JUDGMENT : Manish Choudhury, J. This criminal appeal from Jail under Section 383, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [‘CrPC’ or ‘the Code’, for short] is directed against a Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2019 passed by the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Udalguri in Sessions Case no. 144/2018, which arose out of G.R. Case no. 674/2018 and Harisinga Police Station Case no. 30/2018. In the trial, the accused-appellant faced a charge of fratricide and after conclusion of the trial, the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Udalguri finding him guilty for the offence of murder, has convicted the accused-appellant under Section 302, Indian Penal Code [IPC]. The accused-appellant has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for another 6 [six] months. 2. We have heard Ms. R.D. Mazumdar, learned Amicus Curie for the accused-appellant and Ms. B. Bhuyan, learned Senior Counsel & Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent State. 3. The machinery of investigation was set into motion on lodgment of a First Information Report [FIR] before the Officer In-Charge, Harisinga Police Station on 08.07.2018 by the informant, Smti. Karmi Minj [P.W.1]. In the FIR, the informant [P.W.1] had inter-alia stated that at around 08-00 a.m. on 08.07.2018, her husband, Bhonda Minj [‘the deceased’] was hacked to death with a spade in the agricultural field of the deceased located at no. 2 Kherkheria by his younger brother, Fulekar Minj [‘the accused’] over a dispute regarding land. The informant had thereby, requested to conduct an investigation into the incident. 4. On receipt of the FIR, the Officer In-Charge, Harisinga Police Station registered the FIR as Harisinga Police Station Case no. 30/2018 [corresponding G.R. Case no. 674/2018] for the offence under Section 302, IPC. The accused-appellant was arrested on the date of the incident itself, that is, on. 08.07.2018. The investigation was undertaken by the Officer In-Charge, Harisinga Police Station, Sri Powal Hazarika, Sub-Inspector of Police [P.W.10]. After completing the investigation, the Investigating Officer [I.O.] submitted a charge-sheet under Section 173[2], CrPC vide Charge Sheet no. 22/2018 dated 30.08.2018 finding a prima facie case under Section 302, IPC well established against the accused-appellant. 5. On receipt of the Charge-Sheet in connection with Harisinga Police Station Case no. After completing the investigation, the Investigating Officer [I.O.] submitted a charge-sheet under Section 173[2], CrPC vide Charge Sheet no. 22/2018 dated 30.08.2018 finding a prima facie case under Section 302, IPC well established against the accused-appellant. 5. On receipt of the Charge-Sheet in connection with Harisinga Police Station Case no. 30/2018, the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Udalguri, BTAD secured appearance of the accused-appellant from judicial custody on 29.09.2018. As the offence under Section 302, IPC is exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Udalguri committed the case records of G.R. Case no. 674/2018 to the Court of Sessions, Udalguri by a an Order of Commitment dated 29.09.2018. The accused-appellant was furnished the copies in compliance of the provisions of Section 207, CrPC on 29.09.2018. While fixing the case on 12.10.2018 before the learned Sessions Court, Udalguri the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Udalguri vide its Order of Commitment dated 29.09.2018 directed to notify the learned Public Prosecutor accordingly and to produce the accused before the Court of Sessions on 12.10.2018. 6. On receipt of the case records of G.R. Case no. 674/2018, the case was registered as Sessions Case no. 144/2018 and thereafter, the case was transferred to the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Udalguri for trial. On appearance of the accused before the Court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Udalguri [‘the trial court’, for short], the case was opened by the learned Public Prosecutor. After hearing the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and the learned defense counsel, and upon perusal of the materials on record, the learned trial court framed a charge under Section 302, IPC against the accused-appellant on 15.11.2018. The charge was read over and explained to the accused. On being read over and explained the charge, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In the trial, the prosecution in order to bring home the charge, examined ten nos. of witnesses and exhibited five nos. of documents. After closure of evidence from the prosecution side, the accused was examined under Section 313, CrPC. When the accused was asked to adduce defence evidence, he declined to adduce any evidence in support of his case. After conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court has convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant, as mentioned hereinabove. 7. Ms. of documents. After closure of evidence from the prosecution side, the accused was examined under Section 313, CrPC. When the accused was asked to adduce defence evidence, he declined to adduce any evidence in support of his case. After conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court has convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant, as mentioned hereinabove. 7. Ms. Mazumdar, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant has submitted that the case is based on circumstantial evidence as there was no eye-witness to the alleged incident of murder. The autopsy doctor had opined that the death of the deceased was a homicidal one. However, the circumstantial evidence are not sufficient to link the appellant with the homicidal death of the deceased. The prosecution has sought to attribute a motive to the appellant for causing the murder of his elder brother on the ground that a land dispute was going on between them at the relevant point of time. It is submitted by Ms. Mazumdar that existence of land dispute, even it is assumed to exist, cannot alone be held to be a motive as there is evidence on record that the brother had also a cordial relationship and there was no litigation pending in any forum with regard to any land dispute. It is further contended that the testimony of P.W.6 regarding extra- judicial confession of the appellant cannot be given undue credence as the other two witnesses [P.W.8 & P.W.9] who were present along with him at the place of occurrence, did not corroborate P.W.6 on that aspect. Learned Amicus Curiae has, thus, contended that the appellant deserves to be acquitted. 8. Ms. Bhuyan, learned Senior Counsel & Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State respondent has submitted that the incident had occurred at the paddy field of the deceased. There was a land dispute between the appellant and the deceased. Before P.W.6, the appellant disclosed that he had committed the murder by assaulting the deceased with a spade and the spade was found near the deadbody of the deceased. The appellant was also found to be present at the place of occurrence and it was the villagers who had detained the appellant at first and thereafter, he was handed to the police personnel when police personnel arrived at the place of occurrence. Ms. The appellant was also found to be present at the place of occurrence and it was the villagers who had detained the appellant at first and thereafter, he was handed to the police personnel when police personnel arrived at the place of occurrence. Ms. Bhuyan has made submissions in support of the circumstances, which the learned trial court had recorded to be established. Ms. Bhuyan has submitted that the learned trial court had found five established incriminating circumstances to complete the chain of circumstances for returning the verdict of guilt on the appellant. Placing support in the verdict of the learned trial court, it is submitted that the appeal has no merit and the impugned Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence does not require any interference. 9. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the materials on record of Sessions Case no. 144/2018, in original. 10. It is not in dispute that the case is based on circumstantial evidence. There was no eye-witness to any incident which led to the death of the deceased in the paddy field in the morning hours of 08.07.2018. During the course of the trial, the prosecution examined ten nos. of witnesses including the autopsy doctor, Arup Kumar Kalita [P.W.7] and the I.O. [P.W.10], to bring home the charge of fratricide against the appellant. Out of the prosecution witnesses, P.W.1 – Karmi Minj was the wife of the deceased and P.W.4 – Kemla Minj was a daughter of the deceased. P.W.2 – Silbanus Ekka was the brother-in-law of the deceased. P.W.3 – Deb Das and P.W.5 – Agness Muda were co-villagers of the deceased. P.W.6 – Prolip Baglari and P.W.8 – Babul Tanti were Secretaries of Village Defence Party [VDP] whereas P.W.9 – Markus Daimary was the Gaonbura of Village - Santipur. 11. P.W.1, Karmi Minj deposed to the effect that at around 08-00/09-00 a.m. on the date of the incident, her husband [deceased] went to their paddy field. It was at 10-00 a.m., their brother-in-law, P.W.2 came to her house to inform that the deceased was assaulted by the appellant with a spade in the paddy field. On being so informed, P.W.1 rushed to the place of occurrence with her children. On going there, P.W.1 saw her husband lying dead with cut injury on his face below the eye. On being so informed, P.W.1 rushed to the place of occurrence with her children. On going there, P.W.1 saw her husband lying dead with cut injury on his face below the eye. P.W.1 stated that the appellant was also present in the paddy field. When police was informed about the incident, police personnel came and took the deadbody to Udalguri Civil Hospital. P.W.1 stated to have lodged the FIR on the date of the incident itself by putting her thumb impression on the FIR. 11.1. During cross-examination, P.W.1 disclosed that the FIR was written by one Marco and the FIR was not read over to her. P.W.1 had further admitted that she did not see the incident of assault on her deceased husband. P.W.1 further stated that when she rushed to the place of occurrence, she did not see any person present there other than her husband lying dead. P.W.1 further deposed that no case was filed against the appellant with regard to any land dispute between the two. The suggestions put to P.W.1 by the defence side were denied. 12. P.W.2, Silbanus Ekka was the brother-in-law of the deceased, as he married his younger sister. As regards the incident, P.W.2 deposed to the effect that at about 10-00 a.m. on the date of the occurrence, the appellant came to his house to tell that he had a fighting with the deceased in the paddy field. After telling so, the appellant left the house of P.W.2. Thereafter, P.W.2 went to the house of the deceased to inform P.W.1 about the incident. Later on, P.W.2 went to the paddy field along with the Village Gaonbura [P.W.9]; one Marco [not a witness]; and the VDP Secretary and they found the deadbody of the deceased lying in the paddy field. The deceased was found to have sustained a cut injury on his face below the eye. The deadbody was thereafter, taken to the hospital for performing post-mortem examination. P.W.2 stated to have heard from persons that the deceased was hit with a spade by the appellant. 12.1. In his cross-examination, P.W.2 stated that when the appellant came to his house, there was no other family members in his house except him, as the other family members had gone to church. P.W.2 admitted that he did not see the incident of assault. 12.1. In his cross-examination, P.W.2 stated that when the appellant came to his house, there was no other family members in his house except him, as the other family members had gone to church. P.W.2 admitted that he did not see the incident of assault. P.W.2 stated to have gone to the paddy field after about 1 – 1 ½ hours after the visit of the appellant to his house. P.W.2 further stated that he could not name the person who told him that the appellant hit the deceased with spade. P.W.2 further stated that he informed P.W.1 about the incident of assault only. The suggestions put to him that he had deposed falsely was categorically denied by P.W.2. 13. P.W.3, Deb Das, a co-villager, knew the appellant, the informant and the deceased. P.W.3 stated that at about 02-30 p.m. on the date of occurrence, he was informed that the appellant had murdered the deceased with a spade in the paddy field. When P.W.3 visited to see the deadbody, he saw injury on the face of the deadbody. 13.1. During cross-examination, P.W.3 stated that the appellant and the deceased had a cordial relationship. P.W.3’s house is situated at a distance of about 150-200 metres from the house of the appellant. P.W.3 admitted that he did not see the incident and he did not go to the paddy field where the incident had occurred. 14. P.W.4, Kemla Minj was a daughter of the deceased. In her testimony, P.W.4 stated that at around 10-00 a.m. on the date of the incident, she was in the church of their village. It was at the church her maternal uncle [P.W.5] informed her that the appellant had committed murder of her father in the paddy field by assaulting him with a spade. Then she went to the paddy field along with her younger sister, Birsi. Going there, they saw the deadbody of their father lying in the paddy field with bleeding injury on his face. After the deadbody was brought home, her mother [P.W.1] lodged the FIR. 14.1. When cross-examined, P.W.4 stated that when P.W.5 informed her about the incident, she was returning alone from the church. After being informed, she came back to her house and took her younger sister, Birsi to the place of occurrence. Her mother [P.W.1] was not present in the house at that time. 14.1. When cross-examined, P.W.4 stated that when P.W.5 informed her about the incident, she was returning alone from the church. After being informed, she came back to her house and took her younger sister, Birsi to the place of occurrence. Her mother [P.W.1] was not present in the house at that time. P.W.4 stated that the place of occurrence was 1 - 1 ½ Km away from their house and it took about 10-15 minutes to reach the place of occurrence. P.W.4 did not see her maternal uncle [P.W.5] at the place of occurrence. P.W.4 stated that they stayed at the place of occurrence for about 15-20 minutes and during that time, there was no one there. 15. P.W.5, Agness Munda in his testimony-in-chief, deposed that in the morning hours on the date of the occurrence, he was in the church of their village. It was at around 10-00 a.m. when he was returning from the church, Karmi Minj [P.W.1] informed him that her husband was murdered by the appellant in the paddy field with a spade. P.W.5 then asked P.W.1 to inform the Gaonbura and the VDP Secretary about the incident. P.W.5 stated that he along with the Gaonbura and the VDP Secretary went to the paddy field to see the deadbody. In the paddy field, he saw the deadbody of the deceased lying on the ground with an injury on his face. Police personnel came to the place of occurrence after some time and interrogated the appellant. The appellant told before the police personnel that he had committed the murder by assaulting the deceased with a spade. P.W.5 stated that he was present at the time when the appellant had confessed before the police. P.W.5 did not know the reason why the appellant had murdered the deceased. P.W.5 stated that his signature was taken in the Seizure List, Ext.-1, whereby, a spade was seized. P.W.5 identified the seized spade as Mat.Ext.-1 during his examination-in-chief. 15.4. During cross-examination, P.W.5 stated that Karmi Minj [P.W.1] did not inform him from whom she came to know about the incident. On learning from P.W.1, P.W.5 stated to have informed P.W.4 about the incident. P.W.5 stated that it was at about 01-00 p.m. he went to the paddy field and at that point of time, the deadbody of the deceased was lying there on the ground. On learning from P.W.1, P.W.5 stated to have informed P.W.4 about the incident. P.W.5 stated that it was at about 01-00 p.m. he went to the paddy field and at that point of time, the deadbody of the deceased was lying there on the ground. The appellant also went to the place of occurrence with P.W.5, Baburam, Karma and some other persons. They had remained at the place of occurrence for about an hour. P.W.5 further deposed that the contents of Ext.-1, Seizure List was not read over to him. P.W.5 put his signature in Ext.-1 as asked by police. P.W.5 further stated that spades were available in the houses of the villagers. 16. P.W.6, Prolip Baglari was a VDP Secretary, who knew the appellant, the informant and the deceased. As regards the incident, P.W.6 deposed to the effect that at around 08-30 a.m. on 08.07.2018, the occurrence took place. P.W.6 was informed by the Gaonbura [P.W.9] and another VPD Secretary [P.W.8] in the morning hours of 08.07.2018 that an incident of murder had taken place in Village - Kherkheria. Then, P.W.6 went there and saw the deadbody of the deceased in a paddy field with injuries on his face. Then, P.W.6 informed the police about the incident. P.W.6 stated to have seen the appellant at the place of occurrence. P.W.6 had further stated that when the appellant was asked by them before arrival of the police personnel, the appellant informed them that he had killed the deceased by assaulting him with a spade. Later on, police personnel arrived at the place of occurrence and during interrogation by the police personnel, the appellant produced the spade by which he claimed to have assaulted the deceased. P.W.6 further deposed that the appellant confessed to have altercation with his elder brother, that is, the deceased with regard to a small canal in the paddy field and during altercation, the accused assaulted the deceased with a spade by chasing him and killed him. P.W.6 exhibited the Seizure List, Ext.-1 by which the spade was seized and identified his signature therein as Ext.-1[2]. He further identified the seized spade as Mat. Ext.-1. 16.1. During cross-examination, P.W.6 stated that at the place of occurrence, he met P.W.8 and P.W.9. There were many persons at the place of occurrence but P.W.6 could not name the persons he had seen at the place of occurrence. He further identified the seized spade as Mat. Ext.-1. 16.1. During cross-examination, P.W.6 stated that at the place of occurrence, he met P.W.8 and P.W.9. There were many persons at the place of occurrence but P.W.6 could not name the persons he had seen at the place of occurrence. P.W.6 also stated that the appellant had a land dispute with the deceased but there was no civil case pending between them. All the suggestions put by the defence side were categorically denied by P.W.6. 17. P.W.8, Babul Tanti was another VDP Secretary. In his testimony, P.W.8 stated that the occurrence took place at around 08-00 a.m. on 08.07.2018. It was in the morning hours of 08.07.2018 he was informed by P.W.9 that an incident of murder had taken place at Village – Kherkheria. P.W.8 stated to have gone to the place of occurrence with P.W.9. After going to the place of occurrence, they saw the deadbody of the deceased lying in a paddy field with injuries on his face. Then P.W.8 informed the Officer In-Charge of Harisinga Police Station over phone about the incident. P.W.8 further stated that he saw the appellant at the place of occurrence. After the police personnel came, the appellant was interrogated by the police personnel and before them, the appellant told that he had a boundary dispute with his brother, that is, the deceased and because of such dispute, he committed the murder of the deceased by assaulting him with a spade. P.W.8 stated that they were present at the time when the appellant made the confession before the police personnel. Thereafter, the police personnel took the deadbody and the appellant to the police station. 17.1. In his cross-examination, P.W.8 stated that he went to the place of occurrence along with P.W.9 at around 09-00 a.m. Initially, he did not see the appellant at the place of occurrence. P.W.8 further stated that the appellant came to the place of occurrence subsequently. P.W.8 further stated that they were at the place of occurrence till 04-00 p.m. and no other person from his village was present there. The suggestions put to him by the defence side were denied categorically. 18. P.W.9, Markus Daimary was the Gaonburha of Village-Santipur who knew the appellant, the informant and the deceased. P.W.8 further stated that they were at the place of occurrence till 04-00 p.m. and no other person from his village was present there. The suggestions put to him by the defence side were denied categorically. 18. P.W.9, Markus Daimary was the Gaonburha of Village-Santipur who knew the appellant, the informant and the deceased. Regarding the incident, P.W.9 deposed to the effect that at around 08-30 a.m. on 08.07.2018, P.W.1 came to his house to inform him that the deceased was killed by the appellant with a spade in the paddy field. Then, P.W.9 went to the place of occurrence with P.W.6 and P.W.8. Going there, P.W.9 saw the deadbody of the deceased lying in the paddy field. Thereafter, they informed the Officer In-Charge, Harisinga Police Station over phone about the incident. P.W.9 stated that the appellant was also present at the place of occurrence. P.W.9 further stated that after the police personnel had arrived, the appellant was interrogated and before the police personnel, during interrogation, the appellant confessed that a quarrel broke out between him and the deceased with regard to a boundary of the land of the paddy field and he committed the murder of the deceased by assaulting him with a spade. P.W.9 further stated that they were present at the time when the appellant made the confession before the police personnel. The police personnel thereafter, took the deadbody and the appellant to the police station. 18.1. During cross-examination, P.W.9 stated that he went to the place of occurrence at around 08-30 a.m. At the place of occurrence, he found P.W.5 was present there. P.W.9 could not name other persons from Village – Kherkheria who were present at the place of occurrence. P.W.9 stated that there was no residential house near the place of occurrence. The paddy field where the incident had occurred belonged to the deceased and the appellant and at the time of the incident, they did not see any other person cultivating near the place of occurrence. Suggestions put to P.W.9 were categorically denied. 19. P.W.10, Powal Hazarika was the Officer In-Charge, Harisinga Police Station & I.O. at the relevant point of time. P.W.10 during his examination-in-chief, stated that on 08.07.2018, he received the FIR from P.W.1 and on receipt of the FIR, he registered the case and started investigation. Suggestions put to P.W.9 were categorically denied. 19. P.W.10, Powal Hazarika was the Officer In-Charge, Harisinga Police Station & I.O. at the relevant point of time. P.W.10 during his examination-in-chief, stated that on 08.07.2018, he received the FIR from P.W.1 and on receipt of the FIR, he registered the case and started investigation. P.W.10 stated to have visited the place of occurrence, which was a vacant field in Village no. 2 Kherkheria. After reaching the place of occurrence, P.W.10 prepared a sketch-map of the place of occurrence [Ext.-4]. At the place of occurrence, P.W.10 found the deadbody of the deceased lying with a spade near his paddy field. The spade was accordingly seized vide Seizure List [Ext.-1] in presence of witnesses. Thereafter, the statements of the informant [P.W.1] and the other witnesses were recorded by him. An Executive Magistrate conducted the inquest on the deadbody and prepared an Inquest Report. P.W.10 further stated that the villagers kept the appellant detained. The appellant was thereafter, handed over to him. The appellant was accordingly, arrested and produced before the Court for recording his confessional statement. P.W.10 further stated that after collecting the Post-Mortem Examination Report, he completed the investigation. After having found sufficient materials against the appellant for the offence under Section 302, IPC. Accordingly, P.W.10 submitted the Charge-Sheet [Ext.-5]. 19.1. In his cross-examination, P.W.10 stated that P.W.6 did not state before him that P.W.8 and P.W.9 informed him about the murder at Village – Kherkheria. P.W.10 had further stated that P.W.6 did not state before him that at the place of occurrence, P.W.6 met P.W.8 and P.W.9. P.W.10 further stated that P.W.8 stated before him that the appellant was detained by the villagers at the village and P.W.9 did not state before him that P.W.6 also went to the place of occurrence. 20. Let us now turn to the testimony of the autopsy doctor [P.W.7]. P.W.7 was serving as the Medical & Health Officer-I at Udalguri Civil Hospital on 09.07.2018. P.W.7 stated that at 12-30 p.m. on 09.07.2018, he performed autopsy on the deadbody of the deceased. After examination, P.W.7 found the following :- 1. Wallis ribs and cartilages : 3 rd and 4 th Right rib. 2. Pleurae : congested 3. Laryax and trachere : congested trachea 4. Right lung : Haematoma 5. Left lung : Intact 6. Pericar [diaum] : Intact 7. Heart : Intact 8. After examination, P.W.7 found the following :- 1. Wallis ribs and cartilages : 3 rd and 4 th Right rib. 2. Pleurae : congested 3. Laryax and trachere : congested trachea 4. Right lung : Haematoma 5. Left lung : Intact 6. Pericar [diaum] : Intact 7. Heart : Intact 8. Vessels : congested 9. Injury : 5 cm X 2 cm X 1.5 cm sharp injury over right maxilla bone 10. Disease of deformity : # Right Maxillary bone 11. Fiacture : # Right Maxillary bone 12. Dislocation : Nil More detailed description of injury or disease : ? 5 cm X 2 cm X 1.5 cm sharp injury over right maxilla bone and nose. ? # Right maxillary bone. ? Haemorrhage in both cerebral hemesphere. ? # 3 rd 4 th right ribs ? Haematoma seen in right lung. 13. External appearance ? Condition of subject stout emaciated : An average built male body wearing white ganjee and black pant. ? Wounds-Position and character : 5 cm X 2 cm X 1.5 cm sharp injury over right maxilla bone and nose. ? Bruise-position, size and nature : Nil ? Mark of ligature on neck dissection, etc. 14. Abdomen ? Walls : Intact ? Peritonoum : Intact peritoneal cavity contain blood ? Mouth, Pharynx : Intact ? Stomach and its contents : Intact ? Small intestine and its contents : Intact ? Large intestine and its contents : Intact 15. Cranium and spinal canal ? Scalp, skull, vertebrae : Haemorrhage in scalp vault ? Membrane : congested ? Brain and spinal cord : Haemorrhage seen in both cerebral hemesphere ? Liver : Intact ? Spleen : Intact ? Kidneys : Intact ? Bladder : Intact ? Organs of generation, extrema and internal : Intact 20.1. P.W.7 opined that the death was due to haemorrhagic shock following multiple injuries which were ante-mortem in nature. He further mentioned in the Post- Mortem Examination Report [Ext.-2] that the death had occurred 16-20 hours before. He also exhibited his signature in Ext.-2 as Ext.-2[1]. The defence declined to cross-examine P.W.7. 21. From the testimony of the autopsy doctor, P.W.7 and the Post-Mortem Examination Report [Ext.-2], it can be noticed that the deceased had sustained a sharp injury over right maxilla bone and nose. That apart, the right maxillary bone of the deceased was found fractured. He also exhibited his signature in Ext.-2 as Ext.-2[1]. The defence declined to cross-examine P.W.7. 21. From the testimony of the autopsy doctor, P.W.7 and the Post-Mortem Examination Report [Ext.