JUDGMENT : BISWAROOP CHOWDHURY, J. 1. This is an application filed by the petitioners/plaintiffs praying for the following reliefs: a) Judgment on admission and decree for eviction against the defendant nos. 5(a) 5(b) and 5(c) from the open area marked in pink hatch on the map being annexure ‘B’ to the plaint. b) Injunction restraining the defendant nos. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) from parting with possession of or in any manner dealing with the open are a marked in pink hatch on the map being annexure ‘B’ to the plaint. c) Ad-interim order in terms of prayers above. d) Costs of and incidental to this application be borne by the defendant nos 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c). e) Such further or other order or orders and/or direction or directions as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper. 2. The contention of the Petitioners/plaintiffs in the suit being C.S. No. 136 of 2006 may be summed up thus: 1. The plaintiff no. 3 as owner on or about February 1978 had let out a portion of the premises no. 12, Armenian Street being the shop room no. 10 on the ground floor more fully described in the schedule ‘A’ to the plaint to the plaintiff no. 2 with a right to sublet. 2. The plaintiff no-2 on or about August 2000 had sublet the said shop to the plaintiff no. 1 3. The tenanted shop room no-10, is more fully described in the schedule to the plaint and the map annexed thereto which are marked ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively. 4. The tenanted area of the plaintiff no. 1 in shop no. 10 comprising an area of over 1000 square on ground floor and also with (a) open unenclosed area on North exposed to Armenian Street marked in Pink-hatch on the map referred above and b) open aerial space in rear central portion of such shop was dumped with garbage/rubbish by defendant no-6, 7, and 8 who also erected illegal structures thereon. 5. 5. The original defendant no-5 had trespassed into a portion of open unenclosed area on the northern Armenian Street side but within the portion of the said shop, and thereafter illegally erected a brick wall in front of iron collapsible gate/door of said shop blocking egress and ingress to the enclosed portion of the said shop through Armenian Street on the northern side and was wrongfully occupying the open unenclosed area marked in pink hatch on the map and selling foodstuffs therefrom. The said portion of open unenclosed area is borne out from the report of special Officer appointed in CP No.-108 of 1980 dated 12/10/1982. 6. In spite of repeated opportunities to file Written Statement, the Original Defendant No.5 had deliberately failed and neglected and did not file any Written statement. 7. In the suit the petitioners filed an application being G.A. 1704 of2006 seeking inter-alia the following reliefs:- a) Receiver/Special Officer be appointed to:- i) Make inventory of the demised area and all the surrounding portions including portion above the demised area and to submit a report with photographs with regard to the ingress and egress to the demised area if necessary with police help. ii) Remove all the obstructions by way of rolling shutter and wall to the entrance of the demised area from Southern side and northern side. iii) To remove all the unauthorized structures erected over the open portion forming part of the demised area and also at first floor level. iv) To erect/restore necessary purport wall at the first floor level beside the open area so as to avoid the invasion into the open area from the first floor level. v) Take possession of the demised area and thereafter allow the petitioner No. 1 to occupy use and enjoy the demised area under the Receiver/Special Officer appointed herein. b) Injunction restraining the respondents and each of them and their agents relations servants and assigns in any manner obstructing the free ingress and egress to the demised area more fully described in the Annexure ‘A’ herein from the northern and southern side entrance thereof as shown in the plan; c) Mandatory injunction directing the defendant no.5 to forthwith remove the unauthorized structure in the manner of brick wall obstructing the road side entrance into the demised area from the northern side. d) Injunction restraining the respondents their servants, agents, and assigns in any way interfering with the petitioners’ peaceful use occupation enjoyment of the demised area in any manner whatsoever. e) Injunction restraining the defendant No. 5 from dealing with in any manner alienating or parting with possession of the pink hatched area which defendant No. 5 is calling the same as open tin shed shop and claiming to be a tenant under the petitioner No. 3 at North eastern road side corner of premises No. 12 Armenian Street, Calcutta save and except handing over the same to the petitioner. f) Mandatory Injunction directing the respondents their servants agents and assigns to forthwith handover possession of the demised area to the petitioner No.1 in the event any of them have entered and/or remained in possession thereof. 8. The original defendant no.5 filed his affidavit dated July 3, 2006 opposing GA. 1704 of 2006. In paragraph nos. 8 at page 15, and para 3©, 3(d) at page 8 of the said affidavit the original defendant no.5 alleged: “I am carrying on my business from the premises as aforesaid legally and with all necessary statutory permissions. I am carrying on the business from the said premises and I am a tenant of the plaintiff No. 3. The plaintiffs never initiated any case against me challenging my tenancy or had initiated any case of eviction from the said premises. On the other hand the plaintiff No.3 has been refusing to take my rent. I am on the other hand preferred appropriate applications under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 and after obtaining necessary orders, I am depositing such rent in the office of the Rent Controller. Copies of the petitions preferred before the Learned Rent Controllers and the rent receipts issued by the Rent Controller are collectively annexed herewith and marked ‘C’. I say that in the said application (ie. GA No.-1704 of 2006) a report of the special officer dated October 12, 1982, is annexed and in the said report my possession was clearly established and was recorded as the entry No.-29 ‘[para-3(d)’ pg. I say that in the said application (ie. GA No.-1704 of 2006) a report of the special officer dated October 12, 1982, is annexed and in the said report my possession was clearly established and was recorded as the entry No.