ORDER : M. SUNDAR, J. This order will now govern the captioned main writ petition and captioned writ miscellaneous petitions thereat. 2. When the captioned matter was listed yesterday (05.02.2025), the following proceedings/order was made: 'W.P.No.4076 of 2025 and W.M.P.Nos.4581, 4582 & 4584 of 2025 M.SUNDAR, J. and K. GOVINDARAJAN THILAKAVADI, J. [Order of the Court was made by M.SUNDAR. J.,] Captioned main 'Writ Petition' {hereinafter 'WP' for the sake of brevity} has been filed with a Certiorarified mandamus prayer. 2. In and vide certiorari limb, an 'order dated 28.01.2025 bearing reference Na.Ka.115/2025/A5 made by R4 [the Tahsildar, Udumalpet Taluk, Tiruppur District]' {hereinafter 'impugned order' for the sake of brevity, convenience and clarity} has been assailed. 3. Mr.Rahul Balaji, learned counsel on record for writ petitioner, adverting to impugned order submits that impugned order directs further proceedings pursuant to notice and order under Sections 7 and 6 respectively of 'the Tamil Nadu Land Encroachment Act, 1905 (Tamil Nadu Act III of 1905)' {hereinafter 'said 1905 Act' for the sake of brevity}. To be noted, Section 7 notice is dated 03.12.2024 and Section 6 notice / order is dated 04.12.2024 but contains a signature in the office of R4 dated 02.01.2025. 4. Subject matter of aforementioned proceedings is 'land admeasuring 4.09 acres or thereabouts comprised in S.Nos.419/1 and 419/4 in Ellayamuthur Village, Udumalpet Taluk, Tiruppur District' {hereinafter 'said land' for the sake of brevity, convenience and clarity}. 5. Learned counsel for writ petitioner submits that writ petitioner originally sought assignment, filed a writ petition in W.P.No.11296 of 2014 regarding assignment application dated 07.09.2013. This writ petition was disposed of on 07.02.2022 by a Hon'ble single Judge directing R1 before us to consider the assignment application on merits and in accordance with law and pass orders within 12 weeks but thereafter, the Government has issued G.O.Ms.No.201 dated 10.05.2022 providing for exchange inter alia by substituting Order 26A of 'Revenue Standing Order' {'RSO'} and therefore, the writ petitioner applied for exchange on 17.12.2024 offering a equivalent 4.09 acres in S.Nos.188/A2 and 187/2 Part in Ellayamuthur Village, Udumalpet Taluk, Tiruppur District. 6. Pending exchange application, proceedings under said 1905 Act were kick started and the same has culminated in impugned order is learned counsel for writ petitioner's say. 7. Issue notice. 8. 6. Pending exchange application, proceedings under said 1905 Act were kick started and the same has culminated in impugned order is learned counsel for writ petitioner's say. 7. Issue notice. 8. Mr.T.K.Saravanan, learned Government Advocate accepts notice for all five respondents and seeks a short accommodation inter alia to get instructions qua who is the authority / which is the authority, which is vested with power to decide on the exchange plea of writ petitioner. 9. Let the matter stand over by a day. List in the Admission Board i.e., Motion List tomorrow (06.02.2025). [M.S., J] [K.G.T., J] 05.02.2025' 3. The aforementioned proceedings/order shall now be read as integral part and parcel of this order. This means that the short forms, short references and abbreviations used in our earlier proceedings/order dated 05.02.2025 shall continue to be used in the instant order too. 4. Adverting to the aforementioned earlier proceedings/order, learned State counsel submitted that the authority which is vested with the power to decide the exchange plea is, the Commissioner of Land Administration (CLA) but the CLA will act on reports from R1, which, in turn, will be on the basis of reports collected from the hierarchy of Revenue officials. 5. The impugned order is clearly an order consequent to Section 7 and 6 notice/orders, details of which have been captured in paragraph no.3 of our earlier proceedings/order which, as alluded to supra, is now an integral part and parcel of this order. 6. Absent notice/order under Section 6, the impugned order could not have been made. Before we proceed further, we deem it appropriate to record the stated position of learned State counsel that the notice/order under Section 6 is dated 02.01.2025 and not 04.12.2024 and that it was served on writ petitioner on 08.01.2025. In the light of paragraph no.3 of our earlier proceedings/order dated 05.02.2025, we now proceed on the basis that notice/order under Section 6 made by R4 is dated 02.01.2025 (not 04.12.2024) and it was served on writ petitioner on 08.01.2025. It is also made clear that the date 04.12.2024 mentioned in earlier proceedings/order is date of G.O. Ms.No.540 issued by Revenue Department [S.T. 6(2)]. 7. A statutory appeal under Section 10 of said 1905 Act is available to writ petitioner qua Section 6 notice/order made by R4. There is no disputation or contestation on this obtaining position. It is also made clear that the date 04.12.2024 mentioned in earlier proceedings/order is date of G.O. Ms.No.540 issued by Revenue Department [S.T. 6(2)]. 7. A statutory appeal under Section 10 of said 1905 Act is available to writ petitioner qua Section 6 notice/order made by R4. There is no disputation or contestation on this obtaining position. This Court is also informed by learned counsel for writ petitioner that the writ petitioner has not preferred a statutory appeal under Section 10. 8. Therefore, this Court heard learned counsel for writ petitioner on Alternative Remedy. 