JUDGMENT : SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J. 1. The present first appeal arises out of a suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondent nos. 1 to 4-series against the defendant nos. 1 – 9/appellants inter alia for partition of certain Debuttar properties, for declaration of co-shebaitship of the contesting parties, for a declaration that a deed dated July 10, 1996 executed by one Sukumar Chakraborty (since deceased), transferring his shebaitship rights to the defendants/appellants is void and not binding on the plaintiffs, and for other consequential reliefs. 2. The learned trial Judge partially decreed the suit, thereby declaring co-shebaitship of the parties, declaring the deed dated July 10, 1996 void and not binding on the plaintiffs, and granting permanent injunction restraining the defendants 1-9/appellants from obstructing the plaintiffs’ peaceful and lawful possession of the suit properties and from performing daily sheba puja as joint shebaits of the concerned deities, and permanent injunction restraining the defendant nos. 10, 11 and 13 from mutating the names of the appellants in any manner whatsoever. However, the prayer for partition was refused, since the suit property is a debuttar property. 3. The narrative of the case begins with one Sarat Chandra Chakraborty, who settled his property by way of an Arpannama (Deed of Settlement) dated June 4, 1941, dedicating the same to the family deities Sri Sri Iswari Siddheswari Kalimata Thakurani, Sri Sri Sitalamata, Sri Sri Ratneswar Shiv and Sri Sri Dadhidham Narayan. 4. However, in order to make specific provisions regarding appointment of Shebaits and worship and preservation of the deities, a further Settlement Deed was executed on February 19, 1958. The said deed was challenged in Title Suit No. 184 of 1971, against the decree of which Title Appeal No. 199 of 1976 was preferred, which culminated in Second Appeal No. 628 of 1979. In the said proceeding, it was ultimately decided that the Settlor had the right to execute the Deed of Settlement of the year 1958. 5. In the Deed of 1958, upon the demise of the settlor Sarat Chandra Chakraborty, the first shebait, the shebaitship rights were to devolve on his three sons, namely Kanailal, Sukumar and Rajkumar, who were all living at the time of execution of the deed. 6. Subsequently, on July 10, 1996, Sukumar, one of the sons of Sarat Chandra, the original settlor, executed a Deed for appointment of shebaits, thereby appointing the defendant nos. 6. Subsequently, on July 10, 1996, Sukumar, one of the sons of Sarat Chandra, the original settlor, executed a Deed for appointment of shebaits, thereby appointing the defendant nos. 1 – 9/appellants, being the heirs of Rajkumar, another son of Sarat Chandra, as shebaits after his demise. 7. This gave rise to the dispute between the parties, which culminated in the present suit. 8. Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the learned Trial Judge was justified in refusing partition of the suit property on the ground that property dedicated to pious uses cannot be divided and any such division is void. 9. Secondly, the appellants argue that ‘Pala’s, or turns of worship, are bequeathable and gift of shebaitship in favour of co-shebaits has been recognized in law if it is for the benefit of the endowment. 10. Hence, it is argued that the learned Trial Judge was justified in refusing to grant a partition decree but, on the other hand, erred in law in declaring the deed of 1996 to be void and not binding on the plaintiffs, since Sukumar Chakraborty acted well within his legal rights in transferring his share of shebaitship in respect of the concerned deities to the heirs of Rajkumar by the said deed. It is contended that such transfer did not tantamount to segregation of shebaitship but only affected Sukumar’s own share in the shebaitship, which was exclusively vested in him by virtue of the 1958 Arpannama. 11. In support of such contention, learned senior counsel cites Monohar Mukherjee v. Bhupendra Nath Mukerjee, AIR 1932 Cal 791. 12. Learned senior counsel for the appellants next submits that the alienation by way of the Arpannama to closely connected members of the family, having more interest in the worship of the idols than anyone else, without any idea of personal gain, is governed by special circumstances and such alienation is sanctioned by law. The opinion of Maclean, C.J. that there are authorities for such an alienation inter vivos, as referred to in Nirad Mohini Dassi v. Shibadas Pal Dewasin, 1909 (7) LAWS (PVC) 17, is relied on in such context. 13. Lastly, learned senior counsel cites Profulla Chorone Requitte, Satya Chorone Requitte v. Satya Chorone Requitte, Profulla Chorone Requitte, AIR 1979 SC 1682 , for the proposition that the office of shebaitship, being hereditary, devolves like any other species of heritable property. 