-29 ‘[para-3(d)’ pg. 8 of affidavit] and “…… I am in possession of the premises since 1980 and I am occupying such premises with the permission of petitioner No. 3 and as the petitioner No. 3 has refused to take any rent from me, I am depositing the rent with the office of the Rent Controller following due process of law. 9. The defendant nos. 1 to 4 in an affidavit dated July 21, 2006 claimed that they had not affixed any shutter and were not obstructing ingress or egress into the demised shop no. 10. None of the other defendants/respondents came forward to claim any right title and interest in the said tenanted area. 10. During pendency of GA. No. 1704 of 2006 further application being GA.3072 of 2006 was initiated by the petitioners for directing Special Officer to allow free egress and ingress and user of the shop room by access from Southern side entrance and to supervise the process of relieving the shop Room from Garbage rubbish etc. therein with help of police and KMC in the said application. The application was considered by this Hon’ble Court and disposed by the following order: ‘I am of the opinion that for proper consideration of the case made in this interlocutory motion a fresh report of the Learned Special Officer already appointed in this matter is necessary. I direct the special officer to visit the premises in question and ascertain as to whether any person or persons are in possession of shop room and/or go down in the area delineated in red ink in annexure ‘B’ at page 13 of the petition which corresponds to the eastern side of the suit premises. Learned Special Officer shall visit for this purpose the premises, in question upon giving advance communication of 48 hours to the Learned Advocate-on-Record of the appearing parties. The authorized representatives of the parties shall be entitled to visit the premises along with the Learned Special Officer at the time of making of the enquiry. Let such report be submitted within 10th November 2006.’ 11. GA. 1704 of 2006 was disposed by order dated June 23, 2008. The authorized representatives of the parties shall be entitled to visit the premises along with the Learned Special Officer at the time of making of the enquiry. Let such report be submitted within 10th November 2006.’ 11. GA. 1704 of 2006 was disposed by order dated June 23, 2008. The observation made in the said application are as follows: “The three applications for rejections of the plaint being G.A. No.2219 of 2007, G.A. No. 2218 of 2007 and G.A. No. 2351 if 2007 are dismissed without any order as to costs. The plaintiffs’ Application being G.A. No. 1704 of 2006 is allowed in part by confirming the earlier order by which the rolling shutter on the eastern side of the premises was directed to be removed and by confirming the appointment of the Receiver who had earlier been appointed as Special Officer. The Receiver will remain in symbolic possession of the entire portion of the premises demarcated in red ink in the sketch map and will take steps to have the garbage removed from the open area without disturbing the occupation or the defendant nos. 7 and 8 atop the garbage dump. The reinforcement in the construction over the garbage dump will be carried out upon notice to the plaintiffs and under the Receiver. There will be no order for costs in G.A. No.1704 of 2006. The two applications for alleged perjury are disposed of without any order. The plaintiffs’ case that the concerned defendants have made false statements is subject to the evidence that the parties may lead in the suit and subject to the relevant issues being decided in the suit. It is premature at this stage to entertain the applications under Section 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code and to hold that the statements made were false. G.A. No. 3031 of 2006 and G.A. No. 3032 of 2006 are dismissed with costs assessed at 50 GMs in either case. It will, however, be open to the plaintiffs to apply for similar orders upon the conclusion of the suit. The defendants are permitted to file written statements within three weeks from date. Documents should be discovered by the parties within four weeks therefrom inspection forthwith thereupon and the plaintiffs will have leave to pray for early listing of the suit upon completion of all formalities. For the purpose of the defendant nos. The defendants are permitted to file written statements within three weeks from date. Documents should be discovered by the parties within four weeks therefrom inspection forthwith thereupon and the plaintiffs will have leave to pray for early listing of the suit upon completion of all formalities. For the purpose of the defendant nos. 7 and 8 reinforcing the passage atop the garbage dump, the plaintiffs waive their right of making any objection, subject to the plaintiffs’ contention in the suit and whatever rights may accrue to the plaintiffs upon the decision in the suit. The entire exercise of removal of the garbage will be completed within a period of 12 weeks from date whether or not the defendant nos. 7 and 8 take appropriate steps for reinforcing their passage atop the garbage dump in the meantime. There will be no equity in favour of the defendant nos. 7 and 8 for reinforcing the structure which is allegedly illegal. In the guise of reinforcing the structure, the defendants’ nos. 7 and 8 must not make any additional construction.” 12. The original defendant no. 5 passed away on 23rd December2008 leaving behind him the defendant Nos. 5(a) to 5(c) as his heirs and legal representatives. 13. Several obstructions/erections have come up on Portuguese Church Street in phases after the orders of this Hon’ble Court in this suit like Pillar box of BSNL and/or CESC, illegal shops almirahs and its shed over hanging public street big wooden boxes of hawkers etc. making the entry of KMC garbage trucks in Portuguese Church Street up to the entrance of building technically not feasible. 14. As defendant No. 5 had expired without filing any written statement the petitioners were advised that they were not required to seek any substitution of heirs but apply for exemption from substitution and on making application for exemption the same was allowed on 29th April 2016 passed in G.A. 932 of 2016. An appeal was preferred against the said order being APOT no. 212 of 2016. The said appeal was allowed by Order dated 12th July 2016 and the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased defendant no.5 were directed to be brought on record. 15. In the interregnum the son of deceased defendant No-5 being respondent no. 5(c) filed his affidavit in opposition dated May 20, 2016 to GA no. 212 of 2016. The said appeal was allowed by Order dated 12th July 2016 and the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased defendant no.5 were directed to be brought on record. 15. In the interregnum the son of deceased defendant No-5 being respondent no. 5(c) filed his affidavit in opposition dated May 20, 2016 to GA no. 932 of 2016 in which he inter alia alleged that his predecessor in interest said Dilip Ray alias Dilip Keshari, the deceased defendant no-5 happened to be a lawful tenant under the plaintiff no. 3 in respect of the unenclosed open area of the shop no-10 situated at No. 12 Armenian Street also known as 10/1 Portuguese Church Street Kolkata. Dilip Ray since deceased was in possession of the Premises since 1980 with due permission of plaintiff no-3. The defendant no-5(c) has further contended that possession of the deceased defendant no.5 and presently occupied by his legal representatives over the disputed area in the suit premises are permissive in nature and legal under the plaintiff no.