JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 07.09.2012 passed by learned Special Judge, Kinnaur, Sessions Division at Rampur Bushahr, District Shimla, H.P., (learned Trial Court) vide which, the respondents (accusedbefore learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 18 and 20 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘NDPS Act’). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience). 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 18 and 20 of the NDPS Act. It was asserted that ASI Karam Chand (PW13), HHC Rama Nand (PW2), HC Ram Sain (PW1), HHC Roshan, Constable Surinder, and Constable Atma Ram were present at Kepu near Sainj in an official vehicle bearing registration No. HP-07A-0605,which was being driven by Constable Gopal. They were checking the vehicle bearing registration No.HP-01A-2911, when a Maruti Car bearing registration No. HP-35-0212 came from Rampur. The driver of the car tried to reverse it after seeing the police. ASI Karam Chand stopped the car at a distance of 8-10 feet. The driver revealed his name as Pratap Chand and the persons sitting beside him revealed his name as Dayal Singh. The driver could not be give any satisfactory answer for reversing the vehicle. Ram Lal (PW9) and Praveen Kumar (PW8), who were sitting in the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-01A-2911 were requested to become witnesses. The car bearing registration No. HP-35-0212 was searched in their presence and in the presence of police officials. One backpack (Ext. P2) was found near the handbrake between the driver and the passenger seat. The backpack was checked, and it was found to be containing seven transparent packets. The police checked the packets and found cannabis in the form of spheres and sticks in five packets and opium in two packets. The charas was weighed, and its total weight was found to be 6 kgs. The opium was weighed, and its total weight was found to be 550 grams. The charas was put in the five packets in the same manner in which it was recovered. The charas was weighed, and its total weight was found to be 6 kgs. The opium was weighed, and its total weight was found to be 550 grams. The charas was put in the five packets in the same manner in which it was recovered. Packets were put in the backpack, and the backpack was sealed in a cloth parcel. The opium was also put in the packets in which it was recovered. The packets were put in a cloth parcel. Each parcel was sealed with four impressions of seal ‘H’. The sample seal (Ext. PW1/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. NCB-I form (Ext. PW4/B) was filled in triplicate, and the seal was handed over to Ram Lal after the use. The case property was seized vide memo (Ext. PW1/A). Rukka (Ext. PW1/C) was prepared and sent to the Police Station where FIR (Ext. PW3/D) was registered. The investigations were conducted by ASI Karam Chand (PW13),who prepared the site plan (Ext. PW13/A) and recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version. He arrested the accused vide memo (Ext. PW1/B). He handed over the case property to ASI Surinder Pal (PW4), who re-sealed the parcel with three impressions of seal ‘S’. Specimen seal ‘S’ (Ext. PW4/A) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. Relevant Columns of the NCB-I form (Ext. PW4/B) were prepared. The seal impression was put on the NCB-I form. The resealing memo (Ext. PW4/C) was prepared. The case property was handed over to MHC Laiq Ram (PW3), who made an entry in the register of Malkhana at Sr. No. 4 (Ext. PW3/A) and deposited the case property in malkhana. He sent the case property to FSL Junga on 06.01.2012 through Constable Puran Dev (PW6) vide RC No. 70/11-12 (Ext. PW3/B). Constable Puran Dev deposited the case property at FSL, Junga and handed over the receipt to HC Laiq Ram on his return. ASI Karam Chand (PW13) prepared the special report (Ext. PW11/A) and handed it over to LC Radha Devi (PW11), Assistant Reader to SDPO, Rampur on 04.01.2012 at 4:45 pm. She placed the special report before the SDPO, Rampur, who made the endorsement on the special report and returned it to her. She made an entry at Sr. No. 92 (Ext. PW11/B) in the special report register and retained the special report on record. ASI-Karam Chand obtained the screen report (Ext. She placed the special report before the SDPO, Rampur, who made the endorsement on the special report and returned it to her. She made an entry at Sr. No. 92 (Ext. PW11/B) in the special report register and retained the special report on record. ASI-Karam Chand obtained the screen report (Ext. PW10/A) from the Registration and Licensing Authority, Ani. The result of analysis (Ext. PW3/C) was issued in which it was shown that the exhibit marked in the laboratory as ‘A’ and stated as charas was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas which contained 15.13% w/w resin in it. The exhibit marked in the laboratory as ‘B’ and stated to be opium was a sample of opium which contained 1.53% w/w morphine in it. The statements of the remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Special Judge. 3. Learned Special Judge charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 18 and 20 of the NDPS Act. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. HC Ram Sain (PW1) and HHC Rama Nand (PW2) are the official witnesses to the recovery. HC Laiq Ram (PW3) was working as MHC, with whom the case property was deposited. ASI Surender Pal (PW4) was working as SHO, who re-sealed the parcel. Constable Hukam Chand (PW5) proved the entry in the daily diary. Constable Puran Dev (PW6) carried the case property to FSL, Junga. Constable Bansi Lal (PW7) brought the case property and the result of analysis from FSL Junga. Praveen Kumar (PW8) and Ram Lal (PW9) are the independent witnesses to the recovery who did not support the prosecution case. Baldev Raj (PW10) proved the screen report of the vehicle. LC Radha Devi (PW11) was posted as Assistant Reader, who presented the special report before SDPO, Rampur. SI Ram Phal (PW12) prepared the challan. ASI Karam Chand (PW13) effected the recovery and conducted the investigation. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They claimed that a false case was made against them. The statements of Lachhi Ram (DW1) and Dhirender Kumar (DW2) were recorded in defence. 6. ASI Karam Chand (PW13) effected the recovery and conducted the investigation. 5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution case in its entirety. They claimed that a false case was made against them. The statements of Lachhi Ram (DW1) and Dhirender Kumar (DW2) were recorded in defence. 6. The learned Trial Court held that the independent witnesses did not support the prosecution case regarding the recovery. The explanation provided by them that they had put their signatures in the police station at the instance of the police appeared to be plausible. ASI Karam Chand (PW13) stated that the backpack was kept on the handbrake. It was highly improbable because the accused would have concealed the backpack at a place from where it could not be easily recovered. Keeping the backpack on the handbrake was also not probable because the handbrake is frequently used while driving a vehicle on hilly terrain. There were various contradictions in the testimonies of the police officials, which affected their testimonies regarding the recovery. The accused, Pratap Chand, was found in possession of Rs. 250 rupees, and Dayal Singh was found in possession of Rs.11/-. They were travelling to Parwanoo and would not have travelled with such a low amount. They did not have the documents of the vehicle, which is also improbable because they had to cross many police posts on the way. The accused did not have any personal belongings with them, which makes the prosecution case regarding the accused travelling to Parwanoo highly doubtful. The integrity of the case property was not established. The entry in the malkhana register does not show that seal ‘S’ was put on the parcel deposited in the malkhana. As per the prosecution, the police party left the spot at 11:15 pm, but Surender Pal (PW4) stated that the case property was produced before him at 11:15 pm, which is impossible because the distance between the spot and the police station was about 30 kilometres. The witnesses gave different descriptions of the spot, which made the presence of the police official on the spot highly suspect. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt;therefore, the accused were acquitted. 7. The witnesses gave different descriptions of the spot, which made the presence of the police official on the spot highly suspect. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt;therefore, the accused were acquitted. 7. Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court appreciated the evidence in a slipshod and perfunctory manner. The evidence was not appreciated in its proper perspective. Unrealistic standards were set to evaluate direct and cogent prosecution evidence. The reasoning of the learned Trial Court was manifestly unreasonable and unsustainable. No reason was assigned by the accused as to why they should have been falsely implicated. A huge quantity of 6 kgs of charas and 550 grams of opium could not have been planted by the police. The official witnesses cannot narrate a parrot-like version, and minor contradictions are bound to come. The independent witnesses were joined by the police officials, and failure to join the independent persons from the vicinity would not affect the prosecution case; therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. We have heard Mr I.N. Mehta, learned Senior Additional Advocate General with Ms Sharmila Patial, learned Additional Advocate General and Mr Raj Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. Anubhav Chopra, learned counsel for the respondents-accused. 9. Mr. I.N. Mehta, learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The minor contradictions were bound to come with time. The police could not have planted a huge quantity of charas and opium upon the accused. The learned Trial Court relied upon minor contradictions to discard the prosecution case. The contradictions were bound to come with time; therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr. Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-accused, supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. He submitted that the presence of the police officials on the spot is highly suspect. The integrity of the case property was not established, and learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. 10. Mr. Ajay Kochhar, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent-accused, supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. He submitted that the presence of the police officials on the spot is highly suspect. The integrity of the case property was not established, and learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused. This Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal;hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. We have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 3 SCC 544 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 130 that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the High Court should see whether the evidence was properly appreciated on record or not; second whether the finding of the Court is illegal or affected by the error of law or fact and thirdly; whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a possible view, which could have been taken based on the material on record. The Court will not lightly interfere with the judgment of acquittal. It was observed: “25. We may first discuss the position of law regarding the scope of intervention in a criminal appeal. For that is the foundation of this challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused unless proven guilty. The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretised when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the trial court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened, and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal. 26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal, and there is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition on the High Court to reappreciate or re-visit the evidence on record. 26. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal, and there is no quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate powers, there is no inhibition on the High Court to reappreciate or re-visit the evidence on record. However, the power of the High Court to reappreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order under challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost question to be asked is whether the trial court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence. The second point for consideration is whether the finding of the trial court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact. If not, the third consideration is whether the view taken by the trial court is a fairly possible view. A decision of acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere difference of opinion. What is required is an illegality or perversity. 27. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a criminal case is not an extraordinary phenomenon. The “two-views theory” has been judicially recognised by the courts, and it comes into play when the appreciation of evidence results in two equally plausible views. However, the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of the innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it reinforces the presumption of innocence. Therefore, when two views are possible, following the one in favour of the innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the trial court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eye of the law. 28. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 230 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19: (SCC pp. 236-237, para 13) “13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on an appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view, the view taken by the trial court was a possible one. 28. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 230 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 19: (SCC pp. 236-237, para 13) “13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on an appraisal of the evidence, in our considered view, the view taken by the trial court was a possible one. Thus, the High Court should not have interfered with the judgment of acquittal. This Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2002) 9 SCC 639 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494 has laid down that as the appreciation of evidence made by the trial court while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view, it is not permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High Court while reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by this Court, thus: (SCC p. 643, para 9) ‘9. … We are constrained to observe that the High Court was dealing with an appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal with various grounds on which acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds. It has not done so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeal against acquittal have been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set aside. The view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable view, and even if by any stretch of the imagination, it could be said that another view was possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of acquittal.” 29. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P., (2022) 6 SCC 294 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 522, the Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed the relevant decisions and summarised the approach of the appellate court while deciding an appeal from the order of acquittal. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297, para 7) “7. It is well settled that: 7.1. In Sanjeev v. State of H.P., (2022) 6 SCC 294 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 522, the Hon'ble Supreme Court analysed the relevant decisions and summarised the approach of the appellate court while deciding an appeal from the order of acquittal. It observed thus: (SCC p. 297, para 7) “7. It is well settled that: 7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with in case the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial court deserves to be upturned (See Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586 and Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 395). 7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced (See Atley v. State of U.P., 1955 SCC OnLine SC 51 : AIR 1955 SC 807 ). 7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal (See Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320).” 13. This position was reiterated in Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 9 SCC 169 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2581, wherein it was observed at page 175: “20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325, regarding the power of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus: (SCC p. 432, para 42) “42. … (1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law. (3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, (1977) 2 SCC 205 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 308, a three-judge Bench of this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the trial court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses, and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly finds it well-nigh impossible for the trial court to reject their testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. This was identified as the quintessence of the jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. PW13-ASI Karam Chand stated that he and other police officials were present at Kepu in a government vehicle. He stated in his cross-examination that he had signed the log book of the vehicle after the driver had filled it. He was not aware that cuttings were made regarding the timings in the log book. 16. A copy of the logbook was produced by Lachhi Ram (DW1). He stated in his examination-in-chief that there were cuttings in the original log book as were visible in the photocopy (Ext. DW1/A). The date 06.01.2012 was corrected on the second page. 17. A perusal of the photocopy of the logbook (Ext. DW1/A) shows that the time 10:30 am and 11:15 pm have been clearly overwritten. The distance travelled in the vehicle is shown to be 51 kilometres, and the route is shown as Police Station Kumarsain to Kingal to Sainj and Police Station Kumarsain. FIR (Ext. PW3/D) shows the distance between the police station and Kepu near Sainj as 30 kilometres. Hence, the vehicle should have travelled 60 kilometres and not 51 kilometres. The rukka shows the distance as 22 kilometres, in which situation the vehicle would have travelled 44 kilometres and not 51 kilometres. This entry was recorded after the registration of the FIR because the reason for travelling has been mentioned as in connection with traffic checking, patrolling and case FIR No. 4/12 dated 03.01.2012 under Sections 18 and 20 of NDPS Act. The FIR was registered at 7:45 pm;therefore, there was no justification for overwriting in the log book. This is the first aspect which makes the prosecution case suspect. 