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2025 DIGILAW 816 (HP)

Atul Kumar Gupta v. State of H. P.

2025-04-25

RAKESH KAINTHLA

body2025
JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The present revision is directed against the order dated 8 th July 2024 passed by learned Special Judge (II) Nahan (learned Trial Court), vide which the charges were ordered to be framed against the petitioner (accused before the learned Trial Court). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they are arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the Drugs Inspector filed a complaint against the petitioner and other accused asserting that he had received secret information that spurious and illegal drugs were being manufactured by M/s Soliance Pharma Products, Village Surajpur, Tehsil Paonta Sahib, H.P. The drugs officials of Haryana had seized a huge quantity of drugs from the Godown of M/s Lincoln Pharmaceutical Limited. An F.I.R. was lodged to this effect with SHO P.S. Saha (Haryana). The police sealed the premises of M/s Himalayan Laboratories, Village Surajpur, Tehsil Paonta Sahib on 13.07.2021 and recorded an entry No. 56(A), dated 13.07.2011 in the daily diary. The Drugs Inspector sent a letter to the SDM, Paonta Sahib, to depute an Executive Magistrate. The Drug Inspector opened the sealed premises in the presence of the Executive Magistrate and searched it. A huge quantity of spurious, misbranded, loose drugs without labels and other mandatory information was recovered. Names of M/s N.L.P. Organics Pvt. Limited, M/s Soliance Pharma Products, and M. Sea Pharmaceuticals being the manufacturers were mentioned on some of the drugs. The premises were violating the provisions of Schedule M of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940 and Rules framed thereunder. The drugs, machinery and other materials were seized by the Drugs Inspector in 49 boxes and 7 poly bags. These were sealed. Panchnama was prepared. Atul Kumar Gupta, the present petitioner, visited the spot, and he was asked to produce the documents and explain the manufacturing of spurious and misbranded drugs. He failed to submit any reply and stated that he had sublet the premises to one Saurav Behl; however, he could not produce any proof of this fact. He was asked to sign the documents, but he refused to do so. M/s Himalayan Laboratories was not authorised to manufacture the drugs belonging to or bearing the name and address of the firm M/s NLP Organics Pvt. Ltd, M Sea Pharmaceuticals and M/S Soliance Pharma Products. He was asked to sign the documents, but he refused to do so. M/s Himalayan Laboratories was not authorised to manufacture the drugs belonging to or bearing the name and address of the firm M/s NLP Organics Pvt. Ltd, M Sea Pharmaceuticals and M/S Soliance Pharma Products. 5 (Five) samples were drawn. A request was made to SHO P.S. Paonta Sahib to register the F.I.R. The Police registered the F.I.R. No. 220 of 2011 at Police Station Paonta. The police conducted the investigation. The custody orders were obtained from the Court. The drugs were sent to Government Analyst Kandghat for analysis. A report was issued. Four Samples were stated to be not of standard quality, and the samples were declared misbranded. The Drugs Control Officer Ambala-I, Gurcharan Singh and the Drugs Control Officer Ambala-II, Sunil Dhaiya, attended the office of the Drugs Inspector, Nahan. A letter was written to them with a request to provide the documents of their case. They submitted documents vide letter dated 21.07.2011, which showed that the drugs were manufactured by M/s Soliance Pharma Products, and were seized by the Drugs Controller, Ambala, from the premises of M/s Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Limited. M/s Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Limited wrote a letter to S.P. Solan, H.P., on 24.10.2011 that they had made complaints against M/s Soliance Pharma Products, regarding the supply of spurious and illegal drugs after forging the copies of licenses. The accused intentionally manufactured the illegal drugs and sold them to M/s Lincoln Pharmaceuticals Limited with forged documents. The reports were sent to M/s N.L.P. Organic as per Section 24; however, the registered letter was received with the remark that the addressee had left Bhiwadi. One copy was sent to M/S M. Sea Pharmaceutical, who sent a reply that they had never manufactured the Solvit Tablets. This shows that the drugs were being manufactured in the name of other manufacturers. The police seized the Rent Deed and credit certificates from Atul Gupta, which show that he had sublet the premises to M/s Soliance Pharma Product through its Proprietor, Saurabh Behal. No owner of any licensed Pharma manufacturing unit can sublet the premises to any other person or firm without approval from the competent authority. The consignment papers, Form-26 dated 27.06. 2011 and Invoice No. 1055 dated 26.06.2011 from Satwinder Singh were seized by the police. No owner of any licensed Pharma manufacturing unit can sublet the premises to any other person or firm without approval from the competent authority. The consignment papers, Form-26 dated 27.06. 2011 and Invoice No. 1055 dated 26.06.2011 from Satwinder Singh were seized by the police. M/s Himalayan Laboratories was found with drugs and packing bearing the name of the manufacturer, which does not exist and does not possess a valid drug license; hence, such drugs are spurious as defined under Section 17-B (c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940. The Drugs Licensing Authority also informed that no license was issued. License Nos. SL-MNB/11/57 and SL-MB/11/58 were granted in favour of M/s NBZ Pharma Limited and M/s IPCA Laboratories Limited, respectively. Hence, the accused had fraudulently used fake licenses for manufacturing and selling the drugs. Petitioner Atul Gupta, being the proprietor of M/s Himalayan Laboratories, had filed an application for release of the premises, which is pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Paonta Sahib. The permission to launch the prosecution was granted by the State Drugs Controller. The accused was manufacturing the drugs purporting to be the drugs of some other manufacturer. The drugs were not of standard quality and were misbranded. Therefore, the complaint was filed before the Court to take action against the accused. 