JUDGMENT : Rakesh Kainthla, J. The petitioners have filed the present petitions seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioners were arrested vide FIR No. 103 of 2024 dated 9 th September 2024 for the commission of offences punishable under sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, registered at Police Station, Chowari District Chamba, HP. The petitioners are innocent and have not committed any offence. They have roots in society, and there is no chance of their absconding. They would abide by the terms and conditions, which the Court may impose. Hence, the petitions. 2. The petitions are opposed by filing a status report, asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 9 th September 2024. They found a vehicle bearing registration number HP-38D-3555 parked near the juice factory at about 9:50 PM. Two people were sitting inside the vehicle. The police demanded the vehicle's documents. The driver took out his driving license and the vehicle’s registration certificate from the dashboard of the vehicle and hurriedly closed the dashboard. The driver identified himself as Ashok Kumar, and the person sitting beside him identified himself as Akash Mahajan. The police checked the vehicle in the presence of an independent witness and found a carry bag containing 418 capsules of Proxyvon. The police weighed the capsules, and their weight was found to be 255 grams. They seized the capsules and arrested the occupants of the vehicle. The capsules were sent for analysis to FSL, and according to the report, the capsules contained Tramadol. The weight of the capsules was 255.816 grams, and the weight of the powder was 210.678 grams. The police filed the charge sheet after completing the investigation. The matter was listed on 12 th March 2025 for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses. An FIR number 80/2012 has been registered against the petitioner, Ashok Kumar. The quantity of the drugs found in the possession of the petitioners is commercial. The petitioners would commit a similar offence if released on bail. Hence, it was requested that the present petitions be dismissed. 3. I have heard Mr. KB Khajuria and Mr PK Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 4. Mr. The petitioners would commit a similar offence if released on bail. Hence, it was requested that the present petitions be dismissed. 3. I have heard Mr. KB Khajuria and Mr PK Verma, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 4. Mr. K.B. Khajuria, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The quantity of powder found in the capsules was intermediate, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. The petitioners would abide by the terms and conditions, which the Court may impose. Hence, he prayed that the present petitions be allowed and the petitioners be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of the Kerala High Court in Akash versus State of Kerala 2021:KER:20062 in support of his submission. Mr. P. K. Verma learned counsel also adopted these submissions. 5. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the total weight of the capsules is to be considered while determining the quantity of the drugs. The petitioners were found in possession of a commercial quantity of Tramadol. The rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioners are unable to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. Hence, he prayed that the present petitions be dismissed. Mr. Prashant Sen learned Deputy Advocate General adopted these submissions. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed as under page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed as under page 783: - “Relevant parameters for granting bail 26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, how the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [ Chaman Lal v. State of U.P ., ( 2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] . 8. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed :- “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. 8. This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed :- “12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted below: “14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570 , this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms: — “15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstances and effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstances and effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779 , laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed: “ 4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 9. This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479. 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. A perusal of the status report shows that the police recovered the capsules from the vehicle bearing registration number HP-38D-3555. The petitioners were present in the vehicle at the time of the recovery of the capsules. 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 11. A perusal of the status report shows that the police recovered the capsules from the vehicle bearing registration number HP-38D-3555. The petitioners were present in the vehicle at the time of the recovery of the capsules. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874 , the contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed: “19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle. 20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession. 21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted. 22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term which assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [ (1979) 4 SCC 274 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes. 23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. 24. 23. The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended. 24. As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194: 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756 ], possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in the case in question, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or control. 