ORDER: Y. LAKSHMANARAO, J. 1. This Criminal Petition has been filed by the Investigating Officer of the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Hyderabad under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’)/Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, ‘BNSS’), seeking, to set aside the order dated 20.06.2024 by cancelling bail granted to respondent/Accused No.1 in NCBF.No.48/1/6/2023/NCB/SUB-ZONE/ HYD, now registered as NDPS SC No.7/2024, passed by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge – cum – I Additional District and Sessions Judge (Special Judge for the Trial of Offences under the NDPS Act), Visakhapatnam, in Crl.M.P.No.483 of 2024, and to pass appropriate orders. 2. The case advanced by the prosecution is this: On 05.06.2023, the petitioner/complainant received specific information that four persons viz., namely: i) B. Nageswara Rao, ii) E. Yadaiah Goud, iii) G. Nagaraju, and iv) K. Manohar Reddy, were manufacturing a large quantity of Alprazolam in the production block of CPR Laboratories Pvt. Ltd., located at Plot No. 23-1 (Part-1), De-notified Area, Atchutapuram APSEZ, Lalamkoduru (V), Rambilli Mandal, Anakapalli-531011. Further information indicated that they were nearing completion the manufacturing process. This information was reduced in writing and submitted to Superintendent, NCB Hyderabad Sub-Zone. Following his instructions, the petitioner/complainant engaged two independent witnesses through the Tahsildar of Rambilli Mandal and proceeded to the above-mentioned facility. They intercepted three individuals viz., B. Nageswara Rao, Erukula Yadaiah Goud, and Gonepally Nagaraju in the production block. These individuals were observed packing material into drums. During the search, 119.5 kg of light-yellow powder, suspected to be Alprazolam, was recovered and seized in accordance with the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short, ‘NDPS Act’), in the presence of the owner of CPR Laboratories Pvt. Ltd. Additionally, equipment used in the manufacture of the seized substance was also seized. b. Subsequently, the three suspects viz., B. Nageswara Rao (A-1), Erukala Yadaiah Goud @ Giri (A-2), and Gonepelly Nagaraju (A-3) were examined under Section 67 of ‘the NDPS Act.’ Each gave statements admitting their involvement in the manufacture, possession, and attempt to transport the light-yellow powder (Alprazolam), all with the motive of earning easy money. c. Based on their admissions, the seized materials, and other incriminating documents, the accused were arrested on 06.06.2023 at 17:00 hrs, 17:15 hrs, and 17:30 hrs respectively, for contraventions of Sections 8(c) read with Section 22(c), 28, and 29 of ‘the NDPS Act’. c. Based on their admissions, the seized materials, and other incriminating documents, the accused were arrested on 06.06.2023 at 17:00 hrs, 17:15 hrs, and 17:30 hrs respectively, for contraventions of Sections 8(c) read with Section 22(c), 28, and 29 of ‘the NDPS Act’. They were produced before the Jurisdictional Magistrate at Yellamanchili on 07.06.2023, remanded to judicial custody, and lodged in Visakhapatnam Central Jail. d. As part of the investigation, based on a voluntary disclosure by B. Nageswara Rao (A-1), it was revealed that K. Manohar Reddy, co-accused in another NDPS case registered at RC Puram Police Station, was the financier of the operation, having contributed approximately Rupees Fifty Lakhs for manufacturing. Consequently, on 23.06.2023, summons was issued to K. Manohar Reddy under Section 67 of ‘the NDPS Act’. Upon examination, he admitted to financing the manufacture and attempted transportation of the light-yellow powder (Alprazolam), as seized under the Panchnama dated 05/06.06.2023. He also admitted to various attempts to evade law enforcement and acknowledged his motive of easy money. Accordingly, he was arrested on 23.06.2023 at 17:30 hrs for violations of Sections 8(c), 22(c), 27A, 28, and 29 of ‘the NDPS Act’. e. Following a thorough investigation, including analysis of call data records (CDRs), tower locations, and hotel-stay data in Atchutapuram during the relevant period, the respondent was arraigned as Accused-1. A petition was filed under Section 36A of ‘the NDPS Act.,’ before the learned Additional District & Sessions Judge, Visakhapatnam, on 29.11.2023. The bail petition in Crl.M.P.No.483 of 2024 was allowed by the learned Special Sessions Judge, granting bail to the respondent/accused No.1. Hence, the present application has been filed. 3. Mr. Suresh Kumar Routhu, learned Special Public Prosecutor for NCB, appearing for the petitioner-State, contended that the learned Special Sessions Judge erroneously enlarged the respondent/accused No.1 on bail, disregarding established legal principles. The respondent, being accused No.1, was the principal offender in this case, involving the seizure of 119.5 Kg of Alprazolam, a huge commercial quantity as per ‘the NDPS Act’. The learned Special Sessions Judge failed to provide with the learned Special Public Prosecutor an adequate opportunity to oppose the bail application, contrary to the mandate of Section 37 (1)(b)(ii) of ‘the NDPS Act’. 4. Additionally, the respondent/accused No.1 is involved in another offence under Section 27A of ‘the NDPS Act’ in Crime No.612 of 2020. The learned Special Sessions Judge failed to provide with the learned Special Public Prosecutor an adequate opportunity to oppose the bail application, contrary to the mandate of Section 37 (1)(b)(ii) of ‘the NDPS Act’. 