-2], it can be noticed that the deceased had sustained a sharp injury over right maxilla bone and nose. That apart, the right maxillary bone of the deceased was found fractured. There was hemorrhage in both cerebral rd th hemesphere. The deceased further sustained fracture injuries in the 3 and 4 ribs on the right side. That the death of the deceased was homicidal one due to injuries of ante-mortem in nature, was not contested by the defence. We are also of the unhesitant view that the death of the deceased was a homicidal one. 22. From an analysis of the testimonies of the above prosecution witnesses, it is evidently clear that none had seen the incident of assault. One of the circumstances on which the learned trial court had relied to return the verdict of guilt was that there was extra-judicial confession of the appellant before the villagers that he had committed the murder of his elder brother, the deceased. From the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it was emerged that such an inference was drawn from the testimonies of the witnesses, P.W.5, P.W.6, P.W.8 & P.W.9. It is therefore, necessary to evaluate their testimonies. 23. Both P.W.8 and P.W.9 were found to be consistent on the point that when the police personnel arrived at the place of occurrence, that is, the paddy field where the deadbody of the deceased was lying, the appellant was present. Both P.W.8 and P.W.9 had deposed that the appellant was interrogated by the police personnel after their arrival at the place of occurrence. It was during such interrogation by the police personnel, the appellant had confessed, in their presence, that he had a land boundary dispute with the deceased and because of such boundary dispute, he committed the murder by assaulting the deceased with a spade. P.W.5 also deposed to the effect that the police personnel interrogated the accused and the accused told before police that he murdered the deceased by assaulting with a spade. 24. On the other hand, P.W.6 stated that before the arrival of the police personnel at the place of occurrence, the appellant was present at the place of occurrence. P.W.5 also deposed to the effect that the police personnel interrogated the accused and the accused told before police that he murdered the deceased by assaulting with a spade. 24. On the other hand, P.W.6 stated that before the arrival of the police personnel at the place of occurrence, the appellant was present at the place of occurrence. P.W.6 further stated that before arrival of the police personnel, the appellant, on being asked by them, confessed that he had murdered the deceased by assaulting him with a spade. P.W.6 had, also deposed that when after the arrival of the police personnel the appellant was interrogated, the appellant confessed that he assaulted the deceased. The appellant also informed them that he had an altercation with the deceased with regard to a small canal in the paddy field and during such altercation, the appellant assaulted the deceased with the spade and killed him. 25. All the four prosecution witnesses – P.W.5, P.W.6, P.W.8 & P.W.9 – stated to have gone to the place of occurrence on the date of the incident itself. P.W.9 stated that he went to the place of occurrence with P.W.6 & P.W.8. P.W.8 stated that he went to the place of occurrence only with P.W.9. P.W.6 did not state specifically that he went to the place of occurrence along with P.W.8 & P.W.9. P.W.6 had further stated that it was P.W.8 and P.W.9 who informed him about the incident. In his cross-examination, P.W.6 stated that it was at the place of occurrence, he met P.W.8 & P.W.9. P.W.6 further stated that there were no other persons at the place of occurrence. P.W.5, on the other hand, had deposed that he had gone to the place of occurrence with the Gaonburah and the VDP Secretary and it was only at abut 01-00 p.m., he had gone to the place of occurrence. If it is accepted that all the three prosecution witnesses – P.W.6, P.W.8 & P.W.9 – were together at the place of occurrence along with the appellant before arrival of the police personnel, it can be easily noticed that neither P.W.8 nor P.W.9 had deposed that the appellant had confessed about committing the murder of the deceased before arrival of the police personnel at the place of occurrence. It was only P.W.6 who stated about the extra-judicial confession of the appellant before arrival of police personnel. 26. It was only P.W.6 who stated about the extra-judicial confession of the appellant before arrival of police personnel. 26. At this juncture, a reference to the rules laid down in Section 25, Section 26 and Section 27 of the Evidence Act appears necessary. As per Section 25 of the Evidence Act, a confession made to a Police Officer shall not be proved as against a person accused of any offence. Section 26 of the Evidence Act has provided that no confession made by any person while he is in the custody of a Police Officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 25 and Section 26 of the Evidence Act. It makes that part of the statement which distinctly leads to discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from a person ‘accused of an offence’, in the custody of a Police Officer, to the extent it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered, admissible in evidence against the accused. The fact which is discovered as a consequence of the information given is admissible in evidence. The fact discovered should lead to recovery of a physical object and only that information which distinctly relates to the discovery can be proved. 27. The expression, ‘custody’ appearing in Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Deoman Upadhyaya, 1961 1 SCR 14 , has observed that the bar under Section 25 of the Evidence Act applies equally whether or not the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal trial was in custody at the time of making the confession. Further, for the ban to be effective the person need not have been accused of an offence when he made the confession. The reason is that the expression ‘accused person’ in Section 24 and the expression ‘a person accused of any offence’ in Section 26 and Section 27 have the same connotation, and describe the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. The reason is that the expression ‘accused person’ in Section 24 and the expression ‘a person accused of any offence’ in Section 26 and Section 27 have the same connotation, and describe the person against whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. The adjacent clause ‘accused of any offence’ is, therefore, descriptive of the person against whom a confessional statement made by him is declared not provable, and does not predicate a condition of that person at the time of making the statement. In Dharam Deo Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, [2014] 5 SCC 509, it has been held that the expression ‘custody’ in Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody, but includes any kind of surveillance, restriction or restraint by the Police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information, the accused is, for all practical purposes, in the custody of the Police and the bar imposed by Section 25 and Section 26 of the Evidence Act and accordingly, the exception contained in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, would apply. Following Deoman Upadhyaya [supra] and Dharam Deo Yadav [supra], the Hon’ble Supreme Court recently in Perumal Raja @ Perumal vs. State, Represented by Inspector of Police, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 87 : 2024 INSC 13 , has observed, while interpreting Section 27, that as soon as an accused or suspected person comes into the hands of a Police Officer, he is no longer at liberty and is under a check, and is, therefore, in ‘custody’ within the meaning of Sections 25 to Section 27 of the Evidence Act. It is for this reason that the expression ‘custody’ has been held, as earlier observed, to include surveillance, restriction or restraint by the Police. 28. A coordinate Bench of this Court in Bapan Dutta vs. State of Assam, 2024 : GAU-AS : 8382-DB , has held that the expression ‘a person accused of any offence’ appearing in Section 26 and Section 27 of the Evidence Act includes a person who is under any kind of restriction, restraint or even surveillance by the Police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at a time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed, for all practical purposes, in the custody of the Police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at a time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed, for all practical purposes, in the custody of the Police. As soon as a person as suspect comes into the hands of a Police Officer, he is no longer at liberty and he is under a check and is, therefore, in ‘custody’ within the meaning of Section 25 to Section 27 of the Evidence Act. 29. If the testimony of P.W.5, P.W.8 and P.W.9 are tested against such rules of evidence, then the confession alleged to have been made by the appellant before the police personnel in their presence is clearly inadmissible in evidence due to the bar contained in Section 25 to Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Similarly, the part of the testimony of P.W.6 as regards the confession made by the appellant before the police personnel is inadmissible in evidence and therefore, the same cannot be taken into account for the purpose of finding any guilt against the appellant. 30. It is a settled proposition that an extra-judicial confession, if voluntarily made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon. But the confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The extra-judicial confession is usually considered to be a weak piece of evidence. Therefore, the extra-judicial confession must be accepted with great care and caution. If it is not supported by other evidence on record and it fails to inspire confidence, then it shall not be treated as a strong piece of evidence for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion of guilt. When the testimony of P.W.6 as regards making of extra-judicial confession by the appellant before him is considered against the testimony of other three prosecution witnesses, P.W.5, P.W.8 and P.W.9 who seemed to be present at the place of occurrence along with P.W.6 at the relevant point of time, then the testimony of P.W.6 on one hand and the testimonies of P.W.8 and P.W.9 on the other are found to be at variance with each other. Thus, the testimony of P.W.6 as regards making of extra-judicial confession by the appellant before him cannot be readily accepted in absence of any corroboration from the other three witnesses, P.W.5, P.W.8 and P.W.9. Thus, the testimony of P.W.6 as regards making of extra-judicial confession by the appellant before him cannot be readily accepted in absence of any corroboration from the other three witnesses, P.W.5, P.W.8 and P.W.9. It is pertinent to note that P.W.6 in his testimony, mentioned that such extra-judicial confession was made by the appellant before ‘them’. P.W.6 had, however, failed to mention that who were the other persons before whom the appellant had allegedly made the confession. On an analysis of the testimonies of P.W.5, P.W.6, P.W.8 and P.W.9, we are not persuaded to hold that the extra-judicial confession, stated to have been made before P.W.6 by the appellant, is a piece of evidence which would inspire confidence to accept it, that too, in absence of any other corroboration, to return any finding of guilt against the appellant. 31. The learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State respondent has placed reliance in a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maghar Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1975 SC 1320 , on the point of extra-judicial confession. In Maghar Singh [supra], the extra-judicial confession made by the two accused therein to witnesses was found reliable and voluntary and the conviction of the accused rested on the extra-judicial confession made by them before the independent witnesses. Citing the decision, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the testimony of P.W.6 is to be considered as evidence of an independent witness. 32. There is no doubt about the settled position that conviction can be based on the basis of extra-judicial confession. The extent of acceptability of an extra-judicial confession depends on the trustworthiness of the witness before whom it was given and the circumstance in which it was given. In the case in hand, it appears that all the three prosecution witnesses P.W.6, P.W.8 and P.W.9 can be treated to be in the category of independent witnesses as P.W.6 and P.W.8 were Secretaries of the VDP and the prosecution witness, P.W.9 was the Village Gaonbura. As all of them had testified that they were at the place of occurrence together, their testimonies are to be examined, compared and analyzed together in order to find out the credibility of each of them. As all of them had testified that they were at the place of occurrence together, their testimonies are to be examined, compared and analyzed together in order to find out the credibility of each of them. When so examined, compared and analyzed, as we have noted hereinabove, the testimony of P.W.6 is found to be at variance with the testimonies of P.W.8 and P.W.9 on the point of making extra-judicial confession by the appellant. If all the three prosecution witnesses, P.W.6, P.W.8 and P.W.9 were together at the place of occurrence along with the appellant, then it would not possible to accept that the extra-judicial confession was made by the appellant only before P.W.6 and not before P.W.8 and P.W.9. Thus, the decision in Maghar Singh [supra] is not found applicable to the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case in hand. 33. It has emerged from the evidence on record that a spade was found near the deadbody of the deceased and the same was seized vide a Seizure List, Ext.