25. The word “possession” means the legal right to possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC 498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966 : (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)] .) 26. Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where also presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles. 27. In the factual scenario of the present case, not only possession but conscious possession has been established. It has not been shown by the accused- appellants that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.” 12. The petitioners were present in the vehicle from which recovery was effected; hence, the petitioners were prima facie in possession of the capsules. 13. It was submitted that the weight of the powder has to be considered while determining the quantity. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Reeta v. State of H.P., 2020 SCC OnLine HP 2793, that the total weight of the capsules has to be considered while determining the quantity. It was observed: 6. Petitioner is accused of illegally possessing 501 capsules containing Tramadol Hydrochloride, which is a psychotropic substance. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by this Court in Reeta v. State of H.P., 2020 SCC OnLine HP 2793, that the total weight of the capsules has to be considered while determining the quantity. It was observed: 6. Petitioner is accused of illegally possessing 501 capsules containing Tramadol Hydrochloride, which is a psychotropic substance. The total weight of the capsules so recovered from the petitioner was 267.033 grams, which is above 250 grams notified as ‘commercial quantity’ under the NDPS Act. Even though the weight of Tramadol in 501 capsules recovered from the petitioner comes out as 50.27 grams but it is the total weight of capsules which is to be considered as per the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No. 722 of 2017, titled as Hira Singh v. Union of India, decided on 22 nd April, 2020, wherein it has been held that in the mixture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substance with one or more neutral substance(s), the quantity of the neutral substance(s) is not to be excluded, rather it is to be taken into consideration alongwith actual content by weight of the offending drug while determining the ‘small quantity’ or ‘commercial quantity’ of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance . The relevant para from the judgment is reproduced thus:— “10. The relevant para from the judgment is reproduced thus:— “10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, Reference is answered as under:— (I) The decision of this Court in the case of E. Micheal Raj (supra) taking the view that in the mixture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substance with one or more neutral substance(s), the quantity of the neutral substance(s) is not required to be taken into consideration while determining the small quantity or commercial quantity of a narcotic drug or psychotropic substance and only the actual content by weight of the offending narcotic drug which is relevant for the purpose of determining whether it would constitute small quantity or commercial quantity, is not a good law; (II) In case of seizure of mixture of Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances with one or more neutral substance(s), the quantity of neutral substance(s) is not to be excluded and to be taken into consideration alongwith actual content by weight of the offending drug, while determining the “small or commercial quantity” of the Narcotic Drugs or Psychotropic Substances; (III) Section 21 of the NDPS Act is not a stand-alone provision and must be construed along with other provisions in the statute, including provisions in the NDPS Act, including Notification No. S.O.2942(E) dated 18.11.2009 and Notification S.O. 1055(E) dated 19.10.2001. (IV) Challenge to Notification dated 18.11.2009 adding “Note 4” to the Notification dated 19.10.2001, fails, and it is observed and held that the same is not ultra vires to the Scheme and the relevant provisions of the NDPS Act. Consequently, writ petitions and Civil Appeal No. 5218/2017 challenging the aforesaid notification stand dismissed.” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This judgment is binding upon this Court, and the submission that the weight of the powder is to be considered is not acceptable. 15. The judgment of Kerala High Court in Akash (supra) deals with LSD and holds that the weight of the blotting paper is not to be considered while determining the quantity. This question was considered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in H.S. Arun Kumar v. State of Goa, 2022 SCC OnLine Bom 4696, and it was held that since the blotting paper is used while consuming the drugs, therefore, its weight has to be considered while determining the quantity. It was further held that since capsules are consumed, the weight of gelatine cannot be excluded. It was further held that since capsules are consumed, the weight of gelatine cannot be excluded. It was observed: 81. Again, with the utmost respect, we cannot agree with the above reasoning or the distinguishing of Hira Singh (supra) based upon the above reasoning. First, as noted earlier, there is no discussion on why the paper containing dried LSD drops of the LSD solution cannot be regarded as a mixture, particularly when the NDPS Act provides no statutory definition of the expression “mixture”. Instead, the Act refers to a mixture in whatever state. The Counsel for the accused persons, however, contended that since there was no chemical fusion between the L.S.D. and the blotter paper to give rise to some different substance, L.S.D. impregnated in a blotter was not a mixture. 82. The above contention overlooks that chemical fusion is not essential in the context of a mixture. In a mixture, the mixed elements retain their original properties. When two or more substances are combined by physical methods in any proportion and no new substance is formed, it is called a mixture. This is the difference between a mixture and a compound. Mixtures can be homogeneous or heterogeneous. For example, in a mixture of heroin and chalk powder, it is not as if the Heroin is chemically fused with chalk powder or loses its properties. 83. Secondly, there is no discussion about why the blotter cannot be regarded as a “neutral substance”, particularly considering the observations in Hira Singh (supra), not to mention Chapman (supra) and Finch (supra). Mr. Merchant had fairly accepted that where a drug is in a capsule, the weight of the capsule cannot be excluded. However, in the precise context of L.S.D. impregnated blotter, Finch (supra) holds that a much closer analogy would be the non-drug content of a film coating or a gelatin capsule used in producing lawful drugs as described by the Full Federal Court in Sigma Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Ply Ltd. (supra). The Full Federal Court held that film coating or gelatin capsule is an integral part of the ingestion by the user of the drug. In the same way, the Court held that the cardboard impregnated with L.S.D. was an integral part of the ingestion by the user of the drug and thus a “preparation” or a “substance” within the meaning of Section 4 of the Drug Misuse & Trading Act, 1985. 84. In the same way, the Court held that the cardboard impregnated with L.S.D. was an integral part of the ingestion by the user of the drug and thus a “preparation” or a “substance” within the meaning of Section 4 of the Drug Misuse & Trading Act, 1985. 84. Besides, with the utmost respect, we find that the conclusion about the blotter impregnated with L.S.D. not being a mixture or about the blotter not being a neutral substance is not backed by any reasoning. Moreover, the conclusion, with respect, does not advert the scheme of the NDPS Act, both before and after its amendment and before or after the issue of Notification dated 19.10.2001 and the notes below the same. Therefore, based on such a conclusion, we think the binding precedent in Hira Singh (supra) could not have been distinguished or held as inapplicable in the context of L.S.D. on a blotter. 85. Most of the contentions now urged by the Counsel for the accused persons, including the argument about Hira Singh (supra) being restricted only to Heroin, were considered and ably answered in Anuj Keshwani (supra). We endorse the reasoning. The most relevant discussion is in paragraphs 29 and 30, and the same is quoted below for the convenience of reference: “ 29. Although the drug which was considered by the Apex Court in Hira Singh (supra) was “heroin”, the principle underlying the said conclusion will have to be considered and borne in mind. In fact, the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the Respondent No. 1 with respect to ‘Note 4’ in the Notification dated 18/11/2009 and the Standing Order dated 19/10/2001 have been dealt with by the Apex Court in Hira Singh (supra) and, hence, need not be adverted to again. 30. L.S.D. is put on a blotter paper, which is capable of being swallowed, after placing it on the tongue. It is thus evident that the blotter paper is capable of being swallowed and is used as one of the methods for consuming LSD. Merely because the said blotter paper can be licked or put in a glass of water, does not necessarily mean that the blotter paper has to be excluded whilst determining the L.S.D. on the blotter paper. Take, for example, a capsule containing a drug or a psychotropic substance. Merely because the said blotter paper can be licked or put in a glass of water, does not necessarily mean that the blotter paper has to be excluded whilst determining the L.S.D. on the blotter paper. Take, for example, a capsule containing a drug or a psychotropic substance. The said capsule is capable of being opened, and its contents can either be consumed directly or added to any other mixture/swallowed with the cover. The fact remains that if a drug is put in a capsule, the same will have to be weighed as a whole. It is important to bear in mind the legislative intent, the object and reasons, and the preamble of the NDPS Act, whilst considering whether L.S.D. is to be weighed sans the blotter paper. As noted in Hira Singh (supra), it was never the intention of the Legislature to exclude the quantity of the neutral substance and to consider only the actual content by weight of the offending drug. It is also pertinent to note that illicit drugs are seldom sold in a pure form. They are always adulterated or cut with other substances or put in gelatin or blotter paper, as in the present case. Heroin, for example, is capable of being mixed with other substances like chalk powder, zinc oxide, because of these, impurities in the drug, brown-sugar is cheaper but more dangerous. The blotter paper impregnated or ingested with LSD is, in a sense, a dose. The blotter paper is made out of an extra- absorbent material and generally includes ingredients such as rice, cotton and even flax seed, thus making it edible and, as such, a substance in a dosage form/a mixture for consumption. It is thus evident, that a blotter paper, a carrier material, ingested with L.S.D., forms an integral part of the ingestion by the user of the drug and thus, constitutes preparation of the psychotropic substance i.e. L.S.D., which is capable of being consumed, and as such, forms a substance in a dosage form or a mixture. Infact, at the first blush, one may ask ‘how paper’?, but once it is accepted that a blotter paper ingested/impregnated with L.S.D., is used as a medium of consumption, the same will squarely fall within the definition of the term ‘preparation’, as defined in Section 2 (xx) of the NDPS Act. Infact, at the first blush, one may ask ‘how paper’?, but once it is accepted that a blotter paper ingested/impregnated with L.S.D., is used as a medium of consumption, the same will squarely fall within the definition of the term ‘preparation’, as defined in Section 2 (xx) of the NDPS Act. Like cutting agents used with other drugs that are ingested, the blotter paper, gelatine capsules or sugar cubes carrying L.S.D. can be and often are ingested with the said drug. The object of the NDPS Act is to deal with the street weight of the drug in the diluted form in which they are sold, and not only the weight of the active component. Thus, having regard to the dictum of the Apex Court in Hira Singh (supra), and the legislative intent of the NDPS Act, the blotter paper impregnated or ingested with L.S.D. will have to be considered as a whole, whilst determining whether the quantity is a small or commercial quantity.” 86. Most decisions or the material referred to also speak about the blotter being made up of extra absorbent material, including ingredients like rice, cotton, and flax seeds. Such blotters absorb LSD in their tiny perforations, separable only by dipping them into a liquid or placing them on the tongue. The blotter becomes an integral part of the mixture of the L.S.D.-impregnated blotter. Moreover, blotters made up of rice, flax seeds, etc., are consumable. They qualify as neutral substances in ordinary parlance, just as chalk or talcum powder would, in the context of the drugs with which they are mixed. The ruling in Hira Singh (supra) is quite clear on the status of such neutral substances. The NDPS Act also refers to psychotropic substances, including preparations of one or more psychotropic substances. Preparation includes a mixture in whatever state. 87. Thus, the text, precedents and the literature on the market or street practices in which L.S.D. is stored, transported, concealed, sold, purchased, consumed or otherwise dealt with support the discussion and construction in Anuj Keshwani (supra). xxx 112. In addition to the statutory provisions and schemes, reference is necessary to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act 16 of 2014. xxx 112. In addition to the statutory provisions and schemes, reference is necessary to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act 16 of 2014. This provides that the 2001 Amendment seeks to clarify the legislative intent to take the entire quantity of the drug seized in a case for determining the quantum of punishment and not the pure drug content. Thus, this is where the statutory provisions and the legislative intent align. Accordingly, this matter has no literal or liberal interpretation issue as was attempted to be raised. 113. For all the above reasons, we hold that a blotter paper forms an integral part of the L.S.D. (drug) when put on it for consumption and, as such, the weight of the blotter paper containing L.S.D. will have to be considered for determining a small or commercial quantity of the offending drug under the NDPS Act, 1985. Further, we also hold that the blotter paper that carries the drug (L.S.D. drops), which facilitates its consumption as a whole, is a preparation, mixture, or neutral substance within the meaning of the NDPS Act, 1985. 16. Kerala High Court relied upon the earlier judgment of the Bombay High Court in Hitesh Hemant Malhotra v. State of Maharashtra, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 3581, which was overruled in H.S. Arun Kumar (supra), therefore, it is difficult to follow the judgment of Kerala High Court. 17. The status report shows that the total weight of the capsules was found to be 255.816 grams, which is a commercial quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. 18. Section 37 of the ND&PS Act provides that in an offence involving commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as follows: “37. Offences are to be cognisable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) Every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as follows: “37. Offences are to be cognisable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)— (a) Every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable. (b) No person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19, section 24, or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or his bond unless– (i) the Public Prosecutor has been allowed to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.” 19. This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC 738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit an offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was observed: “7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions about the grant of bail in respect of certain offences enumerated under the said Section. They are: (1) In the case of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 19, (2) Under Section 24, (3) Under Section 27A and (4) offences involving a commercial quantity. 8. The accusation in the present case is about the fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment. (1) The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty of such an offence; (2) that person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 20. This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721 , wherein it was held: “19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the bail application moved by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429 , it has been elaborated as under: - "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused murders one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death on a number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs Chief Secy., Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95 ) as under: 24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine. 8. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine. 8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37, namely, (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail is satisfied. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socio- economic consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended." 20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form, prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of the commission of an offence under the Act unless two conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application, and the second is that the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail operates. 