3. Learned Trial Court ordered the issuance of the summons. The petitioner/accused filed a petition for quashing the summoning order, which was registered as CRMMO No. 76 of 2015 and the same was dismissed on 13 th July 2016. The petitioner again filed a petition under Section 482 of CrPC, which was registered as CrMMO No. 679 of 2022 and the same was also dismissed on 26 th February 2024. Learned Trial Court ordered the framing of charges on 8 th July 2024. 4. Being aggrieved by the framing of the charges, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition for quashing the order framing charges. It has been asserted that the Court has to go through the complaint and the material collected by the prosecution to conclude that a prima facie case exists for the framing of charges. The contents of the complaint and the material annexed thereto do not disclose any prima facie case against the petitioner/accused. The report of the chemical analyst was not supplied to the manufacturer. The contents of the complaint and the material annexed thereto do not disclose any prima facie case against the petitioner/accused. The report of the chemical analyst was not supplied to the manufacturer. The copies were sent to M/S NLP Organics and M/S M Sea Pharma. The manufacturer was deprived of its right to challenge the report by sending the sample to the Central Drugs Laboratory. The drugs had expired long ago. The charges were framed against the petitioner under Section 18 (c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act 1940, which means that the petitioner has been charged for manufacturing the drugs without a license; however, the Drugs Inspector has filed a copy of the license valid from 31st July 2008 till 30 th July 2013. The products were manufactured by Soliance Pharma and were recovered from the premises of M/s Lincoln Pharma at Ambala Cantt as per the complaint. The license in the name of M/s Soliance Pharma was found to be forged. There is no material to show that the drugs were being manufactured by the petitioner. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order framing the charges be quashed. 5. I have heard Mr. Rajneesh Manikatala, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr Dinkar Bhaskar, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for respondent no. 1/State. 6. Mr. Rajneesh Manikatala, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that drugs were seized from the factory of the petitioner/accused, and he was entitled to a copy of the report of analysis. No such copy was supplied to him, and a valuable right of the petitioner/accused was taken away. The drugs had expired and could not be analysed to prove that they were not substandard. The continuation of the proceedings in the circumstances amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the order framing charges be set aside. He relied upon the judgment of this Court in Meenakshi Jain versus State of HP CrMP(M) No. 433 of 2019, decided on 1 st August 2022 , in support of his submissions. 7. Mr. Ajit Sharma learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent no.1/State submitted that the petitioner had earlier approached this court twice with the same pleas, and these pleas were negated by the court. 7. Mr. Ajit Sharma learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent no.1/State submitted that the petitioner had earlier approached this court twice with the same pleas, and these pleas were negated by the court. The petitioner is a manufacturer and is not entitled to a copy of the report. The learned Trial Court had rightly framed the charges against the petitioner. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 9. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao , (2023) 17 SCC 688 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 that at the time of framing of the charge the Court has to see the material collected by the prosecution to determine whether a case has been made out for proceeding with the trial or not. It is not necessary to examine the defence of the accused. It was observed: - 7. It is trite law that the application of judicial mind being necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for proceeding with trial and it would not be necessary to dwell into the pros and cons of the matter by examining the defence of the accused when an application for discharge is filed. At that stage, the trial judge has to merely examine the evidence placed by the prosecution in order to determine whether or not the grounds are sufficient to proceed against the accused on the basis of the charge sheet material. The nature of the evidence recorded or collected by the investigating agency or the documents produced in which prima facie it reveals that there are suspicious circumstances against the accused, so as to frame a charge, would sufÏce, and such material would be taken into account for the purposes of framing the charge. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed. 8. If there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused necessarily, the accused would be discharged, but if the court is of the opinion, after such consideration of the material there are grounds for presuming that the accused has committed the offence which is triable, then necessarily charge has to be framed. 8. At the time of framing the charge and taking cognisance, the accused has no right to produce any material and call upon the court to examine the same. No provision in the Code grants any right to the accused to file any material or document at the stage of framing of the charge. The trial court has to apply its judicial mind to the facts of the case as may be necessary to determine whether a case has been made out by the prosecution for trial on the basis of charge-sheet material only. 9. If the accused is able to demonstrate from the charge- sheet material at the stage of framing the charge, which might drastically affect the very sustainability of the case, it is unfair to suggest that such material should not be considered or ignored by the court at that stage. The main intention of granting a chance to the accused of making submissions as envisaged under Section 227 of the Cr. P.C. is to assist the court in determining whether it is required to proceed to conduct the trial. Nothing in the Code limits the ambit of such hearing to oral hearing and oral arguments only, and therefore, the trial court can consider the material produced by the accused before the I.O. 10. It is a settled principle of law that at the stage of considering an application for discharge the court must proceed on an assumption that the material which has been brought on record by the prosecution is true and evaluate said material in order to determine whether the facts emerging from the material taken on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients necessary of the offence alleged. This Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 , adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject has held: “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. This Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC 709 , adverting to the earlier propositions of law laid down on this subject has held: “29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions and the submissions made by Mr Ranjit Kumar commend us. True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in order to find out whether or not the allegations made are groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the said materials and documents with a view to find out whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the probative value of the materials has to be gone into, and the court is not expected to go deep into the matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence. The law does not permit a mini-trial at this stage.” 11. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the stage when the accused seeks to be discharged. The expression “the record of the case” used in Section 227 Cr. P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. 12. P.C. is to be understood as the documents and articles, if any, produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing of the charge. The submission of the accused is to be confined to the material produced by the investigating agency. 12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case, and at this stage, the probative value of materials on record need not be gone into. This Court by referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338 has held the nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of the charge is to test the existence of the prima-facie case. It is also held at the stage of framing of charge, the court has to form a presumptive opinion to the existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record and to check whether the material on record would certainly lead to conviction at the conclusion of trial.” 10. It was submitted that the petitioner/accused being the manufacturer, is entitled to a copy of the report of analysis. No such copy was supplied to him, and the petitioner/accused was deprived of his valuable right to get the sample analysed from the Central Drugs Laboratory. This submission is not acceptable. The petitioner has asserted in para 13 E of his petition that there is no material on record to show that the drugs were being manufactured by the petitioner; hence, the petitioner cannot claim to be the manufacturer who is entitled to a copy of the report of the analysis. Secondly, it was laid down in Medreich Sterilab Ltd. v. Union of India , 2004 SCC OnLine Kar 182 : ILR 2004 Kar 2545: AIR 2004 Kar 420 , that the manufacturer is not entitled to a copy of the report of analysis. It was observed. 14. Secondly, it was laid down in Medreich Sterilab Ltd. v. Union of India , 2004 SCC OnLine Kar 182 : ILR 2004 Kar 2545: AIR 2004 Kar 420 , that the manufacturer is not entitled to a copy of the report of analysis. It was observed. 14. In so far as the constitutional validity or otherwise of Section 25 of the Act is concerned, the said provision did come up for consideration before the Apex Court in the case of Amery Pharmaceutical v. State of Rajasthan 2001 (4) SCC 382 . In the said decision, the arguments canvassed by the appellant's learned Counsel were more or less similar to the arguments canvassed by the learned Senior Counsel before this Court. In the said decision, it was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the conclusiveness of the report of the Government Analyst as envisaged in sub-section (3) of Section 25 of the Act would nail the manufacturer with the findings in the report as he would otherwise be disabled from controverting the said findings because he has no right to challenge such findings due to the absence of a portion of the sample with him. It was also contended that since the manufacturer is not entitled to get a copy of the report of the Government Analyst as of right, the manufacturer would be disabled from challenging the correctness of the facts stated in the report and such deprivation would visit him with hard civil consequences, as the facts stated in the report would become conclusive evidence against him and that such a provision which disables an accused from disproving the correctness of the facts contained in a document which would nail him down is unfair and unreasonable, besides being oppressive and that amounts to violation of fundamental right enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. The Apex Court, while answering this specific legal issue, was pleased to point out that: “24. The extent of the implication of the words “such evidence shall be conclusive” as employed in Section 25(3) of the Act has to be understood now. Section 4 of the Evidence Act says that when one fact is declared by the said Act to be conclusive proof of another “the Court shall, on proof of one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it”. Section 4 of the Evidence Act says that when one fact is declared by the said Act to be conclusive proof of another “the Court shall, on proof of one fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving it”. The expression “conclusive evidence” employed in Section 25(3) of the Act cannot have a different implication as the legislative intention cannot be different. Such an import as for the word “conclusive” in the interpretation of statutory provisions has now come to stay. If so, what would happen if the manufacturer is disabled from challenging the facts contained in the document, which would visit him with drastic consequences when he is arraigned in a trial? Any legal provision which snarls at an indicted person without affording any remedy to him to disprove an item of evidence, which could nail him down, cannot be approved as consistent with the philosophy enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. The first effort which courts should embark upon in such a situation is to use the power of interpretation to dilute it to make the provision amenable to Article 21. 25. In our view, the Court should lean to an interpretation as would avert the consequences of depriving an accused of any remedy against such evidence. He must have the right to disprove or controvert the facts stated in such a document, at least at the first tier. It is possible to interpret the provisions in such a way as to make a remedy available to him. When so interpreted, the position is thus that the conclusiveness meant in Section 25(3) of the Act needs to be read in juxtaposition with the persons referred to in the sub-section. In other words, if any of the persons who receives a copy of the report of the Government Analyst fails to notify his intention to adduce evidence in controversion of the facts stated in the report within a period of 28 days of the receipt of the report, then such report of the Government Analyst could become conclusive evidence regarding the facts stated therein as against such persons. But as for an accused, like the manufacturer in the present case, who is not entitled to be supplied with a copy of the report of the Government Analyst, he must have the liberty to challenge the correctness of the facts stated in the report by resorting to any other mode by which such facts can be disproved. He can also avail himself of the remedy indicated in sub-section (4) of Section 25 of the Act by requesting the Court to send the other portion of the sample remaining in the Court to be tested at the Central Drugs Laboratory. Of course, no Court is under a compulsion to cause the said sample to be so tested if the request is made after a long delay. It is for that purpose that discretion has been conferred on the Court to decide whether such a sample should be sent to the Central Drugs Laboratory on the strength of such a request. However, once the sample is tested at the Central Drugs Laboratory and a report as envisaged in Section 25(4) of the Act is produced in the Court, the conclusiveness mentioned in that sub-section would become incontrovertible.”(emphasis supplied by me) 15. In my view, the observations made by the Apex Court in Amery Pharmaceutical's case are a complete answer to the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel Sri B.V. Acharya, for the petitioner company. However, the learned Senior Counsel would contend before me, that the observations made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision was with reference to proceedings before a Criminal Court, where a manufacturer of a drug was arrayed as one of the accused and that accused could request the Criminal Court to cause the sample of the drug or cosmetic produced before the Magistrate under sub-section (4) of Section 25 to be sent for test or analysis to the Central Drugs Laboratory. Since such an opportunity was/is available to the accused/manufacturer, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the Apex Court has observed that the provisions of Section 25 of the Act does not violate Article 21 of the Constitution of India and further mere non-supply of the test samples cannot be said has deprived the manufacturer of the drug an opportunity to defend himself in the proceedings filed before the Magistrate. No doubt it is true that the matter which was before the Apex Court is out of an order made in criminal proceedings, but the matter which was substantially argued and discussed was with regard to the submissions made whether the conclusiveness of the report of the Government Analyst would prejudice the defence of the manufacturer since it has no right to challenge the report and the findings of the Government Analyst due to non-supply of the portion of the sample along with the report of the Drug Analyst. While answering this issue, the Apex Court has specifically observed that in view of the language employed in Section 25 of the Act, the manufacturer is not entitled to a copy of the report of the Drug Analyst and also the test samples collected by the Drug Inspector, but that would not prevent him from challenging the correctness of the facts stated in the report by resorting to any other mode by which facts can be disproved. The Court has also observed that the report of the Government Analyst is conclusive proof against these persons mentioned in sub-section (3) of Section 25 of the Act unless they notify the Drugs Inspector or the Court before which any proceedings are pending that they intend to adduce evidence in controversion of the report and that cannot be conclusive proof against the manufacturer since the statute expressly excludes furnishing of either a portion of the sample of the drug or the report of the Government Analyst. By saying so, the Apex Court has negatived the stand of the manufacturer that the provisions of Section 25 of the Act violate Article 21 of the Constitution and thereby the constitutional validity or otherwise of Section 25 of the Act has been sustained by the Apex Court. It is no doubt true that the Apex Court has not noticed whether the provisions of Section 25 of the Act would violate the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution, but that aspect of the matter cannot be looked into by this Court, in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. It is now well settled that the law enunciated by the Supreme Court is binding and absolute. It is now well settled that the law enunciated by the Supreme Court is binding and absolute. Its correctness cannot be doubted on the grounds interalia, of (a) there being another view which was not considered; or (b) was never urged and considered; or (c) the Supreme Court's view being not in tune with “the mores of the day or change of events requiring a change in outlook of the Law”. The laws declared by the Supreme Court are not merely matters of individual opinion; they are products of judicial functioning arrived at on the basis of objective tests, not chances. The Collector of Kamrup v. Smt. Anandi Debi [AIR 1987 Gauhati 13] . The Apex Court in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherji [ (1977) 4 SCC 415 : AIR 1978 SC 8 .] was pleased to observe that when the Supreme Court has held that Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is intra vires, and not violative of Article 14, it is not permissible to raise the objection again on a new ground. It is certainly easy to discover fresh grounds of attack, but that cannot be permitted once the Supreme Court has laid down the law that Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not violate Article 14 of the Constitution. In a case decided by the Bombay High Court in the case of Mohandas Issardas v. A.N. Sattanathan [AIR 1955 Bombay 113] , it is stated that once the Supreme Court makes a declaration of law, that is binding on all the subordinate Courts. Principles of ‘obiter’, ‘per incuriam’, and ‘distinguishable on facts’ which may perhaps apply to the decisions of Courts of coordinate jurisdiction cannot be applied to a declaration of law made by the Supreme Court, and such principles cannot restrict the scope of Article 141 of the Constitution. If a declaration of law has been made by the Supreme Court, it is also not open to the subordinate Courts to hold that the declaration of law is not binding, because on the facts, the case decided by the Supreme Court is distinguishable from the case before the subordinate Court. 13. If a declaration of law has been made by the Supreme Court, it is also not open to the subordinate Courts to hold that the declaration of law is not binding, because on the facts, the case decided by the Supreme Court is distinguishable from the case before the subordinate Court. 13. It was further held that only the person from whom the samples were taken and the person whose name and address are furnished under Section 18 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act are entitled to the reports of the analysis. It was observed: “18. Provisions of Section 25 of the Act mandate the Drugs Inspector to furnish a copy of the report of the Drugs Inspector only to a person from whom samples of the drug were taken and persons whose name and addresses is furnished under Section 18-A of the Act. The Section also deems that the contents of the report is conclusive of the facts and such evidence shall be conclusive against those persons alone, if they do not notify the Drugs Inspector is writing within twenty — eight days of the receipt of the copy of the report that they intend to adduce evidence in controversion of the report. The Statute excludes furnishing of the report of the Government Analyst to the manufacturer and the Statute also expressly states that the contends of the report shall be evidence of facts therein only against those persons who are expected to be supplied with the report of the Government Analyst, unless they make a request to adduce evidence of controversion of the report. If the Statute had expressly provided that the report of the Government Analyst is also conclusive evidence of facts against the manufacturer, then it could have been said that the provisions are discriminatory, since equals are treated unequally and thereby the provisions are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. At the cost of repetition, the conclusiveness of the report of the Government Analyst is only against the persons mentioned in sub- section (3) of Section 25 of the Act, and that conclusiveness of the facts stated therein cannot be conclusive evidence against the petitioner company. 14. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to a copy of the report of analysis, and it cannot be said that his valuable right to get the sample reanalysed was lost. 15. 14. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to a copy of the report of analysis, and it cannot be said that his valuable right to get the sample reanalysed was lost. 15. It was submitted that the samples were taken from the petitioner, and he is entitled to a copy of the report of the analysis. This submission is not acceptable. It was specifically stated in Para 3 of the complaint that Shri Atul Kumar Gupta (the petitioner) came on the spot after repeated calls, he was asked to produce the documents and to explain the manufacturing of spurious and misbranded drugs and other violations. However, he failed to submit the papers. He informed the Drugs Inspector that he had sublet the firm to Saurabh Bahl. He was asked to sign the documents, but he refused to do so. He skipped away from the spot and did not turn up after repeated requests. These averments show that, as per the petitioner, the drugs were seized from Saurabh Bahl and not from him. A similar plea was taken in Para 13D of the revision petition that the premises in question were leased out to M/S Soliance Pharma, the proprietor of which is accused number two. Therefore, it is not open for the petitioner to contend that the drugs were seized from him, and he is entitled to a copy of the report. 16. The petitioner/accused was charged with manufacturing spurious drugs. It was held by this Court in Mukesh Saini v. State of H.P. , 2024 SCC OnLine HP 2118 that the offence punishable under Section 17 B for manufacturing spurious drugs do not require the report of the analysis. It was observed. “23. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as per the analysis reports of the sample received from the government analyst, Regional Drugs Testing Laboratory (Annexure R-22), the samples were declared to be of standard quality and the same were not spurious drugs, therefore, the petitioner deserves to be released on bail. Pertinently, the definition of the ‘spurious drugs’ provided under the DAC Act is very wide. Pertinently, the definition of the ‘spurious drugs’ provided under the DAC Act is very wide. Section 17B of the DAC Act provides that a drug shall be deemed to be spurious if it is manufactured under the name which belongs to another drug, or if it is an imitation, or is a substitute for another drug, or if the label or the container bears the name of an individual or the company purporting to be the manufacturer of the drug, which individual or the company is fictitious or does not exist; or if it has been substituted wholly or in part by another drug or substance; or if it purports to be the product of a manufacturer of whom it is not truly a product. Section 17B of the DAC Act reads as under:— “17B. Spurious drugs.- For the purposes of this Chapter, a drug shall be deemed to be spurious.- (a) if it is manufactured under a name which belongs to another drug, or (b) if it is an imitation of, or is a substitute for, another drug or resembles another drug in a manner likely to deceive or bears upon it or its label or container the name of another drug unless it is plainly and conspicuously marked so as to reveal its true character and its lack of identity with such other drug; or (c) if the label or container bears the name of an individual or company purporting to be the manufacturer of the drug, which individual or company is fictitious or does not exist; or (d) if it has been substituted wholly or in part by another drug or substance; or (e) if it purports to be the product of a manufacturer of whom it is not truly a product.” 24. In view of the above definition for the drug to be spurious, it is not necessary that it should be first subjected to any Chemical examination. It would be deemed to be a spurious drug if any of the above clauses are satisfied. Therefore, this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of any force.” (emphasis supplied) 16. It would be deemed to be a spurious drug if any of the above clauses are satisfied. Therefore, this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is devoid of any force.” (emphasis supplied) 16. Therefore, the petitioner can be charged and tried for manufacturing spurious drugs, even if the report of analysis is taken out of consideration and the petitioner cannot claim discharge on the ground that no copy of the report of analysis was supplied to him and his valuable right to get the drugs re-analysed was lost. 17. It was submitted that the petitioner had a valid license and he could not have been charged with the commission of an offence punishable by Section 18 (c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. This submission is not acceptable. It was stated in para 14 of the complaint that the accused Atul Gupta, informed that he had sublet the premises to M/S Soliance Pharma Products. No owner of any licensed pharma manufacturing could sublet the premises to any other person or firm without the approval of the competent Authority. It was stated in para 17 of the complaint that M/S Himalayan Laboratories was manufacturing drugs, other than the products permitted by the Drugs Licensing Authority. It was asserted in para 19 of the complaint that the accused persons had fraudulently used fake license numbers for manufacturing and selling the drugs to M/s Lincoln Pharmaceutical Ltd. These averments make out a case for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 18 (c) of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. 18. No other point was urged. 19. In view of the above, there is no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Trial Court. Consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed. 20. The observation made hereinabove shall be confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever, on the merits of the case.