18. ASI-Karam Chand (PW13) stated in his cross- examination that there was a motor workshop on the river side of the road and a milk plant on the front side of the road. He did not remember that there were many residential houses at the place of the incident. HC Ram Sain (PW1) stated in his cross- examination that there was a motor workshop and some other shops. There were residential houses, a dhaba and a milk plant on the hillside of National Highway 22 in a radius of about 40- 45 meters on the spot. HC Ram Sain (PW1) stated in his cross- examination that there was a motor workshop and some other shops. There were residential houses, a dhaba and a milk plant on the hillside of National Highway 22 in a radius of about 40- 45 meters on the spot. HHC Rama Nand (PW2), on the other hand, stated that there was no workshop, residential houses, dhabaor milk plant on the riverside. The site plan (Ext. PW13/A) does not show any milk plant, dhaba or residential houses near the place of the incident. It only shows the workshop. Therefore, the witnesses have deposed inconsistently regarding the buildings existing near the place of the incident. 19. HHC Rama Nand (PW2) stated in his cross- examination that they left the spot at 11:15 pm. He categorically stated that he handed over the case file to the Investigating Officer at 10:20 pm. IO updated the police diary and recorded his statement between 10:20 pm and 11:15 pm. ASI Surinder Pal (PW4) stated that the case property was produced before him by ASI Karam Chand at 11:15 pm. This was simply not possible. ASI Karam Chand could not be present at the spot and at the police station at the same time. This casts doubt regarding the prosecution case. 20. A perusal of the malkhana register (Ext. PW3/A) shows that there is overwriting in the name of ASI Surender Pal. HC Liaq Ram (PW3) denied that he had made an interpolation by changing the name of ASI Karam Chand to ASI Surender Pal; however, it is apparent that the name of ASI Surender Pal has been overwritten. Thus, there is no explanation for the same. The overwriting assumes significance because ASI Karam Chand could not have been present on the spot and at the police station simultaneously. Further, the entry in the malkhana register does not show that the parcel was resealed with seal ‘S’; hence, it is highly doubtful that the parcels were deposited in the malkhana by ASI Surender Pal, and that is why the entry had to be interpolated. 21. HHC-Rama Nand (PW2) carried the rukka from the spot to the police station. He stated in his cross-examination that he reached the police station at 7:30 pm and thereafter at the spot at 8:30 pm. 21. HHC-Rama Nand (PW2) carried the rukka from the spot to the police station. He stated in his cross-examination that he reached the police station at 7:30 pm and thereafter at the spot at 8:30 pm. This is contrary to the statement of HC Liaq Ram (PW3), who stated that he had handed over the case file to HHC Rama Nand at 8:30 pm after the registration of the FIR and entry regarding the departure was also recorded. This shows that HHC Rama Nand could not have been present on the spot at8:30 pm. 22. Praveen (PW8) and Ram Lal (PW9) did not support the prosecution case. They were cross-examined by the learned Public Prosecutor, but there is nothing in their cross- examination to doubt their testimonies. They explained that they were members of the Public Road Safety Unit of police station Kumarsain, and their signatures were obtained regarding some work related to road safety. This explanation was found to be plausible by the learned Trial Court, which finding cannot be said to be perverse. 23. Dhirender Kumar (DW2) stated that he was running a workshop in the name and style of Bhagwati Motors. A Maruti car bearing registration No.212 was brought to his shop on the 3 rd or 4 th of January 2012 for repair,which was being driven by Pratap. A noise was heard on NH22 at a distance of 20-30 meters from his workshop. He went to the spot and saw one person running away and policemen chasing him. The police returned without catching the person. He saw the vehicle bearing registration No. 2556 being driven by the son of Chaman Lal. The police did not have any official vehicle and returned in the vehicle at 5:56 with Pratap Chand. They took the vehicle No.212 with them. He had not seen any backpack or vehicle No.2911 on the spot. 24. The presence of the workshop on the spot is not disputed, and the presence of Dhirender Kumar on the spot is also established. It was suggested to ASI Karam Chand that two persons had fled away from vehicle No.2556 and Kuku, driver of the vehicle, disclosed that the persons fleeing from the vehicle were Jebi Ram and Raju. He admitted that he had visited the house of Jebi Ram. It was suggested to ASI Karam Chand that two persons had fled away from vehicle No.2556 and Kuku, driver of the vehicle, disclosed that the persons fleeing from the vehicle were Jebi Ram and Raju. He admitted that he had visited the house of Jebi Ram. He admitted that he was told that Raju belonged to Bagipul in Tehsil Nirmand, and he had visited Bagipul in this connection. He has not given any reason for visiting the house of Jebi Ram or Bagipul, where the accused,Raju, resides. If he had apprehended accused Pratap Chand and Dayal Singh on the spot, he had no justification for visiting the houses of Jebi Rama and Raju. This shows that the statement of Dhirender Kumar (DW2) has a semblance of truth and learned Trial Court was justified in discarding the prosecution case based on his testimony. 25. The learned Trial Court had rightly observed that the absence of any personal belongings or documents of the vehicle and Pratap Chand, having Rs.250/- and Dayal Singh, having Rs.11/- falsified the prosecution case that the accused were transporting the charas to Parwanno. Learned Trial Court was justified in observing that a long distance between Sainj and Parwanno could not have been travelled with such a meagre amount. The accused would have required the personal belongings to stay someplace since they could not cover the distance from Sainj to Parwanoo and back on the same day. This shows that the prosecution witnesses have not disclosed the complete truth before the Court. 26. It was submitted that minor contradictions are bound to come with time, and the prosecution case could not have been brushed aside due to the contradictions in the statements. This submission would have been acceptable had there been a long gap between the recovery and the date of the deposition. The recovery was effected on 03.01.2012, whereas the statements were recorded on 13.07.2012 within six months. The statement of ASI Karam Chand was recorded on 04.08.2012 within the gap of seven months; therefore, much time had not elapsed between the date of the incident and the date of deposition to justify the discrepancies in the testimonies of the official witnesses. The recovery was effected on 03.01.2012, whereas the statements were recorded on 13.07.2012 within six months. The statement of ASI Karam Chand was recorded on 04.08.2012 within the gap of seven months; therefore, much time had not elapsed between the date of the incident and the date of deposition to justify the discrepancies in the testimonies of the official witnesses. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Krishnan v. State, (2003) 7 SCC 56 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1577 : 2003 SCC OnLine SC 756 that the evidence of the prosecution must be tested for its inherent consistency: consistency with the account of other witnesses and consistency with undisputed facts. It was observed: “21. …. Witnesses, as Bentham said, are the eyes and ears of justice. Hence, the importance and primacy of the quality of the trial process. Eyewitnesses' accounts would require a careful, independent assessment and evaluation for its credibility, which should not be adversely prejudged, making any other evidence, including the medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be creditworthy; consistency with the undisputed facts, the “credit” of the witnesses; their performance in the witness box; their power of observation etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” 27. It was held in David Piper vs. Mark Hales, 2013 EWHC B1 (QB) that the Court has to see whether the statement of the witness is consistent or not. It was observed: - 34. The guidance about how courts approach this is given in the extra-judicial writing of the late Lord Bingham of Cornhill, approved by the courts is apposite. In "The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual Issues", published in "The Business of Judging", Oxford 2000, reprinted from Current Legal Problems, vol 38, 1985 p 1-27, he wrote: ". . . Faced with a conflict of evidence on an issue substantially affecting the outcome of an action, often knowing that a decision this way or that will have momentous consequences on the parties' lives or fortunes, how can and should the judge set about his task of resolving it? . . Faced with a conflict of evidence on an issue substantially affecting the outcome of an action, often knowing that a decision this way or that will have momentous consequences on the parties' lives or fortunes, how can and should the judge set about his task of resolving it? How is he to resolve which witness is honest and which dishonest, which reliable and which unreliable? The normal first step in resolving issues of primary fact is, I feel sure, to add to what is common ground between the parties (which the pleadings in the action should have identified but often do not) such facts as are shown to be incontrovertible. In many cases, letters or minutes written well before there was any breath of dispute between the parties may throw a very clear light on their knowledge and intentions at a particular time. In other cases, evidence of tyre marks, debris or where vehicles ended up may be crucial. To attach importance to matters such as these, which are independent of human recollection, is so obvious and standard a practice, and in some cases so inevitable, that no prolonged discussion is called for. It is nonetheless worth bearing in mind, when vexatious conflicts of oral testimony arise, that these fall to be judged against the background not only of what the parties agree to have happened but also of what plainly did happen, even though the parties do not agree. The most compendious statement known to me of the judicial process involved in assessing the credibility of an oral witness is to be found in the dissenting speech of Lord Pearce in the House of Lords in Onassis v. Vergottis, [1968] 2 Lloyds Rep 403 at p 431. In this, he touches on so many of the matters which I wish to mention that I may perhaps be forgiven for citing the relevant passage in full: ''Credibility' involves wider problems than mere 'demeanour', which is mostly concerned with whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he now believes it to be. Credibility covers the following problems. First, is the witness a truthful or untruthful person? Secondly, is he, though a truthful person, telling something less than the truth on this issue, or though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue? Credibility covers the following problems. First, is the witness a truthful or untruthful person? Secondly, is he, though a truthful person, telling something less than the truth on this issue, or though an untruthful person, telling the truth on this issue? Thirdly, though he is a truthful person telling the truth as he sees it, did he register the intentions of the conversation correctly and if so, has his memory correctly retained them? Also, has his recollection been subsequently altered by unconscious bias or wishful thinking or by too much discussion of it with others? Witnesses, especially those who are emotional and who think that they are morally in the right, tend very easily and unconsciously to conjure up a legal right that did not exist. It is a truism, often used in accident cases, that with every day that passes, the memory becomes fainter, and the imagination becomes more active. For that reason, a witness, however honest, rarely persuades a Judge that his present recollection is preferable to that which was taken down in writing immediately after the accident occurred. Therefore, contemporary documents are always of the utmost importance. And lastly, although the honest witness believes he heard or saw this or that, is it so improbable that it is on balance more likely that he was mistaken? On this point, it is essential that the balance of probability is put correctly into the scales in weighing the credibility of a witness. And motive is one aspect of probability. All these problems compendiously are entailed when a Judge assesses the credibility of a witness; they are all part of one judicial process. And in the process, contemporary documents and admitted or incontrovertible facts and probabilities must play their proper part." Every judge is familiar with cases in which the conflict between the accounts of different witnesses is so gross as to be inexplicable save on the basis that one or some of the witnesses are deliberately giving evidence which they know to be untrue . . .. more often dishonest evidence is likely to be prompted by the hope of gain, the desire to avert blame or criticism, or misplaced loyalty to one or other of the parties. . .. more often dishonest evidence is likely to be prompted by the hope of gain, the desire to avert blame or criticism, or misplaced loyalty to one or other of the parties. The main tests needed to determine whether a witness is lying or not are, I think, the following, although their relative importance will vary widely from case to case: (1) the consistency of the witness's evidence with what is agreed, or clearly shown by other evidence, to have occurred; (2) the internal consistency of the witness's evidence; (3) consistency with what the witness has said or deposed on other occasions; (4) the credit of the witness in relation to matters not germane to the litigation; (5) the demeanour of the witness. The first three of these tests may, in general, be regarded as giving a useful pointer to where the truth lies. If a witness's evidence conflicts with what is clearly shown to have occurred or is internally self-contradictory, or conflicts with what the witness has previously said, it may usually be regarded as suspect. It may only be unreliable and not dishonest, but the nature of the case may effectively rule out that possibility. The fourth test is perhaps more arguable. . . ." 