21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” 21. A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100 : (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237 wherein it was observed at page 110: “21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are: (i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail; and (ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to believe” that (a) the person is not guilty of such an offence, and (b) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [ Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505 ], held that : (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11) “7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief contemplated, in turn, points to the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. 8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. 8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. ‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy.’ [See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497 ], SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532 ] ] *** 10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of fact whether a particular act is reasonable or not, depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315 11. The court, while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose, essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail, that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.” (emphasis supplied) 23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High Court and this Court are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High Court and this Court are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.” 22. It was held in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346, that the bail cannot be granted without complying with the requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: 4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which, inter alia, provides that no person accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid down therein are satisfied, namely, (i) the public prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the bail application; and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any such offence while on bail. 15. For the sake of convenience Section 37(1) is reproduced hereinbelow:— “37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)- (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable; (b) No person accused of an offence punishable for 2[offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A and also for offences involving commercial quantity] shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless- (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that no person accused of an offence involving trade in a commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be released on bail unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 23. It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was observed: “5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that in cases involving the commercial quantity of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while considering the application of bail, the Court is bound to ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1) (b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus:— “37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.” 6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing the said enactment after repealing the then existing laws relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in the acts itself reads thus:— “An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters connected therewith.” In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549 , the three- judge bench of this Court considered the provisions under Section 37(1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with regard to the expression “reasonable grounds” used therein. This Court held that it means something more than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates substantial and probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. This Court held that it means something more than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates substantial and probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore, it was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the provision would require the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b) (ii) of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail it was held therein that they are cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of the existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the ‘reasonable grounds’, as referred to above. 7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC 122 , after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by this Court to be followed while considering a bail application moved by an accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that the scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that the exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure but also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b) (ii), NDPS Act. Further, it was held that in case one of the two conditions thereunder is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail would operate. 8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the consistent view of this Court that while considering the bail application made by an accused involved in an offence under NDPS Act a liberal approach ignoring the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is a sine qua non for granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act, cannot be avoided while passing orders on such applications.”. 24. In the present case, there is sufficient material on record to show the involvement of the petitioners in the commission of the crime. 25. 24. In the present case, there is sufficient material on record to show the involvement of the petitioners in the commission of the crime. 25. There is no material on record to show that the petitioners would not commit a similar offence in case of their release on bail. Therefore, the twin conditions laid down in Section 37 of the NDPS Act are not satisfied in the present case. 26. In view of the above, the petitioners are not entitled to bail; hence, the present petitions fail and the same are dismissed. 27. The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the case's merits.