JUDGMENT : (Rakesh Kainthla, J.) The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail. It has been asserted that the petitioner was arrested vide F.I.R. No. 7 of 2024, dated 20.01.2024 for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 15 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short ‘NDPS Act’) registered at Police Station Haroli, District Una, H.P. The petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. According to the prosecution, the police received secret information regarding the presence of contraband in the house of Smt. Sunita Devi, who was granted bail on 29.02.2024 by the learned Special Judge-II, Una, District Una, H.P. The quantity of contraband/poppy husk stated to have been recovered in the present case is 15 kg and 190 grams, which is an intermediate quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act do not apply to the present case. No recovery was made during the personal search of the petitioner. The petitioner has been behind the bars since 20 th January 2024. The investigation is complete, and a charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The petitioner had visited his mother's house, and he resides separately from her. As a truck driver, he stays away from home. F.I.R. No. 66 of 2018, dated 08.03.2018, and F.I.R. No. 87 of 2021, dated 13.05.2021, were previously registered against the petitioner at Police Station Haroli. The petitioner would abide by all the terms and conditions which the Court may impose. Hence, the petition. 2. The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 20.01.2024. They received secret information at 1:55 p.m. that Sunita Devi was selling Poppy Husk from her home, and a huge quantity of Poppy Husk could be recovered in case of a search of her house. The police completed the formalities and associated two independent witnesses. The police went to the house of Sunita Devi, where she and the present petitioner were found. The police searched the house in the presence of Sunita and independent witnesses and recovered 2 kg and 546 grams of Poppy Husk from the room kept in a carry bag. The police also found 12 kg 644 grams of Poppy Husk from outside the house at a place pointed out by the present petitioner. The police searched the house in the presence of Sunita and independent witnesses and recovered 2 kg and 546 grams of Poppy Husk from the room kept in a carry bag. The police also found 12 kg 644 grams of Poppy Husk from outside the house at a place pointed out by the present petitioner. In this manner, 15 kg and 190 grams of Poppy Husk was recovered by the police. The petitioner and Sunita Devi could not produce any permit/license for possessing Poppy Husk. The police arrested the petitioner and Sunita Devi and seized the Poppy Husk. It was sent to FSL, and as per the result, it was found to be a sample of Poppy Straw. F.I.R. No. 66 of 2018 and F.I.R. No. 87 of 2021 were registered against the present petitioner. The challan has been filed before the Court, and the matter was listed for recording the statements of the prosecution’s witnesses on 10.04.2025. Statements of 14 witnesses out of 20 cited by the prosecution have been recorded. The petitioner would intimidate the witnesses and would indulge in a similar offence in case of release on bail. Hence, the status report. 3. I have heard Mr. Lakshay Parihar, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent/State. 4. Mr. Lakshay Parihar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. According to the prosecution's case, the police had received secret information that Sunita Devi was in possession of the Poppy Husk and was selling it from her home. The petitioner had merely visited the house of Sunita Devi, who is his mother. The petitioner cannot be held liable for the possession of the Poppy Husk. The co-accused has been released on bail. The challan has been filed before the Court, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the accused in custody. There is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner's right to a speedy trial is being violated. The petitioner is entitled to bail on this ground. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 5. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent, submitted that the petitioner has criminal antecedents. The petitioner is entitled to bail on this ground. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 5. Mr. Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent, submitted that the petitioner has criminal antecedents. Previously, two FIRs were registered against the petitioner, and there is a chance of his absconding. The principle of parity does not apply to the present case. This Court has already rejected the bail petition filed by the petitioner. There is no change in circumstances. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed. 6. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 7. It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed a bail petition before this Court, which was registered as CRMP(M) No. 1160 of 2024 titled Rohit Kumar Vs. State of H.P. and was dismissed on 24.09.2024. It was held in the State of Maharashtra Vs. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed: “Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 8. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him. 8. Similar is the judgment delivered in State of M.P. v. Kajad, (2001) 7 SCC 673 , wherein it was observed: - 8. It has further to be noted that the factum of the rejection of his earlier bail application bearing Miscellaneous Case No. 2052 of 2000 on 5-6-2000 has not been denied by the respondent. It is true that successive bail applications are permissible under the changed circumstances. But without the change in the circumstances, the second application would be deemed to be seeking a review of the earlier judgment, which is not permissible under criminal law as has been held by this Court in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa [ (2001) 1 SCC 169 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 113] and various other judgments. 9. Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 , that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held: “11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.” 10. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380 , wherein it was observed: 9. A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja, (2005) 8 SCC 380 , wherein it was observed: 9. When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.” 11. This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458 , wherein it was observed: “30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.” 12. It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed: “7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstance. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law which requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail application needs to be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.” 13. Therefore, the present bail petition can only be considered on the basis of the change in the circumstances, and it is not permissible to review the order passed by the Court. 14. The previous bail petitioner was dismissed by this Court on the ground that the petitioner was found in possession of 15 Kgs and 190 grams of poppy husk. He has criminal antecedents. The possibility of the petitioner committing the crime in case of his release on bail could not be ruled out. These considerations have not changed. 15. It was submitted that the witnesses have not supported the prosecution's case, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. Reliance was placed upon the copies of the statements of the witnesses in support of the submission. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. 15. It was submitted that the witnesses have not supported the prosecution's case, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. Reliance was placed upon the copies of the statements of the witnesses in support of the submission. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in X Vs. State of Rajasthan MANU/SC/1267/2024 that ordinarily, in serious offences Trial Court or the High Court should not entertain the bail application of the accused after the commencement of the trial. Bail cannot be granted because there are some discrepancies in the deposition, which affect the credibility of the victim. It was observed: - “14. Ordinarily, in serious offences like rape, murder, dacoity, etc., once the trial commences and the prosecution starts examining its witnesses, the Court, be it the Trial Court or the High Court, should be loath in entertaining the bail application of the Accused. 15. Over a period of time, we have noticed two things, i.e., (i) either bail is granted after the charge is framed and just before the victim is to be examined by the prosecution before the trial court, or (ii) bail is granted once the recording of the oral evidence of the victim is complete by looking into some discrepancies here or there in the deposition and thereby testing the credibility of the victim. 16. We are of the view that the aforesaid is not a correct practice that the Courts below should adopt. Once the trial commences, it should be allowed to reach its final conclusion, which may either result in the conviction of the Accused or acquittal of the Accused. The moment the High Court exercises its discretion in favour of the Accused and orders the release of the Accused on bail by looking into the deposition of the victim, it will have its own impact on the pending trial when it comes to appreciating the oral evidence of the victim. It is only in the event that the trial gets unduly delayed and that, too, for no fault on the part of the Accused, the Court may be justified in ordering his release on bail on the ground that the right of the Accused to have a speedy trial has been infringed.” 16. Thus, the bail cannot be granted because the witnesses have not supported the prosecution's case. 17. Thus, the bail cannot be granted because the witnesses have not supported the prosecution's case. 17. It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this ground. This submission is not acceptable. A perusal of the previous Judgment shows that the matter was listed for consideration of a charge on 1st July 2024. The status report filed in the present case shows that 14 witnesses were examined till 9 th April 2025. The examination of 14 witnesses within nine months shows that the trial is progressing normally. Further, the petitioner has not filed copies of the order sheets to show that the delay, if any, is not attributable to him. Hence, he cannot seek bail on the grounds of delay in the progress of time. 18. No other point was urged. 19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the petitioner is not entitled to bail; consequently, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed. 20. The observations made here-in-above are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits.