ORDER : 1. The appellant before us is the landlord. Respondent No. 1 is the tenant and respondent No. 2 is the erstwhile landlord. 2. On an earlier occasion, an application was filed by the predecessor-in-title of the respondent No.1 for fixation of the standard rent on the file of the Additional Small Causes Court, Surat in HRP Application No.600 of 1976. An order was passed with the consent of the parties, fixing the standard rent at Rs.50/- per month in HRP Application No.600/1976, on 01.07.1976, which has already attained finality inter-se the parties. 3. Respondent No.1, being the tenant who consented to the fixation of standard rent at Rs.50/- per month in the aforesaid order, defaulted in the payment of rent from 01.06.1982. 4. Accordingly, a legal notice was issued to respondent No.1 on 09.12.1983 by the erstwhile landlord, while acknowledging the fact that the default in the payment of rent was only from 01.06.1982 and, therefore, he was duly complying with the payment of rent at Rs.50/- per month as agreed upon since 1976, until then. 5. Strangely, for the very first time, the respondent No.1 disputed the standard rent of Rs.50/-per month in his reply to the legal notice on 24.12.1983. However, as mandated under Explanation I to Section 12 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), appropriate application was not filed by respondent No.1 before the Court for the fixation of the standard rent after the issuance of the legal notice. 6. Under those circumstances, the erstwhile landlord, namely, respondent No.2 filed a suit for eviction bearing Suit No.98/1984. The Trial Court passed a decree for eviction inter alia holding that there was no compliance of the statutory mandate, in view of the denial made by respondent No.1 in the reply notice and the fact that there was a default in the payment of rent. The appeal filed by respondent No.1 also met with the same result. However, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, the High Court, by the impugned judgment, while placing reliance upon the decision rendered in Devkaran Nenshi Tanna (Dead) By Lrs. The appeal filed by respondent No.1 also met with the same result. However, in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction, the High Court, by the impugned judgment, while placing reliance upon the decision rendered in Devkaran Nenshi Tanna (Dead) By Lrs. v. Manharlal Nenshi and Another - (1994) 5 SCC 681 , wherein it was held that the dispute regarding the rent fixed can be raised at any point of time, was pleased to set aside the concurrent judgments rendered by both the Courts. 7. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the present appeal has been filed before us by the appellant-landlord. 8. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that on facts, there is no dispute with respect to both, the non-filing of the application by respondent No.1 as mandated under the Act and the non-payment of rent by respondent No.1. The High Court, in its revisional jurisdiction, has grossly exceeded the jurisdiction vested in it while passing the impugned judgment. In such view of the matter, the impugned judgment will have to be set aside. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent, namely, the respondent No.1 submits that there was a specific denial in the reply notice, a fact which has been duly taken note of by the High Court. In such view of the matter, there is due compliance of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act and, therefore, there is no need for any interference with the impugned judgment. 10. We would like to place on record the relevant provisions of the Act: 12(1) A landlord shall not be entitled to the recovery of possession of any premises so long as the tenant pays, or is ready and willing to pay, the amount of the standard rent and permitted increases, if any, and observes and performs the other conditions of the tenancy, in so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this Act. (2) No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due, until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (3) (a) Where the rent is payable by the month and there is no dispute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases, if such rent or increases are in arrears for a period of six months or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration of the period of one month after notice referred to in subsection (2), the Court shall pass a decree for eviction in any such suit for recovery of possession. (b) In any other case, no decree for eviction shall be passed in any such suit if, on the first day of hearing of the suit or on or before such other date as the Court may fix, the tenant pays or tenders in Court the standard rent and permitted increases then due and thereafter continues to pay or tender in Court regularly such rent and permitted increases till the suit is finally decided and also pays costs of the suit as directed by the Court. (4) Pending the disposal of any such suit, the Court may out of any amount paid or tendered by the tenant pay to the landlord such amount towards payment of rent or permitted increases due to him as the Court thinks fit. Explanation I- In any case where there is a dispute as to the amount of standard rent or permitted increases recoverable under this Act the tenant shall be deemed to be ready and willing to pay such amount if, before the expiry of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-section (2), he makes an application to the Court under subsection (3) of Section 11 and thereafter pays or tenders the amount of rent or permitted increases specified in the order made by the Court.' 11. On a reading of Explanation I, it is clear that if the tenant raises a dispute pertaining to the amount of standard rent, he has to make an application before the Court prior to the expiry of the period of one month after receipt of the notice referred to under sub-section (2) of Section 12 of the Act. This has to be followed by tendering the amount of rent or permitted increases, specified in the order made by the Court. This has to be followed by tendering the amount of rent or permitted increases, specified in the order made by the Court. A factual finding has been rendered by the Trial Court, which has been duly confirmed by the First Appellate Court on the non-compliance of the aforesaid mandate. 12. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1 that a reply given by him to the legal notice of the landlord, denying the rent fixed, would amount to a compliance of the provision referred to above, cannot be countenanced as there must be an application made by him before the jurisdictional Court within the time prescribed under Explanation I to Section 12 of the Act. It is not in doubt that such a compliance has not been made by respondent No.1. We also note, as a matter of fact, that the denial of the respondent No.1 is nothing but an afterthought, as he had thought it fit to comply with the order passed by the Court for nearly six years. 13. Another factual finding has also been rendered with respect to the non-payment of rent. This is also a finding of fact arrived at by both the lower Courts, which has not even been discussed or disturbed by the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. 14. The law is quite settled that in a rent control proceeding, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is rather limited. We have also perused the judgment relied upon by the High Court in Devkaran Nenshi Tanna (Dead) By Lrs. (supra). We have our own reservations about the principles of law laid down thereunder, but do not wish to go into at length. 15. A decision rendered by the Court is binding on the parties to the lis whether obtained by consent or otherwise. 16. As long as the said decision is arrived at consciously by the parties, it binds them. It is not the case of respondent No.1 that the said order has been passed by exerting pressure on him. In fact, he has agreed to the said order and acted upon it by paying the rent of Rs.50/- per month for nearly six years. To attract the provisions, a dispute must be real and, therefore, shall not be a moonshine. 17. In fact, he has agreed to the said order and acted upon it by paying the rent of Rs.50/- per month for nearly six years. To attract the provisions, a dispute must be real and, therefore, shall not be a moonshine. 17. It is very clear that the respondent No.1 merely raised the dispute pertaining to the standard rent in order to avoid eviction. 18. We further note that in the decision referred to in Devkaran Nenshi Tanna (Dead) By Lrs. (supra), an application for the fixation of standard rent was, in fact, filed by the tenant, which is not the case before us. 19. Thus, looking at it from any perspective, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 20. In such view of the matter, the impugned judgment of the High Court stands set aside and the order of eviction passed by the Trial Court and confirmed by the First Appellate Court stands restored. 21. The appeal stands allowed, accordingly. 22. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.