JUDGMENT : ROBIN PHUKAN, J. Heard Mr. P. Mahanta, learned counsel for the petitioner and also heard Mr. S.P. Choudhury, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, for the respondent authorities. 2. The petitioner herein is aggrieved by the letter of the Director General, Border Roads, being No. 15103/GEN/DGBR/26/E1C’B’ dated 12 October, 2010. It is to be noted here that vide said letter, the Director General, Border Roads had rejected the petition filed by the petitioner for grant of pension. 3. Mr. Mahanta, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was appointed on 17.04.1995, as Overseer in General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF), under, Border Roads Organization in the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Government of India. But, on account of illness of his mother and in absence of any person to look after her, he had submitted his resignation on 22.03.2008, however he was released from his service with effect from 5th April, 2008 vide releasing order No. 1413/Out/130/E1 Camp dated 4th April, 2008, after rendering of 13 (thirteen) years of continuous service. 3.1. Mr. Mahanta, also submits that after his resignation he has been paid the gratuity and different arrears of pay as per 6 Central Pay Commission with half of the leave encashment by illegally withholding major portion of the leave encashment accumulated for 124 days during his total 13 years service. And in spite of repeated request for granting him pension, the authority did not pay any heed to the same, though the qualifying service period for entitlement pension is 10 years. Mr. Mahanta, further submits that in the meantime, the Ministry of Personnel, Pension and Public Grievances, Department of Pension and Pensioner’s Welfare, brought some amendment to the provision of pensionand as per Clause 5.3 of the Office Memorandum dated 2 of September, 2008, full pension has been granted at the rate of 50% of the emoluments or average emoluments, whichever is more beneficial to the retiring Government servant, after qualifying service of 10 (ten) years, by superseding earlier prorate pension, as under Rules 49 (2) (b) of the CCS (Pension) Rule, 1972. Mr. Mahanta submits, the petitioner has filed a representation on 19.08.2010, to grant him pension as per provision of Clause 5.3 of the Office Memorandum dated 2nd September, 2008, but, the respondent authorities vide letter dated 22 October, 2010 informed the petitioner that his prayer for pension is rejected. 3.2. Mr. Mahanta submits, the petitioner has filed a representation on 19.08.2010, to grant him pension as per provision of Clause 5.3 of the Office Memorandum dated 2nd September, 2008, but, the respondent authorities vide letter dated 22 October, 2010 informed the petitioner that his prayer for pension is rejected. 3.2. And being aggrieved, the petitioner approached this Court for issuing direction to the respondent authorities to grant pension to the petitioner by setting aside the letter being No. 15103/GEN/DGBR/26/E1C’B’ dated 12th October,2010 issued by the Director General, Border Roads. Mr. Mahanta also submits that the action of the respondent authority in rejecting the representation of the petitioner is illegal and arbitrary and therefore, contended to allow the petition setting aside the impugned letter dated 22nd October, 2010. 4. Per contra, Mr. Choudhury, learned Assistant Solicitor General of India, submits that the respondents authorities have paid all the amounts which the petitioner is legally entitled to and encashment of earned leave and arrear salary as per recommendation of the 6th Pay Commission, had already been paid and no amount is being withheld by the respondent authorities. Mr. Chaudhury further submits that though the petitioner has rendered continuous service for a period of 13 years and the qualifying period for pension is 10 years, yet, the petitioner is not entitled to any pensionary benefit as he resigned from the service and the same has categorically been stated in the letter dated 22nd October, 2010 so annexed as Annexure- R5 in the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent authorities. Under such circumstances, Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent submits that the petitioner is not entitled to any relief and therefore, it is contended to dismiss the petition. 5. Having heard the submission of learned counsel for both the parties, I have carefully gone through the petition and the documents placed on record and also perused the Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, and also the Office Memorandum dated 2nd September, 2008. In order to effectively deal with the issue in the case in hand, a reference to Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 is necessary, which read as under:- (1) Resignation from services or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in public interest by the appointing authority, entails forfeiture of past service. In order to effectively deal with the issue in the case in hand, a reference to Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 is necessary, which read as under:- (1) Resignation from services or a post, unless it is allowed to be withdrawn in public interest by the appointing authority, entails forfeiture of past service. (2) A resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if it has been submitted to take up with proper permission, another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under Government where service qualifies. (3) Interruption in service in a case falling under sub-rule (2), due to the two appointments being at different stations, not exceeding the joining time permissible under the rules of transfer, shall be covered by grant of leave of any kind due to the Government servant on the date of relief or by formal condonation to the extent to which the period is not covered by leave due to him. (4) The appointing Authority may permit a person to withdraw his resignation in the public interest on the following conditions, namely - (i) That the resignation was tendered by the Government servant for compelling reasons which did not involve any reflection on his integrity, efficiency or conduct and the request for withdrawal of the resignation has been made as a result of a material change in the circumstances which originally compelled him change which to tender the resignation. (ii) That during the period intervening between the date on which the resignation became effective and the date from which the request for withdrawal was made, the conduct of the person concerned was in no way improper. (iii) That the period of absence from duty between the date on which the resignation became effective and the date on which the person is allowed to resume duty as a result of permission to withdraw the resignation is not more than ninety days. (iv) That the post, which was vacated by the Government servant on the acceptance of his resignation or any other comparable post, is available. (iv) That the post, which was vacated by the Government servant on the acceptance of his resignation or any other comparable post, is available. (5) Request for withdrawal of a resignation shall not be accepted by the Appointing Authority where a Government servant resigns his service or post with a view to taking up an appointment in or under a private commercial company or in or under a corporation company wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government or in or under a controlled or financed by the Government. (6) When an order is passed by the Appointing Authority allowing a person to withdraw his resignation and to resume duty, the order shall be deemed to include the condonation of interruption in service but the period of interruption shall not count as qualifying service. (7) A resignation submitted for the purpose of Rule 37 shall not entail forfeiture of past service under the government. 6. Thus, a cursory perusal of the aforementioned provision indicates that if a Government servant resigned from service on his own volition, he may entail forfeiture of past service.But, such resignation shall not entail forfeiture of past service if the incumbent concerned submits his resignation to take up another appointment, whether temporary or permanent, under Government where service qualifies, however, with proper permission. 7. It is worth mentioning in this context that the connotation of the expression “resignation” was discussed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Reserve Bank of India v. Cecil Dennis Solomon, reported in (2004) 9 SCC 461 as under:- “ 10. In service jurisprudence, the expressions “superannuation”, “voluntary retirement”, “compulsory retirement” and “resignation” convey different connotations. Voluntary retirement and resignation involve voluntary acts on the part of the employee to leave service. Though both involve voluntary acts, they operate differently. One of the basic distinctions is that in case of resignation it can be tendered at any time, but in the case of voluntary retirement, it can only be sought for after rendering prescribed period of qualifying service. Other fundamental distinction is that in case of the former, normally retiral benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is not mandated, while in case of the latter, permission of the employer concerned is a requisite condition. Other fundamental distinction is that in case of the former, normally retiral benefits are denied but in case of the latter, the same is not denied. In case of the former, permission or notice is not mandated, while in case of the latter, permission of the employer concerned is a requisite condition. Though resignation is a bilateral concept, and becomes effective on acceptance by the competent authority, yet the general rule can be displaced by express provisions to the contrary. In Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal [1989 Supp (2) SCC 175 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 143 : (1990) 12 ATC 683 : AIR 1989 SC 1083] on interpretation of Regulation 20(2) of the Punjab National Bank Regulations, it was held that resignation would automatically take effect from the date specified in the notice as there was no provision for any acceptance or rejection of the resignation by the employer. In Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra [(1978) 2 SCC 301 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 303] it was held in the case of a judge of the High Court having regard to Article 217 of the Constitution that he has a unilateral right or privilege to resign his office and his resignation becomes effective from the date which he, of his own volition, chooses. But where there is a provision empowering the employer not to accept the resignation, on certain circumstances e.g. pendency of disciplinary proceedings, the employer can exercise the power 7.1. The term ‘resignation’ its meaning and it implication was again discussed by Hon’nble Supreme Court in the case of UCO Bank v. Sanwar Mal, reported in ( 2004) 4 SCC 412, as under:- “ 9. We find merit in these appeals. The words “resignation” and “retirement” carry different meanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at any point of time, even on the second day of his appointment but in the case of retirement he retires only after attaining the age of superannuation or in the case of voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the extent that there is severance of employment ( sic is the same) but in service jurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently. Under the Regulations, the expressions “resignation” and “retirement” have been employed for different purpose and carry different meanings. The effect of resignation and retirement to the extent