ORDER : LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J. This Civil Revision Petition is filed assailing the docket order dated 24.01.2024 passed in I.A.No.771 of 2022 in A.S.S.R.No.1725 of 2022 in O.S.No.111 of 2013 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Vikarabad District. 2. Heard Sri V.Venkat Ram Narsaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri P.Shiva Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents. 3. The petitioner herein is the plaintiff, respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein are the defendant Nos.3 and 4, respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein are defendant Nos.1 and 2 in the suit. For convenience, the parties are referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court. 4. Brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed suit for declaration that he is the adoptive son of Late Narayan Reddy and that registered sale deed vide document Nos.1057 of 2013 dated 26.03.2013 and 1142 of 2013 dated 30.03.2013 are not binding on the plaintiff and also for perpetual injunction in respect of the Suit Schedule “A and B” properties. Defendant Nos.1, 3 and 4 failed to contest the suit and defendant No.2 remained ex-parte. The trial Court on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence placed on record, decreed the suit vide judgment dated 17.09.2019. 5. The defendant Nos.3 and 4 filed appeal vide A.S.S.R.No.1725 of 2022 along with an application in I.A.No.771 of 2022 for condonation of delay of 470 days in preferring the appeal. The trial Court vide impugned docket order dated 24.01.2024 condoned the delay on payment of costs of Rs.5,000/- with an observation that though there is a lapse on the part of the petitioner in not contacting the counsel to know the outcome of the suit, however considering the fact that valuable rights in immovable properties are involved, the application was allowed on heavy costs. Aggrieved by the same, revision is filed. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the trial Court without properly considering the scope and concept of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1955 and guidelines formulated by the Hon’ble Apex Court has mechanically condoned the delay in filing the appeal, despite observing that there is lapse on the part of the petitioner in pursuing the matter and contacting the counsel. He would further submit that the appellate Court allowed the application in a cryptic manner instead of passing a reasoned order. He would further submit that the appellate Court allowed the application in a cryptic manner instead of passing a reasoned order. He would further submit that petitioner/plaintiff though filed detailed counter, the same was returned and the appellate Court without considering the said aspect allowed the application. He would further submit that the reasons stated by the defendants are vague, baseless and therefore, the first appellate Court ought to have dismissed the application as the same was devoid of any merit and thus, prayed to allow the petition. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in I.A.No.1 of 2021 in/and City Civil Court Appeal No.110 of 2021 dated 27.06.2023, wherein, this Court dismissed an application filed for condonation of delay of (561) days after excluding the Covid pandemic lockdown period with an observation that petitioner therein failed to explain the reasons for condonation of delay and that the petitioners are not diligent in pursuing the matter. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents would submit that the appellate Court has rightly allowed the application since valuable rights of respondents over the immovable properties are involved. He would further submit that the respondents/ defendants have explained proper, cogent reasons for not filing the appeal within the limitation period and first appellate Court has rightly allowed the application on payment of heavy costs. He finally contended that revision is devoid of any merit and no grounds are made out to interfere with the impugned order and hence, prayed to dismiss the revision. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ Petiton (C) No.3 of 2020, wherein, it was held that covid pandemic period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded in computing the period of limitation. 10. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents relied on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Suo Motu Writ Petiton (C) No.3 of 2020, wherein, it was held that covid pandemic period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded in computing the period of limitation. 10. Perusal of record would discloses that the application filed for condonation of delay of (470) days in preferring the appeal, the defendants stated that defendant No.4 was residing in a village and was doing agriculture and defendant No.3 was residing at Hyderabad for education of his children and after the death of their mother, i.e., defendant No.1, the defendant No.4 shifted his family to Kurnool for his children education and they are not aware of passing of decree; that when the petitioner/plaintiff frequently interfered with the possession, the respondent Nos.3 and 4 made enquiries and came to know that a decree was obtained behind their back; that immediately, they filed application for obtaining certified copy of judgment and came to know that fraud has been played by the plaintiff and that plaintiff did not bring to the notice of the trial Court about the death of defendant No.1 and therefore, judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is nullity; that they approached the counsel on record and they were advised to file appeal. 11. Perusal of counter filed on behalf of petitioner/plaintiff in I.A.No.771 of 2022 in A.S.S.R.No.1721 of 2022 would disclose that plaintiff filed a memo on 03.07.2017 bringing to the notice of the trial Court about death of defendant No.1 along with death certificate and it is further mentioned that defendant No.1 expired on 22.10.2015 leaving behind plaintiff and defendant No.2, who are already on record. 12. Perusal of affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay i.e., I.A.No.771 of 2022 in A.S.S.R.No.1721 of 2022 disclose that suit was decreed on 17.09.2019, whereas the appeal along with said application was filed on 15.03.2020 and in fact, actual delay is of 1185 days. However, defendant No.3 and 4 while computing the delay excluded the covid pandemic lockdown period of 715 days and thus, shown the delay as 470 days in preferring the appeal. 