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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2025 DIGILAW 81 (MP)

Khatmoon Nisha v. Mohd. Irfan Kha

2025-01-31

VIVEK AGARWAL

body2025
ORDER Matter is dictated in open Court. 1. This Miscellaneous Petition is filed by judgment-debtors being aggrieved of the order dated 3.12.2024 (Annx.P/4), passed by learned Principal District Judge, District Rewa (M.P.), in First Appeal RCA No.148/2024, affirming the order of the executing Court in Execution Case No.3800150/1989 and in addition holding that provisions contained under Order XXI rule 97 of Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'CPC' for short), are applicable only to the decree holder and not to the judgment-debtors. 2. Shri Ashish Pathak, learned counsel for petitioners submits that he has serious objection to this interpretation and in support places reliance on decision of a Coordinate Bench in Ranchhod and another v. Hukmaji and others [ 2010(4) M.P.L.J. 426 ], to submit that expression 'any person' used in Order XXI rule 97 CPC, will include the judgment-debtor and, therefore, 1 MP-415-2025 judgment-debtor can also file objections under Order XXI rule 97 CPC. 3. After hearing Shri Ashish Pathak, learned counsel for petitioners and going through the judgment of Coordinate Bench in Ranchhod and another (supra), it is evident that Hon'ble Coordinate Bench had referred to the judgment of apex Court in Bhanwar Lal v. Satyanarain and another ( AIR 1995 SC 358 ) and has held that any person includes the judgmentdebtor also. 4. Similarly, referring to another judgment of Supreme Court in Shreenath and another v. Rajesh and others ( AIR 1998 SC 1827 ), it is held that third party in possession claiming independent right as tenant can object and get his claim adjudicated when sought to be dispossessed by decreeholder, he need not wait until he is dispossessed. Full Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Usha Jain and others v. Manmohan Bajaj AIR 1980 MP 146 (FB), was overruled. 5. After hearing learned counsel for petitioners and going through the judgment of Supreme Court in Bhanwar Lal (supra), in para 4 & 5, Supreme Court has held as under :- "4. The procedure has been provided in Rules 98 to 103. We are not, at present, concerned with the question relating to the procedure to be followed and question to be determined under Order 21, rules 98 to 102. The procedure has been provided in Rules 98 to 103. We are not, at present, concerned with the question relating to the procedure to be followed and question to be determined under Order 21, rules 98 to 102. A reading of order 21, rule 97 CPC clearly envisages that "any person" even including the judgment-debtor irrespective of whether he claims derivative title from the judgment-debtor or set up his own right, title or interest dehors the judgment-debtor and he resists execution of a decree, then the Court in addition to the power under rule 35(3) has been empowered to conduct an enquiry whether the obstruction by that person in obtaining possession of immovable property was legal or not. The decree-holder gets a right under rule 97 to make an application against third parties to have his obstruction (sic) and an enquiry thereon could be done. Since, each occasion of obstruction or resistance furnishes a cause of action to the decree-holder to make an application for removal of the obstruction or resistance by such person. 5. When the appellant had made the application on 25-5- 1979 against Satyanarain, in law it must be only the application made under Order 21, rule 97(1) of CPC. The executing Court, obviously, was in error in directing to make a fresh application. It is the duty of the executing court to consider the averments in the petition and consider the scope of the applicability of the relevant rule. On technical ground the executing court dismissed the second application on limitation and also the third application, on the ground of res judicata which the High Court has in the revisions now upheld. The procedure is the handmaid of substantive justice but in this case it has run its rooster." 6. Similarly, in case of Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust and another ( AIR 1998 SC 1754 ), in paras 11, 12,13 & 15 as under :- " 11.In the above context we may refer to Order 21 rule 35(1) which reads thus: "Where a decree is for the delivery of any immovable property, possession thereof shall be delivered to the party to whom it has been adjudged, or too such person as he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf, and, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property." 12-13. It is clear that executing court can decide whether the resistor or obstructor is a person bound by the decree and he refused to vacate the property. That question also squarely falls within the adjudicatory process contemplated in Order 21 rule 97(2) of the Code. The adjudication mentioned therein need not necessarily involve a detailed enquiry or collection of evidence. Court can make the adjudication on admitted facts or even on the averments made by the resistor. Of course the Court can direct the parties to adduce evidence for such determination. If the Court deems it necessary. 15. In Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and another, [ 1997 (3) SCC 694 ] this Court, following the aforesaid decision, made the under-quoted observation: "It is pertinent to note that the resistance and/or obstruction to possession of immovable property as contemplated by Order 21, rule 97 CPC could have been offered by any person. The words 'any person' as contemplated by Order 21, rule 97, sub-rule (1) are comprehensive enough to include apart from judgment-debtor or anyone claiming through him even persons claiming independently and who would therefore, be total strangers to the decree. ................................... ............ Consequently it must be held that Respondent 1's application dated 6.5.1991 though seeking only re-issuance of warrant for delivery of possession with aid of armed force in substance sought to bypass the previous resistance and obstruction offered by the appellant on the spot. Thus it was squarely covered by the sweep of Order 21, rule 97, sub-rule (1) CPC. Once that happened the procedure laid down by sub-rule (2) hereof had to be followed by the executing court. The Court had to proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the subsequent provisions contained in the said order." 7. When language of Order XXI Rule 97 CPC is examined, then Subrule (1) provides that "where the holder of a decree for the possession of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person obtaining possession of the property, he may make an application to the Court complaining of such resistance or obstruction." 8. When judgment of apex Court in Bhanwarlal (supra), is examined in this context, then in paras 4 & 5, apex Court has held that "any person" even including the judgment-debtor irrespective of whether he claims derivative title from the judgment-debtor or set-up his own right, title or interest, de hors the judgment-debtor and he resists execution of a decree, then the Court in addition to the power under rule 35(3), has been empowered to conduct an enquiry whether the obstruction by that person in obtaining possession of immovable property was legal or not. The decree holder gets right under rule 97 to make an application against third parties to have his obstruction (sic) and an inquiry thereon could be done. Thus, it is evident that Apex Court has not said that judgment-debtor or person claiming through him or independently can file an application under Order XXI rule 97 CPC, but has only held that if such obstruction is caused either by the judgment-debtor or anybody claiming through him or independently to resist the execution of the judgment and decree, then decree-holer gets right to file an application under rule 97. 9. Recently, apex Court in Sriram Housing Finance and Investment India Limited v. Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust [ (2022) 15 SCC 176 ], has held that " on conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it can be observed that under rule 97, it is only the "decree-holder", who is entitled to make an application in case where he is offered resistance or obstruction by "any person". 10. In the present case, as admitted by the petitioners themselves, they are bonafide purchaser of the property and not the "decree holder". As available from the material placed on record, it is the respondent trust along with legal heirs of late N.D. Mishra, who are the decree holders and not the petitioners. Therefore, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot take shelter of rule 97 as stated above, to raise objections against execution of decree passed in favour of respondents." 11. As available from the material placed on record, it is the respondent trust along with legal heirs of late N.D. Mishra, who are the decree holders and not the petitioners. Therefore, it is obvious that the petitioners cannot take shelter of rule 97 as stated above, to raise objections against execution of decree passed in favour of respondents." 11. Thus, the judgment of apex Court is crystal clear that an application under Order XX1 rule 97 CPC, can only be filed by the decree holder against the person resisting the taking over of possession of the decreed property and not the judgment-debtor or a person claiming through judgment-debtor or obstructing the taking over of possession of the decreed property either through judgment-debtor or independently and, thus, the impugned order when tested, cannot be faulted with. 12. Accordingly, petition fails and is dismissed.