-1 in presence of witnesses. It has not emerged from the evidence on record that the spade so seized, was a blood-stained one. The autopsy doctor was not asked by the prosecution whether the kind of injury sustained by the deceased could have been inflicted by a spade, which was seized. There is no evidence on record to connect the spade so seized, with the injury sustained by the deceased. It is not established that the spade was the weapon of assault. It is not the case of the prosecution that the appellant was found carrying any spade. It is also not the case of the prosecution that any person had seen the appellant and the deceased together either prior to or at the time of the alleged incident of assault. When the I.O. [P.W.10] arrived at the place of occurrence, he saw the deadbody of the deceased lying and found a spade [Mat. Ext.-1] near the deadbody. Thus, the question of finding the spade on the basis of disclosure made by the appellant does not arise. 34. Motive for commission of an offence assumes greater significance in cases based on circumstantial evidence than the cases based on direct evidence. Ext.-1] near the deadbody. Thus, the question of finding the spade on the basis of disclosure made by the appellant does not arise. 34. Motive for commission of an offence assumes greater significance in cases based on circumstantial evidence than the cases based on direct evidence. It is true that failure to prove motive in cases resting on circumstantial evidence is not fatal by itself and, at the same time, absence of motive in a case based on circumstantial evidence is a factor which weighs in favour of the accused. In the case in hand, the prosecution side sought to place an existing land dispute between the appellant and the deceased as the motive behind the crime. P.W.1, P.W.6, P.W.8 and P.W.9 spoke about a land dispute existing between the appellant and the deceased who were brothers. P.W.1 stated that there was, however, no case filed against the appellant with regard to the land dispute. P.W.6 testified that the appellant had a land dispute with the deceased and to his knowledge, there was no civil case pending with regard to such land dispute. P.W.8 stated to have heard about the land dispute only when the appellant was interrogated by the police personnel at the place of occurrence. We have already held about inadmissibility of the confession made by the appellant before the police in view of the bar contained in the Evidence Act. For the same reason, the testimony of P.W.9 about the existing land dispute is to be discarded. P.W.3 a co-villager, had, on the other hand, testified that the appellant and the deceased had a cordial relationship. 35. A number of witnesses had testified as regards presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence. P.W.8 stated that initially he did not see the appellant at the place of occurrence and the appellant came to be place of occurrence later on. P.W.1 stated to have seen the appellant in the paddy field. P.W.6, P.W.8 and P.W.9 stated that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence. It has not emerged from the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses that the appellant was present all along with the deceased in the paddy field from a time anterior to the assault made on the deceased. None had deposed that the appellant and the deceased were seen together at any time prior to the death of the deceased. It has not emerged from the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses that the appellant was present all along with the deceased in the paddy field from a time anterior to the assault made on the deceased. None had deposed that the appellant and the deceased were seen together at any time prior to the death of the deceased. A number of villagers arrived at the place of occurrence after being informed about the deadbody of the deceased lying in the paddy field. Thus, mere presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence cannot be held to be a circumstance against him in the chain of circumstances, sought to be proved, in absence of any other relatable proved fact. 36. As per P.W.1, her husband [the deceased] went out from house at about 08-00/09-00 a.m. on the date of the incident to their paddy field. At about 10-00 a.m., she was informed by P.W.2 about the death of her husband. P.W.1 stated that P.W.2 came to her house at about 10-00 a.m. and P.W.2 stated that it was around 10-00 a.m. on the date of the occurrence, the appellant came to his house to tell that he had a fight with the deceased at the paddy field. It was thereafter, P.W.2 went to the house of P.W.1 to tell her about the incident. That the appellant had told him [P.W.2] about the incident is not corroborated by any other piece of evidence. P.W.2 stated that at the time when the appellant told him about the incident he was alone at his house and there were no other family members in home as all had gone to the church. P.W.2 during cross-examination, clarified that he was informed by the appellant about the incident of assault only and nothing else. P.W.4 stated that it was at around 10-00 a.m. when she was in the church, she was informed by P.W.5 about the incident in the paddy field. P.W.5 stated that it was around 10-00 a.m. when he was returning from the church, P.W.1 informed him about the incident of assault on the deceased by the appellant. P.W.5 stated that P.W.1 did not inform him from whom she came to know about the incident. It has not emerged from the testimonies of P.W.6, P.W.8 and P.W.9 as to the exact time when they went to the place of occurrence. P.W.5 stated that P.W.1 did not inform him from whom she came to know about the incident. It has not emerged from the testimonies of P.W.6, P.W.8 and P.W.9 as to the exact time when they went to the place of occurrence. The witnesses, P.W.1 and P.W.4 who had also gone to the place of occurrence did not depose anything regarding presence of other person at the place of occurrence. P.W.1 and P.W.4 deposed that when they visited the place of occurrence, there was no other person present at the place of occurrence. 