ORDER : 1. The petitioners herein are tenants. They have suffered a decree of eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent. 2. In paras 17 and 18 respectively of the impugned judgment, the High Court has observed thus:- "17). The next point for consideration is applicability of Clause (a) or Clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 12 to the present case. Section 12(3)(a) becomes applicable where the rent is payable by month and where there is no dispute about standard rent or permitted increases and where the arrears of rent are for a period of six months or more. Once these three conditions are fulfilled, the act of tenant in neglecting to pay rent within one month after receipt of demand notice mandates the Court to pass a decree for eviction. It appears that prior to 28 March 1963, the words used in Section l2(3) (a) were 'the Court may pass a decree' which are substituted by the words 'the Court shall pass a decree' by amending Act of 1963. Thus, once the conditions of Section I2(3)(a) are satisfied, no discretion is left to the Court but to pass a decree for eviction. 18). In cases other than the one covered by Section 12 (3)(a), decree for eviction cannot be passed if on the first date of hearing of the suit or before such date as the Court may fix, the tenant deposits the arrears of standard rent and permitted increases. Use of the words 'in any other case' would obviously mean a case where (i) the rent is not payable by a month, (ii) the dispute exists regarding standard rent or permitted increases, (iii) the arrears of rent are in respect of the period not exceeding period of six months. This is the reason My Mr. Joshi has attempted to suggest that the rent was not payable by month in the present case. His contention is premised on demand made by Plaintiffs for education cess of 60 paise in the notice. ... (emphasis added)" 3. The High Court has dismissed the petition filed by the petitioners herein thereby affirming the judgment and decree passed by the courts below. 4. The High Court has granted 12 weeks time to the petitioners to vacate the premises. 5. ... (emphasis added)" 3. The High Court has dismissed the petition filed by the petitioners herein thereby affirming the judgment and decree passed by the courts below. 4. The High Court has granted 12 weeks time to the petitioners to vacate the premises. 5. As rightly observed by the High Court, the issue is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in the case of Raju Kakara Shetty v. Ramesh Prataprao Shirole and Another reported in (1991) 1 SCC 570 , wherein this Court has observed as under: "It is, therefore, obvious that the landlord has a statutory right to recover the amount of education cess paid by him in respect of the demised premises from the tenant-occupant and such recovery shall not be an unlawful increase under of Section 7 of the Act but would squarely fall within the expression 'permitted increases' as defined by Section 5(7) of the Act. This statutory right to recover the amount of education cess in respect of the demised premises from the occupant tenant can be quantified by agreement of parties so long as the amount quantified does not exceed the total amount actually paid by the owner by way of education cess. In the present case, it is nobody's contention that the amount of Rs 120 per month payable by way of education cess and other taxes was in excess of the amount actually payable under the relevant statutes to the local authority. The Gujarat High Court has taken a consistent view that where the tenant is obliged under the terms of the tenancy or by virtue of the statute to pay the tax dues to the landlord, since such taxes which form part of the rent are payable annually the case ceases to be governed by Section 12(3)(a) and falls within the purview of Section 12(3)(b) of the Act. In Maheshwari Mills Ltd. [(1962) 3 Guj LR 574] under the terms of the tenancy the tenant was obliged to pay the municipal taxes and property taxes in respect of the demised premises. The court took the view that such payment was by way of rent and since the municipal taxes and property taxes were payable on year to year basis, a part of the rent was admittedly not payable by the month and, therefore, Section 12(3)(a) was not attracted. The court took the view that such payment was by way of rent and since the municipal taxes and property taxes were payable on year to year basis, a part of the rent was admittedly not payable by the month and, therefore, Section 12(3)(a) was not attracted. In Prakash Surya [(1978) 1 RCR 10] the tenant had agreed to pay the municipal tax and education cess. The amount payable towards these taxes constituted rent and since the same was payable at the end of the year the court held that the rent had ceased to be payable by the month and hence Section 12(3)(a) had no application. The same view was reiterated in Vanlila case [ AIR 1975 Guj 163 : 16 Guj LR 71] where education cess was payable by the tenant by virtue of Section 21 of the Gujarat Education Cess Act, 1962. Since it constituted a part of the rent, to be precise permitted increase under Section 5(7) of the Act, it was held that it took the case outside the scope of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. In the case of Vishwambhar Hemandas [ AIR 1986 Guj 153 : (1986) 2 Ren CR 268] also since the rent was inclusive of taxes the court held that the case was