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2025 DIGILAW 812 (HP)

Anil Kumar Rana v. State of H. P.

2025-04-25

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR number 57 of 2020, dated 30 th May 2020, registered at Police Station Gaggal, District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 188 , 269 , 270 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code ( IPC ) and consequential proceedings bearing Police challan number 92 of 2021 pending before learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, District Kangra, HP. (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant, Dr Sanjay Bhardwaj, Block Medical Officer, made a complaint to the police stating that the petitioner/accused was directed to stay in Hotel River Retreat during quarantine. The petitioner/accused was found roaming outside the premises. The informant directed the petitioner to remain in the cottage where he was directed to remain during the quarantine. The petitioner refused to do so and started taking photographs of the informant with the help of his mobile phone. The petitioner violated the conditions of the quarantine. The police registered the FIR, conducted the investigation and filed the chargesheet before the Court after the completion of the investigation. 3. Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR and filing of the chargesheet, the petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing the same. It has been asserted that the petitioner was not suffering from any infectious or contagious disease. The cognisance of the offence punishable under Section 188 of the IPC is barred except upon a written complaint by the Officer whose order has been violated. The FIR was registered on 30th May 2020, and the final report was filed on 17th June 2021. The offence alleged against the petitioner is punishable with simple imprisonment of one month, and the chargesheet was barred by limitation. The petitioner was put under quarantine as he travelled to the State of Himachal Pradesh from another State. The petitioner did not suffer from any illness, and he was in a fit state of health. The allegations contained in the FIR are wrong. The petitioner was put under quarantine as he travelled to the State of Himachal Pradesh from another State. The petitioner did not suffer from any illness, and he was in a fit state of health. The allegations contained in the FIR are wrong. The State Government has issued the guidelines regarding the registration of the FIR for violation of the protocols issued during the COVID-19 period, and only the Sub-Divisional Magistrate or the District Magistrate is competent to lodge the FIR. The informant was a doctor and incompetent to file the complaint with the police. The State decided to close/cancel the FIR registered for the violation of the protocols during the COVID-19 period. The continuation of the proceedings amounted to an abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings be quashed. 4. I have heard Mr Sunil Kumar Kaundal, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents/State. 5. Mr Sunil Kumar Kaundal, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the informant was not competent to lodge the FIR because of the instructions issued by the State Government. The state government has decided to cancel the FIR lodged for the violation of the COVID-19 protocol. The petitioner did not suffer from any contagious or infectious disease, and the offences punishable under Sections 269 and 270 of the IPC are not made out. The continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and chargesheet be ordered to be quashed. He relied upon Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel vs. State of Maharashtra 2024 INSC 737 , Ranjeet Kumar vs. State of HP CrMMO no. 648 of 2023 decided on 08.12.2023 , Shaileshbhai Ranchhodbhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat Cr.A. no. 1884 of 2013 decided on 28.08.2024 and K Bharathi Devi vs. State of Telangana 2024 INSC 750 in support of his submission. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents/State, submitted that the contents of the FIR disclosed the commission of the cognisable offence. The police conducted the investigation and filed the chargesheet before the competent court. The Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction. 6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents/State, submitted that the contents of the FIR disclosed the commission of the cognisable offence. The police conducted the investigation and filed the chargesheet before the competent court. The Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 8. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P. , 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: - “7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 , wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added) 8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed. As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police Officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed. Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.” 9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed: “8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. 9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre- empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 10. The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. It was not disputed in the petition that the petitioner had visited the State of Himachal Pradesh from a different State and was required to undergo quarantine as per the guidelines framed by the State. Section 271 of the IPC provides for punishment for violation of the quarantine rule. Therefore, prima facie, the petitioner is liable for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 271 of the IPC . 12. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false, and there is no evidence that the petitioner suffered from any contagious or infectious disease. This submission will not help the petitioner. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P. , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643 , wherein it was held : - “13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) 14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706 : 2018 INSC 1060 “ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) “16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 13. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.” 13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand , (2025) 1 SCC 392 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-trial. It was observed at page 397: “17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7) 6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. … 7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufÏcient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.” 14. A similar view was taken in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat , (2018) 3 SCC 104 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 683: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 6 , wherein it was observed at page 111: “29 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide O Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1- 2018.]. The High Court, in our view, failed to see the extent of its jurisdiction, which it possesses to exercise while examining the legality of any FIR complaining commission of several cognizable offences by the accused persons. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can it exercise the powers like an appellate court. In order to examine as to whether the factual contents of the FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, the High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can it exercise the powers like an appellate court. The question, in our opinion, was required to be examined keeping in view the contents of the FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. 30 [Ed.: Paras 29 and 30 corrected vide O Corrigendum No. F.3/Ed.B.J./2/2018 dated 31-1-2018.] . At this stage, the High Court could not appreciate the evidence, nor could it draw its own inferences from the contents of the FIR and the material relied on. It was more so when the material relied on was disputed by the complainants and vice versa. In such a situation, it becomes the job of the investigating authority at such stage to probe and then of the court to examine the questions once the charge-sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. 31. In our considered opinion, once the court finds that the FIR does disclose the prima facie commission of any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and allow the investigating machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth the crime in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the Code. 32. The very fact that the High Court, in this case, went into the minutest details in relation to every aspect of the case and devoted 89 pages of judgment to quash the FIR in part led us to draw a conclusion that the High Court had exceeded its powers while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. We cannot concur with such an approach of the High Court. 33. The inherent powers of the High Court, which are obviously not defined as being inherent in its very nature, cannot be stretched to any extent and nor can such powers be equated with the appellate powers of the High Court defined in the Code. The parameters laid down by this Court while exercising inherent powers must always be kept in mind, else it would lead to committing the jurisdictional error in deciding the case. Such is the case here. 34. The parameters laid down by this Court while exercising inherent powers must always be kept in mind, else it would lead to committing the jurisdictional error in deciding the case. Such is the case here. 34. On perusal of the three complaints and the FIR mentioned above, we are of the considered view that the complaint and FIR, do disclose a prima facie commission of various cognizable offences alleged by the complainants against the accused persons and, therefore, the High Court instead of dismissing the application filed by the accused persons in part should have dismissed the application as a whole to uphold the entire FIR in question.” 15. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR. 16. It was submitted that there is insufÏcient material to convict the petitioners. This will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Maroti , (2023) 4 SCC 298 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1503 that the High Court exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot examine the truthfulness, sufÏciency and admissibility of the evidence. It was observed: 21. If FIR and the materials collected disclose a cognizable offence and the final report filed under Section 173(2)CrPC on completion of investigation based on it would reveal that the ingredients to constitute an offence under the POCSO Act and a prima facie case against the persons named therein as accused, the truthfulness, sufÏciency or admissibility of the evidence are not matters falling within the purview of exercise of power under Section 482CrPC and undoubtedly they are matters to be done by the trial court at the time of trial. This position is evident from the decisions referred to supra. 22. In the decision in M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita [ M.L. Bhatt v. M.K. Pandita , ( 2023) 12 SCC 821: 2002 SCC OnLine SC 1300: JT (2002) 3 SC 89] , this Court held that while considering the question of quashing of FIR the High Court would not be entitled to appreciate by way of sifting the materials collected in course of investigation including the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC. 23. 23. In the decision in Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab [Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab, (2020) 3 SCC 317 : (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 51] a two-judge Bench of this Court dealt with the question as to the matters that could be considered by the High Court in quashment proceedings under Section 482CrPC. It was held therein that statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161CrPC, being wholly inadmissible in evidence, could not be taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. In that case, this Court took note of the fact that the High Court was aware that one of the witnesses mentioned that the deceased victim had informed him about the harassment by the accused, which she was not able to bear and hence wanted to commit suicide. Finding that the conclusion of the High Court to quash the criminal proceedings, in that case, was on the basis of its assessment of the statements recorded under Section 161CrPC, it was held that statements thereunder, being wholly inadmissible in evidence could not have been taken into consideration by the Court while adjudicating a petition filed under Section 482CrPC. It was also held that the High Court committed an error in quashing the proceedings by assessing the statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC.” 17. Therefore, it is impermissible to quash the FIR and the proceedings on the ground of insufÏciency of evidence. 