- 3. The defendant no. 5(c) has disputed that the deceased defendant no.5 did not show his right to remain in any portion of the said shop room no. 10 including its open unenclosed area facing Armenian Street as alleged or at all. He has further disputed that Rent Control Challans, for broken period or otherwise with different case number annexed to the affidavit used by the deceased defendant no. 5. In G.A. No. 12704 of 2006, for unilateral ex-parte deposits made with the Rent Controller does not create jural relationship of landlord and tenant nor such deposits with Rent Controller can create tenancy against the intentions and desires of the landowner or any of the plaintiffs as alleged or at all. 16. The defendant no. 5(b) daughter of defendant no-5 in her affidavit in opposition contends that the subject matter of the suit as far as the original defendant no. 5 is concerned was relating to an open road facing space in shop No. 10 on the ground floor at premises No. 12 Armenian Street (also known as 10/1 Portuguese Church Street Kolkata hereinafter referred to as the said Suit premises). The Defendant no. 5(b) further contended that the Original Defendant No. 5 used to carry on business from the said open road facing space in shop no. The Defendant no. 5(b) further contended that the Original Defendant No. 5 used to carry on business from the said open road facing space in shop no. 10 in the northern portion of the ground floor of the said suit premises as a ‘tenant’. It is also contended that the Defendant No. 5 was carrying on business in the said portion of the suit premises as a ‘tenant’ and had been paying rent until the time such rent was refused to be accepted by the said plaintiff No. 3. Upon refusal of acceptance of the said rent the original defendant No. 5 had started depositing the said rent to the Rent Controller in accordance with the order passed by Rent Controller under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956. It is contended that subsequent to the death of defendant no. 5 the names of defendant no. 5(b) and 5(c) were also recorded in the record of Rent Controller and thereupon they have been depositing the rent with the Rent Controller month by month and every month. It is further contended that from the Receiver’s report it will appear that deceased defendant no. 5 was a tenant and regularly was paying rent before the Rent Controller.The petitioners/plaintiffs have contended that save and except that the respondent Nos. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) are in occupation of the open road facing space of shop No-10 on the ground floor at the suit premises No. 12, Armenian Street being the open area marked in pink hatch on the map being annexure ‘B’ hereto and also to the plaint the plaintiffs/petitioners have denied all allegations contained in the affidavit in opposition. 17. G.A. no. 2016 of 2017 was ultimately disposed of by order dated23rd November 2017 in terms of prayers (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of Master Summons granting leave to the petitioners/plaintiffs to take out fresh application for judgment upon admission. 18. The order dated 23rd November 2017 was duly complied with and writ of summons along with re-verified plaint incorporating substituted defendant no. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) was caused to be duly served on January 4, 2018, on Tapas Saha Advocate for the substituted defendants through bailiff attached to the office of Ld. Sheriff to this Hon’ble Court. 19. The substituted defendant nos. 5(a), 5(b) and 5c have served their written statement dated February 2, 2018 on the plaintiffs Advocate. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) was caused to be duly served on January 4, 2018, on Tapas Saha Advocate for the substituted defendants through bailiff attached to the office of Ld. Sheriff to this Hon’ble Court. 19. The substituted defendant nos. 5(a), 5(b) and 5c have served their written statement dated February 2, 2018 on the plaintiffs Advocate. The allegations contained in the written statement are incorrect and denied. 20. In the written statement dated February 2, 2018 the defendant nos. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) have inter-alia alleged that the predecessor in interest of the defendants hereof i.e. the said original defendant was a lawful tenant under the plaintiff no. 3 in respect of said suit premises. The said predecessor in interest of the defendants hereof was in absolute possession and enjoyment of the said suit premises, during his lifetime since 1980, with due and explicit permission of the plaintiff no-3. It is further contended that the said original defendant no. 5 since deceased used to carry on business from the said suit Premises as a lawful tenant under the plaintiff no-3 since 1980 and enjoyed absolute usufructs thereof. It is also contended that the plaintiff no. 3 unilaterally refused to accept rent, all on a sudden the predecessor in interest of the defendants, hereof had started depositing rent with the office of the Rent Controller in adhering due process of law. 21. From the allegations made by the original defendant no.5 in his affidavit in opposition to GA. 1704 of 2006 and the substituted defendant nos. 5(a) to 5(c) in their written statement in the above suit, it will be apparent that the said defendants are contending that the Original defendant no-5 became tenant of the plaintiffs by depositing rent with the Rent Controller. The original defendant no- 5 was using the illegally occupied space for commercial use till his demise on 23rd December 2008. 22. Without making any admission of the allegations of the Original defendant no.5 and the substituted defendant nos. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) the petitioners contended that the purported license or permissive user of the original defendant no.5 is deemed to have been revoked on the institution of the present suit and the said defendant’s subsequent possession is wholly wrongful and illegal. Assuming but not admitting that the original defendant no.5 was a lawful tenant, his heirs and legal representatives being the substituted defendant nos. Assuming but not admitting that the original defendant no.5 was a lawful tenant, his heirs and legal representatives being the substituted defendant nos. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) have no right to retain possession of and remain in the area occupied by them after five years of the demise of the defendant no.5. 23. The petitioner is therefore entitled to and seeks judgment on admission and decree for eviction against the defendant nos. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) from the open area marked in pink hatch on the map being annexure ‘B’ to the plaint. The Defendant no-5(a) filed affidavit in opposition to the petition denying the allegations made in the petition. The contention of the Defendant no-5(a) may be summed up thus: 1. The whole premise of instituting the instant Suit against the Defendant no-5 was to restrain the defendants on the grounds that the defendant no-5 was having unlawful possession as a trespasser in the suit premises. The allegation as levelled by the plaintiff were countered by the defendant no-5 by stating that the defendant no- 5 is an independent tenant in the schedule B property and has been paying rent in such respect to the rent controller since long back. 2. The defendants are operating the business of selling tea and snacks from the unenclosed open area in the northern side portion in the suit premises since a long time. Initially the defendant no.5 had failed to file the written statement however his legal heirs were granted the opportunity to file the written statement in the present suit wherein the defendant nos. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) have always maintained a stand that they have always been the lawful tenants under the plaintiff no. 3 in respect of the said unenclosed open area that has been occupied by the said defendant no. 5. 3. The suit was instituted against the defendants on the ground that the defendants were trespassers and it has been specifically stated and presupposed in the plaint that the defendant no. 5 was never a tenant in respect of the suit premises as mentioned in annexure ‘B’of the plaint. 4. The plaintiffs have sought for reliefs in respect of two number of premises in the present suit being Annexure ‘A’ and Annexure ‘B’ of the plaint. 5 was never a tenant in respect of the suit premises as mentioned in annexure ‘B’of the plaint. 4. The plaintiffs have sought for reliefs in respect of two number of premises in the present suit being Annexure ‘A’ and Annexure ‘B’ of the plaint. The premise mentioned in annexure ‘A’ is already in possession of the plaintiffs and Annexure ‘B’ refers to the unenclosed open area from where the defendant no. 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), are operating and/or are running their business from. 5. The defendant no-5 was a tenant in respect of the said annexure ‘B’ property, on refusal to receive rent from the said defendant the defendant deposited the same before the Rent Controller. The defendant no-5(a), 5(b), and 5(c) are also depositing rent before the Rent Controller. 6. The defendant nos. 5(a), 5(b), 5(c) are lawful tenants under plaintiff no-3 and is occupying the suit premises mentioned in annexure ‘B’ of the plaint by virtue of legal tenancy. The plaintiff has taken out an application for judgment upon admission the main ground of the present application for judgment upon admission is that the original defendant no. 5 was a lawful tenant and since five years have passed since the demise of the original defendant no. 5 the present defendant’s being the legal heirs and the legal representatives of the said defendant no.5 has no right to retain possession of and remain in the said premises. 7. The proposition of law on which the defendants are sought to be evicted is not applicable in this case. It would be applicable when the suit is instituted under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1996 as per the provision of Section 2(g). However the present suit has been instituted on the ground that the original defendant no-5 is a trespasser and the plaintiffs have always sought for an ejectment decree in the present suit and hence the plaintiffs at this point of time cannot contradict their own stand and cause of action in the present suit and institute the instant application for judgment upon admission on the ground that the provisions of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1996 would be applicable in the instant suit. 8. The defendants no. 8. The defendants no. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) denies the allegations made in paragraph 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 of the said petition, and with regard to paragraph 26, 27 and 28 of the petition, it is contended by the defendants that the plaintiffs have all along taken a specific stand that the original defendant no. 5 was a trespasser occupying the said premise. However the plaintiffs in the present application has taken a direct contradictory stand and stated that the original defendant no. 5 is assumed to be a lawful tenant. The instant application cannot be allowed on this single ground that Judgment upon admission cannot be allowed on mere assumptions of the petitioner. Moreover the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1996 cannot be applicable in the present suit since the instant suit is an ejectment suit filed by the plaintiff against the original defendant no.5 alleging to be a trespasser. 3. The Petitioners/Plaintiffs filed affidavit in reply repeating and reiterating the contentions made in the petition. 4. Heard Learned Advocate for the Petitioners/Plaintiffs, and learned Advocates for the defendant no-5(a) 5(b) and 5(c). perused the petition filed and materials on record. 5. Learned Advocate for the petitioners/plaintiffs submits that the suit was instituted for eviction of original defendant no. 5 from suit premises on the ground that he was a trespasser. On his death, his heirs namely his wife son and daughter being defendant nos. 5(a), (b) and (c) respectively, are impleaded. 6. Learned Advocate further submits that the application for judgment on admission under Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure is made in the light of the categorical and unequivocal admissions made by the deceased defendant and the substituted heirs in pleadings. 7. Learned Advocate also submits that in affidavit dated July 3, 2006, filed in opposition to GA 1704 of 2006 by original defendant No-5 the deceased defendant alleged that he was tenant of the plaintiff and was carrying on business at the suit premises and was depositing rent in the office of the Rent Controller. The substituted defendants have also made similar contentions that their predecessor in title was a ‘tenant’ of the plaintiff and on his demise on 23-12-2008 the substituted defendant nos. The substituted defendants have also made similar contentions that their predecessor in title was a ‘tenant’ of the plaintiff and on his demise on 23-12-2008 the substituted defendant nos. 5(a), (b) and (c) inherited the tenancy and were depositing rent of Rs. 105/- month to month with Rent Controller and were therefore not liable to be evicted. Learned Advocate draws attention to the averments made by the defendant in affidavit in opposition dated May 20, 2016 in GA-932 of 2016 by Defendant no-5(c), averments made in affidavit in opposition dated July 28, 2017, in GA 2016 of 2017 by substituted defendant no. 5(b) and averments made in written statement dated 2 February 2018, by substituted defendant nos. 5(a), (b) and (c). 8. Learned Advocate for the petitioner/plaintiffs submits that the averments/allegations made by the defendants to be correct the inevitable position of law is that the deceased defendant was a ‘tenant’ of the plaintiff in a commercial premises at a monthly rent of Rs. 105. On demise dt. 23- 12-2008 of the original defendant no-5 his three legal heirs became entitled to remain in possession of the suit premises only till 22-12-2013, that is on expiry of the period of 5 years from date of death of the original defendant, The substituted defendants ceased to have any right to remain in possession of the suit premises as prescribed in Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997, after 5 years from date of death of Original Defendant no-5. 9. Learned Advocate relies upon the following judicial decisions: a) Goutam Dey vs. Jyotsna Chatterjee, 2012 SCC Online Cal 642 b) Uttam Singh Duggal vs. United Bank, (2000) 7 SCC 120 c) Charanjit Lal Mehra vs. Kamal Saraj Mahajan, (2005) 11 SCC 279 d) Shivani Properties vs. Rama Shankar Pande, (2021) SCC Online Cal 4284 e) Firm Shrinwas Ram vs. Mahavir Prasad, AIR 1951 SC 177 10. Learned Advocate for the opposite parties/defendant no. 5(a), 5(b) and5(c) submits that the instant suit has been originally instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendant no. 5 who was the father of the substituted defendant nos. 5(a), 5(b), and 5(c) inter-alia praying decree for eviction on the ground of trespassing. The sole ground for eviction therefore in the suit was trespassing. 