ORDER : R. Devdas, J. In these batch of writ petitions the petitioners, whose lands have been acquired for the purpose of formation of the Infrastructure Corridor Project connecting Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Project (BMICP) have made various prayers such as to quash the acquisition notifications issued under Sections 28(1) and 28(4) of the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Act , and to set aside the awards passed by the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO); to issue directions to the respondent authorities to either complete the land acquisition proceedings in accordance with the provisions of the KIAD Act and pay compensation immediately; in the alternative, direction to withdraw the lands from the acquisition proceedings; to declare that the land acquisition proceedings in accordance with Section 24 of the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation & Resettlement Act, 2013 have lapsed, etc. Therefore, all these writ petitions are heard together and disposed of by this common order. 2. However, at the outset the learned counsels appearing for the writ petitioners, led by learned Senior Counsel Sri H.N. Shashidhara have submitted that it would suffice if this Court were to issue directions to the respondent-SLAO to pass a fresh award taking the market value prevailing as on 22.04.2019, as was directed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz & Others Vs. Government of Karnataka & Others , [(2025) SCC Online SC 20] . It is contended that the said case too arises from the impugned acquisition notifications and though an award was passed by the SLAO on 22.04.2019 shifting/ postponing the date of the preliminary notification to the year 2011 and by considering the guideline rates prevailing in the year 2011, the Hon’ble Apex Court directed the SLAO to pass a fresh award taking the market value prevailing as on 22.04.2019 and also directed that the appellants therein shall be entitled to all statutory benefits as are available to them in law. The learned counsels would therefore contend that since the writ petitioners are similarly situated as that of the appellants before the Apex Court, similar directions may be issued to the respondent-SLAO to pass a fresh award accordingly. 3. The learned counsels would therefore contend that since the writ petitioners are similarly situated as that of the appellants before the Apex Court, similar directions may be issued to the respondent-SLAO to pass a fresh award accordingly. 3. Per contra, learned Senior Counsels Sri.D.L.N. Rao and Sri.R.V.S.Naik, along with learned counsel Sri.Nitin Prasad, appearing for the respondent-NICE and NECE contended that the said decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court has been rendered in exercise of Article 142 of the Constitution of India and therefore this Court cannot issue such directions. Moreover, it is contended that the appellants in the case of Bernard Francis (supra) had raised a challenge to the award dated 22.04.2019 before this Court and it is on the basis of such prayer made by the appellants therein, that the Hon’ble Apex Court found it necessary to invoke the extraordinary powers conferred on the Apex Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and issued such directions. However, none of the writ petitioners raised a challenge to the award passed by the SLAO and therefore they are not entitled for such a relief at the hands of this Court. 4. Heard the learned Senior Counsel Sri.H.N.Shashidhara and learned Counsels Sri.B.Ramesh, Sri.T.N.Vishwanatha, Sri. S.V.Bhat, Sri. C.M.Nagabhushana, Sri. G.Balakrishna Shastry and Sri. Omkaresha for the petitioners, learned Senior Counsels Sri.D.L.N Rao, Sri.R.V.S.Naik, Sri. Prabhuling K Navadgi, Prof.Ravivarma Kumar, Sri.S.A.Ahmed, learned Additional Advocate General, Sri.Mallaharao K., learned Additional Advocate General, Sri.Siddarth Babu Rao, Sri.Ravindra V Reddy, Special Counsels, and learned Counsels Sri.P.V.Chandrashekar, Sri C.Ramakrishna, Sri.Murugesh V.Charati, Sri.B.B.Patil, Sri.Nitin Prasad, Sri H.L.Pradeep Kumar, Sri.K.Krishna, Sri.Yogesh D. Naik and Sri.Ashok N. Nayak, appearing for the respondent-NICE, NECE, KIADB, BMICPA and perused the petition papers. 5. Having regard to the narrow compass within which the issue to be considered lies, it would be relevant to notice the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Ram Chand And Others Vs. Union of India And Others , [ 1994 SCC (1 ) 44] which was culled out in the judgment in Bernard Francis (supra) as under: “16. On behalf of the respondents, it was pointed out that the petitioners have approached this Court only after making of the awards, or when awards were to be made, having waited for more than fourteen years, without invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or of this Court under Article 32 . On behalf of the respondents, it was pointed out that the petitioners have approached this Court only after making of the awards, or when awards were to be made, having waited for more than fourteen years, without invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or of this Court under Article 32 . It is true that this Court has taken note of delay on the part of the petitioners concerned in invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court for quashing the land acquisition proceedings on the ground that the proceedings for acquisition of the lands in question have remained pending for more than a decade, in the cases of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [ (1975) 4 SCC 285 ] and Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India [1993 Supp (2) SCC 20 : AIR 1993 SC 852 ] . According to us, the question of delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 or of this Court under Article 32 , has to be considered along with the inaction on the part of the authorities, who had to perform their statutory duties. Can the statutory authority take a plea that although it has not performed its duty within a reasonable time, but it is of no consequence because the person, who has been wronged or deprived of his right, has also not invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court for a suitable writ or direction to grant the relief considered appropriate in the circumstances? The authorities are enjoined by the statute concerned to perform their duties within a reasonable time, and as such they are answerable to the Court why such duties have not been performed by them, which has caused injury to claimants. By not questioning, the validity of the acquisition proceedings for a long time since the declarations were made under Section 6, the relief of quashing the acquisition proceedings has become inappropriate, because in the meantime, the lands notified have been developed and put to public use. The lands are being utilised to provide shelter to thousands and to implement the scheme of a planned city, which is a must in the present set- up. The outweighing public interest has to be given due weight. The lands are being utilised to provide shelter to thousands and to implement the scheme of a planned city, which is a must in the present set- up. The outweighing public interest has to be given due weight. That is why this Court has been resisting attempts on the part of the landholders, seeking quashing of the acquisition proceedings on ground of delay in completion of such proceedings. But, can the respondents be not directed to compensate the petitioners, who were small cultivators holding lands within the ceiling limit in and around Delhi, for the injury caused to them, not by the provisions of the Act, but because of the non-exercise of the power by the authorities under the Act within a reasonable time? ” 6. Moreover, it is well settled by now, that in the matter of determination and award of compensation for acquisition of lands, similarly situated persons are required to be compensated similarly. There cannot be discrimination in the matter of determination and award of compensation. It is also necessary to notice that in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 , care is taken to ensure determination of compensation and award in a fair and just manner and that there shall not be discrimination. Section 28A of the Act, 1894 is put in place to ensure re- determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of a subsequent award passed by the Court. The egalitarian concept of ensuring fair and just compensation has left its imprint throughout the statute. 7. Coming to the contention of the respondents that the Hon’ble Apex Court has exercised its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and therefore such directions cannot be issued by this Court, it is relevant to notice paragraph No.52 of the judgment which reads as follows: “52. No doubt that as already observed by us hereinabove, we do not find any error in the approach adopted by the learned Single Judge of the High Court in holding that the SLAO could not have shifted the date and it could have been done only by this Court in exercise of powers under Article 32 /142 of the Constitution of India or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . However, the learned Single Judge of the High Court instead of relegating the appellants to again go through the rigors of determination by SLAO, ought to have exercised powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to do complete justice. Even the Division Bench of the High Court on a hyper technical ground has non-suited the appellants.” 8. It is therefore clear that the Apex Court expected the learned Single Judge and the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court to have exercised powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to do complete justice. Therefore, the contention of the respondents in this regard is required to be rejected and is accordingly rejected. 9. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in paragraphs No.54 to 56 of the judgment in Bernard Francis (supra) has eloquently captured the reasons for issuing such direction to the SLAO to pass a fresh award taking the market value prevailing as on 22.04.2019. It is held that if the compensation to be awarded at the market value as of the year 2003 is permitted, it would amount to permitting a travesty of justice and making the constitutional provisions under Article 300A a mockery. 10. For the reasons stated hereinabove, this Court proceeds to pass the following order: ORDER (i) The Special Land Acquisition Officer shall pass a fresh award taking the market value prevailing as on 22.04.2019, in respect of the lands belonging to the writ petitioners, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, after hearing the parties. (ii) The writ petitioners shall be entitled to all statutory benefits as are available to them in law. (iii) The rights of the parties to challenge the award in reference, if they are aggrieved by it, shall remain open. Ordered accordingly. 11. With these observations, the writ petitions are disposed of. 12. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of