13. However, defendant No.3 and 4 while computing the delay excluded the covid pandemic lockdown period of 715 days and thus, shown the delay as 470 days in preferring the appeal. 13. It is relevant to note that suit was decreed on 17.09.2019 and time limit for preferring the appeal has elapsed much prior to the Covid pandemic lockdown period i.e.,15.03.2020, therefore, the exempted period from 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 cannot be excluded while computing the delay in preferring the appeal since the benefit is applicable only where the limitation period expires during the lock down period. 14. In I.A.No.1 of 2021 in/and CCCA No.110 of 2021, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to examine the above aspect and has come to a conclusion that where the appeal period expired prior to Covid pandemic lockdown period, the delay has to be computed from the date of the order passed by the trial Court till the date of filing of the appeal after excluding ‘90’ days appeal period. 15. Admittedly, in the present case the suit was decreed on 17.09.2019 and therefore, limitation for preferring the appeal had expired much prior to Covid pandemic lockdown period and therefore, defendant Nos.3 and 4 are not justified in excluding the said period while computing the delay in filing the appeal. Therefore, the delay in preferring the appeal would come to 1185 days and not 470 days as projected by the respondent Nos.1 and 2 and this aspect was not examined by the first appellate Court while allowing I.A.No.771 of 2022 in A.S.S.R.No.1721 of 2022. It is also relevant to note that except stating that respondent Nos.1 and 2 have shifted to Hyderabad for their children education and that they are not aware of passing of decree, no other reason has been assigned for inordinate delay of 1185 days in preferring the appeal. 16. In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy , (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court summarized the principles to be applied while deciding a condonation of delay petition as under: “21.From the afore said authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 2.1 (i)There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. (ix) The conduct, behavior and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception (xiii)The State or a public body Oran entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 2.2 To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: - (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of alison merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” (emphasis supplied) 17. From the above decision, it is clear that the Court is vested with power to condone the delay in filing an appeal if sufficient cause is shown by the party and the Court has to adopt liberal approach while condoning the delay. However, said power has to be exercised only where valid reasons are shown and plausible explanation is given for condonation of delay and in case of non- satisfactorily explanation, there was deliberation, wanton delay in prosecuting lis and where reasons are vague, devoid of any merit, the discretionary power of the Court in condoning the delay could not be exercised. 18. 18. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Union of India and another v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR (SLP (Civil) No.21096 of 2019 dated 03.04.2024) , by referring the judgment of the same Court in Esha Bhattacharjee (supra), held that “delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party”. 19. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer , [ 2013 (14) SCC 81 ] , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [ (2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100 ] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [ (2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201 ] .) 12 . It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 20. From a reading of the aforesaid observations, it is clear that the Hon’ble Apex Court at paras-11 and 12 of the judgment interpreted the expression “sufficient cause” and at para-15 summarized the law with regard to the issue of limitation. 21. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another , [ (2012) 3 SCC 563 ] , Hon’ble Apex Court having considered catena of decisions, including Pundlik Jalam Patil (dead) by LRs. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another , (2008) 17 SC 448 wherein it was held that, “17……. The evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring appeals. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and “do not slumber over their rights” and observed that taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, would not be proper and observed as under:- “29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation/resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.” 22. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited , (2021) 6 SCC 460 Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under: “63. ...... In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party’s inaction, negligence or laches.” 23. In the present case, the first appellate Court has observed that respondent Nos.1 and 2 were not debarred from contacting the counsel to know the disposal of the suit and that there is also lapse on the part of the respondents in pursuing the matter, however, allowed the application on payment of costs. It is pertinent to mention that Appellate Court did not examine the aspect of actual delay that occasioned in preferring the appeal and failed to note that limitation for preferring the appeal expired much prior to Covid lockdown and therefore, lockdown exempted period is not applicable to the present case. The trial Court has also failed to note about substantial rights accrued to the other party and thus, committed error in allowing the application. 24. Therefore, in the light of above discussion and settled legal position, the impugned docket order passed by the learned first Appellate Court is unsustainable and the Revision Petition deserves to be allowed. 25. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside the impugned docket order dated 24.01.2024 in I.A.No.771 of 2022 in A.S.S.R.No.1725 of 2022 in O.S.No.111 of 2013 on the file of the Principal District Judge, Vikarabad. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed