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2025 DIGILAW 828 (JHR)

Rachita Choudhary v. State of Jharkhand

2025-03-10

RAJESH SHANKAR

body2025
JUDGMENT : RAJESH SHANKAR, J. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 21.12.2023 (Annexure-13 to the writ petition) passed by the respondent No.2 in J.B.R.C. Revision No. 6 of 2023 whereby the said revision filed by the petitioner has been dismissed upholding the order dated 14.02.2023 passed by the respondent No.3 in J.B.R.C. Appeal No. 1 of 2021 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) as well as the order dated 14.2.2020 passed by the respondent No.4 in J.B.R.C. Case No. 82 of 2017 (Annexure-6 to the writ petition). Further prayer has been made for quashing the order as contained in memo No. 146 dated 31.3.2023 issued by the respondent No.4 (Annexure-9/1 to the writ petition) whereby the petitioner has been directed to vacate the tenanted premises. It is also prayed for directing the respondent No.4 to pass a fresh order in this regard in accordance with law and till then, not to take any coercive step against the petitioner. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a ‘Khaparposh’ house/residential premises standing over the land measuring an area of 950 sq. ft. under Khata No. 253, Plot No. 140, Holding No. 13/43, Chakradharpur Municipality, besides Central Bank, Chakradharpur-Chaibasa Road, P.O.+P.S.Chakradharpur, District-Singhbhum West (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said land/premises’) belonged to one Parbati Devi-mother of the respondent Nos. 5, 6 & 7, who had let-out the said premises to the grandfather-in-law of the petitioner in the year 1950. The petitioner along with her family members had been peacefully residing in the said premises on payment of monthly rent to the landlord till the lifetime of said Parbati Devi, who died on 27.08.2015. After her death, the petitioner used to pay the monthly rent to her successors. 3. It is further submitted that the respondent Nos. 5 to 7 filed an eviction suit i.e. J.B.R.C. Case No. 82 of 2017 under Sections 19(1) (c) & (d) read with Sections 21 & 27 of the Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act, 2011’) before the respondent No.4 for eviction of the petitioner from the said premises. The petitioner filed written statement in the said case stating inter-alia that she was the tenant over the said land on payment of monthly rent of Rs.432/-, which was duly received by the private respondents themselves or through their duly authorized agent. The petitioner filed written statement in the said case stating inter-alia that she was the tenant over the said land on payment of monthly rent of Rs.432/-, which was duly received by the private respondents themselves or through their duly authorized agent. During pendency of the eviction suit, the private respondents and the petitioner had filed a joint compromise petition in J.B.R.C Case No. 82 of 2017 wherein the private respondents had agreed to give 10% discount to the petitioner on purchase of a flat in the proposed housing complex to be constructed over the said land, however, they had failed to execute any agreement to that effect and hence the petitioner did not vacate the said premises. 4. It is also submitted that the respondent No.4, without providing any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, passed the order dated 14.2.2020 directing her to vacate the tenanted premises. It was further observed in the said order that in case of not vacating the said tenanted premises by the petitioner within one month, the private respondents might evict her by adopting legal procedure. 5. It is further submitted that the other tenants have vacated the rented premises after execution of an agreement regarding 10% rebate on purchase of a flat in the proposed residential complex. The petitioner thereafter filed an appeal before the respondent No.3 along with the application for condonation of delay in filing the same, however, the respondent No.3 dismissed the said appeal vide order dated 14.02.2023. Subsequently, the respondent No.4 passed the impugned order as contained in memo No. 146 dated 31.3.2023 by which the petitioner was directed to vacate the said premises and to hand over peaceful possession of the same to the private respondents within one month. Thereafter, the petitioner filed J.B.R.C. Revision No. 6 of 2023 before the respondent No.2, however, the said revision was also dismissed vide the impugned order dated 21.12.2023 in most mechanical manner without any application of mind. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that Section 21 of the Act, 2011 cannot be invoked for eviction of a rented residential premises on the ground of default in payment of rent as well as recovery of alleged arrear of rent. The petitioner cannot be evicted from the said premises without following the procedure under Section 33 of the Act, 2011. The petitioner cannot be evicted from the said premises without following the procedure under Section 33 of the Act, 2011. Moreover, the respondent No.4 did not consider the petition dated 5.11.2019 filed by the petitioner wherein it was stated that in absence of any agreement executed by the private respondents, the petitioner by way of an affidavit dated 27.9.2019 had denied any such consent to vacate the said land. It is further submitted that the respondent No.4 passed the order of eviction dated 14.2.2020 in J.B.R.C. Case No. 82 of 2017 without providing any opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence and hence the same is liable to be set aside on that score also. 7. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 4 may not be interfered by this Court in exercise of the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is further submitted that in the joint compromise petition filed by the plaintiffs/private respondents, the petitioner had agreed to vacate the premises in question, however, she subsequently failed to comply the same and as such there was no question of giving rebate of 10% on purchasing a flat in the proposed residential complex. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials available on record. Thrust of the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the private respondents had assured to provide 10% rebate to the other tenants on purchasing flats in the proposed residential complex by executing agreement with them, however, they had failed to execute any agreement with the petitioner to that effect and as such she did not vacate the said premises. 