5(a), 5(b) and5(c) submits that the instant suit has been originally instituted by the plaintiffs against the defendant no. 5 who was the father of the substituted defendant nos. 5(a), 5(b), and 5(c) inter-alia praying decree for eviction on the ground of trespassing. The sole ground for eviction therefore in the suit was trespassing. Learned Advocate further submits that prior to the present application the defendants filed the written statement and specifically denied being trespassers in the suit premises and on the contrary the defendants made out a case that the defendants are the tenants in the suit premises and have been paying rent with the rent controller. The case of trespassing was disputed. 11. Learned Advocate further submits that the present application being GA. 20 of 2024 has been filed under the provisions of Order 12 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. Order 12 Rule 6 speaks about the admission, if any is made by the defendants of the case made out by the plaintiff in the suit. Therefore the sole ground to attract Order 12 Rule 6 should be the admission if any made by the defendants to the claim of the plaintiff. There is no admission in the written statement by the defendants to the claim of the plaintiff. In the instant case the plaintiffs case is that the defendant is a trespasser. There is no admission in the written statement by the defendants to the effect that the defendants are trespasser in the suit. Therefore the ingredients to attract Order 12 Rule 6 is not available in the written statement/or otherwise filed by the defendants. 12. Learned Advocate also submits that the case made out in the application to the effect that the decree against the defendants should be passed under the provisions of Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Section 2(g) has laid down that the heirs of the original tenant cannot continue as the tenant after 5(five) years of expiry of the original tenant. 13. It is submitted by the Learned Advocate that although the suit was filed only on the ground of trespassing but not under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997 yet the plaintiff sought to convert the suit for trespassing into a suit, under the Tenancy Act which is not permissible. 14. 13. It is submitted by the Learned Advocate that although the suit was filed only on the ground of trespassing but not under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997 yet the plaintiff sought to convert the suit for trespassing into a suit, under the Tenancy Act which is not permissible. 14. Learned Advocate relies upon the following Judicial decision: Jugal Kisor Das Naskar vs. Dilip Das and Another, 2023 SCC Online Cal 927 15. Learned Advocate submits that the decision of Shivani Properties case (supra) is not applicable as it would be evident that the very suit in that case was filed under the WBPT Act and accordingly the WBPT was itself applicable and no other act. Learned Advocate submits that this application is liable to be dismissed. 16. Before proceeding to decide with the material in issue it is necessary to consider the relevant provisions contained in Order 12 Rule-6 of the Code of Civil Procedure: Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 6. Judgment on admissions: 1. Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions. 2. Whenever a judgment is pronounced under Sub-Rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced. 17. Upon, bare reading of the provisions contained in sub-rule-1 of Rule 6 of Order XII of the Code of Civil Procedure, it will appear that the sub-rule provides of admission of fact made either in pleadings or otherwise. Thus it is not necessary that the admission of fact must always be made in pleadings as it can be made through correspondence or orally or even while adducing oral evidence. Thus it is not necessary that the admission of fact must always be made in pleadings as it can be made through correspondence or orally or even while adducing oral evidence. Thus when the Court finds any fact alleged by any party and admitted by the opposite party either in pleadings or otherwise it may at any stage of the suit either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any question between the parties make such order or give such judgment on the basis of such admissions. 18. When different issues come up for determination but any particular fact is admitted court may pronounce Judgment on admission of such fact prior to deciding other issues or it may postpone the decision and decide with other issues. 19. By passing judgment on admission a suit may be decreed as a whole or decreed in part of the total claim. The instant suit was instituted against the Defendant no-5 on the ground that, he is occupying the suit premises as a trespasser, which was disputed by the said defendant. The said defendant no-5 took the plea that he is a tenant under the plaintiff no-3 as per Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997. On the death of defendant no-5 his heirs who are substituted as defendant no. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) also took a stand in the written statement that they are tenants under the plaintiff no-3. It is also an admitted facts that the defendant no. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) are not original defendants and they are claiming tenancy right on the death of defendant no-5. As the plaintiffs have admitted defendant no-5 to be tenant of the subject property and defendant no-5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) as legal heirs of the deceased defendant no-5, the allegation of the plaintiffs that the defendant no-5 was a trespasser fails. As the plaintiff has also admitted the defendant no-5(a) 5(b) and 5(c), are the legal heirs of the defendant no-5 they cannot be held as rank trespassers. They are either to be declared as tenant as of today and in the event they are declared as tenant they will have the right to remain in the suit property as claimed by them. They are either to be declared as tenant as of today and in the event they are declared as tenant they will have the right to remain in the suit property as claimed by them. On the other hand if the contention of the plaintiffs that the defendants no-5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) have ceased to be tenant after 5 years from the death of Defendant no-5 on 23-12-2008, is accepted the defendant no-5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) cease to be tenant on and from 24-12-2013 Thus on and from 24-12-2013 the tenancy right of Defendant no-5(a), 5(b), and 5(c) comes to an end by operation of law. In order to decide as to whether the Tenancy right of defendant no. 5(a) 5(b) and 5(c) has come to an end it is not necessary to permit the parties to adduce evidence but all what is to be considered is relevant Provisions of West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997. 20. Now the point for consideration is whether judgment on admission is maintainable as the defendant has not admitted claim of the plaintiff as alleged in the plaint that the defendant no-5 is a trespasser as submitted by the Learned Advocate for the defendant. Secondly whether judgment on admission is maintainable when the suit is not filed under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997. 