37. It is too well settled that an accused can be convicted if he is found guilty in cases based on circumstantial evidence provided the prosecution is found successful in proving the complete chain of events and circumstances beyond reasonable doubt pointing unerringly towards the involvement of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. The nature of evidence which are required to be led by the prosecution in a case resting on circumstantial evidence has been delineated in the oft-quoted three-Judge Bench decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra [1984] 4 SCC 116 , in the following words :- 152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [ AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [ (1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal vs. State of Maharashtra [ (1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC 656 ]. This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi vs. State of Uttar Pradesh [ (1969) 3 SCC 198 : 1970 SCC (Cri) 55] and Ramgopal vs. State of Maharashtra [ (1972) 4 SCC 625 : AIR 1972 SC 656 ]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case [ AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129] : It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: [1] the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned ‘must or should’ and not ‘may be’ established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’ as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade vs. State of Maharashtra [ (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Cri LJ 1783] where the following observations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047] Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions. [2] the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, [3] the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, [4] they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and [5] there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 38. The learned trial court had observed that the appellant himself had informed about the incident to a near relative of the deceased and the said event was one of the links in the chain of circumstances. It was P.W.2 who stated that he was informed by the appellant about the incident of assault and he proceeded to clarify that he was informed about the incident of assault only and nothing else. Thus, from the testimony of P.W.2, it has not emerged clinchingly that it was the appellant who had committed assault on the deceased. It is not possible to rule out that the appellant had seen the incident of assault and the event was reported by him to P.W.2. From the evidence on record, it is possible to infer both the hypothesis. The second link which the learned trial court had relied to return the finding of guilt was the circumstance that it was only after getting the information from the appellant, the family members of the deceased went to the paddy field to find the deadbody of the deceased lying dead therein. 39. As like from the first circumstance, two hypotheses are possible, from the second circumstance also, two hypothesis are possible. As regards the third circumstances, we have already discussed about inadmissibility of the extra-judicial confession stated to have been made by the appellant. Similarly, the alleged land dispute existing between the appellant and the deceased would create a suspicion that the said land dispute could be a motive for the appellant to commit the crime. But the suspicion has not assumed the character of grave suspicion. Similarly, the alleged land dispute existing between the appellant and the deceased would create a suspicion that the said land dispute could be a motive for the appellant to commit the crime. But the suspicion has not assumed the character of grave suspicion. Even if it is grave suspicion, in the absence of any cogent and reliable corroborative evidence, grave suspicion, much less suspicion, cannot take the place of proof. Suspicion can be double-edged sword. 40. Having considered the evidence/materials on record in its entirety, we are not persuaded to arrive at a conclusion that the prosecution have led satisfactory, reliable and credible evidence on all the circumstances so as to complete the chain of circumstances leading to the one and only conclusion that it was the appellant who was the perpetrator of the crime of murder of the deceased. Even if it is accepted that there was an existing land dispute between the appellant and the deceased, the same would only give rise a suspicion pointed towards the appellant but it is settled that suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the place of proof and there is a long distance to travel from the point of ‘may be true’ to the point of ‘must be true’. In a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must not be permitted to take the place of proof. The long distance between ‘may be true’ and ‘must be true’, must be covered by clear, reliable, credible and unimpeachable evidence before an accused can be held guilty. It is also a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that if two views are possible on the evidence/materials adduced in the case, one pointing towards the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused, at all stages, should be adopted. This principle assumes relevance and pertinence in cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to be established circumstantial evidence. 41. The prosecution side has not been able to lead reliable, credible and cogent evidence to establish all the incriminating circumstances and thereafter, we observe that the circumstances to complete the chain of circumstances pointing only towards the guilt of the appellant are not established. 42. 41. The prosecution side has not been able to lead reliable, credible and cogent evidence to establish all the incriminating circumstances and thereafter, we observe that the circumstances to complete the chain of circumstances pointing only towards the guilt of the appellant are not established. 42. For the reasons mentioned hereinabove, we find ourselves not in agreement with the finding of guilt arrived at by the learned trial court from the evidence/materials on record. Having held that the prosecution has failed to prove his case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubts by way of clear, reliable, credible and clinching evidence, we find that the Judgment and Order dated 09.09.2019 of conviction and sentence passed by the trial court as one unsustainable in law and the same is liable to be set aside. It is accordingly set aside. 43. Consequently, the instant criminal appeal stands allowed. The appellant is to be released from custody forthwith if his custody is not required for any other case or purpose. 44. The records of the trial court are to be sent back forthwith. 45. Before parting with the record, we wish to place our appreciation on record as regards the serves rendered by Ms. R.D. Mozumdar, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant and direct the Registry to make available to her just remuneration as per the notified fee structure applicable to the Amicus Curiae. 46. The District Legal Services Authority is directed to award adequate compensation to the victim[s] after due enquiry under Section 357A, CrPC and the extant Victim Compensation Scheme, 2012 framed thereunder. We further observe that such enquiry shall be undertaken and completed with utmost expediency and thereafter, to award and disburse appropriate compensation thereunder to the victims entitled upon conclusion of such enquiry.