JUDGMENT : Ajit Kumar, J. 1. Heard Ms. Prerna Surolia, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Bushra Maryam, learned counsel for the contesting respondents. 2. By means of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, petitioner has questioned the decision taken by the District Judge, Kaushambi on 7th August, 2024 to order re-inquiry into the charges having found the findings returned by the inquiry officer not agreeable to him. 3. The petitioner has also challenged the subsequent inquiry report as a consequence to the order dated 7th August, 2024 and also the final decision taken by the District Judge, Kaushambi/ disciplinary authority imposing penalty in the nature of two annual increament to the accumulative effects. 4. The submission advanced by Ms. Surolia, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the District Judge, namely the disciplinary authority was required to set aside the report of first inquiry before ordering for re-inquiry inasmuch as on the same set of charges the inquiry could not have been re-opened and hence according to Ms. Surolia, entire procedure and the resultant action suffers from vice of arbitrariness inasmuch as the procedure adopted being flawed one, the impugned decision of the disciplinary authority is rendered unsustainable. 5. Ms. Bushra Maryam, learned counsel for the respondents, on the contrary submits that as per the written provisions contained in the U.P. State District Court Service Rules, 2013 vide its Rule 7(2), the disciplinary authority is well within its right to order re-inquiry into the same charges upon expressing its disagreement with the inquiry report and of course, recording reasons. 6. According to Ms Maryam, the District Judge has recorded a cogent and convincing reasons for his dissatisfaction with the report to order for re-inquiry. Besides this, Ms. Maryam also submits that the petitioner has an alternative efficacious remedy to file departmental appeal before the Administrative Judge under the relevant rules and hence this Court may not interfere with the orders at this stage. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the records, I find merit in the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respondent that disciplinary authority is well vested with its power to order for re-inquiry, upon recording its own satisfaction regarding disagreement with the findings returned by the inquiry officer. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the records, I find merit in the submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respondent that disciplinary authority is well vested with its power to order for re-inquiry, upon recording its own satisfaction regarding disagreement with the findings returned by the inquiry officer. Rule 23(7)(i) & (ii) of the Rules, 2013 is reproduced hereunder: "23.(7)(i) The disciplinary authority may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, remit the case for re-enquiry to the same or any other enquiry officer under intimation to the charged employee. The enquiry officer shall thereupon proceed to hold the enquiry from such stage as directed by the disciplinary authority according to the provisions of Rule 23(5). (ii) The disciplinary authority shall, if it disagrees with the findings of enquiry officer on any charge, record it's finding thereon for reasons to be recorded." 8. Testing the order dated 7th August, 2024 passed by the District Judge, Kaushambi directing for re-inquiry upon the same charges invoking the above provisions, I find that the District Judge, Kaushambi has discussed the oral evidence which were recorded before the inquiry officer and has recorded findings to the effect that the evidence do speak otherwise than what the findings have come to be returned. In my considered view, this itself is sufficient reason to order for re-inquiry. 9. Insofar as the other submission advanced by Ms. Surolia is concerned that inquiry cannot be ordered into the same charges, I find that the rules are absolutely clear to the effect that re-inquiry can be ordered into the same charges as the disagreement is to be recorded by the disciplinary authority upon the findings of the inquiry officer on charges inquired into. 10. Insofar as the submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that the inquiry report is needed to be set aside first before ordering for re-inquiry by the disciplinary authority into the same charges, I find this argument raised to be rejected only for the reason that rules do not provide for setting aside the inquiry report. It only provides for showing disagreement to the findings returned by the inquiry officer. Even otherwise in the considered view of the Court, the report of inquiry officer does not get a legal status unless and until it is acted upon. It only provides for showing disagreement to the findings returned by the inquiry officer. Even otherwise in the considered view of the Court, the report of inquiry officer does not get a legal status unless and until it is acted upon. It is after the inquiry report is acted upon and disciplinary action is taken that question arises as to whether inquiry report is vitiated in law for perverse findings or to be suggestive of any procedural flaw. 11. In the circumstances, therefore, it cannot be said that disciplinary authority is required to set aside the report of inquiry officer by remitting the matter for inquiry afresh. It is sufficient under the rules for that disciplinary authority to express its disagreement to order re-inquiry by giving reasons. 12. Still further, I find that the petitioner has an alternative efficacious remedy of statutory appeal before the Administrative Judge against the order passed by the punishing authority as per Rule 9 of Rules, 2013. 13. In the circumstances, therefore, I consider it appropriate for the petitioner to relegated him to the remedy of statutory appeal leaving it open at the same time for the petitioner to raise all his pleas which are being taken here before the appellate authority as well and further held that any observations made by this Court shall be taken as limited to the disposal of this petition only. 14. In view of the above, while I decline to grant indulgence in the matter of inquiry report and decision taken by the punishing authority, I leave it open for the petitioner to prefer an appeal before the appellate authority, if so advised. 15. Subject to what has been observed above, this petition is consigned to records.