ORDER : Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J. CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 29/2016 The Criminal Revision Case has been preferred by the de-facto complainant under Section 397 and 401 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [the Cr.P.C] challenging the order of discharge of the Respondent Nos.2 to 4, vide order dated 26.08.2015, for the alleged offences punishable under Sections 420, 423 and 468 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 , [theI.P.C ]passed by the learned V Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Nellore , 3 the Trial Court A. FACTUAL MATRIX CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NOS.2 TO 4 IN THE DISCHARGE PETITION: 2. For better and effective understating of the gamut of the dispute, it is apposite to summarize at first the contentions of the Accused and Respondent Nos.2 to 4 under this factual matrix head. The Station House Officer, V Town Police Station, Nellore [the Investigating Officer], filed a charge sheet under Section 173 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ against the Respondent Nos.2 to 4 for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 423 and 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ in Crime No.222 of 2005, which was registered on the basis of the report lodged by Pathapati Pera Reddy/de-facto complainant, wherein it was alleged that the Respondent Nos.2 to 4 executed sale deeds in respect of Plot Nos.1, 1A, 2 and 4 in Sy.No.52/24 to Pratap Kumar, I.Supriya, Vommina Eswara Manoj Kumar and P.Rishita respectively, though they had no right and title over the property. 3. Under the authority of a General Power of Attorney document bearing No.509 of 2005, by which Potti Vijayalakshmi appointed the de-facto complainant as her GPA in respect of plot Nos.1, 1A, 2 and 4. Dwaraka Real Estate was a partnership firm constituted under a deed of partnership dated 26.09.1984 comprising seventeen partners. Respondent Nos.2 to 4 were partner Nos.10, 11 and 5 in the partnership deed. The de-facto complainant further alleged that Dwaraka Real Estates had appointed partner No.6/D.Lakshmi Narayana, partner No.7/P.Sesha Reddy and partner No.15/P.Badri Narayana Rao as GPA holders to deal with partnership properties under GPA dated 25.03.1985 vide document No.91/1985. It is further alleged that, except for those three persons no others had any authority to deal with the properties of partnership firm. After the demise of Kannaiah, partner No.16, partnership was reconstituted under the partnership deed dated 12.11.1988 comprising of the remaining sixteen partners. Thus, the GPA dated 25.03.1985 lapsed on 11.11.1988. It is further alleged that, except for those three persons no others had any authority to deal with the properties of partnership firm. After the demise of Kannaiah, partner No.16, partnership was reconstituted under the partnership deed dated 12.11.1988 comprising of the remaining sixteen partners. Thus, the GPA dated 25.03.1985 lapsed on 11.11.1988. Thereafter partner Nos.6, 7 and 15 had no authority to deal with the partnership properties in view of Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 , [theAct] 4. It is further contended that on perusal of the FIR, case diary, and statements, no case was made out against Respondent Nos.2 to 4.A legal notice dated 16.05.2003 was issued by S.V.Sarma, Senior Advocate to the three partners namely D.Lakshmi Narayana, P.Sesha Reddy and P.Badri Narayana Rao stating that the authority to deal on behalf of the firm had lapsed with the death of Kannaiah. Therefore, no prima facie case was made against Respondent Nos.2 to 4. It was contended that based on the averments of the FIR, case diary, and statements, and in view of the legal position, the entire dispute was civil in nature. As per Article 4 of the said partnership deed, the firm had fixed a tenure. The duration of the said partnership deed was from 12.11.1988 to 30.06.1999 and thereafter, the partnership was deemed to have been dissolved. 5. R.Srinivasulu, instituted a civil suit in O.S.No.446 of 2005 on the file of the learned First Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nellore against the remaining 16 partners including Dwaraka Real Estates, seeking rendition of accounts, and the said civil suit had been pending for adjudication, and the matter was thus sub-judice. 6. The alleged GPA holders, D.Lakshmi Narayana, P.Sesha Reddy had also pleaded that the partnership had become defunct on 09.11.1989 and the GPA was terminated by the death of Kannaiah on 11.11.1988. It was further contended that the Trial Court had to examine the materials to consider that sufficient material was there to establish the guilt of the Respondent Nos.2 to 4 by satisfying itself that a prima facie case was sufficiently made out. The de-facto complainant lacked the competency to initiate the prosecution as he had sold away plot No.1, 1A, 2 and 4 in favour of P.Srinivasulu Reddy and Venkata Ramana Panyam. The de-facto complainant lacked the competency to initiate the prosecution as he had sold away plot No.1, 1A, 2 and 4 in favour of P.Srinivasulu Reddy and Venkata Ramana Panyam. The de-facto complainant cannot be considered bonafide purchaser for value and consideration within the meaning of Section 3(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 , [the T.P.Act] the T.P.Act . It was eventually contended that the criminal proceedings were rightly discharged as no case was made out against Respondent Nos.2 to 4. VERSION OF THE PROSECUTION BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT:- 7. Before the learned Trial Court the prosecution filed counter-affidavit and denied the averments of the discharge petition. It was submitted that the Respondent Nos.2 to 4 and other accused who were also partners of M/s. Dwaraka Real Estate were fully aware of the facts of authorising one Dasa Lakshmi Narayana/L.W.3, Pathapati Sesha Reddy/L.W.4 and Padarthi Badri Narayana Rao/L.W.5 as General Power of Attorney Holders. They had signed in the partnership deed dated 26.09.1984 and the re-constituted deed dated 12.11.1988, executed pursuant to the death of one of the partners in the said firm. Respondent Nos.2 to 4 and other accused also signed in the registered General Power of Attorney dated 25.03.1985 executed in favour of L.Ws.3 to 5 authorising them to deal with all the transactions of the firm. 8. It was further contended that, in the above partnership deed and the General Power of Attorney dated 25.03.1985, any two of the three GPA holders can execute documents on behalf of the firm, and it would bind the remaining partners of the firm. While so, to carryout business of the firm and in exercise of their powers under GPA, the land belonging to Potti Vijaya Lakshmi/L.W.2 who is a third party to the firm, was taken over by the firm under separate Special Power of Attorney given by her on 25.03.1985 and subsequently an agreement was executed by two of the power of attorney holders in her favour on 10.11.2003 allotting certain plots laid out by the firm in proportion with the land taken over from her. The transaction also binds the Respondent Nos.2 to 4 and other accused, who are the partners of the firm. The transaction also binds the Respondent Nos.2 to 4 and other accused, who are the partners of the firm. Out of the plots allotted to her, L.W.2/P.Vijaya Lakshmi, gave registered General Power of Attorney in favour of the de-facto complainant in respect of the plots in question in the present case in the month of July 2005. While so, with dishonest intention and wrongful gain Respondent Nos.2 to 4 and other accused who had no authority, had fraudulently executed registered sale deeds in favour of their kith and kin and it amounts to forgery, punishable under Section 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and also by mentioning false statements of consideration, which is an offence punishable under Section 423 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and thereby caused loss to de-facto complainant and L.W.2 to a tune of more than five lakhs by depriving their right over the said plots which is punishable under Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.’ 9. It was further contended in the counter-affidavit that Respondent Nos.2 to 4 were trying to impress upon the Court that the allegations made against them were all of a civil nature and would not attract criminal offences and to take undue advantage of the Clauses stipulated in the partnership deeds in respect of the duration of partnership of the firm and also under the guise of a civil Suit in O.S.No.446 of 2005, pending on the file of the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Nellore. 10. The Prosecution relied on a judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar , (2001) 2 SCC 17 , wherein it was held that merely because a civil claim is maintainable, it does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintainable. 11. It was further averred that the factum of extension of the duration of the firm after 30.06.1991 by mutual agreement of the partners had been supressed by the Respondent Nos.2 to 4. Unless all the agreements entered by the General Power of Attorney Holders had been duly complied with, the firm could not be dissolved, because it would lead to loss to a large number of public who had invested amounts in the firm. The suit in O.S.No.446 of 2005 was instituted for dissolution of the partnership firm and rendition of accounts. 12. The suit in O.S.No.446 of 2005 was instituted for dissolution of the partnership firm and rendition of accounts. 12. It was furthermore averred that, as on the date of execution of the disputed documents in question, in the present case dated 10.10.2005 and 17.10.2005, the said civil suit was not at all in existence. To escape from the criminal liability under the guise of civil suit, Respondent No.2 got instituted the suit on 09.11.2005 through one of his henchmen by name, Rathikrindi Srinivasulu, who was also one of the partners of the firm. 13. The de-facto complainant was the owner of the property as on the date of the execution of false documents in dispute in that case by the accused i.e., on 10.10.2005 and 17.10.2005. Therefore, the de-facto complainant was a competent person to initiate prosecution against Respondent Nos.2 to 4 and other accused. Thus, urged to dismiss the discharge petition and claimed to try the respondent Nos.2 to 4 and other accused. 14. The learned Magistrate having heard the learned counsel for both sides and on perusal of the written arguments filed by them, discharged Respondent Nos.2 to 4, who are A1, A3 and A5. As there was no prima facie case made out against the other accused/A2 and A4 for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 423 and 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ they were also discharged. 15. It is the solemn duty of the learned Trial Court to examine whether there was a prima facie case was made out against Respondent Nos.2 to 4 for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 423 and 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ while considering an application filed under Section 239 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The prosecution shall ex-facie establish that Respondent Nos.2 to 4 had cheated P.Vijayalakshmi and her GPA holder by dishonestly inducing them to deliver any property to them or to any person, to attract the ingredients of Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.’ B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER 16. Sri Harinadh Nidamanuri, learned Counsel representing Sri C.Masthan Naidu, the learned Counsel for the Revisionist while reiterating the grounds of the Revision, argued that the impugned order of discharge passed by the learned Magistrate is patently illegal, improper, and contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. Sri Harinadh Nidamanuri, learned Counsel representing Sri C.Masthan Naidu, the learned Counsel for the Revisionist while reiterating the grounds of the Revision, argued that the impugned order of discharge passed by the learned Magistrate is patently illegal, improper, and contrary to the settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. The learned Magistrate failed to appreciate that the material collected during the investigation, including documentary evidence and statements of witness, clearly disclosed the commission of cognizable offences punishable under Sections 420, 423, and 468 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The conclusion that the dispute is purely civil in nature is erroneous and overlooks the specific allegations of fraudulent conduct and dishonest intention attributed to the accused. It is evident from the record that the accused persons, without any lawful right, title, or interest in the subject property, fabricated and executed documents with the intent to deceive and cause wrongful loss to the complainant. 17. The investigating agency, after conducting a thorough inquiry, found sufficient material to substantiate the allegations and accordingly filed a charge sheet. The learned Magistrate, however, misdirected himself by engaging in a detailed evaluation of the evidence, which is impermissible at the stage of framing of charge under Section 239 ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ where only a prima facie case is required to be established. The acts of the accused, including the creation and execution of forged documents, are inherently criminal in nature and cannot be equated with a mere civil dispute. The fraudulent design and dishonest intention underlying these acts are evident from the material on record. The learned Magistrate failed to consider that the scope of discharge under Section 239 ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ is limited and does not empower the Court to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence or determine the veracity of the prosecution’s case at that stage. 18. Learned Counsel for the Revisionist further argues that in view of the above, the order of discharge is unsustainable in law and deserves to be set aside. The material on record clearly warrants the framing of charges against the accused for the offences alleged, and the matter ought to proceed to trial in accordance with law. The learned Magistrate’s failure to do so has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. It is eventually argued that the impugned order of discharge of Respondent Nos.2 to 4 is illegal and unsustainable and urged to set aside it. The learned Magistrate’s failure to do so has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. It is eventually argued that the impugned order of discharge of Respondent Nos.2 to 4 is illegal and unsustainable and urged to set aside it. C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NOS.2 TO 4 19. Mr. Rosedar S.R.A, learned Counsel for Respondent Nos.2 to 4 would submit that the charge sheet does not make out any offences much less alleged offences; the facts of the charge sheet give rise to civil claim; since no charges can be framed for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 430 and 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ the learned Magistrate had discharged the Respondent Nos.2 to 4. The impugned discharge order does not suffer from any infirmities on whatsoever grounds or reasons. The order under challenge was rightly passed by appreciating the entire gamut of the litigation. The order of the learned Magistrate is a well-conceived one and does not warrant any interference and urged to dismiss the revision case. D. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE 20. On the other hand, Mrs. P.Akhila, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would argue that the learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the material available filed by the prosecution and discharged the Respondent Nos.2 to 4 as prima facie case was not made out against them. There was no flagrant miscarriage of justice. There were no perverse findings. There was no irregularity let alone material irregularity. The order impugned is not vitiated by manifest error of law or procedure which had resulted in miscarriage of justice. The impugned order doesn’t suffer from any illegality or infirmity. Hence, urged to dismiss the criminal revision case. E. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 21. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, it is necessary for us to explore a few relevant provisions of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ and ‘the I.P.C.’: Section 239 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ When accused shall be discharged – If, upon considering the police report and the documents sent with it under section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge the accused, and record his reasons for so doing. Section 415 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ Cheating.— Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to “cheat”. Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.— Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Section 423 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ Dishonest or fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of consideration — Whoever dishonestly or fraudulently signs, executes or becomes a party to any deed or instrument which purports to transfer or subject to any charge any property, or any interest therein, and which contains any false statement relating to the consideration for such transfer or charge, or relating to the person or persons for whose use or benefit it is really intended to operate, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Section 464 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ Making a false document. Section 464 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ Making a false document. — A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record — First — Who dishonestly or fradulently— (a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document; (b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record; (c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record; (d)makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the electronic signature, with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or Secondly — Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with electronic signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; or Thirdly — Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration.” Section 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ Forgery for purpose of cheating — Whoever commits forgery, intending that the document or electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: Termination of agency — An agency is terminated by the principal revoking his authority; or by the agent renouncing the business of the agency; or by the business of the agency being completed; or by either the principal or agent dying or becoming of unsound mind; or by the principal being adjudicated an insolvent under the provisions of any Act for the time being in force for the relief of insolvent debtors. Section 55 of The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 Rights and liabilities of buyer and seller.— In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the buyer and the seller of immoveable property respectively are subject to the liabilities, and have the rights, mentioned in the rules next following, or such of them as are applicable to the property sold:— (1)The seller is bound— a) to disclose to the buyer any material defect in the property or in the seller’s title thereto of which the seller is, and the buyer is not, aware, and which the buyer could not with ordinary care discover; b) to produce to the buyer on his request for examination all documents of title relating to the property which are in the seller’s possession or power; c) to answer to the best of his information all relevant questions put to him by the buyer in respect to the property or the title thereto; d) on payment or tender of the amount due in respect of the price, to execute a proper conveyance of the property when the buyer tenders it to him for execution at a proper time and place; e) between the date of the contract of sale and the delivery of the property, to take as much care of the property and all documents of title relating thereto which are in his possession as an owner of ordinary prudence would take of such property and documents; f) to give, on being so required, the buyer, or such person as he directs, such possession of the property as its nature admits; g) to pay all public charges and rent accrued due in respect of the property up to the date of the sale, the interest on all encumbrances on such property due on such date, and, except where the property is sold subject to encumbrances, to discharge all encumbrances on the property then existing. (2)The seller shall be deemed to contract with the buyer that the interest which the seller professes to transfer to the buyer subsists and that he has power to transfer the same: Provided that, where the sale is made by a person in a fiduciary character, he shall be deemed to contract with the buyer that the seller has done no act whereby the property is encumbered or whereby he is hindered from transferring it. The benefit of the contract mentioned in this rule shall be annexed to, and shall go with, the interest of the transferee as such, and may be enforced by every person in whom that interest is for the whole or any part thereof from time to time vested. (3)Where the whole of the purchase-money has been paid to the seller, he is also bound to deliver to the buyer all documents of title relating to the property which are in the seller’s possession or power: Provided that, (a) where the seller retains any part of the property comprised in such documents, he is entitled to retain them all, and, (b) where the whole of such property is sold to different buyers, the buye of the lot of greatest value is entitled to such documents. But in case (a) the seller, and in case (b) the buyer, of the lot of greatest value, is bound, upon every reasonable request by the buyer, or by any of the other buyers, as the case may be, and at the cost of the person making the request, to produce the said documents and furnish such true copies thereof or extracts therefrom as he may require; and in the meantime, the seller, or the buyer of the lot of greatest value, as the case may be, shall keep the said documents safe, uncancelled and undefaced, unless prevented from so doing by fire or other inevitable accident. (4)The seller is entitled— a) to the rents and profits of the property till the ownership thereof passes to the buyer; b) where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer before payment of the whole of the purchase-money, to a charge upon the property in the hands of the buyer, any transferee without consideration or any transferee with notice of the non-payment, for the amount of the purchase-money, or any part thereof remaining unpaid, and for interest on such amount or part from the date on which possession has been delivered. (5)The buyer is bound— a) to disclose to the seller any fact as to the nature or extent of the seller’s interest in the property of which the buyer is aware, but of which he has reason to believe that the seller is not aware, and which materially increases the value of such interest; b) to pay or tender, at the time and place of completing the sale, the purchase-money to the seller or such person as he directs: provided that, where the property is sold free from encumbrances, the buyer may retain out of the purchase-money the amount of any encumbrances on the property existing at the date of the sale, and shall pay the amount so retained to the persons entitled thereto; c) where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer, to bear any loss arising from the destruction, injury or decrease in value of the property not caused by the seller; d) where the ownership of the property has passed to the buyer, as between himself and the seller, to pay all public charges and rent which may become payable in respect of the property, the principal moneys due on any encumbrances subject to which the property is sold, and the interest thereon afterwards accruing due. (6)The buyer is entitled— a) where the ownership of the property has passed to him, to the benefit of any improvement in, or increase in value of, the property, and to the rents and profits thereof; b) unless he has improperly declined to accept delivery of the property, to a charge on the property, as against the seller and all persons claiming under him, to the extent of the seller’s interest in the property, for the amount of any purchase-money properly paid by the buyer in anticipation of the delivery and for interest on such amount; and, when he properly declines to accept the delivery, also for the earnest (if any) and for the costs (if any) awarded to him of a suit to compel specific performance of the contract or to obtain a decree for its rescission. An omission to make such disclosures as are mentioned in this section, paragraph (1), clause (a), and paragraph (5), clause (a), is fraudulent. Sections 4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 39, 40, 41 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 Sec.4. An omission to make such disclosures as are mentioned in this section, paragraph (1), clause (a), and paragraph (5), clause (a), is fraudulent. Sections 4, 6, 7, 9, 12, 14, 39, 40, 41 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 Sec.4. Definition of “partnership”, “partner”, “firm” and “firm name” .—“Partnership” is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually “partners” and collectively “a firm”, and the name under which their business is carried on is called the “firm name”. Sec.6. Mode of determining existence of partnership .—In determining whether a group of persons is or is not a firm, or whether a person is or is not a partner in a firm, regard shall be had to the real relation between the parties, as shown by all relevant facts taken together. Sec.7. Partnership at will.— Where no provision is made by contract between the partners for the duration of their partnership, or for the determination of their partnership, the partnership is “partnership at will”. Sec.9. General duties of partners.— Partners are bound to carry on the business of the firm to the greatest common advantage, to be just and faithful to each other, and to render true accounts and full information of all things affecting the firm to any partner or his legal representative. Sec.12. The conduct of the business .—Subject to contract between the partners— (a) every partner has a right to take part in the conduct of the business; (b) every partner is bound to attend diligently to his duties in the conduct of the business; (c) any difference arising as to ordinary matters connected with the business may be decided by a majority of the partners, and every partner shall have the right to express his opinion before the matter is decided, but no change may be made in the nature of the business without the consent of all the partners; and (d) every partner has a right to have access to and to inspect and copy any of the books of the firm. Sec.14. Sec.14. The property of the firm.— Subject to contract between the partners, the property of the firm includes all property and rights and interests in property originally brought into the stock of the firm, or acquired, by purchase or otherwise, by or for the firm, or for the purposes and in the course of the business of the firm, and includes also the goodwill of the business. Unless the contrary intention appears, property and rights and interests in property acquired with money belonging to the firm are deemed to have been acquired for the firm. Sec.17. Rights and duties of partners .—Subject to contract between the partners: (a) After a change in the firm .—Where a change occurs in the constitution of a firm, the mutual rights and duties of the partners in the reconstituted firm remain the same as they were immediately before the change, as far as may be; (b) After the expiry of the term of the firm, and .—Where a firm constituted for a fixed term continues to carry on business after the expiry of that term, the mutual rights and duties of the partners remain the same as they were before the expiry, so far as they may be consistent with the incidents of partnership at will; and (c) Where additional undertakings are carried out .—Where a firm constituted to carry out one or more adventures or undertakings carries out other adventures or undertakings, the mutual rights and duties of the partners in respect of the other adventures or undertakings are the same as those in respect of the original adventures or undertakings. 39. Dissolution of a firm .—The dissolution of partnership between all the partners of a firm is called the “dissolution of the firm”. 40. Dissolution by agreement .—Afirm may be dissolved with the consent of all the partners or in accordance with a contract between the partners. 41. 39. Dissolution of a firm .—The dissolution of partnership between all the partners of a firm is called the “dissolution of the firm”. 40. Dissolution by agreement .—Afirm may be dissolved with the consent of all the partners or in accordance with a contract between the partners. 41. Compulsory dissolution .—Afirm is dissolved— (a) [by the adjudication of all the partners or of all the partners but one as insolvent, or] (b) by the happening of any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the firm to be carried on or for the partners to carry it on in partnership: Provided that, where more than one separate adventure or undertaking is carried on by the firm, the illegality of one or more shall not of itself cause the dissolution of the firm in respect of its lawful adventures and undertakings. F. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION: 22. Now the points for consideration are: i. Whether the order in Crl.M.P.No.2502 of 2014 dated 26.08.2015 in C.C.No.797 of 2008, on the learned V Additional Judicial Magistrate of I Class, Nellore, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, sentence, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? ii. And to what relief? G. ANALYSIS 23. The High Court of Madras in A.R.Saravanan v. State 2002 SCC OnLine Mad 637 , held that under Section 239 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ the trial Court is required to see whether ground for presuming commission of offence exists or whether the charge is groundless; whether a prima-facie case pertaining to the commission of the offence is made out or not. 24. The High Court of Allahabad in State of Uttar Pradesh v Jitendra Kumar Singh , MANU/UP/0342/1987 , held that Section 239 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ enjoins upon the Magistrate to record his reasons for holding the charge against the accused to be groundless and discharging him. This is simply because his order of discharge is subject to revision by the higher Courts. There were sufficient documents and evidence indicating that prima facie charges were made out against the accused, but those documents and evidence were neither referred nor considered and the Magistrate discharged the accused on the ground that nobody represented the state including the official entrusted with the work of supervising the state litigation or any advocate including the District Govt. Counsel. Counsel. It was held that the order of discharge was liable to be set aside. 25. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh v. State of Maharashtra, (1968) 70 ITR 95 , has held that the word 'property' in Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ does not necessarily mean that the thing, of which a delivery is dishonestly desired by the person who cheats, must have a money value or a market value, in the hand of the person cheated. The communicated order of assessment received by an assessee is "property". 26. The High Court of Allahabad in Sonbhadra Coke Product v. State of U.P , 111993SCC OnLine All 40 ., it was held that offence of cheating can be made out only if it has been shown that damage or harm has been caused to the person so deceived. 27. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar (2001) 2 SCC 17 , at Paragraph No.8 held as under: “8. There could be no dispute to the proposition that if the complaint does not make out an offence it can be quashed. However, it is also settled law that facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence. Merely because a civil claimis maintainable does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintained. In this case, on the facts, it cannot be stated, at this prima facie stage, that this is a frivolous complaint. The High Court does not state that on facts no offence is made out. If that be so, then merely on the ground that it was a civil wrong the criminal prosecution could not have been quashed.” 28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander , (2012) 9 SCC 460 , at paragraph Nos.25 to 27 held as under: “25. … We have already indicated above that framing of charge is the first major step in a criminal trial where the court is expected to apply its mind to the entire record and documents placed therewith before the court. Taking cognizance of an offence has been stated to necessitate an application of mind by the court but framing of charge is a major event where the court considers the possibility of discharging the accused of the offence with which he is charged or requiring the accused to face trial. Taking cognizance of an offence has been stated to necessitate an application of mind by the court but framing of charge is a major event where the court considers the possibility of discharging the accused of the offence with which he is charged or requiring the accused to face trial. There are different categories of cases where the court may not proceed with the trial and may discharge the accused or pass such other orders as may be necessary keeping in view the facts of a given case. In a case where, upon considering the record of the case and documents submitted before it, the court finds that no offence is made out or there is a legal bar to such prosecution under the provisions of the Code or any other law for the time being in force and there is a bar and there exists no ground to proceed against the accused, the court may discharge the accused. There can be cases where such record reveals the matter to be so predominantly of a civil nature that it neither leaves any scope for an element of criminality nor does it satisfy the ingredients of a criminal offence with which the accused is charged. In such cases, the court may discharge him or quash the proceedings in exercise of its powers under these two provisions. 26. This further raises a question as to the wrongs which become actionable in accordance with law. It may be purely a civil wrong or purely a criminal offence or a civil wrong as also a criminal offence constituting both on the same set of facts. But if the records disclose commission of a criminal offence and the ingredients of the offence are satisfied, then such criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because a civil wrong has also been committed. The power cannot be invoked to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The factual foundation and ingredients of an offence being satisfied, the court will not either dismiss a complaint or quash such proceedings in exercise of its inherent or original jurisdiction. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736 ., this Court took the similar view and upheld the order of the High Court declining to quash the criminal proceedings because a civil contract between the parties was pending. ii. 27. In Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736 ., this Court took the similar view and upheld the order of the High Court declining to quash the criminal proceedings because a civil contract between the parties was pending. ii. 27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, now it will be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but is inherently impossible to state with precision such principles. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be: iii. 27.1. Though there are no limits of the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. iv. 27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied then the Court may interfere. v. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. vi. 27.4. v. 27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge. vi. 27.4. Where the exercise of such power is absolutely essential to prevent patent miscarriage of justice and for correcting some grave error that might be committed by the subordinate courts even in such cases, the High Court should be loath to interfere, at the threshold, to throttle the prosecution in exercise of its inherent powers. vii. 27.5. Where there is an express legal bar enacted in any of the provisions of the Code or any specific law in force to the very initiation or institution and continuance of such criminal proceedings, such a bar is intended to provide specific protection to an accused. viii. 27.6. The Court has a duty to balance the freedom of a person and the right of the complainant or prosecution to investigate and prosecute the offender. ix. 27.7. The process of the court cannot be permitted to be used for an oblique or ultimate/ulterior purpose. x. 27.8. Where the allegations made and as they appeared from the record and documents annexed therewith to predominantly give rise and constitute a “civil wrong” with no “element of criminality” and does not satisfy the basic ingredients of a criminal offence, the court may be justified in quashing the charge. Even in such cases, the court would not embark upon the critical analysis of the evidence. xi. 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice. xii. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. xiii. 27.11. xii. 27.10. It is neither necessary nor is the court called upon to hold a full-fledged enquiry or to appreciate evidence collected by the investigating agencies to find out whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction. xiii. 27.11. Where allegations give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence, merely because a civil claim is maintainable, does not mean that a criminal complaint cannot be maintained. xiv. 27.12. In exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 228 and/or under Section 482, the Court cannot take into consideration external materials given by an accused for reaching the conclusion that no offence was disclosed or that there was possibility of his acquittal. The Court has to consider the record and documents annexed therewith by the prosecution. xv. 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records but is an opinion formed prima facie. xvi. 27.14. Where the charge-sheet, report under Section 173(2) of the Code, suffers from fundamental legal defects, the Court may be well within its jurisdiction to frame a charge. xvii. 27.15. Coupled with any or all of the above, where the Court finds that it would amount to abuse of process of the Code or that the interest of justice favours, otherwise it may quash the charge. The power is to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for administration of which alone, the courts exist. xviii. 27.16. These are the principles which individually and preferably cumulatively (one or more) be taken into consideration as precepts to exercise of extraordinary and wide plenitude and jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code by the High Court. Where the factual foundation for an offence has been laid down, the courts should be reluctant and should not hasten to quash the proceedings even on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated or do not appear to be satisfied if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of the offence.” 29. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohd. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 held that at para Nos.17 and 22 as under: “17. When a document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not his, he is not claiming that he is someone else nor is he claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document (purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner) is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of the Code. If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 nor Section 471 of the Code are attracted. 22. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of the Code.” 30. In Mohd. Ibrahim’s case supra, what is the meaning of false documents was defined at paragraph No.11 as under: “In short, a person is said to have made a `false document', if (i) he made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; or (ii) he altered or tampered a document; or (iii) he obtained a document by practicing deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.” 31. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Soma Chakravarty v. State, (2007) 5 SCC 403 , at paragraphNos.10 and 19 held as under: “10. It may be mentioned that the settled legal position, as mentioned in the above decisions, is that if on the basis of material on record the court could form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the offence. At the time of framing of the charges the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by the accused was possible. Before framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the commitment of offence by the accused was possible. Whether, in fact, the accused committed the offence, can only be decided in the trial. 19. Some of the questions, however, which have been raised by the appellant are of some importance and it may be necessary to deal therewith. The learned trial Judge, it appears, did not properly apply its mind in regard to the different categories of the accused while framing charges. It ought to have been done. Charge may although be directed to be framed when there exists a strong suspicion but it is also trite that the court must come to a prima facie finding that there exist some materials therefor. Suspicion cannot alone, without anything more, it is trite, form the basis therefor or held to be sufficient for framing charge.” 32. The Hon’ble High Court of Rajasthan in Shabbir Mohammad v. State of Rajasthan, 1995 SCC OnLine Raj 233, at paragraph Nos.8 and 11 held as under: “8. The plain reading of section 294 of the Code shows that on the genuineness of a document in question being admitted by the party concerned, it can be read in evidence for the purposes of deciding the issue pending before the court in any inquiry, trial or other proceedings. It appears to us that section 294 of the Code was introduced to dispense with the avoidable waste of time and to facilitate the removal of obstruction in the speedy trial and is based on the rule of evidence contained in section 58 of the Evidence Act that the facts admitted need not be proved. If it is held that such a document can be used in evidence only for the purposes mentioned in sections 145, 157 and 159 of the Evidence Act, as has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in Mahaveer's case (supra), it would amount to reading something in the section which is not written therein and the very object of the Section itself would be frustrated. 11. 11. For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that if the genuineness of any document produced by the prosecution or the accused is admitted by the opposite party, when called upon to do so under sub-section (1) of section 294 of the Code, in view of sub-section (3) of section 294 of the Code, it can be read by the court as a substantive piece of evidence for deciding the issue pending before it with its probative value being the same as it would have had if it had been proved by the party concerned on its genuineness having been disputed by the opposite party when called upon to do so under sub-section (1) of section 294 of the Code. The reference is answered accordingly.” 33. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. (2) v. Stateof Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656 , at paragraph No.20 held as under: “Scope of power of attorney 20. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property. The power of attorney is creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorises the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him(see Section 1-A and Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the grantee.” 