that the parties have negotiated themselves and told him that 1 st defendant and her husband executed Ex.A.1 agreement on 10.09.1980, agreeing to re-convey the total plaint schedule property which was sold by the 1 st plaintiff and others to them and that as per the terms of Ex.A.1, the 1 st plaintiff and others paid entire amount to them and the same was endorsed on the back of Ex.A.1 and at that time original of Ex.A.1 was also brought to him and he noted the schedule after reading the contents. He further deposed that after preparing Ex.A.5, the 1 st defendant signed in the presence of attestors P.W.7 and P.W.8. P.W.7 and P.W.8 deposed in their evidence about the execution of Ex.A.5 by 1 st defendant and P.W.7 and P.W.8 narrated Ex.A.5 transaction happened in their presence. They also further deposed that a sum of Rs.75,000/- was paid in their presence to 1 st defendant and balance sale consideration of Rs.15,000/- has to be paid by the plaintiffs within a month. As stated supra, Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 are strongly disputed by the 1 st defendant. On application filed by the defendants, Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 were sent to the handwriting expert. The Handwriting Expert is examined as P.W.5 and as per his evidence, he compared the signatures of Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 with admitted signatures of 1 st defendant and P.W.5 opined that the signatures on Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 belong to 1 st defendant only and Ex.X.1 report is got marked through P.W.5. 23. The learned counsel for the defendants would contend that the opinion of Handwriting Expert is not a conclusive proof. It is true that the opinion of Handwriting Expert is not a conclusive proof, but it has to be read along with other evidence. Though Handwriting Expert was cross examined at length, nothing was elicited in the cross examination to discredit the testimony of P.W.5. Furthermore, Ex.X.1-the opinion of Handwriting Expert is supported by the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.5 and P.W.6 to P.W.8. Though Handwriting Expert was cross examined at length, nothing was elicited in the cross examination to discredit the testimony of P.W.5. Furthermore, Ex.X.1-the opinion of Handwriting Expert is supported by the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.5 and P.W.6 to P.W.8. Therefore, the plaintiffs proved Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 are true and genuine. 24. The specific case of the 1 st defendant is that whereabouts of her husband are not known to her and that she executed Ex.B.3 to Ex.B.5 along with defendant Nos.5 and 6 in favour of defendant Nos.2 to 4. In the sale deeds are also it was recited whereabouts the husband of 1 st defendant are not known since 10 years onwards. As seen from Ex.A.4 and Ex.A.5, they were signed by 1 st defendant alone. As stated supra, Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 are proved in accordance with law. Ex.A.4 endorsement on the back of Ex.A.1 shows that the vendor received total sale consideration and it was endorsed under Ex.A.4 that they will execute a sale deed as and when demanded by the plaintiffs and no time limit is fixed for obtaining regular sale deed by the plaintiffs. 25. The evidence on record proves that after executing Ex.B.2 document, on the same day, there was an agreement of re-conveyance under Ex.A.1 on a condition that the plaintiffs have to pay total balance sale consideration to the 1 st defendant and her husband, the 1 st defendant also executed a fresh agreement under Ex.A.5 in favour of the plaintiffs ratifying and confirming Ex.A.1 sale agreement, dated 10.09.1980 for revised price of Rs.1,00,500/- as per the mediation made by the elders. The contents of Ex.A.5 further goes to show that the 1 st defendant has received Rs.10,500/- under Ex.A.1 and the plaintiffs paid an amount of Rs.75,000/- on the date of Ex.A.5 and the plaintiffs have to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.15,000/- which was stipulated to be paid on or before 11.08.1999. As stated supra, the plaintiffs proved Ex.A.1 agreement and Ex.A.5 agreement and also proved Ex.A.2 to Ex.A.4 endorsements and plaintiffs also proved Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 are genuine. After execution of Ex.A.5, the defendants gone into the extent of denial of Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5. As stated supra, the plaintiffs proved Ex.A.1 agreement and Ex.A.5 agreement and also proved Ex.A.2 to Ex.A.4 endorsements and plaintiffs also proved Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 are genuine. After execution of Ex.A.5, the defendants gone into the extent of denial of Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5. As noticed supra, the plaintiffs have taken hectic efforts to prove Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 through P.W.1 to P.W.4 and P.W.6 to P.W.8 which is well supported by the evidence of P.W.5 Handwriting Expert coupled with Ex.X.1 report. 