ORDER: MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM, J. The writ petition No.21411 of 2006 is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking the following prayer:- “……a) call for the records pertaining to the impugned Award dated June 30, 2006 in I.D.No.135 of 2003 passed by the Respondent No.1 viz. the Chairman-cum-Presiding Officer Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Anantapur and Published by the Deputy Secretary to Government Labour Employment Training Factories (Lab.I) Department G.O.Rt.No.1839 dated August 29, 2006 on 25th September 2006 and b) quash the same by the issuance of a Writ more particularly, in the nature of Writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate Writ order or direction declaring the same as wholly without jurisdiction., and pass such other further orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case while awarding costs of these proceedings to the petitioner and render justice….” 2. The writ petition No.25556 of 2006 is instituted under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, praying the relief as under :- “……to issue a writ more particularly one in the nature of writ of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ calling upon records pertaining to I.D No.135 of 2003 dated 30.6.2006 which was published in G.O.Rt.No.1839, Labour Employment Training Factories (Lab.I) Department dated 29.8.2006 and to set aside the same as arbitrary, illegal and against principles of natural justice and consequently direct the 2nd respondent to reinstate the petitioner into service with continuity of service and with all other attendant benefits and to pass such other order or orders….” 3. The petitioner-Company in the writ petition No.21411 of 2006, had challenged the award dated 30.11.2006 in I.D No.135 of 2003 passed by the 1st respondent by invoking Section 2-A(2) of Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred as the ‘Act’). Dissatisfied with the very same award, the respondent No.2-Workman, had also filed W.P No.25556 of 2006 and sought his reinstatement with continuity of service, attendant benefits and back wages. 4. Since, these are cross-writ petitions, the petitioner in W.P No.21411 of 2006 and respondent No.2 in W.P No.25556 of 2006; and petitioner in W.P No.25556 of 2006 and respondent No.2 in W.P No.21411 of 2006, are referred by their nomenclature as arrayed before the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Ananthapur (hereafter referred to as ‘Tribunal’) for the sake of convenience i.e.,‘Management’ and ‘Workman’ respectively. Case of the Workman :- 5. Case of the Workman :- 5. The Workman filed I.D No.130 of 2003 by invoking Section 2-A(2) of ‘Act’ before the Tribunal to pass an award holding that discharge/termination order dated 10.03.2003, passed against him by the Management as illegal. 6. The Workman was appointed in the year 1979 and his services were confirmed in the year 1980. Thereafter, in view of time to time promotions in the Company, the Workman was promoted to Charge Hand way back in 1990. Further escalated to the Senior Charge Hand and discharging his duties from 01.07.1995 by drawing the salary of Rs.9,043/- p.m. 7. In a nutshell, the Workman continued in the Management Company as Senior Charge Hand and he was also active in workers union activities. Upon disturbances between the Workman and the Management affairs, a criminal case was registered against the workman in the concerned Police Station. Finally, the termination/discharge orders dated 10.03.2003 were issued to the Workman by the Management. The said termination orders were assailed by the Workman under Section 2-A of the Act., before the Tribunal. Case of the Management :- 8. The Management specifically filed its rejoinder by touching various aspects primarily contending that, the workman does not come under the definition of Section 2(s) of the Act. Even as per the assertions of the Workman, he is discharging his duties as Senior Charge Hand in the Management and drawing a salary of Rs.9,043/- p.m. 9. It is also firmly asserted by the Management in its rejoinder that, the Senior Charge Hand post involves supervisory as well as administrative duties in the Company and controlling sub-ordinates, etc. In fact, the Workman was tasked to monitor seven sub-ordinate workers, who were working under his supervision and he had the authority to grant them leave. Thus, the main ground of attack of the Management is that, the very institution of an I.D under Section 2(s) of the Act by the Workman is not maintainable, as he is not a Workman who comes under the definition of Section 2(s) of the Act. Hence, the very institution of proceedings before the Tribunal is per-se not maintainable. Hence, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. 10. Hence, the very institution of proceedings before the Tribunal is per-se not maintainable. Hence, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. 10. During the course of the proceedings in I.D No.135 of 2003, the Management filed I.A No.154 of 2005 before the Tribunal, requesting to frame an issue in respect of the very maintainability of the industrial dispute by specifically asserting that Workman is discharging the supervisory functions and not treated as a Workman. The said I.A was resisted by the Workman stating that, he comes under the purview of 2(s) of Act. At last, the Tribunal was pleased to dismiss the said I.A vide order dated 20.09.2005. 