JUDGMENT : Heard. 2. The petitioner in W.P.No. 10595 of 2018 is the Management, challenging the award passed by the III Additional Labour Court, Chennai, in I.D. No. 408 of 2005 dated 01.11.2007. By the said award, the respondent workman was granted reinstatement with continuity of service, along with 50% back wages and other attendant benefits. The writ petition was admitted on 26.04.2018, and in W.M.P. No. 10562 of 2008, an interim stay was granted, subject to the condition that the Management deposits 50% of the award amount, failing which the stay would stand vacated. 3. Upon receiving notice, the respondent workman filed two miscellaneous petitions: W.M.P. No. 30605 of 2018 to vacate the stay granted on 06.04.2010 and W.M.P. No. 30609 of 2018 seeking payment of monthly wages under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act. These petitions were disposed of by a common order dated 02.04.2019, wherein this Court directed the payment of monthly wages under Section 17B from January 2019 until the disposal of the writ petition. Also, the Management was ordered to deposit the amount covered by the award with the Labour Court, which in turn was directed deposit the amount in a nationalized bank. Subsequently, when the matter was listed on 02.06.2020, this Court directed verification of whether the Management had deposited 50% of the back wages as required. 4. Much later, the workman came up with his writ petition being W.P.No.2 197 of 2020 challenging that portion of the impugned award in 1.D.408 of 2005 dt. 1.11.2017 and after quashing the same sought for a payment of full wages with all attendant benefits, In that W.P., notice was ordered to the other side on 30.1.2020 and the said writ petition was directed to be posted along with the earlier writ petition filed by the management. Thus, both WPs were clubbed together and a Common order is passed. 5. The workman was employed as a storekeeper in the warehouse of the petitioner company, which is engaged in the production of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) and operates a storehouse under the supervision of the Excise Department of the Government of Tamil Nadu. Thus, both WPs were clubbed together and a Common order is passed. 5. The workman was employed as a storekeeper in the warehouse of the petitioner company, which is engaged in the production of Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) and operates a storehouse under the supervision of the Excise Department of the Government of Tamil Nadu. He was charge-sheeted by an order dated 07.04.2003, alleging that on 29.03.2003, he reported for duty during the first shift at 6:00 a.m. instead of his designated general shift, which commenced at 8:30 a.m., without obtaining prior permission from his superior, and despite the absence of any dispatch activities in the warehouse on that day. 6. On the same day, when the workman attempted to leave his shift at 7:10 a.m., the security guard demanded a gate pass for his exit. Instead of obtaining the required gate pass, he assured the guard that he would arrange for it when the Works Manager arrived at 8:30 a.m. Furthermore, during a meeting convened by the Works Manager later that day, a supervisor reported that the workman was found sleeping in the room of the Excise Deputy Tahsildar at around 11:20 a.m. Despite being questioned by the Works Manager, he did not leave the factory at the end of the first shift and instead overstayed, finally leaving only at 3:48 a.m. It was also alleged that he was engaged in money lending within the factory premises, charging exorbitant interest rates. As a result, he was placed under suspension pending an inquiry. 7. The workman submitted his explanation on 09.04.2003, denying the charges against him. Subsequently, an inquiry was conducted, and based on the findings of the Inquiry Officer dated 19.08.2003, he was dismissed from service with effect from 02.04.2003. Following his dismissal, he raised an industrial dispute before the Conciliation Officer. Upon the issuance of a failure report dated 23.12.2004, he filed a claim statement before the Labour Court. His dispute was registered as I.D. No. 408 of 2005, and notice was issued to the Management. In response, the Management filed a counter statement on 06.01.2006, defending its action. Additionally, the Management contended that if the domestic inquiry conducted was found to be vitiated, they should be granted an opportunity to present fresh evidence before the Labour Court. 8. His dispute was registered as I.D. No. 408 of 2005, and notice was issued to the Management. In response, the Management filed a counter statement on 06.01.2006, defending its action. Additionally, the Management contended that if the domestic inquiry conducted was found to be vitiated, they should be granted an opportunity to present fresh evidence before the Labour Court. 8. The Labour Court, after framing a preliminary issue regarding the validity of the inquiry conducted by the Management, found that the inquiry was not conducted in a fair and proper manner. Consequently, by a preliminary order dated 13.08.2010, it set aside the domestic inquiry conducted by the Management. In light of the Management’s request, they were permitted to lead fresh evidence. Thereafter, the Management examined three witnesses: (1) S.D. Parthasarathy (MW1) – Time Keeper, (2) K. Ambeth (MW2) – Supervisor, and (3) R. Shankar (MW3) – Senior Personnel Officer. 9. Except for the termination order dated 29.03.2003, which was marked as Ex.M16, the various reports submitted by different individuals to the Management were not examined. Instead, MW3, the Senior Personnel Officer, who was not an eyewitness to the incident, filed 16 documents, which were marked as Exs. M1 to M16. At the relevant time, he was working as an Administrative Assistant and he produced these reports. In paragraph 7 of his proof affidavit dated 19.01.2015, he stated, "though I did not personally notice the incident, as I was present in the general shift, I got to know about the incident and the subsequent actions taken against the petitioner (workman)." Meanwhile, the workman deposed as WW1. 10. Upon analyzing both the oral and documentary evidence presented, the Labour Court concluded that the charge regarding reporting for duty in the wrong shift was not proved. The Court made the following observation: "The attendance of the petitioner in the first shift has been noticed and brought to the knowledge of the Works Manager only at about 11:45 a.m. It is not made clear from the side of the respondents that after knowing the attendance of the petitioner in the first shift instead of the general shift, whether they have intended to allow the petitioner to continue in the first shift itself to work till 2.00 p.m or to work till 5.00 p.m till the end of the general shift. It is nowhere seen from the case of the respondents that even though the petitioner had reported for duty at 6.00 a.m on 29.3.2003, the management has not informed him as to whether he should work till 2.00 p.m for the first shift or till 5.00 p.m. for the general shift. If the management has not given clear directions to the petitioner after he reporting to duty, then, they cannot blame the petitioner for his overstay till 3.30 p.m” 11. Similarly, regarding the allegation that the workman was found sleeping in the room of the Excise Deputy Tahsildar, the Labour Court noted that the said officer was a government official. If anyone had unauthorizedly slept in his room, he would have reported the matter to an independent authority unconnected with the management. Since the officer in question was part of the internal administration of the management and no report from him was submitted as evidence, the Court found the testimony of MW2 on this issue to be unreliable. In this context, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant portion of MW2’s cross-examination, including re-examination and further cross-examination conducted on 15.04.2012 before the Labour Court, as follows: 12. Regarding the allegation that the workman smelled of liquor when subjected to a blow test, the Labour Court held that there was no corroborative evidence to support the statement of MW1. On the contrary, the circumstances surrounding the allegation were highly doubtful. The Management had contended that, although no IMFL production was taking place at the time, the workman could have consumed liquor from the sample stock. However, the Court rejected this theory, noting that any sample bottle would have been kept in a sealed cover in the Excise Tahsildar's room. If any seal had been broken, it would have been noticed by the Excise Officer, who would have taken appropriate action, but no such report was produced. The Court also observed that even the timeline of events did not indicate that liquor consumption could have occurred during working hours. Further, the Management failed to produce the results of the blow test either before the Court or during the domestic inquiry. Moreover, no police complaint was filed regarding the alleged consumption of alcohol on the premises. 13. Based on the two judgments, the Labour Court concluded that the charge of liquor consumption was not proved. Further, the Management failed to produce the results of the blow test either before the Court or during the domestic inquiry. Moreover, no police complaint was filed regarding the alleged consumption of alcohol on the premises. 13. Based on the two judgments, the Labour Court concluded that the charge of liquor consumption was not proved. In this regard, during cross-examination, MW1 made the following admission: 14. In the impugned award, the Labour Court noted that during the domestic inquiry, the Management had examined 13 witnesses and marked 17 documents. However, after the inquiry was set aside and the matter proceeded before the Labour Court, the Management examined only three witnesses and with the help of the MW2 the Personal Officer, they marked all the reports without examining their authors. 15. The Labour Court, having found that the charges against the workman were not proved, concluded that the dismissal order dated 29.03.2003 was not legal and, therefore, liable to be set aside. Consequently, it held that the workman was entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service. Regarding back wages, the Court determined that the workman was not gainfully employed elsewhere after his dismissal, and the Management had failed to present any rebuttal evidence to prove otherwise. Accordingly, the Court held that the workman was entitled to back wages. However, it restricted the quantum of back wages to 50% despite ordering reinstatement with continuity of service. For the denial of full back wages, the Labour Court provided the following reasoning in paragraph 45: “45. …Considering the above citation and of the facts discussed above, in view of the long time elapsed between the dismissal and reinstatement for which no blame could be put on the respondents, this court is of the view that, awarding 50% of back wages may be proper in the interest of both parties." 16. Aggrieved by the denial of back wages, the workman filed W.P. No. 2197 of 2020, in which notice was ordered on 31.01.2020. The matter was directed to be listed along with the writ petition filed by the management, as noted earlier. 17. The counsel for the management cited as many as ten Supreme Court judgments to support their contention that the Labour Court's findings were erroneous and that the evidentiary requirements in a domestic tribunal are minimal. The matter was directed to be listed along with the writ petition filed by the management, as noted earlier. 17. The counsel for the management cited as many as ten Supreme Court judgments to support their contention that the Labour Court's findings were erroneous and that the evidentiary requirements in a domestic tribunal are minimal. The first judgment cited was State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, reported in 1977 (2) SCC 491 , which established that strict and technical rules of evidence under the Evidence Act do not apply to domestic inquiries. Instead, all materials that are logically probative for a prudent mind are permissible. The Supreme Court observed as follows: “4. There is no allergy to hearsay evidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. It is true that departmental authorities and administrative tribunals must be careful in evaluating such material and should not glibly swallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the Indian Evidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to cite decisions nor text books, although we have been taken through case law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. The essence of a judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneous materials or considerations and observance of rules of natural justice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity or arbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiate the conclusions reached, such finding,even though of a domestic tribunal, cannot be held good.” 18. The second judgment cited was Food Corporation of India Workers Union v. Food Corporation of India & Anr., reported in 1996 (9) SCC 439 . The Supreme Court held that a Tribunal is not a court, and therefore, the requirement is only for material and not strict evidence as mandated as required by Evidence Act. 19. The third judgment cited was Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh & Anr., reported in 2004 (8) SCC 200 , wherein the Court held that the procedural rules under the CrPC do not apply to Labour Courts. It further emphasized that the approach and objectives of criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are entirely distinct and different. 20. The fourth judgment cited was West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO Ltd.) v. Ram Pravesh Singh, reported in 2008 (3) SCC 729 , which reiterated a similar position as under: “19. It further emphasized that the approach and objectives of criminal proceedings and disciplinary proceedings are entirely distinct and different. 20. The fourth judgment cited was West Bokaro Colliery (TISCO Ltd.) v. Ram Pravesh Singh, reported in 2008 (3) SCC 729 , which reiterated a similar position as under: “19. …… It is well settled principle of law that yardstick and standard of proof in a criminal case is different from the one in disciplinary proceedings. While the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the standard of proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities. 20. …….In a case where two views are possible on the evidence on record, then the Industrial Tribunal should be very slow in coming to a conclusion other than the one arrived at by the domestic Tribunal by substituting its opinion in place of the opinion of the domestic Tribunal.." 21. In the fifth case, Usha Breco Mazdoor Sangh v. Management of Usha Breco Ltd. & Anr., reported in 2008 (5) SCC 554 , the Supreme Court pointed out that in a departmental inquiry, misconduct need not be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. Instead, the applicable standard of proof is whether the test of preponderance of probabilities has been met. 22. In the sixth case, Collector Singh v. L.M.L. Ltd., reported in 2015 (2) SCC 410 , the Supreme Court held that courts will not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the disciplinary authority in imposing a penalty by substituting their own conclusion or punishment. However, if the penalty imposed is disproportionate to the misconduct committed, the court may appropriately modify the relief. 23. The seventh case, Union of India & Ors. vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in 2015 (2) SCC 610 , involved a service matter wherein the Supreme Court outlined the parameters of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227. The Court held that it cannot reappreciate evidence or interfere with conclusions in disciplinary proceedings, provided they are conducted in accordance with law. It further ruled that courts cannot examine the reliability or adequacy of evidence, interfere if there is some legal evidence supporting the findings, correct errors of fact, however grave, or assess the proportionality of punishment, unless it shocks the conscience of the court. It further ruled that courts cannot examine the reliability or adequacy of evidence, interfere if there is some legal evidence supporting the findings, correct errors of fact, however grave, or assess the proportionality of punishment, unless it shocks the conscience of the court. Judicial review is limited to assessing whether the inquiry was conducted by a competent authority in accordance with established legal procedures and principles of natural justice, and whether the decision was influenced or rendered vulnerable by irrelevant or extraneous considerations, the exclusion of admissible material evidence, or the admission of inadmissible evidence. 24. As for the eighth case, Management of Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation (Coimbatore) Ltd. vs. M. Chandrasekaran, reported in 2016 (16) SCC 16 , it pertains to the principles governing the scope of Section 33(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act and may not be relevant in the adjudication of disputes involving Section 11A. In this context, the Supreme Court held that the Commissioner, acting as the approval authority, had exceeded his jurisdiction by reappreciating the evidence presented before the Inquiry Officer and substituting his own judgment for that of the disciplinary authority. 25. The ninth case, Union of India vs. Dalbir Singh, reported in 2021 (11) SCC 321 , reaffirmed the principles laid down in the Rattan Singh case with regard to the appreciation of evidence. 26. The tenth case, State of Karnataka vs. Umesh, reported in 2022 (6) SCC 563 , was a service matter wherein the Supreme Court reiterated that criminal prosecution and departmental inquiry are governed by distinct considerations and that the rules of evidence applicable to a criminal trial differ from those governing disciplinary proceedings. 27. The aforesaid rulings cited by the counsel for the management has no bearing on the case on hand. On the other hand, as noted already the inquiry proceedings conducted by the management was held to be bad in law as it had contravened the principles of natural justice vide the preliminary order dated 13.8.2010. It was thereafter with permission the management let in oral evidence and marked certain documents. The workman also examined himself as WW1. In such a situation, the powers of the Labour court under Section 11A came to be considered by the Supreme Court vide its decision in The Workmen of M/s.Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt) Ltd Vs. It was thereafter with permission the management let in oral evidence and marked certain documents. The workman also examined himself as WW1. In such a situation, the powers of the Labour court under Section 11A came to be considered by the Supreme Court vide its decision in The Workmen of M/s.Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt) Ltd Vs. The Management reported in 1973 (1) SCC 813 and the court held as follows: “Having held that the right of the employer to adduce evidence continues even under the new section, it is needless to state that, when such evidence is adduced for the first time, it is the Tribunal which has to be satisfied on such evidence about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned. The law, as laid 'down by this Court that under such circumstances the issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and that it has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved, continues to have full effect. In (1) [1972] I.L.L.J. 180, such a case, as laid down by this Court, the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all. Therefore, it will-be seen that both in respect of cases where a domestic enquiry has been held as also in cases where the Tribunal considers the matter on the evidence adduced before it for the first time, the satisfaction under section 11 A, about the guilt or otherwise of the workman concerned, is that of the Tribunal. It has to consider the evidence and come to a conclusion one way or other. Even in cases where an enquiry has been held by an employer and a finding of misconduct arrived at, the Tribunal can now differ from that finding in a proper case and hold that no misconduct is proved. We are not inclined to accept the contentions advanced on behalf of the employers that the stage for interference under section 11 A by the Tribunal is reached only when it has to consider the punishment after having accepted the finding of guilt recorded by an employer. It has to be remembered that a Tribunal may 'hold that the punishment is not justified because the misconduct alleged and found proved is such that it does not warrant dismissal or discharge. It has to be remembered that a Tribunal may 'hold that the punishment is not justified because the misconduct alleged and found proved is such that it does not warrant dismissal or discharge. The Tribunal may also hold that the order of discharge or dismissal is not justified because the alleged misconduct itself is not established by the evidence. To come to a conclusion either way, the Tribunal will have to reappraise the evidence for itself. Ultimately it may hold that the misconduct itself is not proved or that the misconduct proved does not warrant the punishment of dismissal or discharge. That is why, according to us, section 11A now gives full power to the Tribunal to go into the evidence and satisfy- itself on both these points. Now the ,jurisdiction of the Tribunal to reappraise the evidence and come to its conclusion enures to it when it has to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to it in which an employer relies on the findings recorded by him in a domestic enquiry. Such a power to appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion about the guilt or otherwise was always recognised in a Tribunal when it was deciding a dispute on the basis of evidence adduced before it for the first time. Both categories are now put on a par by section 11 A” 28. Therefore, the decisions cited by the management do not have direct applicability. As held by the Supreme Court in the Firestone case, the standard of proof required for presenting evidence before the court demands greater scrutiny. In the present case, the evidence in question is not that which was recorded in the domestic inquiry and accepted by the disciplinary authority. Instead, the management sought permission to lead evidence before the court but miserably failed to substantiate the allegations of misconduct convincingly before the Labour Court based on the materials presented in order to come to the conclusion that the misconducts alleged were established. 29. The counsel for the workman referred to another judgment of the Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, reported in 2010 (4) SCC 491 , wherein the Court held as follows: “15.To prove his averments in the suit, respondent- plaintiff tendered himself in the witness box and proved his case as also documents filed in support thereof. vs. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, reported in 2010 (4) SCC 491 , wherein the Court held as follows: “15.To prove his averments in the suit, respondent- plaintiff tendered himself in the witness box and proved his case as also documents filed in support thereof. Surprisingly enough, appellants herein did not lead any oral evidence, yet some of the documents filed by appellants were exhibited, probably under misconception of law that they were not disputed in Court by respondent. It is also necessary to mention here that appellants had also not served any notice of admission or denial of documents on the respondent during trial as contemplated under Order XII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short,`CPC'). …… 24.Records do not reveal that any such procedure was adopted either by the appellants or by the Trial Court to prove the documents filed by the appellants and mark them as Exhibits. Thus, no advantage thereof could be accrued to the appellants, even if it is assumed that said documents have been admitted by respondent and were then exhibited and marked. 