Order : FARJAND ALI, J. 1. The instant Misc. Petition has been preferred on behalf of the accused petitioners Parmanand Adwani and Mangi Lal seeking quashing of the order dated 21-05-2012 passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ ST (Prevention of Atrocities Act) Cases, Pali in Criminal Revision No.77/2013 as well as the order dated 19-08-2015 passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate No.2, Pali in Criminal Original Case No.184/2012, whereby the learned Magistrate took cognizance under Sections 420 & 120-B of the IPC and issued process against them. 2. Briefly stated the facts of the case would be that the respondents Smt. Geeta Devi and Mangal Singh filed a criminal complaint based on which an FIR was lodged. It was stated in the complaint that one Smt. Chhaniya happened to be mother-in-law of the complainant Smt. Geeta and the other accused Radha, Pushpa and Laxmi are her sister-in-laws. Her father-in-law and husband had died intestated. There is a shop situated at Mill Gate, Pali in the name of her father-in-law and the said shop was given to respondent No.2 Mangal Singh by Smt. Geeta to take care of it and later on 25-09-2009, the same was sold to him by way of execution of a registered sale deed and the possession was also handed over to him. The complainant Smt. Geeta and Mangal Singh were arrested on 11-12-2009 in relation to a dispute of the shop in question and whereupon they came to know that the said shop had been sold to the petitioner Parmanand by the vendor Smt. Chhaniya through a registered sale deed dated 18-09-2009 and possession had been handed over to him. 2.1. The matter was thoroughly investigated by the police and whereafter it was concluded that the allegations were false and it was a civil dispute and therefore a negative final report was submitted. The basis of the negative final report are as under:- (a) The father-in-law of the complainant Smt. Geeta, was the owner of the shop in question who died intestated, therefore the vendor, Smt. Chhaniya, by a propriety right over it and in the capacity of absolute ownership, sold the property to Parmanand. (b)The complainant, Smt. Geeta Devi, had stayed with her in-laws for only two years, after which she left their house. She allegedly stole ornaments belonging to her mother-in-law, and the couple thereafter began residing separately from the in-laws. (b)The complainant, Smt. Geeta Devi, had stayed with her in-laws for only two years, after which she left their house. She allegedly stole ornaments belonging to her mother-in-law, and the couple thereafter began residing separately from the in-laws. (c) The complainant, Smt. Geeta Devi, returned to her in-laws' house after nine years. By that time, Smt. Chhaniya had already sold the property to the petitioner, Parmanand. Smt. Chhaniya is the legally wedded wife of the actual owner of the property, who had since passed away, and therefore, she was within her rights to sell the property to the petitioner, Parmanand. 3. The complainant lodged a protest, upon which an inquiry was initiated. During the inquiry, the complainant was examined under Section 200 Cr.P.C. and her witnesses under Section 202 Cr.P.C. The learned Magistrate heard the complainant and thereafter took cognizance of the offence. 3.1 The petitioner preferred a Criminal Revision; however, the subject matter of the case, as well as the legal and factual aspects involved, were not appropriately considered. Consequently, the revision petition was dismissed by the Revisional Court vide order dated 19-08-2015. 4. I have heard the counsel for the parties and gone through the niceties of the matter. 4.1 It is an admitted fact situation that the complainant Smt. Geeta Devi does not have an absolute proprietary right or title over the shop in question, but she claim to have obtained rights after the death of her husband and father-in-law. The fact that the respondent No.2 Smt. Geeta Devi had left matrimonial home and started to reside with her husband at a separate place is also discernible from the material available. Smt. Chhaniya, who is the seller of the property to the petitioner No.1 Parmanad may have an impression that after death of her husband, his property had divested in her and, therefore, under this belief, she sold the property to the petitioner No.1 Parmanand through a registered sale deed. 4.2. The facts mentioned above, making it abundantly clear that prima facie the offence under Section 420 of the IPC is not made out for the following reasons. 4.2. The facts mentioned above, making it abundantly clear that prima facie the offence under Section 420 of the IPC is not made out for the following reasons. (a) The essential ingredients of the offence of cheating are deception of a person by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment and as a matter of fact that is not the case here because neither it’s a case of the complainant that the petitioners had either made a false representation or made dishonest concealment to her by any of their act or omission. (b) The other ingredient which is essential to constitute an offence of cheating is fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to retain thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he has not been so deceived; and such an act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to the body, mind, reputation or property of the victim. However, even if the facts narrated by the complainant are taken as it is, nothing mentioned above could be traced. 5. Here in this case, there is not an iota of evidence to show or suggest that there was any transaction between the petitioner Parmanand and the complainant Smt. Geeta so, there arises no question of inducement, leave aside, dishonest inducement. The offence of cheating would have entered into play when the petitioner had induced complainant Smt. Geeta to deliver any property and under the influence of that inducement Smt. Geeta may have delivered the property which she would not have delivered if such fraudulent or dishonest inducement had not been given to her and by doing so she caused loss to her property. As a matter of fact, nothing has been delivered by the complainant to the petitioners. On the contrary, the facts as it is emerging from the record are that the shop-in-question was in proprietary ownership of the husband of Smt. Chhaniya and after his passing away she sold the property to the petitioner No.1 through a registered sale deed after receiving monetary consideration. Nothing was taken from the complainant and nothing was given by her to the petitioner. Nothing was taken from the complainant and nothing was given by her to the petitioner. Even prima facie, the facts and circumstances do not suggest constitution of an offence under Section 420 of the IPC. The incorporation of Section 120B of the IPC, prima facie, seems to be unjustified because there is no whisper regarding hatching of a criminal conspiracy by the petitioner with any of the accused persons. This Court has taken guidance from the judgment passed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, reported in (2009) 4 Crimes 13 and the same is squarely applied in this case. For the ready reference, the relevant paragraphs are being reproduced here under:- 13. Let us now examine whether the ingredients of an offence of cheating are made out. The essential ingredients of the offence of "cheating" are as follows: (i) deception of a person either by making a false or misleading representation or by dishonest concealment or by any other act or omission; (ii) fraudulent or dishonest inducement of that person to either deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce that person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived; and (iii) such act or omission causing or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. To constitute an offence under section 420, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should have dishonestly induced the person deceived (i) to deliver any property to any person, or (ii) to make, alter or destroy wholly or in part a valuable security (or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security). 