35. The following guidance of Lord Goff in Grace Shipping v. Sharp & Co. [1987] 1 Lloyd's Law Rep. 207 at 215-6 is also helpful. "And it is not to be forgotten that, in the present case, the Judge was faced with the task of assessing the evidence of witnesses about telephone conversations which had taken place over five years before. In such a case, memories may very well be unreliable, and it is of crucial importance for the Judge to have regard to the contemporary documents and the overall probabilities. In this connection, their Lordships wish to endorse a passage from a judgment of one of their number in Armagas Ltd.v. Mundogas S.A. (The Ocean Frost), [1985] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 1, when he said at p. 57: - "Speaking from my own experience, I have found it essential in cases of fraud, when considering the credibility of witnesses, always to test their veracity by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, in particular by reference to the documents in the case, and also to pay particular regard to their motives and the overall probabilities. It is frequently very difficult to tell whether a witness is telling the truth or not, and where there is a conflict of evidence, such as there was in the present case, reference to the objective facts and documents, to the witnesses' motives, and the overall probabilities, can be of very great assistance to a Judge in ascertaining the truth." [emphases added]. That observation is, in their Lordships' opinion, equally apposite in a case where the evidence of the witnesses is likely to be unreliable, and it is to be remembered that in commercial cases, such as the present, there is usually a substantial body of contemporary documentary evidence." In that context, he was impressed by a witness described in the following terms. "Although, like the other main witnesses, his evidence was a mixture of reconstruction and original recollection, he took considerable trouble to distinguish precisely between the two, to an extent which I found convincing and reliable." That is so important and so infrequently done." 36. This approach to fact-finding was amplified recently by Lady Justice Arden in the Court of Appeal in Wetton (as Liquidator of Mumtaz Properties) v. Ahmed and others, [2011] EWCA Civ 610, in paragraphs 11, 12 & 14: 11. By the end of the judgment, it is clear that what impressed the judge most in his task of fact- finding was the absence, rather than the presence, of contemporary documentation or other independent oral evidence to confirm the oral evidence of the respondents to the proceedings. 12. There are many situations in which the court is asked to assess the credibility of witnesses from their oral evidence, that is to say, to weigh up their evidence to see whether it is reliable. Witness choice is an essential part of the function of a trial judge, and he or she has to decide whose evidence and how much evidence to accept. This task is not to be carried out merely by reference to the impression that a witness made by giving evidence in the witness box. It is not solely a matter of body language or the tone of voice or other factors that might generally be called the 'demeanour' of a witness. The judge should consider what other independent evidence would be available to support the witness. It is not solely a matter of body language or the tone of voice or other factors that might generally be called the 'demeanour' of a witness. The judge should consider what other independent evidence would be available to support the witness. Such evidence would generally be documentary, but it could be other oral evidence, for example, if the issue was whether a defendant was an employee, the judge would naturally consider whether there were any PAYE records or evidence, such as evidence in texts or e-mails, in which the defendant seeks or is given instructions as to how he should carry out work. This may be particularly important in cases where the witness is from a culture or way of life with which the judge may not be familiar. These situations can present particular dangers and difficulties to a judge. 14. In my judgment, contemporaneous written documentation is of the very greatest importance in assessing credibility. Moreover, it can be significant not only where it is present, and the oral evidence can then be checked against it. It can also be significant if written documentation is absent. For instance, if the judge is satisfied that certain contemporaneous documentation is likely to have existed were the oral evidence correct and that the party adducing oral evidence is responsible for its non-production, then the documentation may be conspicuous by its absence, and the judge may be able to draw inferences from its absence. 37. Contemporaneity, consistency, probability and motive are key criteria and more important than demeanour, which can be distorted through the prism of prejudice: how witnesses present themselves in a cramped witness box surrounded for the first time with multiple files can be distorted, particularly elderly ones being asked to remember minute details of what happened and what was said, and unrecorded, nearly 4 years later as here. Lengthy witness statements prepared by the parties' lawyers long after the events also distort the accurate picture even though they are meant to assist the court.” 28. In the present case, the discrepancies related to the place of the incident, the manner in which the accused were apprehended, and the recovery. They cannot be called minor and learned Trial Court was justified in rejecting the prosecution’s case due to the discrepancies. 29. It was specifically stated in the rukka (Ext. In the present case, the discrepancies related to the place of the incident, the manner in which the accused were apprehended, and the recovery. They cannot be called minor and learned Trial Court was justified in rejecting the prosecution’s case due to the discrepancies. 