18. It was submitted that the chargesheet was filed after the period of limitation. This submission is not acceptable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court excluded the period of limitation from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 in Cognisance for Extension of Limitation, In re , (2022) 3 SCC 117 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 27. It was observed at page 119: 5.1. 18. It was submitted that the chargesheet was filed after the period of limitation. This submission is not acceptable. The Hon’ble Supreme Court excluded the period of limitation from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 in Cognisance for Extension of Limitation, In re , (2022) 3 SCC 117 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 27. It was observed at page 119: 5.1. The order dated 23-3-2020 [ Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2020) 19 SCC 10 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 801] is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 8-3-2021 [ Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2021) 5 SCC 452 : (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 40 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 615 : (2021) 2 SCC (L&S) 50 ], 27-4-2021 [ Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, (2021) 17 SCC 231 : 2021 SCC OnLine SC 373 ] and 23-9-2021 [ Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 947] , it is directed that the period from 15-3-2020 till 28-2-2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. 19. In the present case, the chargesheet was filed during the excluded period and cannot be said to be barred by limitation. 20. It was submitted that the State Government has decided to close/cancel/withdraw the FIR registered for violation of the COVID-19 protocol, and the continuation of the proceedings amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. This submission will not help the petitioner. First, the authenticity of the letter annexed to the petition has not been established. Secondly, it is a letter written by the Principal Secretary (Home) to all District Magistrates, who have been directed to constitute a committee to decide on the withdrawal by adopting appropriate procedures as per the law. Therefore, it is for the committee to decide about the withdrawal, and this court cannot quash the FIR without the decision of the committee based on a letter written by the Principal Secretary (Home). 21. It was submitted that the informant was not competent to lodge the FIR as per the instructions issued by the State Government. The submission will not help the petitioner. First, the copy of the instruction has not been placed on record. Secondly, the principle of locus standi does not apply to criminal proceedings. 21. It was submitted that the informant was not competent to lodge the FIR as per the instructions issued by the State Government. The submission will not help the petitioner. First, the copy of the instruction has not been placed on record. Secondly, the principle of locus standi does not apply to criminal proceedings. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ratanlal v. Prahlad Jat, (2017) 9 SCC 340 : (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 729: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that the concept of locus standi is foreign to criminal law. It was observed at page 345: “9. However, a criminal trial is conducted largely by following the procedure laid down in the CrPC. Locus standi of the complaint is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. Anyone can set the criminal law in motion, except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. This general principle is founded on a policy that an offence, that is, an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force, is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. Therefore, in respect of such offences which are treated against society, it becomes the duty of the State to punish the offender. In A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak[A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 277] , a Constitution Bench of this Court has considered this aspect as under: (SCC pp. 508-09, para 6) 6. … In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence, i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force [see Section 2(n) CrPC], is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. Society, for its orderly and peaceful development, is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people, which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. Society, for its orderly and peaceful development, is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people, which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of society is one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for the larger good of society, the right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a straitjacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception.” 10. In Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand [Manohar Lal v. Vinesh Anand, (2001) 5 SCC 407 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1322] , this Court has held that the doctrine of locus standi is totally foreign to criminal jurisprudence. To punish an offender in the event of the commission of an offence is to subserve a social need. Society cannot afford to have a criminal escape his liability since that would bring about a state of social pollution which is neither desired nor warranted, and this is irrespective of the concept of locus. 22. The judgments in Shaileshbhai (supra), K Bharathi Devi (supra) and Ranjeet Kumar (supra) dealt with the power of the Court to quash the FIR based on the compromise, which is not a situation here. Kailashben (supra) dealt with a case which disclosed a civil wrong and not a criminal offence. Hence, this judgment also does not apply to the present case. 23. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. It was observed: “At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating Officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.” 24. The FIR discloses the commission of cognizable offences, and it cannot be quashed at this stage. 25. No other point was urged. 26. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 27. The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.