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2025 DIGILAW 787 (HP)

Ram Prasad v. State of H. P.

2025-04-23

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 19.03.2013, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 29.05.2007 and order of sentence dated 31.05.2007, passed by learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Rohru, District Shimla, (learned Trial Court) convicting the appellant (accused before the learned Trial Court) of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304-A of Indian Penal Code (in short ‘IPC’) and Section 187 of Motor Vehicles (in short ‘MV Act’) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC. It was asserted that informant-Ajay Dhawan (PW2) was sitting on the lawn of his house on 03.04.2005. Vinay Sharma (since deceased) came towards the road at 12:30 pm. A truck bearing registration No. HP-63-1277 came from Rohru at a high speed and hit Vinay Sharma. The driver left the truck and ran away from the spot. Vinay Sharma succumbed to his injuries. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the truck driver. An intimation was given to the police. HC-Roshan Lal (PW13) went to the spot and recorded the statement of Ajay Dhawan (Ext. PW2/A) and sent it to the police station where FIR (Ext.PW13/A) was registered. HC Roshan Lal conducted the investigation. He prepared the site plan (Ext. PW13/B) and seized the truck bearing registration No. HP-63-1277 along with the documents vide memo (Ext.PW1/A). He conducted the inquest on the dead body and prepared the report (Ext. PW13/C). Dr Dilsher Singh (PW10) conducted the post-mortem examination of Vinay Sharma and found that he had died due to a crushed head injury leading to the fracture of both frontal parietal temporal and occipital bones. He issued the report (Ext. PW10/A). Ashok Kumar (PW12) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle and found that there was no defect in it which could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext. PW12/A). HC Roshan Lal recorded the witnesses' statements. The challan was prepared and presented before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. PW10/A). Ashok Kumar (PW12) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle and found that there was no defect in it which could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext. PW12/A). HC Roshan Lal recorded the witnesses' statements. The challan was prepared and presented before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. The learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of IPC and Section 187 of the MV Act to which, the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. Madan Sharma (PW1) is the witness to the recovery of the truck and the documents. Ajay Dhawan (PW2) is the informant. Trilok Chand (PW8) and Lajwanti (PW11) are the eye-witnesses. Shiv Dev (PW3) and Bhagat Chand (PW4) reached the spot after hearing the noise. Akshay Chauhan (PW5) is the owner of the truck; however, he did not support the prosecution case. Kaushalya Devi (PW6) is the mother of the deceased and an eyewitness. Raj Kumar (PW7) is the father of the deceased, who was informed about the accident and reached the spot after the accident. Constable Ashok Kumar (PW9) is the witness to the recovery. Dr. Dilsher (PW10) conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased. Ashok Kumar (PW12) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. HC Roshan Lal (PW13) conducted the investigation. 5. The accused in his statement recorded under Sections 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution case in its entirety. He claimed that he was innocent and was falsely implicated. No defence was sought to be adduced by the accused. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the death of Vinay Sharma @ Chottu was duly established on record. Ajay Dhawan, Kaushalaya Devi, Trilok Chand and Lajwanti specifically stated that the accused was driving the vehicle at a high speed. The vehicle hit Ajay Sharma and crushed him under the tyres. The driver fled away from the spot. There was nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were making false statements. The minor contradictions in the testimonies were bound to come with time and could not be used for discarding their testimonies. The vehicle hit Ajay Sharma and crushed him under the tyres. The driver fled away from the spot. There was nothing in their cross-examination to show that they were making false statements. The minor contradictions in the testimonies were bound to come with time and could not be used for discarding their testimonies. The accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident; therefore, he was convicted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 304A of IPC and 187 of the MV Act and sentenced as under: - Under Section 279 of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months Under Section 304-A of IPC To undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months Under Section 187 of Motor Vehicles Act To pay a fine of Rs.500/- 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal which was decided by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla (learned Appellate Court). The learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the prosecution evidence proved that the accused was driving the vehicle at the relevant time at a high speed in a rash and negligent manner. The vehicle hit Vinay @ Chottu and crushed him under the tyres. The accused ran away from the spot after the accident and failed to carry the injured to the hospital; hence, the appeal was dismissed. 8. Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence. There is no cogent and reliable evidence to prove that the accused was driving the vehicle in a rash and negligent manner or that he was driving the vehicle, which caused the accident. The owner denied that he had engaged the accused as a driver of the vehicle. This evidence was ignored by the learned Courts below. The presence of Lajwanti (PW11) was not established. There were discrepancies regarding the place where Ajay Dhawan was sitting. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Vinay Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. There were discrepancies regarding the place where Ajay Dhawan was sitting. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 9. I have heard Mr. Vinay Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State. 10. Mr Vinay Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the evidence. The prosecution evidence made it doubtful that Ajay Dhawan was in a position to witness the accident. The presence of Lajwanti on the spot was not satisfactorily established. The mere use of the term high speed is not sufficient to infer the rashness or negligence, therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside. 11. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State submitted that learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident and his negligence led to the death of Vinay Sharma @ Chottu. The accused had failed to stop the vehicle after the accident and he was rightly convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of the MV Act, therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed. 12. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204 : (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court is not an appellate jurisdiction and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed on page 207: - “10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like to the appellate court and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings. 14. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 wherein it was observed: “13. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 Cr. P.C. which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept into such proceedings. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chandra, (2012) 9 SCC 460 where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: “ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which upon the face of it bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits. 13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex- facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with the law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under the CrPC.” 15. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 16. Informant Ajay Dhawan (PW2) stated that he was sitting in his lawn on 03.04.2005 at 12:30 pm. Vinay Sharma was walking towards the road. When he reached the road, a truck bearing registration No. HP-63-1277 hit him at a high speed and crushed him under the tyres. The driver ran away from the spot. The accident occurred due to the high speed and negligence of the driver. He informed the police. He stated in his cross-examination that Vinay Sharma was his neighbour. He was studying in Baleti High School but he was not aware of the class. He was aged 17-18 years at the time of the accident. The accident occurred on Sunday. The accident occurred due to the high speed and negligence of the driver. He informed the police. He stated in his cross-examination that Vinay Sharma was his neighbour. He was studying in Baleti High School but he was not aware of the class. He was aged 17-18 years at the time of the accident. The accident occurred on Sunday. The place of the accident had a straight road. The deceased was crushed under the rear tyre. He saw the vehicle when it crossed him. The deceased was getting down a field located on the upper side of the road and there was no proper approach to the road. His house was located at a distance of 55-60 feet from the spot and his lawn was towards the road. He admitted that there was a tree in front of the house. He could not tell the speed of the vehicle. He used to drive the vehicle and cross the place of the incident at the speed of 40-60 kilometres per hour. He saw the accused when he got out of the vehicle and ran away from the spot. The vehicle was parked near his house. He was told about the name of the driver by someone but he could not name him. 17. He specifically stated that the place of incident was a straight road. This is duly corroborated by the site plan (Ext.PW13/B), in which, the place of the accident was shown as a place ‘A’, which is a straight road. The house of Balbir Dhawan is shown adjacent to the place of the accident. This site plan establishes the fact that the informant could have witnessed the accident because his house is located adjacent to the place of the accident and the place of the accident is a straight road. 18. HC-Roshan Lal (PW13) conducted the investigation. He also stated in his cross-examination that the road at the place of the accident was straight. He was not cross-examined regarding the site plan, which means that his testimony that he had prepared the site plan depicting the spot position was accepted as correct; therefore, his testimony also corroborates the informant’s testimony that he was present near the place of the accident and the road was straight at the place of incident. 19. He was not cross-examined regarding the site plan, which means that his testimony that he had prepared the site plan depicting the spot position was accepted as correct; therefore, his testimony also corroborates the informant’s testimony that he was present near the place of the accident and the road was straight at the place of incident. 19. The fact that the road was straight shows that the driver would have been in a position to see a person walking on the road. The accused failed to notice the deceased or to slow down the vehicle after seeing him, which led to the accident. This shows his negligence. He was duty-bound to slow down the vehicle after seeing a pedestrian on the road. He failed to do so and was clearly negligent while driving the vehicle. 20. It was submitted that this witness has not given the approximate speed of the vehicle and his statement is not sufficient to infer the negligence of the accused. There can be no dispute with the proposition of law that the use of the term high speed is not sufficient to infer the negligence of the person, however, in the present case, continuing to drive the vehicle at a speed even after watching the pedestrian on a straight road and hitting him is clearly an act of negligence. 21. Kaushalaya Devi (PW6) stated that her son (Vinay Sharma) was going towards the road. A vehicle was going from Rohru to Jalgaon at a high speed. The driver did not apply the brake and crushed her son under the tyres of the vehicle. The accused was driving the vehicle and the accident occurred due to his negligence. She stated in her cross-examination that she was not aware of the date, on which, she was making the statement. The house of Ajay Dhawan is at some distance from the spot. The road is straight at the place of the accident. She could not say under which tyre of the truck; the deceased was crushed. She saw three persons travelling in the vehicle. She denied that the accused was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Ajay Dhawan, Trilok and Lajwanti were present on the spot who had seen the accident. She did not know the accused before the accident and could not tell, who had mentioned the name of the accused. She saw three persons travelling in the vehicle. She denied that the accused was not driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. Ajay Dhawan, Trilok and Lajwanti were present on the