9. Before proceeding further, we deem it appropriate to write the obtaining legal position that Alternative Remedy rule is not an absolute rule and that it is a rule of discretion. Exceptions to Alternative Remedy rule have been adumbrated in the oft-quoted celebrated Whirlpool judgment i.e., Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 . These exceptions have come to stay in legal parlance as Whirlpool exceptions. The Whirlpool exceptions, broadly stated, are four in number and they are: (i) Enforcement of fundamental rights; (ii) Violation of Natural Justice Principles (NJP); (iii) Order being 'wholly' without jurisdiction; and (iv) when the vires of a statute are assailed. 10. On the touchstone of Whirlpool principle, we heard learned counsel for writ petitioner on Alternative Remedy. 11. Learned counsel took us through certain provisions of said 1905 Act and they are Section 2 captioned 'Right of property in public roads, etc. waters and lands', Section 3 captioned 'Levy of assessment on lands unauthorisedly occupied', Section 7 captioned 'Prior notice to person in occupation' and Section 6 captioned 'Liability of person unauthorisedly occupying land to summary eviction, forfeiture of crops, etc.'. Adverting to these provisions, learned counsel for writ petitioner submitted that the Appellate Authority (to be noted, in this case, R1 is the Appellate Authority) will not have powers to take cognizance of the pendency of the exchange plea. 12. The argument is, a conjoint reading of the aforementioned provisions of said 1905 Act, makes it clear that the statutory appeal before R1 is capable of answers which are only binary, i.e., as to whether public roads, streets, lanes, bridges, ditches, etc. adumbrated in Section 2 have been occupied or not. 13. 12. The argument is, a conjoint reading of the aforementioned provisions of said 1905 Act, makes it clear that the statutory appeal before R1 is capable of answers which are only binary, i.e., as to whether public roads, streets, lanes, bridges, ditches, etc. adumbrated in Section 2 have been occupied or not. 13. To put it differently, learned counsel for writ petitioner predicated his argument on the simple point that Alternative Remedy is inefficacious in the facts and circumstances of the case on hand. 14. We carefully considered the arguments. 15. Section 6 notice/order is made post enquiry albeit summary. As regards the statutory appeal provision, i.e., Section 10, the same reads as follows: '10. Appeal.-- An appeal shall lie-- (a) to the Collector from any decision or order passed by a Tahsildar or Deputy Tahsildar under this Act, and (aa) to such officer as may be specified by the State Government in this behalf (hereinafter referred to as the appellate authority) from any decision or order passed by an authorised officer under this Act and different appellate authorities may be specified for different classes of cases; and (b) to the District Collector from any decision or order of a Collector passed otherwise than on appeal, and (c) to the Commissioner of Land Administration from any decision or order of a District Collector passed otherwise than on appeal.' 16. In the case on hand, we are concerned with Section 10(a) as the Section notice/order has been made by R4. A careful reading of Section 10 makes it clear that the District Collector will hear an appeal from any decision or order passed by a Tahsildar under the Act. We deem it appropriate to extract and reproduce Section 10-B captioned 'Stay pending decision in appeal or revision' which reads as follows: '10-B. Stay pending decision in appeal or revision.-- Pending the disposal of any appeal or application or proceedings for revision under this Act, the Collector, the District Collector (the appellate authority), the Commissioner of Land Administration or the State Government, as the case may be, may, by order, and subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, stay the execution of the decision or order appealed against or sought to be revised.' 17. A careful perusal of Section 10-B makes it clear that R1 (Appellate Authority) is vested with the power to stay the execution of the decision or order (in this case, Section 6 notice/order dated 02.01.2025 made by R4), pending disposal of appeal and that can be subjected to conditions specified therein. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the argument of the learned counsel for writ petitioner that Appellate Authority cannot take cognizance of the exchange plea that is pending and say that execution of Section 6 notice/order will stand stayed until CLA takes a call on the exchange plea. There is no material, legal or otherwise, to demonstrate that the Appellate Authority lacks the power to make such an interim order. This view taken by this Court is buttressed by the expression 'subject to such conditions as may be specified therein' occurring in Section 10- B. We hasten to add that we are not suggesting that the District Collector should make such a stay order, if approached. We are only making the legal position clear that the width and amplitude of Section 10-B as can be discerned from plain language of the statute does not denude the District Collector (Appellate Authority) of such powers, as argued by learned counsel for writ petitioner. Any order passed under 10-B can also be assailed and subjected to judicial review and there is no impediment on the same. 18. Reverting to explanation of the term 'appeal', we went into P.Ramanatha Aiyar's 'The Law Lexicon, Fifth Edition' and we find that an appeal, in legal parlance, is renewal of a cause from an inferior Tribunal or forum to a superior Tribunal or forum, in order to test and scrutinise the correctness of the impugned decision. The most appropriate explanation of the term 'appeal' as in P. Ramanatha Aiyar's 'The Law Lexicon, Fifth Edition', reads as follows: 'An appeal in legal parlance is held to mean the renewal of a cause from an inferior or subordinate to a superior tribunal or forum in order to test and scrutinise the correctness of the impugned decision. It amounts in essence and pith to a complaint to a higher forum that the decision of the subordinate tribunal is erroneous and therefore liable to be rectified or set right.' 