34. The Hon’ble High Court of Nagpur in Janardhan Jaikrishna v. Gangaram Mangalchand, AIR 1951 NAGPUR 313, at paragraph Nos.8 & 9 held as under: “8.The lower appellate Court has dealt with the point in para. 10 of the judgment. In its opinion the dissolution of a firm does not affect the authority of the agent of that firm. The view is based upon the fact that S. 201, Contract Act, which deals with the question of the termination of the authority of an agent does not expressly provide that upon the dissolution of a firm the authority of an agent to act for the firm shall stand terminated. The view is based upon the fact that S. 201, Contract Act, which deals with the question of the termination of the authority of an agent does not expressly provide that upon the dissolution of a firm the authority of an agent to act for the firm shall stand terminated. Most textbook writers have expressed the view that s. 201, Contract Act, is not exhaustive and that it does not mention all the circumstances in which an agency can be terminated. In my opinion the view is correct for the obvious reason that the section is not so worded as to be exhaustive. Had the Legislature intended the section to be exhaustive they could easily have said so. It would appear that the section is really illustrative and the question whether in particular circumstances an agency can be deemed to have terminated will have to be decided upon the general principles of law. 9. The circumstances set out in S. 201 indicate that the contract of agency terminates when the principal or the agent or the subject-matter of the agency ceases to exist or where either party expressly revokes the contract or becomes subjected to a legal disability. A firm is an artificial person and upon dissolution it ceases to exist. Therefore, in my opinion, a contract of agency entered into by a firm would stand terminated upon its dissolution. This would follow from the decision in Tasker v. Shepherd, (1816) 158 E. R. 237: (30 L. J. Ex. 207) where it was held that a change in the composition of a firmhad the effect of determining and constituting a breach of a contract of agency. In several other cases cited at p. 163 of Lindley on Partnership (10th Edn.) it has been held that as a contract of agency is generally of a personal character it is determined by a change in the composition of a firm. The principle underlying these decisions is applicable to cases governed by the Indian Contract Act and is not peculiar to the law of England as, apparently, the lower appellate Court seems to think.” 35. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh in A.B. Ramulu v. B. Yadigir Reddy, 1993 SCC OnLine AP 59 at paragraph Nos.6 & 7 held as under: “6. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh in A.B. Ramulu v. B. Yadigir Reddy, 1993 SCC OnLine AP 59 at paragraph Nos.6 & 7 held as under: “6. In view of the above principle of law laid down by the Privy Council, as also by the Lahore High Court, it is clear that as soon as the Principal dies the agency stands terminated unless the legal representatives or assignees of the principal authorities the power of attorney holders to continue as such. In this view of the matter, inasmuch as there is no question of authorisation involved in the instant case, the power of attorney stood terminated on the date of the death of the plaintiff and in any event by the date of filing of the L.R., application I.A. (SR) 13 of 1986. 7. Furthermore, it cannot be held that the power of attorney is a party to the suit independent of the principal. He stands only in the shoes of the principal and there is no competence for the power of attorney holder to continue the proceedings after the death of the principal inasmuch as the suit gets abated immediately on the death of the plaintiff. Contextually, it is useful to have a reference to a decision of the Madras High Court in Satyanarayana v. Anjareddi (3) (28) AIR 1941 Madras 719. There the question arose was, whether the next friend of the minor plaintiff could “be said to be a party to the suit. ADivision Bench of the Madras High Court held: “The word ‘Plaintiff’ in Sec. 95 is confined to the plaintiff alone and does not include a next friend. Consequently, the court has no jurisdiction to order the next friend of the minor plaintiff to pay compensation under section 95 but this does not prevent an injured party from instituting a suit to recover from the next friend compensation should he wish to do so”.” 36. The High Court of Madras in Garapati Venkanna v. Mullapudi Atchutaramanna, MANU/TN/0109/1937 at paragraph Nos.5 and 6 held as under: “5. The more vital question is the one arising from Ex. F. In the first place, I amnot prepared to agree with the appellant's earned Counsel that it cannot be construed as a power-of-attorney. The High Court of Madras in Garapati Venkanna v. Mullapudi Atchutaramanna, MANU/TN/0109/1937 at paragraph Nos.5 and 6 held as under: “5. The more vital question is the one arising from Ex. F. In the first place, I amnot prepared to agree with the appellant's earned Counsel that it cannot be construed as a power-of-attorney. It provides for the 6th plaintiff filing the suit himself and conducting it, and for the properties, when recovered, being divided, in two equal moieties between himand the reversioners. I see no reason why a narrow meaning should be put upon this document. But there is a far more serious objection, which I think ought to prevail. The power-of attorney was executed by six persons, of whom Brahmayya (junior) was one, he being entitled to one-half of the property; but before the power could be acted upon, the latter died. Under Section 201 of the Contract Act, an agency is terminated by the death of the principal. The question that then arises is, where the agency was created by more than one principal, does the death of one or some of them terminate the agency? It has been held in several English cases that the death of one or more of the principals revokes the agent's authority, although it has been explained in a decision of the Calcutta High Court, Re Sital Prosad (1916) 21 C.W.N. 620, that the rule is not one of universal application, the question being one of intention to be determined upon the terms of the document and from the surrounding circumstances. In Gee v. Lane (1812) 15 East. 592 : 104 E.R. 967 and Raw v. Alderson (1817) 7 Taunt. 453 : 129 E.R. 182, it was held that a joint warrant of attorney given to enter judgment "against us" does not authorise the entering up of judgment, on the death of one, against the survivor only. In Tasker v. Shephard (1861) 6 H. & N. 575 : 158 E.R. 237, where the question was as to the effect of the death of a member of a partnership firm, the Court held that the contract was subject to the condition that it was to be in force so long as all the parties lived. In Bowstead's book, it is stated that the agency is determined by the death of any one of the partners before the expiration of the period fixed. In Bowstead's book, it is stated that the agency is determined by the death of any one of the partners before the expiration of the period fixed. (Law of Agency, 7th Ed., 1924.) In the Calcutta case, already referred to, the property belonged to a joint Hindu family and the intention of the joint power-of-attorney appearing to be to facilitate joint loans by the mortgage of the joint estate, it was held that the death of one member did not revoke the agency. Re Sital Prosad : Badrinarain Agarwalla v. Raja Brijnarain Roy (1916) 21 C.W.N. 620. But the facts here are entirely different. Brahmayya (junior) had a distinct half right in the property and I am unable to deduce from the terms of Ex. F that it was intended to be in force even in the event of his death. 6. But it is contended that this is an agency coupled with interest and is saved by Section 202 of the Contract Act. This argument cannot prevail. Ex. F contemplates the agent incurring costs in future for the filing and the conducting of the suit. The principle applies only to cases, where authority is given for the purpose of being a security or a part of the security, and not to cases where the interest of the donee arises afterwards and incidentally; in such cases there is no authority coupled with an interest, but an independent authority, and an interest subsequently arising Smart v. Sandars (1848) 5 C.B. 895 : 136 E.R. 1132. Illustration (b) to the section refers to a consignment made after the factor's advance and with an express request by the principal to repay himself out of the price of the goods (see Pollock and Mulla, Commentaries, under Section 202 and the Indian Cases cited there). I am therefore of the opinion that the 6th plaintiff's agency had become revoked before the date of the suit and that the plaint that he filed is thus an invalid and ineffectual document. That would be sufficient to dispose of the appeal, as in this view the suit fails.” 37. The High Court of Rajasthan in Prahlad v. Laddevi, AIR 2007 RAJASTHAN 166, at paragraphNo.9 held as under: “9.A power of attorney granted by the donor to the donee is operative and effective only during the lifetime of the donor. That would be sufficient to dispose of the appeal, as in this view the suit fails.” 37. The High Court of Rajasthan in Prahlad v. Laddevi, AIR 2007 RAJASTHAN 166, at paragraphNo.9 held as under: “9.A power of attorney granted by the donor to the donee is operative and effective only during the lifetime of the donor. The donor and donee stand in relationship of master and agent. Since the actions done by the donee are deemed to be actions done on the part of the donor, naturally such a power of attorney cannot be operative or be effective after the demise of the donor. Therefore, the power of attorney granted by Mr. Jain on 28-5-1997 came to an end on 20-10-1997 upon his demise.” 