11. Assailing the said I.A orders dated 20.09.2005, the Management filed W.P No.25484 of 2005 before the Erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad seeking quashing of the said proceedings and also direct the Tribunal to frame an issue whether the Workman in the case comes within the meaning of 2(s) of the Act. 12. The above said writ petition was disposed on merits vide orders dated 27.12.2005, whereby and whereunder, Unified High Court of A.P directing the Tribunal to frame an independent issue as to whether the 2nd respondent is a Workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act and answer it independently in the award, by leading evidence of both parties within a period of 4 months from the date of receipt of the orders in Writ Petition. 13. For the sake of a comprehensive view, the relevant para in Orders dt: 27.12. 2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005 reads as under:- “….For the foregoing reasons, the Writ Petition is disposed of, directing that the Labour Court shall frame an independent issue as to whether the 2nd respondent is a Workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act and answer it independently in the Award, through which the I.D. is disposed of. Further, it shall be open to both the parties to lead evidence and put forward their respective contentions on this aspect. The I.D. shall be disposed of within a period of four (4) months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs…..” 14. Subsequently, the Tribunal initiated the adjudication process. In the I.D proceedings. Workman got himself examined as W.W.1 and Exs.W.1 to W.33 were marked. The I.D. shall be disposed of within a period of four (4) months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs…..” 14. Subsequently, the Tribunal initiated the adjudication process. In the I.D proceedings. Workman got himself examined as W.W.1 and Exs.W.1 to W.33 were marked. Per contra, the Management examined its witness as RW.1 to RW.4, and Exs.M.1 to M.12 were marked. 15. The Tribunal finally disposed of the I.D vide its Award dated 30.06.2006. The relevant paras 37 & 38 in the award dated 30.06.2006 is extracted hereunder:- “….Under the above circumstances to safeguard the interest of the Management as well as the interest of the workers of the management the petitioner herein need not be allowed again to work in the Management but the order of discharge can be modified into one of compulsory retirement from service and thereby entitle him to take of such benefits under the rules besides awarding payment of compensation of ten months salary for the reason he worked for about a period of 24 years in the Management. In the result, the order of discharge from service issued by the respondent herein on 10.03.2003 is hereby modified into one of the compulsory retirement from service and there by the petitioner shall be entitled for all such retirement benefits as per rules and also entitled for ten months last drawn salary by way of compensation and the same shall be paid to the petitioner within one month from the date of publication of the award after deduction of the amounts if any which were already paid to him. The award is passed accordingly.” 16. Being aggrieved by the Award dated 30.06.2006, the Management filed instant W.P No.21411 of 2006, seeking to set-aside the I.D Court award 30.06.2006, and the workman also filed W.P No.25556 of 2006, challenging the very same award to the extent of modifying the punishment as discharge from service to that of compulsory retirement. In other words, the Management as well as Workman both are before this Hon’ble Court by filing two separate writ petitions against the very same I.D award. Thus, the following common orders are being emanated by this Court as clearly stated in Para Nos.3 & 4 supra. 17. In other words, the Management as well as Workman both are before this Hon’ble Court by filing two separate writ petitions against the very same I.D award. Thus, the following common orders are being emanated by this Court as clearly stated in Para Nos.3 & 4 supra. 17. Heard Sri C.R. Sridharan, learned Senior Counsel representing the learned counsel Sri G.V.S Ganesh for the Management and Sri Bachina Hanumanth Rao, learned counsel for the Workman as well as learned Government Pleader too. Contentions of the counsels :- 18. The learned Senior Counsel who is appearing for the Management while reiterating the averments made in the writ affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, mainly asserted that the very institution of I.D is perse illegal, nonest in the eye of Law on two grounds. Firstly, even as per the case projected by the Workman, he does not come under the purview of Section 2(s) in view of his nature of work, etc and as the Workman does not come under the clutches of the Act, the award by the Tribunal/Labour Court is without Jurisdiction. Secondly, the orders dated 30.06.2006 are hit by judicial indiscipline on the ground that in the earlier proceedings between the very same parties, specific directions were given by the Hon’ble High Court in W.P No.25484 of 2005, to frame an independent issue in respect of Section 2(s) of the Act and answer the same independently. But, the same was not followed at all. Thus, the very award itself is without jurisdiction and got vitiated. 19. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Workman Sri Bachina Hanumantha Rao submitted that, though there are no specific issue framed by the Tribunal in terms of the orders dated 27.12.2005 of Hon’ble High Court of A.P. However, the Tribunal answered that as the nature of duties of the workman is supervisory in nature, the workman comes under the definition of 2(s) of the Act. More so, he sought to allow the I.D in toto. The learned Government Pleader adopted the Workman side argument. Consideration of the Court :- 20. The above facts and circumstances, raise the following issues in the lis:- i. Whether the workman comes within the purview of the definition of 2(s) of the ‘Act’ or not? ii. More so, he sought to allow the I.D in toto. The learned Government Pleader adopted the Workman side argument. Consideration of the Court :- 20. The above facts and circumstances, raise the following issues in the lis:- i. Whether the workman comes within the purview of the definition of 2(s) of the ‘Act’ or not? ii. Whether the directions in the order dated 27.12.2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005, are followed by the Tribunal in its true letter and spirit? Issue No.1:- 21. In order to determine whether Workman comes within the ambit of Section 2(s) of the Act, it is useful to refer the factual aspects in the case on hand. Even as per the assertions in the claim petition before the Tribunal also, the Workman was initially appointed as General Workman in 1979, confirmed the same in 1980 in the Company. Further, he was promoted multiple times. At last, after 24 years of service, he was designated as Charge-Hand and later on as Senior Charge Hand from 01.17.1995 and was drawing a Salary of Rs.9,043 per month (Act pre- amendment ceiling was Rs.1,600/- and it was substituted with Rs.10,000/- p.m. Amendment Act 24/2010 w.e.f 15.09.2010). Admittedly, the Management issued Termination Orders dated 10.03.2003. The instant I.D filed way back in the year 2003 and Award was passed on 30.06.2006. Above all dates relates to pre-amendment of the Act, thus, the ceiling limit of salary is Rs.16,00/- per month only. 22. Admittedly, the Tribunal had not framed any such issue in terms of the orders dated 27.12.2005 passed by the Erstwhile High Court of A.P.at Hyderabad. 23. Apparently, the Tribunal comes under the supervisory jurisdiction of Erstwhile High Court in all its corners. But for the reasons best known, the Tribunal has not adhered to the specific direction issued by the Constitutional Court. The said approach is not legal and valid, why because, if the Tribunal ought to have framed an independent issue in terms of the orders passed by the High Court dated 27.12.2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005, it would not have lead to multiple years of litigation without any logical conclusions in the lis. 24. In this context, it is trite to mention that Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 aims to resolve the disputes in between the Employers and Employees by setting out certain statutory parameters by defining who is Workman in terms of the Act. 24. In this context, it is trite to mention that Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 aims to resolve the disputes in between the Employers and Employees by setting out certain statutory parameters by defining who is Workman in terms of the Act. To answer the moot point whether the workman comes within the purview of Section 2(s) of the Act or not?, it is relevant to extract the definition of 2(s) of the Act:- Section 2(s):- “…..‘Workman’ means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has, led to that dispute, but does not include any such person:- (i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950(46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or (ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or. (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or (iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding ten thousand rupees per mensem (after amendment) or exercises, either by the nature of duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature.” A plain reading of Section 2(s) of the Act would emphasize that the definition of the Workman in the first portion is inclusive. The later portion is an excluding in Nature. Thus, to determine Workman, both should be read conjointly together in order to test the meaning of Workman. 25. It is apt to refer the facts of the case on hand which reveals that, Ex.W-3, is a Letter of initial appointment of the Workman, Ex.W-4 is confirmation letter, Ex.W-5 is the Change of designation letter, Ex.W-6, Ex.W-7 are letters of further appointment of the Workman, Ex.W-8 is the change of designation, Ex.W-9, Ex.W-10 is the letters of annual increments. Ex.W-11 is the Letter of Confirmation as a Charge-Hand. Ex.W-11 is the Letter of Confirmation as a Charge-Hand. Ex.W-12, Ex.W-13 & Ex.W-14, reveals the nature of employment as a Charge-Hand. Ex.W-15 is a letter of Confirmation as Senior Charge- Hand. Ex.W-16 to Ex.W-21 are letters of annual increments. Ex.W-22 to Ex.W-25 and Ex.W-28 are Salary Slips. The entire depositions and evidence clearly reveals that the Workman was inducted into the Management Company in the year 1979. Later on, he was promoted to several designations and at last, on 30.06.1995, his services as Senior Charge Hand was confirmed. 