14. When a sale deed is executed conveying a property claiming ownership thereto, it may be possible for the purchaser under such sale deed, to allege that the vendor has cheated him by making a false representation of ownership and fraudulently induced him to part with the sale consideration. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. But in this case the complaint is not by the purchaser. On the other hand, the purchaser is made a co-accused. It is not the case of the complainant that any of the accused tried to deceive him either by making a false or misleading representation or by any other action or omission, nor is it his case that they offered him any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver any property or to consent to the retention thereof by any person or to intentionally induce him to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived. Nor did the complainant allege that the first appellant pretended to be the complainant while executing the sale deeds. Therefore, it cannot be said that the first accused by the act of executing sale deeds in favour of the second accused or the second accused by reason of being the purchaser, or the third, fourth and fifth accused, by reason of being the witness, scribe and stamp vendor in regard to the sale deeds, deceived the complainant in any manner. As the ingredients of cheating as stated in Section 415 are not found, it cannot be said that there was an offence punishable under Sections 417, 418, 419 420 of the Code. A clarification 15. When we say that execution of a sale deed by a person, purporting to convey a property which is not his, as his property, is not making a false document and therefore not forgery, we should not be understood as holding that such an act can never be a criminal offence. If a person sells a property knowing that it does not belong to him, and thereby defrauds the person who purchased the property, the person defrauded, that is the purchaser, may complain that the vendor committed the fraudulent act of cheating. But a third party who is not the purchaser under the deed may not be able to make such complaint. The term `fraud' is not defined in the Code. The dictionary definition of `fraud' is "deliberate deception, treachery or cheating intended to gain advantage". Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines `fraud' with reference to a party to a contract. In Dr. Vimla Vs. The term `fraud' is not defined in the Code. The dictionary definition of `fraud' is "deliberate deception, treachery or cheating intended to gain advantage". Section 17 of the Contract Act, 1872 defines `fraud' with reference to a party to a contract. In Dr. Vimla Vs. Delhi Administration- AIR 1963 SC 1572 , this Court explained the meaning of the expression `defraud' thus "The expression "defraud" involves two elements, namely, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable, or of money, and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied." The above definition was in essence reiterated in State of UP Vs. Ranjit Singh- 1999 (2) SCC 617 . 16. The Penal Code however defines `fraudulently', an adjective form of the word `fraud', in Section 25, as follows : "A person is said to do a thing fraudulently if he does that thing with intent to defraud but not otherwise". The term "fraudulently" is mostly used with the term "dishonestly" which is defined in Sectioon 24 as follows : "Whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person is said to do that thing "dishonestly". To `defraud' or do something fraudulently is not by itself made an offence under the Penal Code, but various acts when done fraudulently (or fraudulently and dishonestly) are made offences. These include: (i) Fraudulent removal or concealment of property (sec.206, 421, 424) (ii) Fraudulent claim to property to prevent seizure (sec. 207). (iii) Fraudulent suffering or obtaining a decree (sec.208 and 210) (iv) Fraudulent possession/delivery of counterfeit coin (sec.239, 240, 242 and 243). (v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of coin (sec. 246 to 253) (vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (sec. 261-261) (vii) Fraudulent use of false instruments/weight/measure (sec.264 to 266) (viii) Cheating (sec. 415 to 420) (ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to creditors (sec. 422). (v) Fraudulent alteration/diminishing weight of coin (sec. 246 to 253) (vi) Fraudulent acts relating to stamps (sec. 261-261) (vii) Fraudulent use of false instruments/weight/measure (sec.264 to 266) (viii) Cheating (sec. 415 to 420) (ix) Fraudulent prevention of debt being available to creditors (sec. 422). (x) Fraudulent execution of deed of transfer containing false statement of consideration (sec. 423). (xi) Forgery making or executing a false document (sec. 463 to 471 and 474) (xii) Fraudulent cancellation/destruction of valuable security etc.(sec. 477) (xiii) Fraudulently going through marriage ceremony (sec.496). It follows therefore that by merely alleging or showing that a person acted fraudulently, it cannot be assumed that he committed an offence punishable under the Code or any other law, unless that fraudulent act is specified to be an offence under the Code or other law. Section504 of Penal Code 6. The learned trial Court has erred in not taking into consideration legal and factual aspects of the matter as no transaction took place between Smt. Geeta and petitioners thus, Section 420 IPC is not attracted, the learned Magistrate has not taken care of it while passing the order under assail and ordered to issue process against the petitioners which, in my view, is bad in law and therefore not sustainable. The learned Court of Revision was supposed to examine the legality and correctness of the order of the learned Magistrate but he failed to exercise the revisional jurisdiction. Thus, both the orders deserve to be quashed and set aside. 7. Accordingly, the instant Misc. Petition is allowed. The order dated 21-05-2012 passed by the learned Special Judge, SC/ ST (Prevention of Atrocities Act) Cases, Pali in Criminal Revision No.77/2013 as well as the order dated 19-08-2015 passed by the Court of Judicial Magistrate No.2, Pali in Criminal Original Case No.184/2012 are hereby quashed and set aside. The petitioners are exonerated from the charges. 8. The stay petition stands disposed of.