38. The High Court of Delhi in Krishna Kumari v. Ram Singh, 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2857, at paragraphNo.12 held as under: “12. A power of attorney is based on the principle of agency. By virtue of such a document an authority is given by a formal instrument i.e. by the principal to his agent to act on his behalf. It may be a general or a special attorney with a limited or an unlimited authority. The revocation of an authority has been contemplated under Section 201 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. It specifies that an agency is limited by the principal revoking his authority; or by either the principal or the agent dying. However, where the authority is given by one or more principals; it is a matter of a construction of the document itself whether on the death of one such principal, the power comes to an end or whether it is continued even thereafter. The intention of the parties to the contract, terms as contained therein and the surrounding circumstances are the deciding factors. Ex.PW-1/1 had been construed in the light of these observations and the Court below had rightly held that death of Girwar Singh did not affect the validity of Ex.PW-1/1; admittedly both RamSingh and Girwar Singh had a common and joint interest in the property in respect of which this power of attorney had been executed. The judgment reported in Janki Vashdeo Bojwani (supra) is inapplicable; contents of Ex.PW-1/1 are not under challenge; only contention is that on the death of one executant, the document dies.” 39. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Md. The judgment reported in Janki Vashdeo Bojwani (supra) is inapplicable; contents of Ex.PW-1/1 are not under challenge; only contention is that on the death of one executant, the document dies.” 39. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Md. Akbar v. State of A.P., 2002 SCC OnLine AP 1174, at paragraphNo.3 held as under: “3. The contention of the learned counsel for petitioners is that since the accused were not called upon to admit or deny the genuineness of the documents, as contemplated by S. 294(1), Cr. P.C., and since the pahanies are manipulated and since the contents of the FIR have to be proved, the accused ought to have been given an opportunity to say what they have to in respect of the pahanies and the certified copy of the FIR produced into Court. It is his contention that the word ‘fabrication’ used in the counter filed by the petitioners/accused refers to pahanies, and not to the certified copy of the Court order and that the Court below without making a reference to the pahanies and the FIRproduced by the prosecution on the basis or assumption that only a certified copy of the order of the Court was sought to be produced, decided the petition, thereby causing great injustice to the petitioners.” 40. The High Court of Karnataka in Auto Vimal Rathraj L. v. State of Karnataka, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 2549, at paragraph Nos.4 & 5 held as under: “4. The learned counsel for the petitioners while attacking the bonafides of Respondent No. 2, points out that it has been established beyond doubt that she was not the legally wedded wife of the Petitioner No. 1 and the entire proceedings initiated by her including the criminal proceedings herein were foisted with ulterior motives and therefore, the petitioners sought to be discharged. On an examination of the material on record, on the face of it, would submit that the court below having refused to look into the documents which would have clearly absolved the petitioners of any involvement of any such alleged incident, results in grave injustice and seeks to place reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rukmini Narvekar v. Vijaya Satardekar (2009 AIR SCW118) where the Apex Court has observed that it is not an absolute proposition that under no circumstances the court can look into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, though this should be done in very rate cases, i.e., where the defence produces some material which convincingly demonstrates that the whole prosecution case is totally absurd or totally concocted. The court would be justified in looking into the material produced by the defence at the time of framing of the charges, it such material convincingly establishes that the whole prosecution version is totally absurd, preposterous or concocted. Hence, the learned counsel would submit that this was an ideal case where such an exercise ought to have been carried by the trial court which would have enabled the petitioners to have been discharged. 5. The learned counsel though has made out a strong case to indicate that there is want of bona fides on the Part of Respondent No. 2, the question whether she is the legally wedded wife of the Petitioner No. 1 or not, is purely incidental. The allegation is of offences punishable under the provisions of the IPC and the focus of the court below is on the allegations made in that regard. Therefore, the court below having formed an opinion that there was adequate material to proceed with the trial and having dismissed the application seeking discharge, may not be irregular or illegal. The refusal of the court below to look into the documents produced by the accused at the time of framing of charge cannot also be said to be in violation of law. The Apex Court has only declared that it is possible that in a rare case, this exercise may also be undertaken by the trial court. That by itself may not make every single case a rare case and certainly not the present case on hand. The Apex Court has only declared that it is possible that in a rare case, this exercise may also be undertaken by the trial court. That by itself may not make every single case a rare case and certainly not the present case on hand. Therefore, the order of the court below having been tested in revision and the revisional court also having affirmed the order passed by the trial court, this court does not find any room for interference and accordingly, the petition is rejected.” 41. Framing of charge is the first major step in a criminal trial where the court is expected to apply its mind to the entire record and documents placed therewith before the court. Taking cognizance of an offence has been stated to necessitate an application of mind by the court but framing of charge is a major event where the court considers the possibility of discharging the accused of the offence with which he is charged or requiring the accused to face trial. There are different categories of cases where the court may not proceed with the trial and may discharge the accused or pass such other orders as may be necessary keeping in view the facts of a given case. In a case where, upon considering the record of the case and documents submitted before it, the court finds that no offence is made out or there is a legal bar to such prosecution under the provisions of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or any other law for the time being in force and there is a bar and there exists no ground to proceed against the accused, the court may discharge the accused. There can be cases where such record reveals the matter to be so predominantly of a civil nature that it neither leaves any scope for an element of criminality nor does it satisfy the ingredients of a criminal offence with which the accused is charged. In such cases, the court may discharge him or quash the proceedings in exercise of its powers under these two provisions. 42. Sections 420, 423, and 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ each addressing facets of fraudulent conduct in property and documentation. These provisions, now subsumed under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 , [the] BNS as Sections 318, 322, and 336 of ‘the BNS’ respectively, preserving the core principles of deception-based offences. 43. 42. Sections 420, 423, and 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ each addressing facets of fraudulent conduct in property and documentation. These provisions, now subsumed under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 , [the] BNS as Sections 318, 322, and 336 of ‘the BNS’ respectively, preserving the core principles of deception-based offences. 43. Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ deals with the offence of cheating and dishonestly inducing the delivery of property. Its application hinges on the presence of a false representation, the accused’s knowledge of its falsity, and a dishonest intention at the inception that causes the victim to part with property or valuable security. Over time, Courts have drawn a clear line between criminal culpability and mere breach of contractual obligation. Judgments such as Mahadeo Prasad v. State of W.B , 27(1954)1SCC40 ., and Hari Prasad Chamaria v. Bishun Kumar Surekha , 28(1973)2SCC823 , emphasized that criminal proceedings under Section 420 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ must rest on demonstrable fraudulent intent from the very beginning. It is repeatedly also cautioned against misuse of this provision for debt recovery or coercive settlement of civil disputes, as reiterated in V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat , 29(2009)3SCC78 , Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny , 30(2011)13SCC412 , and more recently in Ramesh Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) , 31(2023)7SCC461 , where anticipatory bail was improperly tied to financial reimbursement. 