13. Lastly, learned senior counsel cites Profulla Chorone Requitte, Satya Chorone Requitte v. Satya Chorone Requitte, Profulla Chorone Requitte, AIR 1979 SC 1682 , for the proposition that the office of shebaitship, being hereditary, devolves like any other species of heritable property. 14. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs/respondents controverts the arguments of the appellants and contends that the deed of gift made by Sukumar Chakraborty in the year 1996 with regard to his shebaitship and the Debuttar property allotted in his favour by the 1958 Deed of Settlement, is in violation of the terms of the 1958 Deed. 15. It is argued that Section 411 of the Hindu Law (Mulla, 22 nd Edition), defines the function of shebaitship and according to such definition, no shebait can transfer his shebaitship and the Debuttar property. A shebait is a manager and has no personal interest in the Debuttar property or any legal ownership, but only has the title of the manager of a religious endowment. 16. By the Deed of 1996 (Exhibit-F), Sukumar Chakraborty, the author thereof, transferred Debuttar property and shebaitship in favour of the heirs of Rajkumar Chakraborty exclusively, including the right to collect all income derived from movable and immovable properties for the said estate for the first four months, starting from the first day of Baishakh in each Bengali Year, and the obligation to incur all expenditure for Seva Puja of deities. It is argued that the shebaitship right cannot be transferred for pecuniary consideration; if so done, such transfer is to be treated as void and illegal. Learned counsel relies on Kali Kinkor Ganguly v. Panna Banerjee and others, AIR 1974 SC 1932 for such proposition. 17. It is argued that Section 412 of Hindu Law (Mulla, 22nd Edition), provides that a shebait has no power to alienate the property of an idol or Debuttar property. A shebait, it is submitted, cannot delegate his duty to worship the deities or create any interest in Math property during his lifetime. 18. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents argues that Sukumar Chakraborty did not utter a single line in the 1996 Transfer Deed as to the reason for making such transfer; rather, the Deed contains the gift of shebaitship of Debuttar property which was allotted to him by the founder of the Deed of Settlement executed in 1958. 19. 18. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/respondents argues that Sukumar Chakraborty did not utter a single line in the 1996 Transfer Deed as to the reason for making such transfer; rather, the Deed contains the gift of shebaitship of Debuttar property which was allotted to him by the founder of the Deed of Settlement executed in 1958. 19. It was not stated in the 1996 Deed that the other shebait Kanailal violated any condition of the Deeds of Settlement of 1941 or 1958, which might have been a ground for transfer in favour of the sons of Rajkumar, depriving Kanailal. 20. Learned counsel submits that the 1996 Deed is void ab initio since the same was made in complete violation of the 1941 and 1958 Arpannamas. 21. The founder, Sarat Chandra, categorically mentioned in the Arpannama Deeds the condition when a shebait can transfer shebaitship to others, which was not followed by Sukumar in the 1996 Deed. 22. The intention of the founder was that the shebaits shall perform Seva Puja jointly but they have introduced ‘Pala Pratha’ in violation of the said term. 23. In the Deed of 1941, it was declared that if any shebait changes religion or has immoral character or fails to perform Sheba Puja, then the other shebaits can remove him from shebaitship of the idols. However, in the present case, Sukumar transferred his shebaitship and gifted the property allotted by the founder in the 1958 Arpannama as well as allotted Pala of the idols for four months in favour of the sons of Rajkumar without any of the grounds mentioned in the 1941 Deed being fulfilled. 24. Learned counsel argues that since Sukumar died issueless, his shebaitship was inherited upon his demise by his two brothers according to the Hindu Succession Act, since the founder did not provide who would be the next shebait after the death of a shebait. 25. Learned counsel cites Sankar Nath Mullick & Anr. v. Lakshmi Sona Datta, 2004 (4) CHN 435 to argue that once a shebait is appointed and so long as he survives or his heirs survive the settlor, the office is inherited by the heirs of the shebait. Succession of shebaitship is governed by the ordinary law of inheritance. 26. 25. Learned counsel cites Sankar Nath Mullick & Anr. v. Lakshmi Sona Datta, 2004 (4) CHN 435 to argue that once a shebait is appointed and so long as he survives or his heirs survive the settlor, the office is inherited by the heirs of the shebait. Succession of shebaitship is governed by the ordinary law of inheritance. 26. Thus, the transfer of shebaitship, which is otherwise not transferrable in law by virtue of Exhibit-F, renders the said document void ab initio and the learned Trial Judge rightly decreed the suit in part in favour of the plaintiffs. 