19. It amounts in essence and pith to a complaint to a higher forum that the decision of the subordinate tribunal is erroneous and therefore liable to be rectified or set right.' 19. As would be evident from Section 10-B which provides for stay pending decision in appeal, it uses the expression 'stay the execution ...........' In other words, it is couched in a language which includes the expression 'stay the execution'. The expression 'stay of execution' implies a term (qua time) during which no execution can issue i.e., suspend enforcement of an order 'until something else happens'. This can be discerned from explanation of the expression 'Stay of execution' in P. Ramanatha Aiyar's 'The Law Lexicon, Fifth Edition'. Therefore, we see no reason as to why the Appellate Authority is denuded of the powers to say that execution of decision of R4 will be stayed till the CLA decides the exchange plea. 20. This Court has repeatedly held that said 1905 Act is a self contained Code. The reason inter alia is that there is a provision to have the alleged encroacher show caused under Section 7 of said 1905 Act followed by an order (considering the cause shown). The order under Section 6 is appealable under Section 10 (District Collector is the appellate authority) and there is a provision for further revision to the Government under Section 10-A (Section 10-A(3) to be precise) of said 1905 Act. Pending appeal / revision, there is a provision for making interim prayer vide Section 10-B of said 1905 Act. Therefore, said 1905 Act is a self contained Code in every sense of the expression. 21. Learned counsel for writ petitioner adverted to aforereferred to G.O.201 Revenue and Disaster Management Department, Land Disposal Wing, LD3 (1) Section dated 10.05.2022 and inter alia submitted that exchange is a desired option and that the land that is being offered by writ petitioner as exchange is superior. We refrain from dealing with this submission for three reasons and they are: (i) CLA will stand bound by any view we express; (ii) Such submissions turn heavily on facts and it is only appropriate that the designated authority takes a call on such submissions; and (iii) This would be outside the remit of the challenge to the impugned order. 22. 22. Reverting to the statutory appeal under Section 10, limitation for statutory appeal is 30 days from the date on which Section 6 notice/order is served on the writ petitioner and this is vide sub-section (1) of Section 11. Be that as it may, sub-section (4) of Section 11 vests the Appellate Authority with powers to admit an appeal preferred after the specified period, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for preferring the appeal. These are all in the realm of discretion of the Appellate Authority and it is for the Appellate Authority to consider such a prayer on its own merits and in accordance with law, if such a prayer is made. We write this as the 30 days period has not elapsed as of today, is what we are informed. We make it clear that if a statutory appeal is filed, with or without condonation of delay (COD) plea, the same and the stay petition thereat under Section 10-B, shall be considered on its own merits and in accordance with law. 23. In the light of the narrative, discussion and dispositive reasoning set out supra, we are of the considered view that Alternative Remedy is not inefficacious and we also hold that the width and amplitude of Section 10-B is statutorily wide and legally loud enough to include interim orders of the nature alluded to supra and Appellate Authority is not denuded of powers to stay impugned orders. As already alluded to supra, Alternative Remedy rule is not an absolute rule but it is only a rule of discretion. It is a self imposed restraint qua this Court. This Court having repeatedly taken a view that said 1905 Act is a self contained Code, is clear that this is a fit case to relegate the writ petitioner of approaching Appellate Authority rather than entertain the WP on the teeth of Alternative Remedy. 24. Ergo, the sequitur is, certiorari limb of the prayer fails. This means that the prayer for issue of writ of certiorari is not acceded to and the certiorari limb is dismissed. As regards the mandamus limb, we have already observed in this order that exchange plea will be processed on its own merits and in accordance with law and therefore, we are of the view that this observation addresses the mandamus limb of the prayer. As regards the mandamus limb, we have already observed in this order that exchange plea will be processed on its own merits and in accordance with law and therefore, we are of the view that this observation addresses the mandamus limb of the prayer. Captioned main WP is disposed of in the aforesaid manner. Consequently, captioned writ miscellaneous petitions thereat are disposed of as closed. There shall be no order as to costs.