44. Section 423 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ addresses the fraudulent or dishonest execution of deeds of transfer, typically involving false statements about the consideration paid or the real beneficiary. Its historical intent was to ensure integrity in property documentation and penalize deceptive conveyance. The Courts have interpreted this section narrowly, emphasizing that liability arises only when intentional misrepresentation in the deed is established. Mere disputes over ownership or impropriety in execution are insufficient unless the act contains a fraudulent core. This section now appears as Section 322 of ‘the BNS’, wherein penalties have been made more stringent and terminological clarity improved. 45. Section 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ focuses on forgery committed with the intention to cheat. It is invoked in cases where false documents such as certificates, contracts, or financial records are deliberately created to deceive. It is trite law that for an offence under Section 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ to stand, the forged document must be proven as such, and its usage must have been intended for cheating. It is invoked in cases where false documents such as certificates, contracts, or financial records are deliberately created to deceive. It is trite law that for an offence under Section 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ to stand, the forged document must be proven as such, and its usage must have been intended for cheating. Courts have maintained its seriousness by declaring it non-bailable and non-compoundable, and it plays a critical role in safeguarding institutional and public trust. Cases involving forged property records or manipulated certificates typically fall under this provision. With the advent of ‘the BNS’, this section is now catalogued as Section 336 of ‘the BNS’, preserving its legal weight while adapting procedural aspects. 46. Together, these three sections viz., Sections 420, 423 and 468 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ form a triad of fraud-centric offences under ‘the I.P.C.,’ and now ‘the BNS’, balancing deterrence with judicial restraint. While their procedural form has evolved, the Courts in India continues to ensure that criminal law remains a tool for penalizing genuine deceit, not a weapon to enforce civil remedies. 47. Indeed, it was an admitted position that Respondent Nos.2 to 4 had never approached either Potti Vijayalakshmi or her GPA holder nor induced them to deliver any property to them or to any person. It was the case of the prosecution that Respondent Nos.2 to 4 without any authority executed registered sale deeds in favour of A.Pratap Kumar in respect of plot No.1; I.Supriya in respect of plot No.1A; Vommini Eshwar Manoj Kumar, who is none other than the son of R2, in respect of plot No.2; P.Rishitha, who is none other than the daughter-in-law ofA2, in respect of plot No.4. It is the contention of the prosecutor that except the GPA holders namely D.Lakshmi Narayana, P.Sesha Reddy and P.Badri Narayana Rao, who are General Power of Attorney holders to M/s Dwaraka Real Estate, no other persons were competent to make any sale transactions on behalf of the firm. Thus, the documents executed by Respondents were forged documents. Respondent Nos.2 to 4, being the Petitioners before the learned Trial Court admitted that they had executed registered sale deeds with the contention that the above GPA holders had no authority to deal with the property of the firm and Respondent Nos.2 to 4 only had the authority to execute the registered sale deeds. 48. Respondent Nos.2 to 4, being the Petitioners before the learned Trial Court admitted that they had executed registered sale deeds with the contention that the above GPA holders had no authority to deal with the property of the firm and Respondent Nos.2 to 4 only had the authority to execute the registered sale deeds. 48. Even the prosecution also admitted that Respondent Nos.2 to 4 had not forged the signatures of any others and they signed on the registered sale deeds claiming that they had authority to sell the property on behalf of the firm. Forging the signatures of someone is altogether different from executing sale deeds claiming that Respondent Nos.2 to 4 had the authority to enter registered sale transactions. 49. A document which is executed by Respondent Nos.2 to 4, claiming that they had the authority to execute that document by virtue of which some property was conveyed, even though they were not owners of the property, cannot be regarded as a false document, as defined under Section 464 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The vendee of the document has a duty to verify whether the vendor has got the right, title and authority to convey the property to the vendee as per Section 55 of ‘the T.P.Act’. ‘The T.P.Act’ has clearly defined the rights and liabilities of the vendor while transferring the title of an immovable property. ‘The T.P.Act’ act also clearly delineated the rights and liabilities of the vendee while buying the immovable property from the vendor, what are the precautions to be taken by the vendee and the vendor while entering any transactions of conveying immovable property. If the vendor mis-represents the vendee and transfers the property by creating certain false documents and by forging the signatures of third parties, then the vendor is liable for prosecution. However, here is a case where Respondent Nos.2 to 4 had got registered immovable properties in favour of certain third parties and their kith and kin, claiming that they had authority to transfer those properties. Here the vendees, namely Pratap Kumar, I.Supriya, Vommina Eswara Manoj Kumar and P.Rishita had not aggrieved by claiming that they were cheated by the Respondent Nos.2 and 4 and based on some forged documents the property was wrongfully conveyed to them. Here the vendees, namely Pratap Kumar, I.Supriya, Vommina Eswara Manoj Kumar and P.Rishita had not aggrieved by claiming that they were cheated by the Respondent Nos.2 and 4 and based on some forged documents the property was wrongfully conveyed to them. There is civil remedy available to the de-facto complainant or her GPA holder to seek cancellation of the sale deeds executed by the Respondent Nos.2 to 4 in favour of vendees namely Pratap Kumar, I.Supriya, Vommina Eswara Manoj Kumar and P.Rishita. 50. When such a comprehensive civil remedy alone is available, filing a criminal case, with disguised civil litigation, against Respondent Nos.2 to 4 is not at all maintainable. It was the case of the prosecution that Respondent Nos.2 to 4 had given false statements relating to the consideration in the sale deeds, therefore, they were liable for prosecution for the offence under Section 423 of ‘the I.P.C.’ 51. Learned Trial Court observed that the possession of the property pursuant to registered sale deeds, was not handed over to the purchasers therein. P.Vijayalakshmi and her GPA holder, who is the de-facto complainant, were not divested of the property, consequent to the registration of the sale deeds executed by the Respondent Nos.2 to 4. It was an admitted position that the de- facto complainant sold away the property subsequently and had not sustained any monitory loss. Therefore, allegation of the prosecution that because of execution of sale deeds the de-facto complainant sustained loss, is not acceptable and believable. It can be held that no prima facie case was made out against Respondent Nos.2 to 4 for the offence punishable under Section 423 of ‘the I.P.C.’ 52. A document is executed by a person claiming a property which is not belonging to him. He is not claiming that he is someone else nor he is claiming that he is authorised by someone else. Therefore, execution of such document, purporting to convey some property of which he is not the owner, is not execution of a false document as defined under Section 464 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ If what is executed is not a false document, there is no forgery. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ nor Section 471 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ are attracted. If there is no forgery, then neither Section 467 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ nor Section 471 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ are attracted. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under Sections 417, 418, 419 or 420 of ‘the I.P.C.’ H. CONCLUSION: 53. The learned Trial Court had rightly appreciated the facts and circumstances of the case and held that Respondent Nos.2 to 4 were not liable for prosecution for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 423 and 468 of ‘the I.P.C.’ and rightly allowed the discharge petition. There are no merits whatsoever. Hence, this Criminal Revision Case must be dismissed. 54. Accordingly, the Criminal Revision Case is dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.