26. Conversely, by going through the depositions of M.W.1 and M.W.4 and documents on behalf of the Management, more particularly, Performance Appraisal Form dated 09.09.1998 (Ex.M.1), it is apparent that the Workman had signed the said form as Appraiser. In the said form, the superiors of Workman Ch. Gopala Charyulu, Sec. Crushing Sys.Opr/G.W, Grade 05, had duly assessed his overall job performance and reviewed his personal details in a supervisory capacity and also signed on the said form. Thereafter, the Workman also reviewed the remarks made therein and finally signed the form as superior to them. Thus, the review made by the Workman under Ex.M1 would clearly discloses that he had done supervisory duties in the company. 27. Further, Ex.M.2 to Ex.M.5, would go to show that the Workman in a supervisory and monitory capacity has recorded certain details with regard to the shifts, status of the plant, granting leaves to his sub-ordinates, granting permissions to attend the job and etc. Ex.M.6 is Appraisal Form of workman herein dated 20.02.2003, wherein, he has submitted the details of his work/role in the company. 28. Undoubtedly, during the cross examination, Workman as W.W-1 admitted the documents under Ex.M.1 to Ex.M.6. Thus, all the relevant documents clearly proves that the, Workman herein is working as Senior Charge Hand in the company and he is holding independent post performing his duties as supervisory and administrative in nature. Thus, the Workman was discharging Administrative works and was also drawing a salary of Rs.9,043/- as on the date of his termination. 29. Apart from supervisory capacity, even coming to the salary drawn by the Workman, as per Section 2(s)(iv) of the Act, the salary of the Workman should not exceed Rs.1,600/- per month (before amendment). Thus, the Workman was discharging Administrative works and was also drawing a salary of Rs.9,043/- as on the date of his termination. 29. Apart from supervisory capacity, even coming to the salary drawn by the Workman, as per Section 2(s)(iv) of the Act, the salary of the Workman should not exceed Rs.1,600/- per month (before amendment). However, in the present case, the Workman was drawing a salary of Rs.9,043/- p.m. till the date of dismissal from the service i.e., 10.03.2003, which is contrary to the statutory limit. On that point also, a person, who is drawing a salary exceeding the statutory limit of Section 2(s) of the Act, would not be qualified as a Workman and he/she is not at all entitled to raise a dispute before the Tribunal by invoking Section 2-A of the Act and the Tribunal ought not to have entertained the I.D itself in view of subject matter of jurisdiction is not amenable under the provisions of the Act. 30. It is apt to refer to the Dictum in Bharti Airtel Ltd. Vs. A.S Raghavendra , (2024) 6 SCC 418 wherein, the Apex Court by meticulously going through the definition of the Workman and its vistas of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, and also perceiving the relevant legal position had viewed Ved Prakash Gupta Vs. Delton Cable India Pvt. Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 569 and S.K Maini Vs. Carona Sahu , (1994) 3 SCC 510 and had clarified that the definition of the Workman that mere absence of power to appoint, dismiss or hold disciplinary inquiries against other employees cannot be the sole criteria to determine the status of an employee as Workman. 31. Further very recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lenin Kumar Ray Vs. Express Publications (Madurai) Ltd. , 2024 SCC Online SC 2987 while dealing with Section 2(s) of the Act, held as under:- “15. The law is well settled that the determinative factor for “workman” covered under section 2(s) of the I.D. Act, is the principal duties and functions performed by an employee in the establishment and not merely the designation of his post. Further, the onus of proving the nature of employment rests on the person claiming to be a “workman” within the definition of section 2(s) of the I.D. Act.” 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Milkhi Ram Vs. Further, the onus of proving the nature of employment rests on the person claiming to be a “workman” within the definition of section 2(s) of the I.D. Act.” 32. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Milkhi Ram Vs. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, AIR Online 2021 SC 872 in Civil Appeal No. 1346 of 2010 (Decided on 8-10-2021)., held as under:- “14. In the present matter, the appellant has clearly founded his claim in the suit, on the provisions of the ID Act and the employer therefore is entitled to raise a jurisdictional objection to the proceedings before the civil court. The courts below including the executing court negated the jurisdictional objection. The High Court in Revision, however has overturned the lower court’s order and declared that the decree in favour of the plaintiff is hit by the principle of coram non judice and therefore, the same is a nullity.” 