governed by Section 12(3)(b) of the Rent Act. The Bombay High Court has expressed the same view in Muktabai case [(1969) 71 Bom LR 752]. This Court in the Bombay Municipal Corporation case [ (1970) 1 SCC 791 : (1971) 1 SCR 335 ] held that while Section 7 of the Act prohibits increase above the standard rent it does not prohibit the recovery of increase to which a landlord is entitled under the other provisions of the said statute, namely, increase by way of 'permitted increases'. Education cess is specifically recoverable as rent by virtue of Section 13 and as sub-section (3) thereof provides that it shall not be treated as increase in rent under Section 7 of the Act, there can be no doubt that such an increase falls within the definition of 'permitted increases' under Section 5(7) of the Act. Education cess is specifically recoverable as rent by virtue of Section 13 and as sub-section (3) thereof provides that it shall not be treated as increase in rent under Section 7 of the Act, there can be no doubt that such an increase falls within the definition of 'permitted increases' under Section 5(7) of the Act. It, therefore, seems to be well settled that education cess is a part of 'rent' within the meaning of the Act and when the same is claimed in addition to the contractual or standard rent in respect of the demised premises it constitutes a permitted increase within the meaning of Section 5(7) of the Act and being payable on a year to year basis, the rent ceases to be payable by the month within the meaning of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. But the question still survives whether the parties can by agreement quantify the said amount and make it payable on a month to month basis provided of course the said amount does not exceed the tax liability of the landlord; if it exceeds that liability it would infringe Section 7 of the Act and the excess would not be allowed as permitted increase within the meaning of Section 5(7) of the Act. A right to recover a certain tax amount from the tenant-occupant under the provisions of a statute can be waived by the owner or quantified by agreement at a figure not exceeding the total liability under the statute. If by agreement the amount is so quantified and is made payable by the month notwithstanding the owner's liability to pay the same annually to the local authority, the question is whether in such circumstances the 'rent' can be said to be payable by the month within the meaning of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act? We see no reason why we should take the view that even where the parties mutually agree and quantify the tax amount payable by the tenant to the landlord on monthly basis, the rent should not be taken to be payable by the month within the meaning of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. We see no reason why we should take the view that even where the parties mutually agree and quantify the tax amount payable by the tenant to the landlord on monthly basis, the rent should not be taken to be payable by the month within the meaning of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. A statutory right to recover the tax amount by way of reimbursement can be waived or limited by the holder of such right or the recovery can be regulated in the manner mutually arranged or agreed upon by the concerned parties so long as it is not in violation of statute. If for convenience and to facilitate payment, the parties by mutual consent work out an arrangement for the enforcement of the owner's statutory right to recover the tax amount and for discharging the tenant-occupant's statutory obligation to reimburse the owner, we see no reason for refusing to uphold such a contract and if thereunder the parties have agreed to the tenant-occupant discharging his liability by a fixed monthly payment not exceeding the tax liability, the said monthly payment would constitute 'rent' payable by the month within the meaning of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. The view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in Vishwambar Hemandas [ AIR 1986 Guj 153 : (1986) 2 Ren CR 268] does not, with respect, state the law correctly if it holds that even in cases where the entire tax liability is on the landlord and the tenant had to pay a gross rent of Rs 19.50 p.m. the mere recital in the lease that the rent is inclusive of taxes takes the case outside the purview of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act. We are, therefore, in respectful agreement with the view taken by the appellate court and the High Court in that behalf. We, therefore, hold that as the tenant had failed to comply with the requirement of Section 12(3) (a) to seek protection from eviction, the courts below were justified in ordering his eviction." 6. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and having gone through the materials on record, we are of the view that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order. 7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and having gone through the materials on record, we are of the view that no error not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the High Court in passing the impugned order. 7. If the petitioners want some more time to vacate, it shall be open for them to request the High Court. 8. The petition is dismissed accordingly. 9. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.