JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 19.05.2010, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nahan District Sirmaur, H.P (learned Trial Court), vide which the complaint filed by the appellant (complainant before learned Trial Court) for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (in short ‘NI Act’) was dismissed and respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was asserted that the accused had family relations with the complainant. The accused borrowed a sum of Rs.95,000/- from the complainant in December 2005. She promised to repay the amount on or before 14.03.2006. She issued a cheque bearing No. 278852 drawn on Punjab National Bank for a sum of Rs.95,000/- in the discharge of her legal liability. The complainant presented the cheque before his bank-State Bank of India, Nahan from where, it was sent to the Bank of the accused for realization, however, the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement of ‘insufficient funds’. The complainant issued a notice asking the accused to pay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. The notice was delivered to the accused and he acknowledged the delivery vide receipt dated 27.03.2006. The accused failed to pay the amount despite the receipt of the notice of demand; hence, the complaint was filed against the accused for taking action as per the law. 3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which, the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The complainant examined himself (CW1) and Prakash Chand (CW2) to prove his case. 4. The accused in her statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the complainant’s case in its entirety. She stated that the complainant made a false statement against her and she was not to pay any money to the complainant. She was falsely implicated in the present case. 4. The accused in her statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the complainant’s case in its entirety. She stated that the complainant made a false statement against her and she was not to pay any money to the complainant. She was falsely implicated in the present case. Initially, the accused stated that she wanted to lead defence evidence but subsequently, no evidence was led. 5. The learned Trial Court held that the complainant asserted in his statement on oath that the accused had demanded money for treatment of her medical ailment. The accused was working as a peon and in the absence of any medical record, the plea of the complainant that he had advanced a sum of Rs.95,000/- towards the domestic need/medical ailment was not probable. The complainant claimed that he was engaged in the business of selling milk. He was an income tax payee, however, he did not produce any evidence to establish his financial capacity. The complainant asserted in the complaint that the accused promised to pay the money on or before 14.03.2006, however, he stated that the cheque was issued on the date of advancing of the loan, which is contrary to the averments in the complaint. The receipt of notice of demand was not sufficient in the absence of evidence regarding the legal liability of the accused, therefore, the accused was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. 6. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant filed the present appeal asserting that the accused did not dispute her signatures and there is a presumption of consideration attached to the cheque. Learned Trial Court erred in shifting the burden of proof upon the complainant. The accused was to discharge the burden by showing that the cheque was not issued for legal liability. Learned Trial Court erred in drawing a distinction between personal illness and domestic urgent need, which is not correct because the medical need also falls within the definition of domestic urgent needs. The complainant had arranged money with difficulty to help the accused but his complaint was dismissed by the learned Trial Court without any plausible reasons, therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 7. I have heard Mr. The complainant had arranged money with difficulty to help the accused but his complaint was dismissed by the learned Trial Court without any plausible reasons, therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 7. I have heard Mr. Rupinder Singh Thakur, learned counsel for the complainant/appellant and Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 8. Mr. Rupinder Singh Thakur , learned counsel for the complainant/appellant submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused and dismissing the complaint. The accused did not dispute the issuance of the cheque and there is a presumption of consideration attached to the cheque. The accused has to rebut the presumption by leading the evidence, however, she did not lead any evidence to rebut the presumption. Learned Trial Court erred in ignoring this position and shifting the burden upon the complainant to establish his financial capacity. The other ingredients of Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied; hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgments of M/s Asia Tradelinks versus Divyanshu Electronics , 2024:HHC:5403-DB and Raj Kumar Versus Sanjiv Kumar , 2024:HHC:9467 in support of his submission. 9. Mr. Sanjeev Kumar Suri, learned counsel for the respondent/accused submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that there were discrepancies in the evidence of the complainant vis-à-vis the complaint filed by him. This was sufficient to cast doubt upon the complainant’s case. This was a reasonable view taken by the learned Trial Court and this Court should not interfere with it while deciding an appeal against acquittal. He relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dattatraya v. Sharanappa , (2024) 8 SCC 573 : (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 776: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1899 , in support of his submission. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. 10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 11. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed: “11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035 a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus: “ 38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court. 39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below: (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29) “29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: ( Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325 ], SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’” 40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581 : (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8) “8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence; 8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence; 8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record; 8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.” 41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles: 41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; 41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and 41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 12. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. The complainant asserted in his complaint that the accused had taken a loan of Rs.95,000/- for her domestic needs in December 2005 and promised to pay the amount on or before 14.03.2006. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 13. The complainant asserted in his complaint that the accused had taken a loan of Rs.95,000/- for her domestic needs in December 2005 and promised to pay the amount on or before 14.03.2006. She issued a cheque to discharge her legal liability. He stated in his cross-examination that he had advanced the loan on 10.12.2005. The accused issued a blank cheque on the same day. He had filled the cheque in the presence of the accused. 14. Therefore, as per the complainant’s version, the accused had issued a blank cheque on the date of the taking of the loan, which was filled by him. 15. The complainant stated in his cross-examination that he had not withdrawn the amount on 10.12.2005 and he could not say how much amount was available in his account on 10.12.2005. He was a milk seller and was selling about 100 kg of milk per day. He was also an income tax payee. He claimed that he had advanced the loan to about 20 people but he could not tell the date of advancing the loan. 16. The cross-examination of the complainant shows that he claimed to be a milk seller and an income tax payee. He also claimed to have advanced loans to twenty people. He had not produced the income tax record to show his financial capacity. This was significant because of his admission that he had not withdrawn the money from the bank and he had advanced the loan to 20 people. He was only a milk seller and once he claimed to have advanced loan to various people, it was necessary to show that he had the financial capacity to do so. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tedhi Singh Versus Narayan Dass Mahant (2022) 6 SCC 735 that the accused has a right to demonstrate that the complainant did not have the financial capacity to advance the loan stated to have been advanced by him. It was observed:- “9. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have noted that in the case under Section 138 of the N. I. Act, the complainant need not show in the first instance that he had the capacity. The proceedings under Section 138 of the N. I. Act is not civil suits. It was observed:- “9. The Trial Court and the First Appellate Court have noted that in the case under Section 138 of the N. I. Act, the complainant need not show in the first instance that he had the capacity. The proceedings under Section 138 of the N. I. Act is not civil suits. At the time, when the complainant gives his evidence unless a case is set up in the reply notice to the statutory notice sent, that the complainant did not have the wherewithal, it cannot be expected of the complainant to initially lead evidence to show that he had the financial capacity. To that extent, the Courts in our view were right in holding on those lines. However, the accused has the right to demonstrate that the complainant in a particular case did not have the capacity and therefore, the case of the accused is acceptable which he can do by producing independent materials, namely, by examining his witnesses and producing documents. It is also open to him to establish the very same aspect by pointing to the materials produced by the complainant himself. He can further, more importantly, achieve this result through the cross-examination of the witnesses of the complainant. Ultimately, it becomes the duty of the Courts to consider carefully and appreciate the totality of the evidence and then come to a conclusion whether in the given case, the accused has shown that the case of the complainant is in peril for the reason that the accused has established a probable defence.” 17. This question was also considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in BasalingappaVersus Mudibasappa (2019) 5 SCC 418 and it was held that where the financial capacity to pay Rs.6,00,000/- was questioned and there was no satisfactory reply the accused had raised a probable defence. It was observed:- “26. Applying the preposition of law as noted above, in facts of the present case, it is clear that the signature on the cheque having been admitted, a presumption shall be raised under Section 139 that the cheque was issued in discharge of debt or liability. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused. In cross-examination of the PW1, when the specific question was put that a cheque was issued in relation to a loan of Rs. The question to be looked into is as to whether any probable defence was raised by the accused. In cross-examination of the PW1, when the specific question was put that a cheque was issued in relation to a loan of Rs. 25,000/-taken by the accused, the PW1 said that he does not remember. PW1 in his evidence admitted that he retired in 1997 on which date he received a monetary benefit of Rs. 8 lakhs, which was encashed by the complainant. It was also brought in the evidence that in the year 2010, the complainant entered into a sale agreement for which he paid an amount of Rs. 4,50,000/-to Balana Gouda towards sale consideration. Payment of Rs. 4,50,000/-being admitted in the year 2010 and further payment of loan of Rs. 50,000/-with regard to which complaint No.119 of 2012 was filed by the complainant, copy of which complaint was also filed as Ex.D2, there was a burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity. In the years 2010-2011, as per the own case of the complainant, he made a payment of Rs. 18 lakhs. During his cross-examination, when the financial capacity to pay Rs. 6 lakhs to the accused was questioned, there was no satisfactory reply given by the complainant. The evidence on record, thus, is a probable defence on behalf of the accused, which shifted the burden on the complainant to prove his financial capacity and other facts. 27. There was another evidence on the record, i.e., a copy of the plaint in O.S. No. 148 of 2011 filed by the complainant for recovery of a loan of Rs. 7 lakhs given to one Balana Gouda in December 2009. Thus, there was evidence on record to indicate that in December 2009, he gave Rs. 7 lakhs in a sale agreement, in 2010, he made a payment of Rs. 4,50,000/- towards sale consideration and further, he gave a loan of Rs. 50,000/-for which complaint was filed in 2012 and further loan of Rs. 6 lakhs in November 2011. Thus, during the period from 2009 to November 2011, an amount of Rs. 7 lakhs in a sale agreement, in 2010, he made a payment of Rs. 4,50,000/- towards sale consideration and further, he gave a loan of Rs. 50,000/-for which complaint was filed in 2012 and further loan of Rs. 6 lakhs in November 2011. Thus, during the period from 2009 to November 2011, an amount of Rs. 18 lakhs was given by the complainant to different persons including the accused, which put a heavy burden to prove the financial capacity when it was questioned on behalf of the accused, the accused being a retired employee of State Transport Corporation, who retired in 1997 and total retirement benefits, which were encashed were Rs. 8 lakhs only. The High Court observed that though the complainant is a retired employee, the accused did not even suggest that pension is the only means for the survival of the complainant. The following observations were made in Paragraph 16 of the judgment of the High Court: "17. Though the complainant is a retired employee, the accused did not even suggest that a pension is the only means for the survival of the complainant. Under these circumstances, the Trial Court's finding that the complainant failed to discharge his initial burden of proof of lending capacity is perverse." 28. There is one more aspect of the matter which also needs to be noticed. In the complaint filed by the complainant as well as in the examination-in-chief, the complainant has not mentioned as to on which date, the loan of Rs. 6 lakhs was given to the accused. It was during cross-examination, he gave the date as November 2011. Under Section 118 (b), a presumption shall be made as to the date that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn on such date. Admittedly, the cheque is dated 27.02.2012, there is not even a suggestion by the complainant that a post-dated cheque was given to him in November 2011 bearing dated 27.02.2012. Giving of a cheque on 27.02.2012, which was deposited on 01.03.2012 is not compatible with the case of the complainant when we read the complaint submitted by the complainant, especially Para 1 of the complaint, which is extracted as below: "1. The accused is a very good friend of the complainant. Giving of a cheque on 27.02.2012, which was deposited on 01.03.2012 is not compatible with the case of the complainant when we read the complaint submitted by the complainant, especially Para 1 of the complaint, which is extracted as below: "1. The accused is a very good friend of the complainant. The accused requested the Complainant a hand loan to meet out the urgent and family necessary sum of 6,00,000/-(Rupees Six Lakh) and on account of long-standing friendship and knowing the difficulties, which is being faced by the accused the complainant agreed to lend hand loan to meet out the financial difficulties of the accused and accordingly the Complainant lends hand loan Rs. 6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakh) dated 27.02.2012 in favour of the Complainant stating that on its presentation it will be honoured. But to the surprise of the Complainant on presentation of the same for collection through his Bank, the Cheque was returned by the Bank with an endorsement "Funds Insufficient" on 01-03-2012." 29. Thus, there is a contradiction in what was initially stated by the complainant in the complaint and in his examination-in-chief regarding the date on which the loan was given on one side and what was said in cross- examination in the other side, which has not been satisfactorily explained. The High Court was unduly influenced by the fact that the accused did not reply to the notice denying the execution of the cheque or legal liability. Even before the trial court, the appellant-accused has not denied his signature on the cheque. 30. We are of the view that when evidence was led before the Court to indicate that apart from a loan of Rs. 6 lakhs given to the accused, within 02 years, an amount of Rs. 18 lakhs have been given out by the complainant and his financial capacity being questioned, it was incumbent on the complainant to have explained his financial capacity. The court cannot insist on a person to lead negative evidence. The observation of the High Court that the trial court's finding that the complainant failed to prove his financial capacity of lending money is perverse cannot be supported. We fail to see how the trial court's findings can be termed as perverse by the High Court when it was based on consideration of the evidence, which was led on behalf of the defence.” 