27. Thus, it is argued that the appeal ought to be dismissed. 28. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, the Court comes to the following conclusions: 29. The saga begins with the Arpannama executed by the settlor Sarat Chandra in the year 1941, whereby the suit property was dedicated to the deities. However, the most crucial document for the present adjudication is the subsequent Deed of Settlement dated February 19, 1958, whereby the settlor provided for shebaitship, worship of the deity and distribution of the debuttar property. Thus, it is the interpretation of the terms of the 1958 Deed which acquires prime importance in deciding the present appeal. 30. The said Deed has two distinct parts – provisions of shebaitship and distribution of property. 31. Insofar as the second component is concerned, three demarcated portions of the debuttar property were settled respectively in favour of Sukumar and Rajkumar (regarding cash, ornaments, valuable utensils and the balance amount left upon meeting the funeral expenses of the settlor) and in favour of the three sons, namely Kanailal, Sukumar and Rajkumar respectively (in respect of the immovable properties), which were given to the said sons and their heirs by way of succession, in exclusion of each other. 32. As regards the other component of shebaitship, the 1958 Deed provides that all three sons of the Settlor, namely Kanailal, Sukumar and Rajkumar, shall function jointly as shebaits for performing the worship of the deities and shall look after and maintain the debuttar property, by paying taxes and maintaining the property, and use the usufructs of the debuttar property for such purpose, retaining the balance amount left after meeting such expenses. 33. 33. It was categorically stipulated in the said Deed that, for the purpose of worship, the shebaits would not be permitted to resort to ‘Pala’ system (worship by turns). 34. The restriction as to transfer, however, was confined to the three demarcated portions of immovable property given to the three sons respectively and did not extend to the shebaitship, as is evident from the plain language of the 1958 Deed itself. 35. It is well-settled that the intention of the Settlor is to be derived from the Deed of Settlement itself and if the language of the same is unambiguous, no other internal or external aid is required to be resorted to. 36. Going by such principle, the ‘Pala’ system which has apparently been adopted by the shebaits is not sanctioned by the said Deed. The intention of the Settlor as regards the shebaitship is as clear as daylight; the same cannot be segregated between the three sons and their heirs by forming three distinct branches but has to be performed by the sons, and after them by their heirs, jointly. 37. In Kali Kinkor Ganguly (supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that transfer of shebaiti rights in respect of a private family endowment for consideration is not permitted. It was further held that even if the transfer is for no consideration, the same would be bad if it is not in favour of those in the line of succession. Similarly, a co-ordinate Bench of this Court, in Sankar Nath Mullick (supra) 2 held that the line of succession determined in the Deed of Dedication has to be followed and the shebaiti rights cannot be alienated by way of gift or sale, except among the heirs in the line of succession. 38. It was also observed that the line of succession has to be followed in respect of shebaitship and there is no question of deviation from the terms and conditions of the Deed and/or the line of succession: 1. Kali Kinkor Ganguly v. Panna Banerjee and others, AIR 1974 SC 1932 2. Sankar Nath Mullick & Anr. v. Lakshmi Sona Datta, 2004 (4) CHN 435 39. In Monohar Mukherjee v. Bhupendra Nath Mukerjee, AIR 1932 Cal 791 a Five-Judge Bench of this Court reiterated the proposition that the property dedicated for pious uses cannot be divided and if a deviation has been made, it is void. 40. Sankar Nath Mullick & Anr. v. Lakshmi Sona Datta, 2004 (4) CHN 435 39. In Monohar Mukherjee v. Bhupendra Nath Mukerjee, AIR 1932 Cal 791 a Five-Judge Bench of this Court reiterated the proposition that the property dedicated for pious uses cannot be divided and if a deviation has been made, it is void. 40. Thus, the allocation of demarcated portions of the debuttar property in the 1958 Deed is self-contradictory and also violates the 1941 dedication exclusively in the favour of the deities. Thus, the learned Trial Judge rightly observed that such separate allocation of the property among the sons of the settlor is not sanctioned by law. 41. In Profulla Chorone Requitte, Satya Chorone Requitte v. Satya Chorone Requitte, Profulla Chorone Requitte, AIR 1979 SC 1682 it was held that the office of shebaitship is hereditary and devolves like any other species of heritable property, which is in consonance of the judgments in Sankar Nath Mullick & Anr. v. Lakshmi Sona Datta, 2004 (4) CHN 435 and Kali Kinkor Ganguly v. Panna Banerjee and others, AIR 1974 SC 1932 . 