25.No doubt, it is true that failure to prove the defence does not amount to an admission, nor does it reverse or discharge the burden of proof of the plaintiff but still the duty cast on the defendants has to be discharged by adducing oral evidence, which the appellants have miserably failed to do….." 30. The counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court which arose under the Motor Vehicles Act in Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan, reported in 1963 SCC OnLine SC 24, wherein the Court set out the scope of Article 226 in interfering with orders of the Tribunal, as follows: “….the High Court would certainly 1 SCI/64--5 have jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the order of the authorities and direct them to ascertain whether the claim of the first respondent was true, and if it was true, to take that into consideration before issuing the permit to one or other of the claimants before them. In such an event the High Court would not be interfering with the finding fact arrived at by the Appellate Tribunal based on the material placed before it, but would only be quashing the order on the ground that an important and material circumstance was ignored or not investigated into by the Tribunal. If a Tribunal ignores or fails to investigate a material circumstance put forward by a claimant and gives a finding against him, the said finding can certainly be said to be vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record.” 31. In light of the above, it cannot be concluded that the Labour Court misdirected itself in ordering reinstatement with continuity of service along with partial back wages. Therefore, the management's writ petition in W.P.No. 10595 of 2018 seeking to challenge the Award of the labour court in I.D.No.408/2005 dt. 1.11.2007 to that extent does not call for any interference and liable to be dismissed. 32. This brings us to the quantum of back wages awarded by the Labour Court, which is challenged by the workman in the second writ petition. As previously noted, the Labour Court, after finding the dismissal unjustified and ordering reinstatement with all benefits, granted only 50% of the back wages, citing the prolonged pendency of the matter before the court and absolving the management of any blame. Such reasoning does not merit acceptance. 33. In this context, the learned counsel for the workman relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.), reported in 2013 (10) SCC 324 , wherein the Court addressed the quantum of back wages payable to a workman in cases of wrongful dismissal. In paragraph 38, after analyzing previous decisions, the Supreme Court laid down certain broad principles as contained in paragraphs 38(1), 38(2), and 38(6), which state as follows: “In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. In paragraph 38, after analyzing previous decisions, the Supreme Court laid down certain broad principles as contained in paragraphs 38(1), 38(2), and 38(6), which state as follows: “In cases of wrongful termination of service, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. The aforesaid rule is subject to the rider that while deciding the issue of back wages, the adjudicating authority or the Court may take into consideration the length of service of the employee/workman, the nature of misconduct, if any, found proved against the employee/workman, the financial condition of the employer and similar other factors.” …… In a number of cases, the superior Courts have interfered with the award of the primary adjudicatory authority on the premise that finalization of litigation has taken long time ignoring that in majority of cases the parties are not responsible for such delays. Lack of infrastructure and manpower is the principal cause for delay in the disposal of cases. For this the litigants cannot be blamed or penalised. It would amount to grave injustice to an employee or workman if he is denied back wages simply because there is long lapse of time between the termination of his service and finality given to the order of reinstatement. The Courts should bear in mind that in most of these cases, the employer is in an advantageous position vis-à-vis the employee or workman. He can avail the services of best legal brain for prolonging the agony of the sufferer, i.e., the employee or workman, who can ill afford the luxury of spending money on a lawyer with certain amount of fame.” 34. The Labour Court's reasoning for denying 50% of the back wages, solely on the ground that the matter remained pending for several years and that the management could not be blamed, has been expressly rejected in paragraph 38(6) of the Deepali Gundu Surwase case. Therefore, the impugned award in L.D. No. 408/2005 dated 01.11.2007, to the extent that it denies 50% of the back wages, is liable to be set aside. 35. In the light of the above the management's writ petition in W.P.No.10595 of 2018 will stand dismissed. The workman's writ petition in W.P.No.2197 of 2020 will stand allowed. No costs. As already directed, the compliance report regarding Section 17B payment is not forthcoming. 35. In the light of the above the management's writ petition in W.P.No.10595 of 2018 will stand dismissed. The workman's writ petition in W.P.No.2197 of 2020 will stand allowed. No costs. As already directed, the compliance report regarding Section 17B payment is not forthcoming. In any event the workman was in receipt of last drawn wages as per the interim orders, then there is no cause for complaint. However, if the amounts as ordered is not paid, the workman is eligible for recovering the same.