4. Additionally, the respondent/accused No.1 is involved in another offence under Section 27A of ‘the NDPS Act’ in Crime No.612 of 2020. Learned Special Public Prosecutor argued that the averments in the counter affidavit filed by the prosecution before the learned Special Sessions Judge were not properly considered. 5. The learned Special Public Prosecutor further submitted that the learned Special Sessions Judge did not correctly apply the provisions of Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.,’ and mechanically passed the order, stating that the petitioners were in judicial custody for over a year. It was argued that, in contrast, the learned Special Sessions Judge had duly considered the implications of Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.,’ while dismissing the bail application of Bondalapati Nageswara Rao/accused No.2, in Crl.M.P.No.690 of 2025. It is argued, however, that the learned Special Sessions Judge failed to apply the same reasonings to the respondent/accused No.1. 6. Per contra, Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent/accused No.1, filed a counter affidavit, asserting that sufficient opportunity was provided to the learned Special Public Prosecutor before the learned Special Sessions Judge to present his arguments. It was also submitted that the learned Special Sessions Judge passed a reasoned order, which does not warrant interference on whatsoever grounds, as the prosecution had also filed a counter affidavit. The respondent denied committing any offence and claimed to have been falsely implicated and urging the dismissal of the petition. 7. Learned Special Public Prosecutor for NCB, to buttress his contentions relied on the following judgments: a. In State v. B. Ramu , [2024 SCC OnLine SC 4073] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that in a case of recovery of a huge quantity of narcotic substance, the Courts should be slow in granting even regular bail or anticipatory bail more so when accused is alleged to have criminal antecedents. In this regard, paragraph Nos.8, 9 & 11, relevant paragraphs, are extracted hereunder: “8. Section 37 of the NDPS Act deals with bail to the accused charged in connection with offence involving commercial quantity of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance. In this regard, paragraph Nos.8, 9 & 11, relevant paragraphs, are extracted hereunder: “8. Section 37 of the NDPS Act deals with bail to the accused charged in connection with offence involving commercial quantity of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance. The provision is reproduced herein-below for the sake of ready reference: "37.Offences to becognizable andnon-bailable: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2of 1974): (a)everyoffencepunishable under thisAct shall becognizable. (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for [offences under Section 19 or Section 24 or Section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless: (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for suchrelease. (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the courtis satisfiedthat therearereasonablegroundsfor believing thathe is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of subsection (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or any other law for the time being inforce on granting of bail. 9. A plain reading of statutory provision makes it abundantly clear that in the event, the Public Prosecutor opposes the prayer for bail either regular or anticipatory, as the case may be, the Court would have to record a satisfaction that there are grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to commit any offence while onbail. 11. In case of recovery of such a huge quantity of narcotic substance, the Courts should be slow in granting even regular bail to the accused what to talk of anticipatory bail more so when the accused is alleged to behaving criminal antecedents." b. In Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh , [2023 SCC OnLine SC 346] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that no person accused of offence involving trade in a commercial quantity of narcotics is entitled to be released on bail unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. c. In State of Kerala v. Rajesh , [ (2020)12 SCC 122 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held at Paragraph No.19 as under: “19. c. In State of Kerala v. Rajesh , [ (2020)12 SCC 122 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held at Paragraph No.19 as under: “19. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC, but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37 which commences with non- obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of commission of an offence under the Act, unless twin conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application; and the second, is that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail operates” d. In Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal , [ (2022) 18 SCC 374 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the length of the period of judicial custody and the fact that the charge sheet has been filed and the trial has commenced are by themselves not considerations that can be treated as persuasive grounds for granting relief to the respondent under Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.’ In that regard, the relevant paragraph Nos.18 and 19 are extracted hereunder: “18. Even dehors the confessional statement of the respondent and the other co-accused recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, which were subsequently retracted by them, the other circumstantial evidence brought on record by the appellant-NCB ought to have dissuaded the High Court from exercising its discretion in favour of the respondent and concluding that there were reasonable grounds to justify that he was not guilty of such an offence under the NDPS Act. We are not persuaded by the submission made by learned counsel for the respondent and the observation made in theimpugnedorder thatsince nothing wasfound from the possession of the respondent, he is not guilty of the offence for which he has been charged. Suchan assumption would be prematureat thisstage. 19. In our opinion the narrow parameters of bail available under Section 37 of the Act, havenot been satisfied in the facts of the instant case. Suchan assumption would be prematureat thisstage. 19. In our opinion the narrow parameters of bail available under Section 37 of the Act, havenot been satisfied in the facts of the instant case. At this stage, it is not safe to conclude that the respondent has successfully demonstrated that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is not guilty of the offence alleged against him, for him to have been admitted to bail. The length of the period of his custodyor the fact that the charge-sheet has been filed and the trial has commenced are by themselves not considerations that can be treated as persuasive grounds for granting relief to the respondent under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.” e. In Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari , [ (2007) 7 SCC 798 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held about recovery of 400 kgs. of poppy straw from possession of accused respondent that two conditions to be satisfied under Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.,’ for granting bail: First, the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that accused not guilty, and second that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. If either of conditions are not satisfied, the accused cannot be granted bail. In that regard, the relevant paragraph Nos.6, 7 and 11 are extracted here under: “6. As the provision itself provides no person shall be granted bail unless the two conditions are satisfied. They are; the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Both the conditions have to be satisfied. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, thebar operates and the accused cannot be released on bail. 7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is "reasonable grounds". The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence chargedand thisreasonable belief contemplated in turn points to existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. 11. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence chargedand thisreasonable belief contemplated in turn points to existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. 11. The Court while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that the Court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the Court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording afinding ofnot guilty.” f. In Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan , [ (2021) 10 SCC 100 ] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held that given the seriousness of offences punishable under ‘the NDPS Act.,’ and to curb the menace of drug-trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for grant of bail under ‘the NDPS Act.,’ have been prescribed. g. In State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo , [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraph Nos.5 to 8 as below: “5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that in cases involving commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while considering the application of bail, the Court is bound to ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. Thesaid provision readsthus:- “37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offencewhile onbail.” 6. While considering the cases under NDPS Act, one cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing the said enactment after repealing the then existing laws relating to the Narcotic drugs. While considering the cases under NDPS Act, one cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing the said enactment after repealing the then existing laws relating to the Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in the acts itself reads thus: - “An act toconsolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters connected there with." In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira { (2004) 3 SCC 549 }, the three judge bench of this Court considered the provisions under Section 37(1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, withregard to theexpression “reasonable grounds” used therein. This Court held that it means something more than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates substantial and probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the provision would require existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. As relates the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail it was held therein that they are cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of existence of those twin conditionshadto bebasedon the‘reasonablegrounds’, asreferredabove. 7. In the decision in State of Kerala and Ors. v. Rajesh and Ors. Satisfaction of existence of those twin conditionshadto bebasedon the‘reasonablegrounds’, asreferredabove. 