18. We fail to see how the trial court's findings can be termed as perverse by the High Court when it was based on consideration of the evidence, which was led on behalf of the defence.” 18. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dattatraya (supra) that when there is a discrepancy regarding the issuance of the cheque and the financial capacity of the accused is not established, the accused is entitled to acquittal. It was observed: “29. Applying the aforementioned legal position to the present factual matrix, it is apparent that there existed a contradiction in the complaint moved by the appellant as against his cross-examination relatable to the time of presentation of the cheque by the respondent as per the statements of the appellant. This is to the effect that while the appellant claimed the cheque to have been issued at the time of advancing of the loan as a security, however, as per his statement during the cross-examination it was revealed that the same was presented when an alleged demand for repayment of alleged loan amount was raised before the respondent, after a period of six months of advancement. Furthermore, there was no financial capacity or acknowledgement in his income tax returns by the appellant to the effect of having advanced a loan to the respondent. Even further the appellant has not been able to showcase as to when the said loan was advanced in favour of the respondent nor has he been able to explain as to how a cheque issued by the respondent allegedly in favour of Mr Mallikarjun landed in the hands of instant holder, that is, the appellant. 19. A similar view was taken in John K. Abraham Versus Simon C. Abraham & Another (2014) 2 SCC 236 wherein it was held:- “9. It has to be stated that in order to draw the presumption under Section 118 read along with 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the burden was heavy upon the complainant to have shown that he had required funds for having advanced the money to the accused; that the issuance of the cheque in support of the said payment advanced was true and that the accused was bound to make the payment as had been agreed while issuing the cheque in favour of the complainant. 10. 10. Keeping the said statutory requirements in mind, when we examine the facts as admitted by the respondent- complainant, as rightly concluded by the learned trial Judge, the respondent was not even aware of the date when the substantial amount of Rs.1,50,000/- was advanced by him to the appellant, that he was not sure as to who wrote the cheque, that he was not even aware when exactly and where exactly the transaction took place for which the cheque came to be issued by the appellant. Apart from the said serious lacuna in the evidence of the complainant, he further admitted as PW.1 by stating once in the course of the cross-examination that the cheque was in the handwriting of the accused and the very next moment taking a diametrically opposite stand that it is not in the handwriting of the accused and that it was written by the complainant himself, by further reiterating that the amount in words was written by him. 20. It was submitted that the accused had issued a signed cheque in favour of the complainant and a presumption arises regarding due consideration. Learned Trial Court erred in ignoring this presumption. There can be no dispute with the proposition of the law that the issuance of a cheque raises presumption regarding the consideration. However, it was held in Dattatraya (supra) that when the accused was unable to put forth the details of the loan and made contradictory statements, the presumption will not help him. It was observed: 30. Admittedly, the appellant was able to establish that the signature on the cheque in question was of the respondent and in regard to the decision of this Court in Bir Singh [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 : (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40] , a presumption is to ideally arise. However, in the above-referred context of the factual matrix, the inability of the appellant to put forth the details of the loan advanced, and his contradictory statements, the ratio therein would not impact the present case to the effect of giving rise to the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881. The respondent has been able to shift the weight of the scales of justice in his favour through the preponderance of probabilities. 31. The respondent has been able to shift the weight of the scales of justice in his favour through the preponderance of probabilities. 31. The trial court had rightly observed that the appellant was not able to plead even a valid existence of a legally recoverable debt as the very issuance of a cheque is dubious based on the fallacies and contradictions in the evidence adduced by the parties. Furthermore, the fact that the respondent had inscribed his signature on the agreement drawn on white paper and not on stamp paper as presented by the appellant, creates another set of doubt in the case. Since the accused has been able to cast a shadow of doubt on the case presented by the appellant, he has therefore successfully rebutted the presumption stipulated by Section 139 of the NI Act, 1881. 21. In the present case, there was a discrepancy regarding the issuance of the cheque, the purpose for which it was issued, the financial capacity of the complainant and the ability of the accused to repay the amount. Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a possible view based on the evidence led before it and this Court will not interfere with it while deciding the appeal against acquittal even if another view is possible. 22. The judgments cited on behalf of the complainant will not help him because, in none of the cited judgments, there were contradictions in the testimony of the complainant vis-a-vis the complaint filed by him and his financial status was in question. 23. No other point was urged. 24. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 25. A copy of the judgment and the record of the learned Trial Court be sent forthwith.