JUDGMENT : Jyotsna Rewal Dua, J. Petitioner seeks reinstatement as Peon in the office of Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala against the post reserved for Physically Challenged persons. 2. From the pleaded case and submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, following facts emerge:- 2(i). Petitioner was appointed as Peon in the office of respondent No.3-Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala vide office order dated 11.11.2008 on contract basis for a period of one year on terms & conditions mentioned in the appointment letter. Petitioner continued to discharge his duties on contract basis in the subsequent years as well. 2(ii). Petitioner was transferred to the office of Sub- Divisional Officer (Civil) Jaisinghpur, Tehsil Jaisinghpur, District Kangra on 31.05.2013. He joined there on 01.06.2013. According to learned counsel, the petitioner was finding it difficult to discharge the duties assigned to him at Sub-Divisional Office Jaisinghpur in view of his visual impairment. Petitioner was accordingly transferred to the office of respondent No.3 against a vacant post on 15.10.2013. 2(iii). On 04.07.2014 (Annexure P-10), petitioner resigned from the post citing his visual impairment and his difficulty in rendering service on that count. It appears that prior to his resignation, petitioner had instituted CWP No.431 of 2012, seeking regularization of his services. The aforesaid writ petition was decided on 05.09.2014 alongwith several other connected matters on the basis of statement made by learned counsel for the petitioners in the bunch matters that the case of the petitioners for regularization is covered by a judgment and accordingly, the petitions were disposed of with a direction to the respondents to examine the case of the petitioners in light of the aforesaid judgment. The petitioner had already resigned at the time of disposal of his writ petition. 2(iv). On 29.03.2016, petitioner represented to respondent No.3 to re-engage him as Peon. The representation was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner on 29.06.2016 (Annexure P-13). The petitioner had already resigned at the time of disposal of his writ petition. 2(iv). On 29.03.2016, petitioner represented to respondent No.3 to re-engage him as Peon. The representation was rejected by the Deputy Commissioner on 29.06.2016 (Annexure P-13). While rejecting the representation, respondent No.3 observed that: The petitioner had voluntarily submitted his resignation on 04.07.2014 stating that he was not in a position to work due to his visual impairment; Even thereafter, the petitioner was given an opportunity vide office letter dated 19.08.2014 for his appearance before respondent No.3 on 23.08.2014 and to present his case, but the petitioner did not avail the opportunity; It is two years thereafter that he has moved this representation; Petitioner’s contract had elapsed as he had voluntarily resigned, therefore, his services stood automatically terminated. 2(v). More than 08 years thereafter, i.e. on 12.12.2024, petitioner sent a legal notice to the respondents seeking reinstatement. Getting no response from the respondents, petitioner has instituted this writ petition. 3. Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and on consideration of the case file, I am not inclined to exercise any discretion in favour of the petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner of his own volition had resigned from the post on 04.07.2014. He has not even disputed the fact that pursuant to his aforesaid resignation, respondent No.3-Deputy Commissioner, Kangra at Dharamshala had given him a further opportunity under office letter dated 19.08.2014 to present his case before the authority on 23.08.2014. Petitioner failed to appear before the authority on the said date. He did not make any representation for more than two years. It was on 29.03.2016 that he represented to respondent No.3 for his reinstatement. In the given facts and circumstances of the case, respondent No.3 justly rejected the representation of the petitioner on 29.06.2016. Even this rejection was accepted by the petitioner. He did not take any steps for assailing the same at that stage. He has instituted this writ petition almost 09 years after the rejection of his representation and 11 years after resigning from the post. The claim of the petitioner, therefore, suffers from delay & laches and acquiescence. In Bichitrananda Behera Versus State of Orissa and others, Civil Appeal No.6664 of 2023 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.16238 of 2017), decided on 11.10.2023, Hon’ble Supreme Court highlighted the significance of the doctrines of delay & laches and acquiescence in service-related disputes. The claim of the petitioner, therefore, suffers from delay & laches and acquiescence. In Bichitrananda Behera Versus State of Orissa and others, Civil Appeal No.6664 of 2023 (@ Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.16238 of 2017), decided on 11.10.2023, Hon’ble Supreme Court highlighted the significance of the doctrines of delay & laches and acquiescence in service-related disputes. Hon’ble Court observed that the claimant therein had delayed pursuing his claim for over 12 years despite being aware of the appointment of another person to the same post of Physical Education Trainer (PET). This prolonged inaction was held to amount to acquiescence, which effectively bars the claim because it implies consent through silence or failure to act. Hon’ble Court explained that while laches refers to an unreasonable delay without active consent, both delay and laches serve the important purpose of preventing stale claims that disrupt settled rights and administrative decisions. In service matters, these doctrines were held to play crucial roles as they protect the stability and finality of administrative decisions. Relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:- “21. Profitably, we may reproduce relevant passages from certain decisions of this Court: (A) Union of India v Tarsem Singh , (2008) 8 SCC 648 : “To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” (emphasis supplied) (B) ………………………………………. 20 to 23. …………………………………… (C) Chairman, State Bank of India v M J James , (2022) 2 SCC 301 : 36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non- existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing action after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal was after four years and five months, which is certainly highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the ground that the respondent was not allowed to be represented by a representative of his choice. The respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge.We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case. xxx 38. This is highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the appellants by the delayed challenge.We would, subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and its judicial effect in the context of the present case. xxx 38. In Ram Chand v. Union of India [Ram Chand v. Union of India, (1994) 1 SCC 44 ] and State of U.P. v. Manohar [State of U.P. v. Manohar, (2005) 2 SCC 126 ] this Court observed that if the statutory authority has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, it cannot justify the same by taking the plea that the person who has been deprived of his rights has not approached the appropriate forum for relief. If a statutory authority does not pass any orders and thereby fails to comply with the statutory mandate within reasonable time, they normally should not be permitted to take the defence of laches and delay. If at all, in such cases, the delay furnishes a cause of action, which in some cases as elucidated in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] may be continuing cause of action. The State being a virtuous litigant should meet the genuine claims and not deny them for want of action on their part. However, this general principle would not apply when, on consideration of the facts, the court concludes that the respondent had abandoned his rights, which may be either express or implied from his conduct. Abandonment implies intentional act to acknowledge, as has been held in para 6 of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. [Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1979) 2 SCC 409 : 1979 SCC (Tax) 144] Applying this principle of acquiescence to the precept of delay and laches, this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] after referring to several judgments, has accepted the following elucidation in Halsbury's Laws of England : (Jaswant Singh case [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 500] , SCC pp. 470-71, paras 1213). “12. 470-71, paras 1213). “12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911, p. 395 as follows: ‘In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.’ 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?” 39. Before proceeding further, it is important to clarify distinction between “acquiescence” and “delay and laches”. Doctrine of acquiescence is an equitable doctrine which applies when a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right, while the act is in progress and after violation is completed, which conduct reflects his assent or accord. He cannot afterwards complain. [See Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149. Also, see Gobinda Ramanuj Das Mohanta v. Ram Charan Das, 1925 SCC OnLine Cal 30 : AIR 1925 Cal 1107 ] In literal sense, the term acquiescence means silent assent, tacit consent, concurrence, or acceptance, [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584 ] which denotes conduct that is evidence of an intention of a party to abandon an equitable right and also to denote conduct from which another party will be justified in inferring such an intention. [See Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, 1964 SCC OnLine HP 5 : AIR 1964 HP 34 ] Acquiescence can be either direct with full knowledge and express approbation, or indirect where a person having the right to set aside the action stands by and sees another dealing in a manner inconsistent with that right and in spite of the infringement takes no action mirroring acceptance. [See “Introduction”, U.N. Mitra, Tagore Law Lectures — Law of Limitation and Prescription, Vol. I, 14th Edn., 2016.] However, acquiescence will not apply if lapse of time is of no importance or consequence. 40. Laches unlike limitation is flexible. However, both limitation and laches destroy the remedy but not the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Laches like acquiescence is based upon equitable considerations, but laches unlike acquiescence imports even simple passivity. On the other hand, acquiescence implies active assent and is based upon the rule of estoppel in pais. As a form of estoppel, it bars a party afterwards from complaining of the violation of the right. Even indirect acquiescence implies almost active consent, which is not to be inferred by mere silence or inaction which is involved in laches. Acquiescence in this manner is quite distinct from delay. Acquiescence virtually destroys the right of the person. [See Vidyavathi Kapoor Trust v. CIT, 1991 SCC OnLine Kar 331 : (1992) 194 ITR 584 ] Given the aforesaid legal position, inactive acquiescence on the part of the respondent can be inferred till the filing of the appeal, and not for the period post filing of the appeal. Nevertheless, this acquiescence being in the nature of estoppel bars the respondent from claiming violation of the right of fair representation.” 4. In view of above, no case is made out for granting the relief as prayed for by the petitioner. The writ petition, therefore, lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.