7. In the decision in State of Kerala and Ors. v. Rajesh and Ors. { (2020) 12 SCC 122 }, after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by this Court to be followed while considering an application for bail moved by an accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that the scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that the exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act. Further it was held that in case one of the two conditions there under is not satisfied the ban for granting bail would operate. 8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra revealing the consistent view of this Court that while considering the application for bail made by an accused involved in an offence under NDPS Act a liberal approach ignoring the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is sine qua non for granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act cannot be avoided while passing orders on such applications.” 8. On the other hand, Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/accused No.1, relied on the following judgments: a. In Union of India v. K.A.Najeeb , [(2021)3SCC713] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraph Nos.8 and 15 as under: “8. It must be emphasised at the outset that there is a vivid distinction between the parameters to be applied while considering a bail application, vis-à- vis those applicable while deciding a petition for its cancellation. In Puran v. Rambilas, it was reiterated that at the time of deciding an application for bail, it would be necessary to record reasons, albeit without evaluating the evidence on merits. In turn, Puran cited Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.); wherein this Court observed that bail once granted by the trial Court, could be cancelled by the same Court only in case of new circumstances/evidence, failing which, it would be necessary to approach the Higher Court exercising appellate jurisdiction. 15. In turn, Puran cited Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.); wherein this Court observed that bail once granted by the trial Court, could be cancelled by the same Court only in case of new circumstances/evidence, failing which, it would be necessary to approach the Higher Court exercising appellate jurisdiction. 15. This Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. In Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing Undertrial Prisoners) v. Union of India, it was held that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no personought tosuffer adverse consequencesof his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter. However, owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, the courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, the courts wouldordinarilybe obligatedtoenlarge themonbail.” b. In Bharat Chaudhary v. Union of India , [(2021)20SCC50] , the Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraph Nos.13 and 14 as under: “13. In the absence of any clarity so far on the quantitative analysis of the samples, the prosecution cannot be heard to state at this preliminary stage that the petitioners have been found to be in possession of commercial quantity of psychotropic substances as contemplated under the NDPS Act. Further, a large number of the tablets that have been seized by DRI admittedly contain herbs/medicines meant to enhance male potency and they do not attract the provisions of the NDPS Act. Most importantly, none of the tablets were seized by the prosecution during the course of the search conducted, either at the office or at the residence of A-4 at Jaipur, on 16-3-2020. Reliance on printouts of WhatsApp messages downloaded from the mobile phone and devices seized from the office premises of A -4 cannot be treated at this stage as sufficient material to establish a live link between him and A-1 to A-3, when even as per the prosecution, scientific reportsin respect of thesaiddevices isstill awaited. 14. Reliance on printouts of WhatsApp messages downloaded from the mobile phone and devices seized from the office premises of A -4 cannot be treated at this stage as sufficient material to establish a live link between him and A-1 to A-3, when even as per the prosecution, scientific reportsin respect of thesaiddevices isstill awaited. 14. In the absence of any psychotropic substance found in the conscious possession of A-4, we are of the opinion that mere reliance on the statement made by A-1 to A-3 under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is too tenuous a ground to sustain the impugned order dated 15-7-2021 {Union of India Vs. Bharat Choudary, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 6554}. This is all the more so when such a reliance runs contrary to the ruling in Tofan Singh {Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1 }. The impugned order qua A-4 is, accordingly, quashed and set aside and the order dated 2-11-2020 passed by the learned Special Judge, EC & NDPS cases, is restored. As for Raja Chandrasekharan (A-1), since the charge-sheet has already been filed and by now the said accused has remained in custody for over a period of two years, it is deemed appropriate to release him on bail, subjecttothesatisfaction ofthetrial court.” c. In Narcotics Control Bureau v. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta , [ (2022) 12 SCC 633 ] the Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraph Nos.11 and 12 as under: “11. Having gone through the records along with the tabulated statementof therespondentssubmittedonbehalf of thepetitioner NCB and on carefully perusing the impugned orders [Pallulabid Ahamad Arimutta v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3516] , [Mohd. Afzal v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3433] , [Munees Kavil Paramabath v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3431] , [Abu Thahir v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3517] , [Mohd. Afzal v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 1294] , [Munees Kavil Parambath v. State of Karnataka, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3432] passed in each case, it emerges that except for the voluntary statements of A-1 and A-2 in the first case and that of the respondents themselves recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, it appears, prima facie, that no substantial material was available with the prosecution at the time of arrest to connect the respondents with the allegations levelled against them of indulging in drug trafficking. It has not been denied by the prosecution that except for the respondent in SLP (Crl.) No. 1569 of 2021, none of the other respondents were found to be in possession of commercial quantities of psychotropic substances, as contemplated under the NDPS Act. 12. It has been held in clear terms in Tofan Singh v. State of T.N. [Tofan Singh v. Stateof T.N., (2021) 4 SCC 1 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 246] , that a confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act will remain inadmissible in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act. In the teeth of the aforesaid decision, the arrests made by thepetitioner NCB, on thebasis of theconfession/voluntary statements of the respondents or the co-accused under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, cannot form the basis for overturning the impugned orders [Pallulabid Ahamad Arimutta v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3516] , [Mohd. Afzal v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3433] , [Munees Kavil Paramabath v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3431] , [Abu Thahir v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3517] , [Mohd. Afzal v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 1294] , [Munees Kavil Parambath v. State of Karnataka, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3432] releasing them on bail. The CDR details of some of the accused or the allegations of tampering of evidence on the part of one of the respondents is an aspect that will be examined at the stage of trial. For the aforesaid reason, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the orders dated 16-9-2019 [Pallulabid Ahamad Arimutta v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3516] , 14-1-2020 [Mohd. Afzal v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3433] , 16-1-2020 [Munees Kavil Paramabath v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3431] , 19-12-2019 [Abu Thahir v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3517] and 20-1-2020 [Munees Kavil Parambath v. State of Karnataka, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3432] passed in SLP (Crl.) No. arising out of Diary No. 22702 of 2020, SLP (Crl.) No. 1454 of 2021, SLP (Crl.) No. 1465 of 2021, SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 1773-74 of 2021 and SLP (Crl.) No. 2080 of 2021 respectively. The impugned orders [Pallulabid Ahamad Arimutta v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3516] , [Mohd. 1773-74 of 2021 and SLP (Crl.) No. 2080 of 2021 respectively. The impugned orders [Pallulabid Ahamad Arimutta v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3516] , [Mohd. Afzal v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3433] , [Munees Kavil Paramabath v. State, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3431] , [Abu Thahir v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Kar 3517] , [Mohd. Afzal v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 1294] , [Munees Kavil Parambath v. State of Karnataka, 2020 SCC OnLine Kar 3432] are, accordingly, upheld and the special leave petitions filed by the petitioner NCB seeking cancellation of bail granted to the respective respondents,aredismissedasmeritless.” d. In Bhuri Bai v. State of M.P., , [112022SCCOnLineSC1779] the Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraph Nos.19 and 20 as under: “ 19. It remains trite that normally, very cogent and overwhelming circumstances or grounds are required to cancel the bail already granted. Ordinarily, unless a strong case based on any supervening event is made out, an order granting bail is not to be lightly interfered with under Section439(2)CrPC. 20. It had not been the case of the prosecution that the appellant had misused the liberty or had comported herself in any manner in violation of the conditions imposed on her. We are impelled to observe that power of cancellation of bail should be exercised with extreme care and circumspection; and such cancellation cannot be ordered merely for any perceived indiscipline on the part of the accused before granting bail. In other words, the powers of cancellation of bail cannot be approached as if of disciplinary proceedings against theaccused and in fact, in a casewhere bail has already been granted, its upsetting under Section 439(2) CrPC is envisaged only in such cases where the liberty of the accused is going to be counteracting the requirements of a proper trial of the criminal case. In the matter of the present nature, in our view, over-expansion of the issue was not required only for one reason that a particular factor was not stated bytheTrial Court initsorder granting bail.” 9. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by Mr. Suresh Kumar Routhu, learned Special Public Prosecutor for NCB, appearing for the petitioner-State, and Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/accused No.1. 10. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by Mr. Suresh Kumar Routhu, learned Special Public Prosecutor for NCB, appearing for the petitioner-State, and Sri P. Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/accused No.1. 10. Of course, the learned Special Sessions Judge passed a two-page order granting bail to the petitioner therein, merely stating that the petitioner had been in judicial custody for the past one year. The order does not reflect thorough consideration of the stringent requirements under Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.’ 11. Indeed, the length of his custody period or the fact that the charge sheet has been filed and the trial has commenced are by themselves not considerations that can be treated as persuasive grounds for granting relief to the respondent under Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.’ Of course, a plain reading of statutory provision makes it abundantly clear that in the event, the Public Prosecutor opposes the prayer for bail either regular or anticipatory, as the case may be, the Court would have to record a satisfaction that there are grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The learned Special Sessions Judge ignored the above settled position. 12. It is pertinent to note that in a separate application concerning accused No.2, the learned Sessions Judge duly considered the purport of Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.,’ and passed the interim order. 13. In fact, Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), , [12(1978)1SCC118] the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that bail once granted by the trial Court could be cancelled by the same Court only in case of new circumstances/evidence, failing which, it would be necessary to approach the Higher Court exercising appellate jurisdiction. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution of India would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. 14. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified in numerous judgments that the liberty guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution of India would cover within its protective ambit not only due procedure and fairness but also access to justice and a speedy trial. 14. While this Court possesses the power under Section 439 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ or Section 483 of ‘the BNSS’ to cancel the bail granted by the learned Special Sessions Judge, but we are not inclined to exercise this discretion at this juncture by which time much water has been flown since the learned Special Sessions Judge has been apprised of the entire matter and seized of trial. 15. Needless to say, very cogent and overwhelming circumstances or grounds shall exist for cancelling the bail already granted to the Respondent by the learned Special Sessions Judge. It is trite law that, unless a strong case based on any supervening event is made out, an order granting bail is not to be lightly interfered with under Section 439(2) of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ 16. It is not the contention of the learned Special Public Prosecutor for NCB that the Respondent had misused the liberty or had comported himself in any manner in violation of the conditions imposed on him. Undoubtedly, the power of cancellation of bail should be exercised with extreme care and circumspection. 17. Be that as it may, the impugned order was passed over a year ago and since then, significant developments have been taken place. The learned Special Sessions Judge has taken cognizance of the offence following the filing of the charge sheet, and the matter has been assigned a Sessions case number. It is the learned Special Sessions judge, who would be aware of the facts whether the respondent misused the liberty or composed himself in any manner in violation of conditions imposed on him. Further, no reasons are assigned for filing this application before us directly without filing the application before the learned Special Sessions Judge. Therefore, it is appropriate to give necessary directions to the petitioner to approach the learned Special Sessions Judge for cancellation of bail given to the respondent. 18. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has also fairly conceded that the learned Special Sessions Judge has initiated the trial by framing charges. Therefore, it is appropriate to give necessary directions to the petitioner to approach the learned Special Sessions Judge for cancellation of bail given to the respondent. 18. The learned Special Public Prosecutor has also fairly conceded that the learned Special Sessions Judge has initiated the trial by framing charges. In that view of the matter, it would be appropriate to dispose of this criminal petition with a direction to the petitioner-State to move an application seeking the cancellation of the bail before the learned Special Sessions Judge, who granted bail to the respondent/accused No.1. 19. In the event of such an application is filed by the petitioner-State, the learned Special Sessions Judge is directed to consider it, on its own merits, considering the arguments and judgments, if any, relied upon by both the learned Public Prosecutor and learned Counsel for the accused. The application should be disposed of expeditiously, preferably within two weeks from the date of its filing. 20. However, it is made clear that the observations made above were only confined to the disposal of this application and in no way be construed to have an expression on the merits of the case before the learned Trial Court. 21. With the above observations, this Criminal Petition is disposed of. As a sequel, interlocutory applications, if any pending, shall stand closed.