9. Before coming to the merit of the petitioner’s contention, it would be appropriate to refer few judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealing with the scope of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 10. In the case of Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim & Ors. reported in (1983) 4 SCC 566 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: ‘’ 7. 10. In the case of Mohd. Yunus Vs. Mohd. Mustaqim & Ors. reported in (1983) 4 SCC 566 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: ‘’ 7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited “to seeing that an inferior court or tribunal functions within the limits of its authority”, and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. In this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision. ’’ 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Venkatlal G. Pittie & Anr. Vs. Bright Bros. (P) Ltd. reported in (1987) 3 SCC 558 , has held thus: ‘’ 27. Interference by the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution must be within limits. This question has been considered by this Court from time to time and principles laid down. This Court in Ganpat Ladha v. Sashikant Vishnu Shinde [ (1978) 2 SCC 573 ] expressed the view that the High Court commits a gross error in interfering with what was a just and proper exercise of discretion by the Court of Small Causes, in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution. This was unwarranted. The High Court under Article 227 has a limited jurisdiction. It was held in that case that a finding as to whether circumstances justified the exercise of discretion or not, unless clearly perverse and patently unreasonable, was, after all a finding of fact and it could not be interfered with either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. The High Court under Article 227 has a limited jurisdiction. It was held in that case that a finding as to whether circumstances justified the exercise of discretion or not, unless clearly perverse and patently unreasonable, was, after all a finding of fact and it could not be interfered with either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. If a proper court has come to the conclusion on the examination of the nature of the structure, the nature of the duration of structure, the annexation and other relevant factors that the structures were permanent in nature which were violative of Section 13(1)(b) of the Rent Act as well as Section 108 clause (p) of Transfer of Property Act and such a finding, is possible, it cannot be considered to be perverse. In such a situation, the High Court could not have and should not have interfered. 28. In India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A. Baker [ (1977) 4 SCC 587 ] this Court reiterated that the limitation of the court while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution is well settled. Power under Article 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset the conclusions of facts, however erroneous these may be. It is possible that another court may be able to take a different view of the matter by appreciating the evidence in a different manner, if it determinedly chooses to do so. That will not be justice administered according to law to which courts are committed notwithstanding dissertation in season and out of season, about philosophies. In that case, the court found that the High Court had arrogated to itself the powers of the appellate court. ’’ 12. It is well settled that the supervisory jurisdiction conferred to the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is primarily to see that Court or tribunal functions within the bounds of its authority and it must be exercised sparingly. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court should not act as an appellate Court or tribunal. The High Court is not supposed to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the Court below or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court should not act as an appellate Court or tribunal. The High Court is not supposed to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the Court below or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should not assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. Where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers, it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. The jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be exercised as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. 13. In the present case, the petitioner has not denied the tenant-landlord relationship between her and the private respondents. In the eviction suit, the petitioner had also agreed to vacate the said premises, however, she was claiming rebate of 10% on purchase of a flat in the proposed residential complex contending that the other tenants were assured to provide such rebate on purchase of flats. 14. The respondent No.4 in the order dated 14.02.2020 has clearly observed that the plaintiffs were ready to give 10% rebate to the petitioner on purchase of a flat, however, for getting the said rebate, the petitioner was required to vacate the said premises and as such she was directed to vacate the same. 15. On bare perusal of the joint compromise petition filed by the petitioner and the private respondents before the respondent No.4, it transpires that the petitioner had agreed to vacate the said premises on or before 30.10.2019 and the private respondents had agreed to give 10% rebate to the petitioner on purchase of a flat. Thus, the petitioner was to vacate the said premises as a pre-condition for getting 10% rebate on purchase of a flat. Thus, the petitioner was to vacate the said premises as a pre-condition for getting 10% rebate on purchase of a flat. In the joint compromise petition, it was however not agreed that an agreement would be executed before eviction of the said premises by the petitioner and thus I find no substance in her contention that since no agreement was executed by the private respondents, she did not vacate the said premises. 16. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find no error in the impugned orders passed by the respondent Nos. 2, 3 & 4 so as to make any interference with the same. 17. The present writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 18. Consequently, I.A No. 853 of 2025 also stands dismissed.