42. Again, in Nirad Mohini Dassi v. Shibadas Pal Dewasin, 1909 (7) LAWS (PVC) 17 the Privy Council observed that by an Arpannama, there can be alienation in favour of closely connected members of the family. 43. Read in conjunction, the crux of the ratio laid down in the above judgments is that shebaitship devolves by succession and the line of succession cannot be deviated from. 44. Even in the 1958 Deed, the Settlor expressed his clear intention that the shebaitship rights shall be exercised jointly by his three sons Kanailal, Sukumar and Rajkumar, without there being any segregation or ‘Pala’ system by creation of separate lines/branches of the said three sons. 45. On the demise of any of the sons of the settlor, their respective heirs would join in the pool of shebaits and would continue to perform the Sheba Puja jointly. 46. There can be two possible interpretations of the 1958 Deed. 47. First, it may be argued that the shebaitship of the deities was common between all three sons of Sarat Chandra, without there being any segregation into the separate branches of each of the sons and their heirs. 46. There can be two possible interpretations of the 1958 Deed. 47. First, it may be argued that the shebaitship of the deities was common between all three sons of Sarat Chandra, without there being any segregation into the separate branches of each of the sons and their heirs. In such case, if one of the said sons of the settlor died without leaving behind any son/first-degree heir of his own, the shebaiti rights would revert back to the common pool of shebaits, comprised of the settlor’s other sons/their heirs. 48. The second possible interpretation would be that the office of shebaitship devolved upon three branches on the death of the settlor, each comprised of one of the settlor’s sons and his heirs. In such event, if one of the branches ended with the demise of a son without any first-degree heirs of such son being left behind, the shebaiti rights of the deceased would devolve on his second- or third-degree heirs, who would join the common pool of shebaitship in such case as well. 49. Thus, from both the above perspectives, on the demise of Sukumar on February 4, 2000 without leaving any son/first-degree heir, his shebaiti rights could not devolve exclusively upon the heirs of Rajkumar, but would vest jointly in his then-living brother Kanailal and the heirs of his then-deceased brother Rajkumar. 50. By virtue of the 1996 Deed, however, Sukumar sought to deviate from such line of succession, which was patently contrary to the 1958 Deed as well as the settled law on the subject, as laid down in Sankar Nath Mullick & Anr. v. Lakshmi Sona Datta, 2004 (4) CHN 435 as well as Kali Kinkor Ganguly v. Panna Banerjee and others, AIR 1974 SC 1932 . Even in Profulla Chorone Requitte, Satya Chorone Requitte v. Satya Chorone Requitte, Profulla Chorone Requitte, AIR 1979 SC 1682 , the same principle was reiterated. Thus, Sukumar did not have any right, within the four corners of the 1958 Deed and/or as per the prevalent law governing the subject, to deviate from the line of succession and transfer his shebaiti rights exclusively to one branch of the heirs of the Settlor and/or his sons, either posthumously or inter vivos. 51. Thus, Sukumar did not have any right, within the four corners of the 1958 Deed and/or as per the prevalent law governing the subject, to deviate from the line of succession and transfer his shebaiti rights exclusively to one branch of the heirs of the Settlor and/or his sons, either posthumously or inter vivos. 51. In such view of the matter, the Deed of Gift dated July 10, 1996, executed by Sukumar, was not only contrary to the 1958 Deed but also de hors the law and, thus, void ab initio, as rightly held by the learned Trial Judge in the impugned judgment. 52. Insofar as the partition of a debuttar property is concerned, it is well-settled that a debuttar property and shebaiti rights are respectively in the nature of dedication to deities and an office, in which the ownership vests in the deities and not the shebaits. Thus, neither of the two is partible or transferable, either in deviation of the line of succession or otherwise. 53. As such, the learned Trial Judge acted in consonance with law in refusing to grant partition. 54. In view of the above, we do not find any illegality in the impugned judgment and decree of the learned Trial Judge. Rather, the same was fully in consonance with law as well as the 1958 Deed. 55. Accordingly, FA No. 174 of 2010 is dismissed on contest without any order as to costs, thereby affirming the judgment and decree dated January 6, 2010 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), First Court at Howrah, District – Howrah in Title Suit No. 55 of 2005. 56. A formal decree be drawn up accordingly. 57. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. I agree - Supratim Bhattacharya, J.