21. As Sub-Rule 1 of Rule 6 of Order XII of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the Court to consider the pleadings of the parties at any stage of the proceedings and ascertain the facts which is admitted and pronounce judgment on the said fact and postpone other questions, it is not necessary that the admission has to be confined only with pleadings made in the plaint. In the event defendant takes a stand in the pleadings or otherwise by virtue of which the case of the plaintiff succeeds and the relief claimed in the plaint can be granted the Court has discretion to pass judgment upon admission. 22. The following judicial decisions relied by the parties will clarify the position. 23. In the case of Uttam Singh Duggal (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “12. As to the object of Order 12 rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. 22. The following judicial decisions relied by the parties will clarify the position. 23. In the case of Uttam Singh Duggal (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “12. As to the object of Order 12 rule 6, we need not say anything more than what the legislature itself has said when the said provision came to be amended. In the objects and Reasons set out while amending the said Rule, it is stated that “where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgement for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgement at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.” We should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgement. Where the other party has made a plain admission entitling the former to succeed, it should apply and also wherever there is a clear admission of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making such admission to succeed.” 24. In the case of Charanjit Lal Mehra (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows: “8. Learned counsel made an alternative submission that the revision petition was not maintainable and the lease deed is not registered one and therefore, it is not maintainable. None of these objections were raised by the defendants before the learned Single Judge. Even before the trial court, the non-registration of lease deed ( which did not prescribe any term) was not put in issue. It is only devised now to somehow defeat and delay the eviction and possession of the premises to the landlady. . In fact, Order XII Rule 6, C.P.C. is enacted for the purpose of and in order to expedite the trials if there is any admission on behalf of the defendants or an admission can be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case without any dispute; then, in such a case in order to expedite and dispose of the matter such admission can be acted upon. In the present case, looking at the terms of lease deed, there can be no two opinions that the tenancy was joint/ composite and not individual one. In the present case, looking at the terms of lease deed, there can be no two opinions that the tenancy was joint/ composite and not individual one. Therefore, on these admitted facts the view taken by learned Single Judge of the High Court appears to be justified. In this connection, a reference may be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of India & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 120 . Their Lordships have held as follows: "In the Objects and Reasons set out while amending Rule 6 of Order 12 CPC it is stated that "where a claim is admitted, the court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff and to pass a decree on admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled." The Supreme Court should not unduly narrow down the meaning of this Rule as the object is to enable a party to obtain speedy judgment." Therefore, in the present case, as appearing to us, there is a clear admission on behalf of the defendants that there existed a relationship of landlord and tenants, the rent is more than Rs.3500/- and the tenancy is joint and composite one. As such on these admitted facts, there is no two opinion in the matter and the view taken by the learned Single Judge of the High Court appears to be correct and there is no ground to interfere in this Special Leave Petition and the same is dismissed.” 25. In the case of Shivani Properties Pvt. Ltd. (Supra) this Hon’ble Court observed as follows: “12. A case under Order XII Rule 6 of The Code of Civil Procedure presumes that the factual admissions which have been made by a party in its pleadings or in writing or by way of oral submissions or otherwise, are such that the Court would be persuaded to pronounce judgment without having to wait for the adjudication on the other issues to be completed. 13. Payal Vision was concerned with a suit for recovery of possession from a tenant where the tenancy was not protected under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. 13. Payal Vision was concerned with a suit for recovery of possession from a tenant where the tenancy was not protected under the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The Supreme Court held that in such a case, all that the plaintiff/landlord is required to establish is the existence of a jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the tenancy had been terminated either by lapse of time or by notice served by the landlord under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Supreme Court was of the view that once these two aspects have been admitted, the Court can proceed to pass a decree in terms of Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. The Supreme Court further opined that Order XII Rule 6 empowers the Court to deliver judgment based on admissions whenever such admissions are sufficient for the grant of the relief prayed for. In Atma Ram Properties the Delhi High Court held that there was no requirement for any evidence raised by the defendants since the plaintiff has been able to establish the three ingredients for passing a decree for possession. The Court further held that purely legal questions may not require any evidence and the Court would not be deterred from passing a decree on the issues where a clear admission has been made by the defendant. 14. The decisions relied upon by learned counsel for the defendants, namely, Raj Kumar Chawla, S.M. Asif and Balraj Taneja are on the principles which are relevant for an application under Order XII Rule 6. Each of these decisions have to be seen in their particular factual context in which the admission was held to be not sufficient. In Inder Mohan Singh the Delhi High Court proceeded on the basis that the particular questions involved could not be disposed of without recording of evidence and that the concerned party would have to prove his case before the Court. 15. The power of a Court to pronounce judgment on admissions has to be seen in the particular facts of this case and the decisions shown cannot come to the assistance of the parties before the Court unless the decisions are substantially similar to the facts of the present case. Admission, by its very definition, is relevant to the factual context in which the admission has been made. Admission, by its very definition, is relevant to the factual context in which the admission has been made. There cannot hence be any uniform rule save and except that the admission must be clear, unequivocal and completely relevant to the issue on which the Court can pronounce judgment without going into the rigours of a trial. The plea with regard to limitation and pecuniary valuation are issues which do not call for evidence. The issue with regard to whether the 1997 Act will apply in the present case has already been settled in Sri Sushil Kumar Jain as discussed above.” 26. The following cases though not relied by the parties will also clarify the position thus the same should be considered. 27. In the case of Sikharchand and Others vs. Mst. Bari Bai and Others, AIR 1947 M.P. 75 it was observed as follows: “13. In order to provide relief to the plaintiff on the basis of subsequent events the normal course for the plaintiff is to seek an amendment of the plaint in order to Put the new facts in issue so as to give the other party an opportunity to meet them. But if the plaintiff is entitled to the whole or potion of the relief asked for in the plaint on the basis of certain new facts stated by the defendant in the pleadings or otherwise, it is open to the Court to base a - judgment on such admission of the defendant even though the plaintiff has not expressly founded his cause of action on such facts by suitably amending his plaint because the defendant cannot be said to have been taken by surprise or prejudiced by giving the plaintiff a relief on the basis of his own case (Defendant's case). The object of procedural law is to promote justice and this must be kept in view while applying and interpreting rules of procedure. 14. In Sheojee Bhai v. Shyamacharan, Civil Revn. No. 385 at 1962, D/-26-10-1962 (Madh Pra) Bhargava, J. directed the trial Court to pass a suitable decree for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises on the basis of the case as set up BY the defendant. In that case tenancy was created by a registered lease-deed commencing from 22-5-1950 and its duration was 10 years. No. 385 at 1962, D/-26-10-1962 (Madh Pra) Bhargava, J. directed the trial Court to pass a suitable decree for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises on the basis of the case as set up BY the defendant. In that case tenancy was created by a registered lease-deed commencing from 22-5-1950 and its duration was 10 years. After the expiry of the lease by efflux of time on 22-5-1960 the landlord brought a suit for eviction against the defendants-tenants as they had failed to vacate the accommodation in spite of the notice. The defendant No. 1 pleaded in his written statement that the lease was not determined as it was extended for 2 years, after the expiry of the period originally fixed by a verbal agreement. The trial Court framed an issue covering the question of extension of lease for two years. Subsequently the defendant No. 1 made an application alleging that there was a compromise between the parties according to which the lease of the suit premises was to continue for a further period of two years commencing from 20-5-1960. The plaintiff denied the said compromise and alleged that it was put forward only to prolong the case with a mala fide intent. However, while the suit was still being tried the period of two years expired on 23-5-1962, the plaintiff then made an application without prejudice to his pleadings, that he was entitled to a decree for possession under Order 12. Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This application, was opposed and was rejected by the lower Court. The order was, however, set aside in revision and the lower Court was directed to pass a decree for eviction. We agree with the view taken by this Court in that case. The position in this case both in regard to facts as well as law is very much similar. Here the defendant has taken a defence that under a compromise the term of the lease was extended by 10, years and this term has expired. It was, therefore, open to the Court to base a judgment against the defendant on the basis of his own admissions because it is clear from the case as set up by him that he was not entitled to continue in possession, in any case, after the expiry of the fresh term of 10 years. 15. It was, therefore, open to the Court to base a judgment against the defendant on the basis of his own admissions because it is clear from the case as set up by him that he was not entitled to continue in possession, in any case, after the expiry of the fresh term of 10 years. 15. We would like to point out that while trying the suit or other actions at law the Court is not to function helplessly in the routine manner. The primary object of a Court must be to do justice between the parties according to law and where at any stage of the suit it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief asked for by him on the basis of defendant's own admissions there would be no point in delaying the judgment unnecessarily with a view to decide all controversial points in the routine manner. We must say that the learned Judge of the lower Court rightly exercised his discretion in granting a decree to the plaintiff in this case and there is no justification for interference with it.” 28. In the case of SRL Ltd. Vs. Techtrek India Ltd., AIR 2014 Bombay 42 the Hon’ble Court observed as follows: “13. Under Rule 6 of Order XXII, the Court has jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the Plaintiff and pass a decree for the admitted claim even if such admitted claim be a part of the total claim in the suit. The Calcutta High Court in the case of Premsuk Das Assaram vs. Udairam Gungabux, (1918) Indian Law Reports (Vol XLV) Calcutta Series 138 : AIR 1918 Cal 467, considered a money claim based on accounts. There was an admission of a part of the claim. On the basis of this admission, the Court entered a judgment for part of the suit claim, whilst permitting the Plaintiff to proceed to prove the rest of his claim at the trial. There was an admission of a part of the claim. On the basis of this admission, the Court entered a judgment for part of the suit claim, whilst permitting the Plaintiff to proceed to prove the rest of his claim at the trial. The Calcutta High Court held as follows: “In my opinion, it would be lamentable if the discretion, which for the best of reasons has been left free and untrammelled by the Legislature, were to be crystallised by judicial decisions, as it would become in course of time by one Judge attempting to prescribe definite rules with a view to bind other Judges in the exercise of the discretion, which must be applied with due regard to the varying circumstances of each particular case. I must consequently decline to interpret Order XII, Rule 6, so as to restrict its operation to cases where the plaintiff accepts the admission of the defendant in its entirety or where the claim is severable into distinct portions and the defendant admits his liability in respect of one such fragment of the claim. I do not also feel pressed by the argument that if a decree is made first on admission in respect of one portion of the claim and then on investigation as to the remainder, there may ultimately be two decrees in the same suit. I see nothing objectionable in principle to such a result, specially in view of the provisions of Order XXIV which treats of payments into Court.” 29. Upon considering the judicial decisions on Order XII Rule 6 sub-rule-1 this Court is of the view that even if there is absence of specific alternate case made out by the plaintiff in the plaint there is nothing improper in giving plaintiff decree on the admission of the defendant in the written statement. 