Majeeda Khanam, D/o. Habib Khan v. Ahmed Khan S/o. Late Haider Khan
2025-07-07
RAMACHANDRA D.HUDDAR
body2025
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : (RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR, J.) This Miscellaneous First Appeal is instituted under Order XLIII Rule 1 (r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, (for short, "CPC") 1908, by the appellants herein, who are aggrieved by the order dated 15.02.2025 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge and J.M.F.C., Channapatna in I.A.No.I in O.S.No.307/2024. In the said application filed by the plaintiffs under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 of the CPC, the appellants sought for an order of temporary injunction restraining the respondents from alienating the suit schedule property, more particularly Item No. 2, pending disposal of the suit. The Trial Court, by the impugned order dismissed the said application which has prompted the appellants to approach this Court seeking redressal by way of an appropriate interim order during the pendency of the suit. 2. The factual matrix of the case, as brought on record, reveals that the suit schedule property originally belongs to one Haider Khan, who is stated to have acquired the same from the joint family income during his lifetime. It is not in serious dispute that Haider Khan had 11 children, and the appellants and respondents are all the descendants and legal heirs of the said Haider Khan. According to the appellants, there was no formal partition of the suit schedule properties during the lifetime of Haider Khan, or at any point thereafter. 3. It is further case of the appellants that, the properties continued to be held and enjoyed jointly by the legal heirs of Haider Khan and were used commonly including for agricultural purposes by several members of the extended family. 4. The appellants specifically contend that, subsequent to the demise of Haider Khan, the name of the first respondent was entered in the revenue records in respect of the suit schedule property Item No. 2. However, the said mutation is claimed to have been effected solely on the strength of a statement given by the siblings of the first respondent, without there being any formal relinquishment or partition of shares. The appellants allege that, the said mutation was not an act of a transfer of ownership but, was made only for the purpose of managing the property and does not confer absolute ownership rights on the first respondent. Despite this, the first respondent along with respondent Nos.
The appellants allege that, the said mutation was not an act of a transfer of ownership but, was made only for the purpose of managing the property and does not confer absolute ownership rights on the first respondent. Despite this, the first respondent along with respondent Nos. 2 to 8, alleged to have executed an unregistered Sale Agreement with third parties, namely P.Sumati Kumar and P.Vimalchand, for the sale of suit schedule property Item No. 2 for a substantial consideration of Rs.71,21,250/-, of which Rs.30,00,000/- is stated to have been received as advance. The appellants contend that, this act of execution of the Sale Agreement is not only without their consent but, also against their rights joint owners in the suit schedule property. The appellants further submit that, they were never parties to the earlier suits bearing O.S.No.248/2006 and O.S.No.431/2006 filed at Ramanagara Court, nor were they aware of the Compromise Decree that is claimed to have been passed before the Lok-adalath on 14.09.2011. 5. The respondents, on the other hand, have relied heavily upon those prior proceedings to contend that the matter of ownership of the suit schedule property has already been settled and that the appellants' claim is barred by principles of res judicata and limitation. However, it is the specific stand of the appellants that, they were excluded from those proceedings and were not afforded an opportunity to assert their rights therein; thereby rendering any decree passed therein not binding on them. 6. This court, having heard the arguments and perused records, is of the considered opinion that, the Trial Court failed to examine the matter in its proper perspective. While rejecting the application for temporary injunction, the Trial Court appears to have placed undue reliance on the previous litigation without adequately considering whether the appellants were parties to those suits and whether their rights were adjudicated therein. 7. It is well settled in law that, mutation entries in revenue records do not, by themselves, confer title. It is also a settled proposition that, the execution of an agreement for sale, especially in respect of property claimed to be joint property of the plaintiffs and defendants, without the consent of all the legal heirs or the tenants in common, cannot be deemed valid or conclusive.
It is also a settled proposition that, the execution of an agreement for sale, especially in respect of property claimed to be joint property of the plaintiffs and defendants, without the consent of all the legal heirs or the tenants in common, cannot be deemed valid or conclusive. Furthermore, when there is no registered partition deed or any document showing relinquishment of rights by the appellants, and when the appellants have made out a case that they are tenants in common, who have been wrongly excluded from the process of alienation, there exists a strong prima facie case warranting protection of their rights pending adjudication of the main suit. Thus, the balance of convenience, in such cases, tilts in maintaining the present status of the property and preventing any further alienation that may complicate the dispute or prejudice the appellant's interest. The principle of irreparable injury is also satisfied as any sale or alienation during the pendency of the suit may defeat the very purpose of the partition suit and create third party interests which may be difficult to reverse even upon success in the suit. 8. The denial of a temporary injunctive relief merely based on a preliminary view of a limitation and res judicata without properly testing the evidence and factual assertions, appears to be premature and unjustified. This Court is also conscious of the fact that, the appellants have sought the partition of the joint property and have sought protection of the suit schedule property during the pendency of the suit. Granting a direction to maintain status quo would not cause any prejudice to the respondents, as, it would merely preserve the existing condition of the property until final adjudication. 9. In the circumstances, and in order to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and avoid the creation of a third party interest that may affect the rights of the parties in the suit schedule property, this Court deems it just and proper to direct that, both the parties shall maintain status quo in respect of the suit schedule properties, more particularly Item No. 2, in terms of its nature, possession and alienation, pending disposal of O.S.No.307/2024 on the file of the learned Senior Civil Judge and J.M.F.C., at Channapatna.
Such a direction is necessary to ensure that the fruits of litigation, if any, are not rendered negatory and that the rights of the co-sharers are not jeopardized by acts of unilateral alienation. 10. Accordingly, the Miscellaneous First Appeal is partly allowed . The impugned order dated 15.02.2025 passed on I.A.No.1 in O.S.No.307/2024 stands set aside. The parties are directed to maintain status quo as on the date of this judgment with regard to the suit schedule property, particularly Item No. 2, until the disposal of the suit. 11. The Trial Court is requested to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible and in accordance with law, without being influenced by any of the observations made herein which are only for the purpose of deciding the present appeal with all its promptitude. Costs made easy.