that there is severance of employment ( sic is the same) but in service jurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently. Under the Regulations, the expressions “resignation” and “retirement” have been employed for different purpose and carry different meanings. The Pension Scheme herein is based on actuarial calculation; it is a self-financing scheme, which does not depend upon budgetary support and consequently it constitutes a complete code by itself. The Scheme essentially covers retirees as the credit balance to their provident fund account is larger as compared to employees who resigned from service. Moreover, resignation brings about complete cessation of master-and- servant relationship whereas voluntary retirement maintains the relationship for the purposes of grant of retiral benefits, in view of the past service. Similarly, acceptance of resignation is dependent upon discretion of the employer whereas retirement is completion of service in terms of regulations/rules framed by the Bank. Resignation can be tendered irrespective of the length of service whereas in the case of voluntary retirement, the employee has to complete qualifying service for retiral benefits. Further, there are different yardsticks and criteria for submitting resignation vis-à-vis voluntary retirement and acceptance thereof. Since the Pension Regulations disqualify an employee, who has resigned, from claiming pension, the respondent cannot claim membership of the fund. In our view, Regulation 22 provides for disqualification of employees who have resigned from service and for those who have been dismissed or removed from service. Hence, we do not find any merit in the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent that Regulation 22 makes an arbitrary and unreasonable classification repugnant to Article 14 of the Constitution by keeping out such class of employees.” 8. In the instant case, the petitioner had resigned on 22.03.2008. By resigning from his service, the petitioner had submitted himself to the legal consequences that flow from a resignation under the provisions applicable to his service. Rule 26 states that upon resignation, an employee forfeits past service. 9. Though Mr. In the instant case, the petitioner had resigned on 22.03.2008. By resigning from his service, the petitioner had submitted himself to the legal consequences that flow from a resignation under the provisions applicable to his service. Rule 26 states that upon resignation, an employee forfeits past service. 9. Though Mr. Mahanta, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner had resigned under compelling circumstances and in view of Clause 5.3 of the O.M. Dated 2nd September, 2008 he is entitled to pension since he had rendered 13 years of continuous service and the clause provides for qualifying service as 10 years, yet, said submission left this Court unimpressed inasmuch as, the petitioner had resigned from service, for whatever reason, it has to be taken into account as resignation for all purposes and it entail the legal consequences that flows from Rule 26 of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 which states that upon resignation, an employee forfeits past service. Over and above in Clause No.5.1 of the said O.M. clearly states that a government servant retiring in accordance with the provision of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 before completing qualifying services of 10 years shall not be entitled to pension, but he shall continue to be entitled to service gratuity in terms of Rule 49(1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. 10. Though Mr. Mahanta argued that Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules speaks about forfeiture of past service, but not about forfeiture of pension and that the action of the Director General, Boarder Roads, in refusal to grant pension to the petitioner, with reference to the Rule 26 (1) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, is nothing but colourable exercise of power,yet such submission is found to be bereft of merit as pensionary benefits are usually linked to qualifying service and a formal retirement from service. If past service is forfeited, then as a logical corollary, the incumbent concerned would not get any pension for want of qualifying service. 11. It is to be noted here that in the case of BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. vs Ghanshyam Chand Sharma, reported in (2020) 3 SCC 346 , while dealing with the Rule 26, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that- even if the first respondent had served twenty years, under Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, his past service stands forfeited upon resignation. The first respondent is therefore, not entitled to pensionary benefits. 12. In the case of LIC vs. SreeLal Meena, reported in (2019) 4 SCC 479, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that:- “ 26. There are some observations on the principles of public sectors being model employers and provisions of pension being beneficial legislations (see:- Asger Ibrahim Amin v LIC). We may, however, note that as per what we have opined aforesaid, the issue cannot be dealt with on a charity principle. When the legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain beneficial provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a particular date and on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded cannot be included in it by implication.” 13. Thus, taking note of the submission of learned counsel for both the parties and also considering the facts and circumstances on the record, this Court is of the view that the petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference of this Court and accordingly, the petition stands dismissed. 14. In terms of above, this writ petition stands disposed of, leaving the parties to bear their own cost.