33. Apparently, the Workman filed documents, which also reveal that Workman had exercised supervisory duties too. In that backdrop of the above unequivocal facts and circumstances, it is determined that the Workman does not come within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. Once, he is not a Workman, the very institution of I.D No.135/2003 itself is per se without jurisdiction. Thus, if any orders passed by the judicial forums, which do not have jurisdictional powers lead to nullity and also trip under the realm of ‘Doctrine of Coram non judice’. Issue No.2:- 34. This Court has consciously gone through the material papers placed on record., whereunder, the Tribunal in its 18 pages award had not at all framed any issue, much less, an independent issue, so as to, answer the pivotal point, whether Workman comes within the meaning of Section 2 (s) of the Act? in terms of specific direction issued by the High Court in earlier writ petition between the very same parties i.e., vide order dated 27.12.2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005. 35. Unfortunately, the Tribunal had not adhered to the Constitutional Court’s judicial command, by virtue of its vested powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. If the Tribunal had adhered to the earlier directions of the High Court, the lis ought to have reached its logical end at the earliest, which fulfills the object and intendment of the statutory framework as well. If the Tribunal had adhered to the earlier directions of the High Court, the lis ought to have reached its logical end at the earliest, which fulfills the object and intendment of the statutory framework as well. In fact, it is also beneficial to the respective parties, so as to, pursue their respective legal rights in accordance with the Law. 36. Evidently, Workman on his own quoted his age at the time of filing I.D No.135 of 2003 as 43 years. Now, he is aged about 64 years, (who crossed the age of superannuation) without any benefit from his litigation. 37. In this context, it is the trite to mention the well settled principle of law that the court which does not have jurisdiction to try the matter would have no jurisdiction to pass any orders which affect the rights of the parties. Hence, deciding the issue with regard to jurisdiction is a fundamental issue, which goes to root of the matter and decide the fate of matter either at preliminary stage or on merit. The jurisdiction of the judicial Forums is categorized into multiple categories. The main wings are i) Territorial jurisdiction ii) Pecuniary jurisdiction iii) Jurisdiction over the subject matter. In fact, territorial and pecuniary jurisdictional objections have to be raised at the threshold stages so as to take steps to cure the procedural aspects by transferring to the concerned Forum. Whereas, in the case of jurisdiction over the subject matter is entirely different and distinct, why because by the limitations prescribed in the statutory framework come into play. Hence, where judicial fora has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, it cannot take up the cause in the lis. Even an order passed by such Forum having no jurisdiction also hit by the ‘Doctrine of Coram non judice’. In this context it is relevant to note the Apex Court dictum in Kiran Singh Vs. Chaman Paswan , AIR 1954 SC 340 which reads as under:- “6. It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether it is in respect of the ‘subject matter’ of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties.” 38. The above line of legal position is further followed in the case of Chief Engineer, Hydal Project Vs. Ravinder Nath, 2008 (2) SCC 350 as under:- “28. Once the original decree itself has been held to be without jurisdiction and hit by the doctrine of coram non judice, there would be no question of upholding the same merely on the ground that the objection to the jurisdiction was not taken at the initial, First Appellate or the Second Appellate stage. It must, therefore, be held that the civil court in this case had no jurisdiction to deal with the suit and resultantly the judgments of the Trial Court, First Appellate Court and the Second Appellate Court are liable to be set aside for that reason alone and the appeal is liable to be allowed”. 39. It is apt to mention that the Tribunal ought to have followed the aforesaid order dated 27.12.2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005 of the Erstwhile High Court at Hyderabad, which binds on the Tribunal. In fact, as the Tribunal comes under the supervisory jurisdiction of this High Court, the primary duty casts upon the Tribunal to follow the Constitutional Court orders. 40. More so, in the backdrop of Article 215 (High Court is Court on record), under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Coming to the instant lis, the Tribunal directly comes under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Thus, it is the constitutional duty as well as the judicial discipline to maintain judicial uniformity, the Tribunal ought to have followed the previous direction of the Hon’ble High Court dated 27.12.2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005, in between the very same parties. 40. But, unfortunately for the reasons best known, Tribunal had not followed the same. Thus, it is the constitutional duty as well as the judicial discipline to maintain judicial uniformity, the Tribunal ought to have followed the previous direction of the Hon’ble High Court dated 27.12.2005 in W.P No.25484 of 2005, in between the very same parties. 40. But, unfortunately for the reasons best known, Tribunal had not followed the same. In fact, on the point of the Doctrine of Judicial discipline also, it is the bounden duty of the Tribunal in its strict sense. If the Tribunal had adhered to the High Court orders, it would have curtailed the unnecessary prolonged litigation then and there itself. 41. In the case of Priya Gupta Vs. Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, (2013) 11 SCC 404 emphasizes the fundamental principle that judicial discipline and adherence to the law declared by higher courts are integral to the credibility and effective functioning of the judicial system and observed that:- “12. The government departments are no exception to the consequences of willful disobedience of the orders of the Court. Violation of the orders of the Court would be its disobedience and would invite action in accordance with law. The orders passed by this Court are the law of the land in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. No Court or Tribunal and for that matter any other authority can ignore the law stated by this Court. Such obedience would also be conducive to their smooth working, otherwise there would be confusion in the administration of law and the respect for law would irretrievably suffer. There can be no hesitation in holding that the law declared by the higher court in the State is binding on authorities and tribunals under its superintendence and they cannot ignore it. This Court also expressed the view that it had become necessary to reiterate that disrespect to the constitutional ethos and breach of discipline have a grave impact on the credibility of judicial institution and encourages chance litigation. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty are important hallmarks of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country, as discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. It must be remembered that predictability and certainty are important hallmarks of judicial jurisprudence developed in this country, as discipline is sine qua non for effective and efficient functioning of the judicial system. If the Courts command others to act in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and to abide by the rule of law, it is not possible to countenance violation of the constitutional principle by those who are required to lay down the law.” 42. In the case of Mary Pushpam Vs. Telvi Curusumary & Ors , (2024) 3 SCC 224 the Apex Court highlighted the importance of ensuring Judicial Discipline and observed as follows:- “1. The rule of ‘Judicial Discipline and Propriety’ and the Doctrine of precedents has a merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to individuals as to the consequences of their actions. The Constitution benches of this Court have time and again reiterated the rules emerging from Judicial Discipline. Accordingly, when a decision of a coordinate Bench of sameHigh court is brought to the notice of the bench, it is to be respected and is binding subject to right of the bench of such co-equal quorum to take a different view and refer the question to a larger bench. It is the only course of action open to a bench of co-equal strength, when faced with the previous decision taken by a bench with same strength. 43. In view of the peculiar facts and circumstances and also taking into consideration of well-settled Law that, the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is a welfare legislature, this Court is inclined to direct the Courts, Industrial Tribunals and Judicial Forums, which come under the domain of judicial as well as administrative arenas to follow the Higher Court’s directions, more particularly, the mandates of Constitutional Courts in its true letter and spirit and further to maintain the judicial discipline too. Conclusion:- 44. In view of the above foregoing discussion, this Court pass the following:- i. The impugned award dated 30.06.2006 passed in I.D No.135 of 2003 by the Tribunal is hereby set-aside. ii. Writ Petition No. 21411 of 2006 instituted by the Management is allowed. iii. Writ Petition No.25556 of 2006 filed by the Workman is dismissed. iv. Conclusion:- 44. In view of the above foregoing discussion, this Court pass the following:- i. The impugned award dated 30.06.2006 passed in I.D No.135 of 2003 by the Tribunal is hereby set-aside. ii. Writ Petition No. 21411 of 2006 instituted by the Management is allowed. iii. Writ Petition No.25556 of 2006 filed by the Workman is dismissed. iv. Needless to say, the dismissal of the claim of the Workman, will not come in the way of Workman to pursue his legal remedies, in accordance with Law. No costs. The miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.