spot who had seen the accident. She did not know the accused before the accident and could not tell, who had mentioned the name of the accused. She denied that there was no negligence on the part of the driver. She saw the truck at the time of the accident and not before that. 22. Her testimony also corroborates the informant’s testimony. She also stated that the accident occurred on a straight road. She also stated that the accused did not apply the brake and did not slow down the vehicle; hence, her testimony shows that the accused was negligent because he had failed to slow down the vehicle even after seeing the pedestrian on the road. 23. Trilok Chand (PW8) stated that a vehicle came from Rohru at a high speed. A boy was crushed under the tyre of the vehicle. The accused was driving the vehicle and his negligence led to the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that Kaushalaya Devi, Dhawan and he were present at the time of the accident and no other person was present. He was present on the left side of the road. Kaushalaya Devi came to the road from her home. Her old house was located towards the lower side of the road. He called Kaushalaya and told her that her son was crushed under the tyre of the vehicle. She was serving water to the cows at that time. He could not tell, under which tyre of the vehicle, the boy was crushed. The boy was coming from the upper side of the road and he was going towards the lower side of the road after crossing the road. The place of the accident was wide. He had seen two persons running away from the spot. 24. The testimony of this witness corroborates the testimonies of the informant and Kaushalaya Devi. He has named them as the persons present on the spot. He also stated that the place of the accident had a straight road. There is nothing inherently improbable in his testimony and learned Courts below had rightly relied upon his testimony. 25. Lajwanti (PW11) stated that she was sitting in her old house. He has named them as the persons present on the spot. He also stated that the place of the accident had a straight road. There is nothing inherently improbable in his testimony and learned Courts below had rightly relied upon his testimony. 25. Lajwanti (PW11) stated that she was sitting in her old house. Vinay Sharma was coming from the new house towards the old house. A truck came from Rohru at a high speed, which crushed her brother (Vinay Sharma). The driver stopped the truck at some distance and ran away from the spot. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the driver. The accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. She stated in her cross-examination that she, Ajay, Trilok and Kaushlaya were present on the spot. The accident was seen by all of them. She saw the driver getting out of the vehicle. She did not notice the number of persons sitting inside the truck. She only saw the accused after he got out of the truck. The road was straight at the place of the accident. She could not tell the speed of the vehicle. 26. Her testimony also corroborates the prosecution’s version. She also stated that the vehicle was being driven at a high speed and the road was straight at the place of the accident, therefore she has corroborated the prosecution version that the accused had not slowed down the vehicle after seeing the pedestrian and hit him. Her testimony also establishes the negligence of the driver. 27. It was submitted that her name was not mentioned by Trilok and her presence on the spot is highly doubtful. This submission is not acceptable. Her name was mentioned by Ajay Dhawan (PW2) and Kaushlaya (PW6); hence, the mere omission to mention her name by Trilok is not sufficient to doubt her presence. 28. Shiv Dev (PW3), Bhagat Chand (PW4) and Raj Kumar (PW7) reached the spot after the accident, and their testimonies cannot be used to determine the negligence. 29. Akshay Chauhan (PW5), owner of the truck, did not support the prosecution case. He was permitted to be cross- examined. He stated in his cross-examination by learned APP that he is the owner of the vehicle and the driver is employed by his brother. He contradicted his earlier statement made to the police. 29. Akshay Chauhan (PW5), owner of the truck, did not support the prosecution case. He was permitted to be cross- examined. He stated in his cross-examination by learned APP that he is the owner of the vehicle and the driver is employed by his brother. He contradicted his earlier statement made to the police. This statement was duly proved by HC Roshan Lal; therefore, his credit has been impeached with reference to his previous testimony; and his testimony cannot be used to discard the prosecution case. (please see Dilo Begum vs. State of H.P. 2024: HHC:1519 para 24 to 34). Thus, the submission that since the owner of the vehicle has not supported the prosecution case, therefore, his testimony is sufficient to reject the prosecution case cannot be accepted. 30. Ajay Dhawan (PW2), Trilok Chand (PW8) and Lajwanti (PW11) specifically stated that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. There is nothing in their cross-examination to doubt their testimonies. HC-Roshan Lal (PW13) recovered the truck, insurance, RC and driving license of the accused. The recovery of the driving license of the accused corroborates the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. 31. Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the accused was driving the vehicle and his negligence led to the accident. 32. Dr. Dilsher Singh (PW10) conducted the postmortem examination and as per his opinion, the deceased Vinay Sharma had died due to a fracture of the skull. He was not cross- examined at all, which means that his testimony is not challenged by the defence. Further, it was suggested to the prosecution witnesses that the deceased had died due to his negligence, which means that the death is not in dispute; hence, the learned Courts below had rightly held that the negligence of the accused led to the death of deceased Vinay. The accused had failed to carry the injured to the hospital as required under Section 134 of the Motor Vehicles Act and he was rightly held guilty of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 187 of the MV Act. 33. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304A of IPC. 33. The learned Trial Court had sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304A of IPC. Considering the fact that a life was lost, the sentence of six months is not at all excessive and no interference is required with it. 34. No other point was urged. 35. In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed. 36. A copy of the judgment and the record of the learned Trial Court be sent forthwith.