26. It is settled law that unless the deed of agreement of sale stipulated a date for performance, time is not always essence of the contract. It is also well settled that under Article 54 of the Schedule to the LIMITATION ACT 21 of 1963, limitation for specific performance begins to run from the date fixed in the contract or from the date of refusal to execute the sale deed. As noticed supra, Ex.A.4 endorsement on the reverse of Ex.A.1 goes to show that the vendors received total sale consideration and they will execute a re- conveyance deed i.e., sale deed as and when demanded by the plaintiffs and no time limit is fixed for executing the registered sale deed. As stated supra, to ratify Ex.A.1 agreement of sale, dated 10.09.1980, the 1 st defendant executed Ex.A.5 agreement of sale, dated 11.07.1999 by ratifying Ex.A.1 transaction and further it was settled in the presence of mediators that the plaintiffs agreed to pay Rs.1,00,500/- and it was reiterated in Ex.A.5 that the 1 st defendant received an amount of Rs.10,500/- under Ex.A.1 and also received an amount of Rs.75,000/- on the date of Ex.A.5 and the plaintiffs have to pay the balance amount of Rs.15,000/- on or before 11.08.1999. It is also admitted by both the parties that the plaintiffs issued a legal notice under Ex.A.8, the 1 st defendant received the said notice and the present suit for specific performance of agreement of sale is filed in the year 1999 and the present suit in O.S.No.82 of 1999 is filed within a period of limitation. 27. It is the specific case of the 1 st defendant that relief of cancellation of sale deeds Ex.B.3 to Ex.B.5 has not sought by the plaintiffs and that the suit itself is not maintainable. 27. It is the specific case of the 1 st defendant that relief of cancellation of sale deeds Ex.B.3 to Ex.B.5 has not sought by the plaintiffs and that the suit itself is not maintainable. Clause (b) of Section 19 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT says that “the defendants who are claiming under the sale deeds executed after the execution of the suit agreement can be subjected to a decree of specific performance as the suit agreement can be enforced specifically against such defendants unless they are bonafide purchasers without the notice of the original contract”. The defendant Nos.2 to 4 failed to prove that they entered into sale deed in good faith and without the notice of the suit agreement, but they failed to prove the same. Therefore, the subsequent purchasers have to execute a sale deed along with original vendor and there is no need for cancellation of subsequent sale deeds. In the case on hand, on having knowledge of Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 transactions, the 1 st defendant along with her two sons alienated the property under Ex.B.3 to Ex.B.5 in favour of defendant Nos.2 to 4 and approached the Court with unclean hands with a specific contention that Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 are fabricated one. As stated supra, Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 are proved in accordance with law. It is well settled that the equitable discretion to grant relief of specific performance or not to grant the relief of specific performance also depend upon the conduct of the parties. The necessary ingredients have to be proved and established by the plaintiff, so that discretion would be exercised judiciously in favour of the plaintiff. At the same time, if the defendant does not come with clean hands and suppressed the material facts and evidence and misleads the Court, then such discretion should not be exercised by refusing to grant a relief of specific performance. 28. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that by giving cogent reasons, the learned trial Judge rightly decreed the suit for specific performance of agreement of sale filed by the plaintiffs in O.S.No.82 of 1999 and on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned First Appellate Judge confirmed the said finding of the learned trial Judge and dismissed the First Appeal filed by the defendants. Therefore, there is no need to interfere with the finding arrived by both the Courts below and the second appeal is liable to be dismissed. S.A.No.195 of 2012 connected with O.S.No.262 of 2004 connected with A.S.No.240 of 2007: 29. The defendant Nos.1, 5 and 6 in O.S.No.82 of 1999 filed a suit in the year 2000 before the Principal Junior Civil Judge, Eluru vide O.S.No.886 of 2000 for recovery of plaint schedule property. Later, the same has been transferred to Principal Senior Civil Judge, Eluru and it was renumbered as O.S.No.262 of 2004. The contention of the plaintiffs in O.S.No.262 of 2004 i.e., appellants herein is that on execution of original of Ex.B.2 registered sale deed, dated 10.09.1980 in favour of her and her husband, the 1 st respondent, her mother and her brother delivered the plaint schedule property to her and on the same day onwards herself and her family members are residing in the plaint schedule hut by paying tax to the concerned panchayat. The appellants further pleaded that in the year 1992, P.W.1 i.e., 1 st defendant in O.S.No.262 of 2004 and her family members asked her to permit them to erect a small thatched hut in the plaint schedule property to reside along with her family members including defendant Nos.2 and 3 and gave assurance that they will hand over the vacant site whenever on demand made by her and in view of the friendship, they permitted to stay in the part of the eastern portion of the schedule site. The contention of the respondents is that though the 1 st defendant and her husband obtained Ex.B.2 on 10.09.1980, the possession was not delivered to them in view of re-conveyance deed executed on the same day i.e., on 10.09.1980 by 1 st defendant and her husband under Ex.A.1 which was confirmed under Ex.A.5. As stated supra, Ex.A.1 to Ex.A.5 are proved in accordance with law. As noticed supra, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.82 of 1999 is entitled the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale. Admittedly, no document is filed by the appellants to prove that they are in possession and enjoyment over the plaint schedule property from 1980 onwards till 1991. The 1 st defendant also admitted the same in her evidence that she has no document to show that herself and her children residing in a thatched hut from 1980 onwards till 1991. 