29. It was specifically stated in the rukka (Ext. PW1/C) as well as the statement on oath that the Police recovered seven transparent plastic packets, out of whom five contained cannabis and two contained opium. The case property was opened in the Court during the examination of HC Ram Sain (PW1). It was mentioned by the learned Trial Court that the outer parcel cover (Ext. P1), Pithu bag (Ext. P2), Charas (Ext.P3), Outer parcel cover (Ext.P4), transparent plastic envelope (Ext. P5) and opium (Ext. P6) were produced before the Court. Thus, it is apparent that only one plastic envelope (Ext. P5) was produced before the Court. 30. The report of analysis (Ext. PW3/C) also does not mention the contents of the parcels marked as ‘A’ and ‘B’; therefore, it cannot be said that the packets were misplaced in the laboratory during the analysis. Even if it was so, the burden was upon the prosecution to lead the evidence to this effect, and in the absence of any evidence, the reduction in the number of transparent packets in the Court will lead to an inference that the integrity of the case property was compromised. 31. This is also apparent from the fact that as per the entry (Ext. PW3/A) recorded by HC Liaq Ram (PW3), one packet bearing four seals of seal ‘H’ stated to contain charas, one packet sealed with four seals of seal ‘H’ stated to contain opium were deposited with him. He specifically stated in his cross- examination that there was no mention of the number of re-seals in the entry (Exhibit PW3/A). The report of analysis mentions that the packets were sealed with four impressions of seal ‘H’ and three impressions of seal ‘S’. However, the Court observed while recording the statement of HC Ram Sain (PW1) that the parcel was sealed with six seals of FSL and four seals of seal ‘H’. The other parcel was sealed with seal impression of FSL and ‘H’. The Court did not observe that the parcels produced before it had impressions of seal ‘S’. However, the Court observed while recording the statement of HC Ram Sain (PW1) that the parcel was sealed with six seals of FSL and four seals of seal ‘H’. The other parcel was sealed with seal impression of FSL and ‘H’. The Court did not observe that the parcels produced before it had impressions of seal ‘S’. This shows that the parcel which was deposited with the MHC had four seals of seal ‘H’, and when it was produced before the Court, it had four seals of seal ‘H’; however, the report of analysis mentions that parcel also had three seals of seal ‘S’; hence, the parcel deposited with the MHC and produced before the Court is not connected to the parcel analysed in the laboratory because the parcels deposited with MHC and produced in the Court did not bear the seal impression ‘S’ whereas the parcels analysed in the laboratory bore the seal impression ‘S’. 32. It has been stated in Analysis of Evidence (Second edition Terence Anderson, David Schum, and William Twining Cambridge University Press) that before the reliance can be placed on the tangible evidence; the link evidence has to be led to establish that there was no tampering with the same. It has been stated on page 64: “There are three major sources of ancillary evidence that may call into question the authenticity of tangible evidence. The first involves evidence that has been deliberately contrived to mislead others, such as a forged document. Errors in recording, transmitting, or processing evidence are the second source. Tangible evidence may pass through many hands before it is offered at trial. The opportunities for processing or handling errors of various kinds increase with the number of hands a tangible item passes through. Blood samples may be mislabeled or even substituted one for another. That is the reason for the requirement that there should be evidence establishing the chain of custody from the time the evidence was discovered (the bloody glove) or generated (an entry into a business record) until the time the evidence is presented at trial. If we do not know all of the links in a chain of custody, we cannot vouch for the authenticity of a tangible item. Finally, the witness whose testimony is offered to establish the authenticity of an item may be mistaken or untruthful.” (Emphasis supplied) 33. If we do not know all of the links in a chain of custody, we cannot vouch for the authenticity of a tangible item. Finally, the witness whose testimony is offered to establish the authenticity of an item may be mistaken or untruthful.” (Emphasis supplied) 33. A similar view was taken by Division Bench of this Court in Sansar Chand Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2023 HHC 10188-DB, wherein one of us (Justice Tarlok Singh Chbauhan,J) observed as under : 15. In State of Rajasthan vs. Daulat Ram, AIR 1980 (SC) 1314 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that when sample changed several hands, the entire chain needs to be established with utmost clarity. 16. In Valsala vs. State of Kerala, 1993 Supp. 3 SCC 665, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the prosecution was required to establish that during the entire period, when samples were lying with the prosecution, it were lying with whom and whether it were in safe custody. The Officer in-Charge was required to be examined. The safe custody of samples for the entire duration was required to be established. 17. In State of Gujarat vs. Ismail U. Haji Patel, 2003 (12) SCC 291 emphasized that in a prosecution relating to the NDPS Act, the question as to how and where the samples had been stored or as to when they had been dispatched or received in the laboratory is a matter of great importance and a noncompliance thereof could also result in the trial being vitiated. It shall be apt to reproduce the relevant observations as contained in paras 5 and 6 of the judgment, which read as under:- “5. We find that there was really no material brought on record to show as to where the seized articles were kept. The High Court after analysing the evidence on record came to hold that the identity of the articles sent for analysis was not established and it was not established that the articles seized were in fact sent for chemical examination. In view of the judgment of this Court in Valsala v. State of Kerala the view of the High Court is in order. It is not the delay in sending the samples which is material. In view of the judgment of this Court in Valsala v. State of Kerala the view of the High Court is in order. It is not the delay in sending the samples which is material. What has to be established is that the seized articles were in proper custody, in proper and the samples sent to the Chemical Analyst related to the seized articles form. 6. Further, there was nothing brought on record to show as to under f whose directions the samples were sent for chemical examination. The High Court relied on Section 55 of the Act to hold that the absence of such information also vitiates the proceedings. Section 55 of the Act provides that the officer in charge of the police station has to take charge of and keep in safe custody the seized articles pending orders of the Magistrate. Since there is no material to show that there was any order of the Magistrate as to where g the seized articles were to be kept, and there was no material to show that there was safe custody as is required under Section 55 of the Act, the view of the High Court is in order. Judgment of the High Court does not warrant any interference in our hands and the appeal is dismissed”. 18. In State of Rajasthan vs. Gurmail Singh, 2005 (3) SCC 59 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court found the link evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution to be unsatisfactory and on the basis of such evidence was pleased to uphold the acquittal. 19. The issue of safe custody of contraband goods assumes significant and seminal importance has been appropriately dealt in State of Rajasthan vs. Tara Singh, 2011 (11) SCC 559 , where the Hon’ble Supreme Court succinctly observed as under:- “6. We must emphasize that in a prosecution to the Act the question as to how and where the samples had been stored or as to when they had despatched or received in the laboratory is a matter of great importance on account of the huge penalty involved in these matters. The High Court was, therefore, in our view, fully justified in holding that the sanctity of the samples had been compromised which cast a doubt on the prosecution story. We, accordingly, feel that the judgment of the High Court on the second aspect calls for no interference. The High Court was, therefore, in our view, fully justified in holding that the sanctity of the samples had been compromised which cast a doubt on the prosecution story. We, accordingly, feel that the judgment of the High Court on the second aspect calls for no interference. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. The respondent is on bail. His bail bonds stand discharged.” 20. In State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Hansraj alias Hansu, (2018) 18 SCC 355 , it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there is delay in producing the samples of the contraband substance in the court and when the evidence is that the same were kept in the police station, the prosecution has to adduce evidence to show that as to how and in what condition, samples were preserved at the police station. 21. In Vijay Pandey vs. State of U.P., 2019 (SC) 3569, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that mere production of a laboratory report that the sample tested from contraband substance cannot be a conclusive proof by itself and that the sample seized and one tested have to be correlated. It shall be apt to reproduce relevant observations as contained in paras 8 and 9 of the judgment, which read as under:- “8. The failure of the prosecution in the present case to relate the seized sample with that seized from the appellant makes the case no different from failure to produce the seized sample itself. In the circumstances the mere production of a laboratory report that the sample tested was narcotics cannot be conclusive proof by itself. The sample seized and that tested have to be corelated. The observations in Vijay Jain vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 14 SCC 527 , as follows are considered relevant : “10. In the circumstances the mere production of a laboratory report that the sample tested was narcotics cannot be conclusive proof by itself. The sample seized and that tested have to be corelated. The observations in Vijay Jain vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2013) 14 SCC 527 , as follows are considered relevant : “10. On the other hand, on a reading of this Court's judgment in Jitendra's case, we find that this Court has taken a view that in the trial for an offence under the NDPS Act, it was necessary for the prosecution to establish by cogent evidence that the alleged quantities of the contraband goods were seized from the possession of the accused and the best evidence to prove this fact is to produce during the trial, the seized materials as material objects and where the contraband materials alleged to have been seized are not produced and there is no explanation for the failure to produce the contraband materials by the prosecution, mere oral evidence that the materials were seized from the accused would not be sufficient to make out an offence under the NDPS Act particularly when the panch witnesses have turned hostile. Again, in the case of Ashok (supra), this Court found that the alleged narcotic powder seized from the possession of the accused was not produced before the trial court as material exhibit and there was no explanation for its nonproduction and this Court held that there was therefore no evidence to connect the forensic report with the substance that was seized from the possession of the appellant.” 9. In Ashok alias Dangra Jaiswal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2011) 5 SCC 123 , it was observed: “12. Last but not the least, the alleged narcotic powder seized from the possession of the accused, including the appellant was never produced before the trial court as a material exhibit and once again there is no explanation for its nonproduction. There is, thus, no evidence to connect the forensic report with the substance that was seized from the possession of the appellant or the other accused.” 34. Thus, it is essential to prove the integrity of the case property before reliance can be placed upon it. In the present case, the integrity of the case property has not been established and the learned Trial Court was justified in rejecting the report of analysis. 35. Thus, it is essential to prove the integrity of the case property before reliance can be placed upon it. In the present case, the integrity of the case property has not been established and the learned Trial Court was justified in rejecting the report of analysis. 35. Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 36. Hence, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed. 37. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the respondents/accused are directed to furnish their personal bonds in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused, on receipt of notice(s) thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 38. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand(s) disposed of.