30. When a Court finds from the pleadings of a defendant that the defendant has no defence and will have no chance to succeed in the suit, and from the pleadings the right of the plaintiff to get the relief is established the Court may either allow the plaintiff to amend the pleading or invoke the inherent power under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and pass judgment on admission. Admission in such a case will not be confined to pleadings and allegations made in the plaint but on extended meaning has to be given and it will include admission with regard to right of plaintiff to obtain the relief as claimed in the suit. Inspite of the defendants having no right to succeed in the suit, on certain pleadings being made a judgment is not passed on admission it would amount to abuse of the process of law. Thus in the interest of justice it would be reasonable to pass a judgment on admission. 31. Now in order to decide as to whether defendant no-5(a), 5(b) and 5(c)continue to be tenant of the suit property under West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997, it is necessary to consider the definition of Tenant under Section 2(g) of the said Act. 32. Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997 defines Tenant as follows: ‘Tenant’ means any person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any premises is or, but for a special contract would be payable and includes any person continuing in possession after termination of his tenancy and in the event of death of such tenant or from the date of coming into force of this Act whichever is later his spouse son daughter parent and the widow of his predeceased son who were ordinarily living with the tenant upto the date of death of the tenant as the members of his family and were dependant on him and who do not own or occupy any residential premises and [in respect of Premises let out for non-residential purpose his spouse, son daughter and parent who were ordinarily living with the tenant up to the date of his death as members of his family and were dependant on him or a person authorized by the tenant who is in possession of such premises] but shall not include any person against whom any decree or order of eviction has been made by a Court of Competent jurisdiction. 33. 33. Provided that the time limit of five years shall not apply to the spouse of the tenant who was ordinarily living with the tenant upto his death as a member of his family and was dependant on him and who does not own or occupy any residential premises: Provided further that the son, daughter, parent, or the widow of the pre-deceased son of the tenant who was ordinarily residing with the tenant in the said premises upto the date of death of the tenant as a member of his family and was dependant on him and who does not own or occupy any residential premises, shall have a right of preference for tenancy in a fresh agreement in respect of such premises [on condition of payment of fair rent]. The proviso shall apply mutatis mutandis to premises let out for non-residential purpose. 34. Thus considering the stand taken by the defendant no. 5(a), 5(b) and5(c) in the written statement and considering the provision of Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997, and the fact that the tenanted portion was used for non-residential purpose under no stretch of imagination the Defendant no-5(a) 5(b) and 5(c) can be said to be tenants of suit property after 23-12-2013 and they have no right to remain in the suit property. If at all the defendants have any right it is only defendant no. 5(b), and 5(c) who have preferential right to be inducted as tenant on fresh agreement and fair rent, in the event plaintiff decides to induct tenant in the suit property. 35. With regard to the submission of Learned Advocate for the Defendant no. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) that as the suit is not filed under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997 Judgment on admission cannot be passed this Court is of the view that in order to file a suit against a person who is a tenant under Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act a suit is required to be filed under Section 6 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997, but a tenant whose right is extinguished under Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997 or never existed from inception suit for eviction of such persons cannot be filed under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the same has to be filed under the Specific Relief Act. Similarly when a defendant claims right of a tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997 and the said right is for a limited period under the said statute the said defendant cannot claim such right after expiry of the said period. After expiry of the said period the status of the defendant although not a rank trespasser but is a trespasser. He cannot claim any benefit under the said statute and is liable to be evicted. The decision of Jugal Kisor Das Naskar (supra) relied upon by the defendants is thus not applicable to the facts of the case. 36. In the facts and circumstances this Court is of the view that the plaintiffs have made out a case for judgment on admission. Thus this application should be allowed. Let there be an order in terms of prayer (a) and (b) of the Notice of motion dated 21st September 2024. 37. Plaintiffs do get a decree of eviction against Defendants/Respondents no. 5(a) 5(b) and 5(c). The defendants no. 5(a) 5(b) and 5(c) are directed to hand over vacant and Khas Possession of suit property being annexure ‘B’ to the plaint to the plaintiffs within 5 weeks failing which plaintiffs will have the right to put the Decree in Execution. 38. As plaintiffs have obtained decree by accepting the original defendant no-5 as tenant under Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Act 1997, and the substituted Defendants no. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) as tenants for limited period of 5 years on the death of Defendant no-5, the Defendant no-5(b) and 5(c) shall be entitled to a preference for tenancy as per second proviso to Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy. Act 1997 in a fresh agreement in respect of such premises on condition of payment of fair rent. Thus in the event the plaintiffs intend to induct a new tenant after the suit property is vacated an offer in writing should be given to defendant no-5(b) and 5(c) with an opportunity of discussion with regard to fair rent. In the event there is dispute with regard to fair rent either party may move before the Rent Controller to decide the Fair Rent as per West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997. 39. In the event there is dispute with regard to fair rent either party may move before the Rent Controller to decide the Fair Rent as per West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997. 39. It is needless to mention that in the event no compliance is made by the plaintiff in terms of second proviso to Section 2(g) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1997 the Defendant no. 5(a) and 5(c) will be entitled to move the competent Court of law. 40. After delivering the Judgment Learned Advocate for Defendant no.5(a), 5(b), and 5(c) prays for stay of the operation of this Judgment and Decree. Such prayer is refused. However. time to vacate the suit property by the Defendants no. 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) is made 8 weeks instead of 5 weeks.