30. The 1 st defendant also admitted the same in her evidence that she has no document to show that herself and her children residing in a thatched hut from 1980 onwards till 1991. 30. It is not in dispute that the plaint schedule property in O.S.No.262 of 2004 is an extent of 109.2 sq. yards which is a part of the property in O.S.No.82 of 1999. The total extent in O.S.No.82 of 1999 is 274.2 sq. yards. The contention of the respondents is that they are in possession of total extent of 274.2 sq. yards i.e., the plaint schedule property in O.S.No.82 of 1999. It is admitted by the defendants that after obtaining Ex.B.2 sale deed, dated 10.09.1980, the 1 st defendant and her husband created equitable mortgage over the plaint schedule property in an extent of 274.2 sq. yards in the month of April, 1982 and subsequently the mortgagee filed a suit and obtained preliminary decree and final decree in respect of the plaint schedule property and the schedule property was also brought for sale and property was also auctioned, by that time P.W.1 i.e., 1 st defendant in O.S.No.262 of 2004 filed a petition to set aside the sale by depositing required amount and the Court set aside the sale. The evidence on record further reveals that to defeat the rights of the respondents, 1 st appellant and her children appellant Nos.2 and 3 executed sale deeds in favour of defendant Nos.2 to 4 on 14.07.1999 in O.S.No.82 of 1999 for an extent of 165 sq. yards on the western side of the total schedule property of 274.2 sq. yards. As stated supra, in view of Clause (b) of Section 19 of the SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT , the appellants who were claiming under the sale deeds executed after execution of suit agreement can be subjected to a decree of specific performance as the suit against all the defendants can be enforced specifically against the defendants unless they are bonafide purchasers without the notice of original contract. In the case on hand, the defendant Nos.2 to 4 in O.S.No.82 of 1999 failed to prove that they are the bonafide purchasers. 31. In the case on hand, the defendant Nos.2 to 4 in O.S.No.82 of 1999 failed to prove that they are the bonafide purchasers. 31. The evidence of P.W.1 coupled with Ex.A.2 to Ex.A.5 establishes that the 1 st appellant and her husband received consideration from the 1 st respondent and 1 st appellant and her husband acknowledge the receipt of payment and extended time of specific performance of contract under Ex.A.2 to Ex.A.4 and promised to execute a sale deed whenever the respondents demanded. Further Ex.A.5 also establishes that 1 st appellant executed a fresh agreement in favour of respondents by ratifying and confirming earlier Ex.A.1 sale deed for enhanced price of Rs.1,00,500/- and the 1 st appellant admitted about the receipt of Rs.10,500/- under Ex.A.1 and the respondent also paid an amount of Rs.75,000/- at the time of execution of Ex.A.5 and balance amount of Rs.15,000/- has to be paid within one month and that the suit is filed in the year 1999. As stated supra, the respondents are entitled relief of decree of specific performance of agreement of sale in O.S.No.82 of 1999. In view of findings arrived in O.S.No.82 of 1999, the plaintiffs in O.S.No.262 of 2004 are not entitled the relief of recovery of possession since the plaint schedule property in O.S.No.262 of 2004 is a part of property in O.S.No.82 of 1999. By giving cogent reasons, the learned trial Judge rightly dismissed the suit in O.S.No.262 of 2004 and on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned First Appellate Judge confirmed the said decree and judgment and dismissed the First Appeal. 32. This Court while exercising power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure must confine to the substantial question of law involved in the second appeal and this Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence on record and the interference with the concurrent findings of both the Courts below where the Courts below are exercised judiciously. Further, the existence of substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substantiate its own opinion unless the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. Further, the existence of substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substantiate its own opinion unless the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. I am of the considered view that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, both the Courts below recorded concurrent finding that the plaintiffs in O.S.No.82 of 1999 are entitled the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale and the plaintiffs in O.S.No.262 of 2004 are not entitled the relief of recovery of possession of the property in O.S.No.262 of 2004 and the suit in O.S.No.82 of 1999 is decreed and the suit in O.S.No.262 of 2004 is dismissed. Therefore, there are no merits in the second appeal and the same is liable to be dismissed. 33. In the result, both the Second Appeals i.e., S.A.No.194 of 2012 and S.A.No.195 of 2012 are dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, each party do bear their own costs in both the second appeals. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeals shall stand closed.