ORDER : This criminal petition is filed under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code (for short “Cr.P.C.”) to quash the proceedings in S.C.No.250 of 2017 on the file of the I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ongole, Prakasam District corresponding to Crime No.140 of 1995 on the file of Ongole Town Police Station, Prakasam District, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 147 , 148 , 307 and 302 read with 149 of Indian Penal Code (for short “I.P.C.”) and Section 25 and 27 of the Arms Act . Petitioners herein are accused Nos.3, 4 and 7. 2) The case of the prosecution is that crime No.140 of 1995 was registered against 8 persons. Accused Nos.1 to 8 are known to each other and very close associates. With avowed ideology of the Peoples’ War Group, the members of P.W.G. and their associates organised attacks on law abiding citizens whom they dub as class enemies. Magunta Subbarama Reddy was a member of Parliament and elected on the Congress-I Ticket in the year 1991 from Ongole Constituency, Prakasam District and one of the leading industrialists of South India. He was a sole distributor for the Mcdowell Brand Liquor for South India. After he became a Member of Parliament in the year 1991, he started taking keen interest in his constituency by promoting several welfare schemes and was serving many poor persons and the downtrodden. One V.Nagabhushanam, retired Tahsildar was functioning as Assistant to him. During the year 1995, the accused and others entered into criminal conspiracy to do away the life of Magunta Subbarama Reddy and in pursuance of the criminal conspiracy, Rayalaseema Reddeppa supplied money to accused Nos.1 to 7 to accomplish the common object of murder and Vemu Rama Rao @ Prasad engaged car bearing No.AAG 8300 belonging to accused No.2 in the month of November, 1995 and all the accused formed themselves into members of an unlawful assembly, entered into the Office-cum-residence of Magunta Subbarama Reddy on 01.12.1995 at 01.40 p.m. and committed the alleged offences. While the accused were escaping, they committed theft of the car bearing No.AEE 2999 belonging to Sri Yada Srinivasa Rao and during the same transaction, they attempted to murder Subba Reddy and Penchal Reddy having committed trespass. While the accused were escaping, they committed theft of the car bearing No.AEE 2999 belonging to Sri Yada Srinivasa Rao and during the same transaction, they attempted to murder Subba Reddy and Penchal Reddy having committed trespass. During the course of same transaction, accused No.1 fired at the deceased Magunta Subbarama Reddy, Chappidi Venkata Ratnam, Chennareddy Penchal Reddy by using his unlicensed 0.45” pistol and thereby committed the offence punishable under Section 27 of the Arms Act and that accused No.2 facilitated accused No.1 and others to escape after commission of the offence and he was in possession of four live 7.63 cartridges without valid licence and thereby accused No.2 committed an offence punishable under Section 25 of Arms Act . After completion of the investigation, police filed charge sheet against the accused for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 307, 302 read with 149 of I.P.C. As the offences alleged against the accused are triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions, Prakasam Division. Subsequently, the case was transferred to the Metropolitan Sessions Division, Hyderabad, as per the orders of the High Court and the case against accused Nos.1 and 2 was renumbered as S.C.No.315 of 1997. Subsequently, the case was transferred to the Metropolitan Sessions Division, Hyderabad, as per the orders of the High Court and the case against accused Nos.1 and 2 was renumbered as S.C.No.315 of 1997. After full-fledged trial, Sessions Court found accused Nos.1 and 2 guilty and convicted and sentenced accused Nos.1 to suffer imprisonment for life each for the offence punishable under Section 302 of I.P.C., under Section 120-B, 449, 307 read with 149 of I.P.C. and also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 147 of I.P.C. and rigorous imprisonment for two years each for the offence punishable under Section 148 of I.P.c. and rigorous imprisonment for seven years for the offence under Section 397 of I.P.C. and rigorous imprisonment for five years for the offence under Section 25 (1-A) of the Arms Act and also sentenced accused No.2 to suffer imprisonment for life each for the offence under Section 120-B, 302 read with 149 of I.P.C. on two counts, 307 read with 149 of I.P.C. on two counts, and further sentenced to suffer Rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 147 of I.P.C. and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 7 years for the offence punishable under Section 397 of I.P.C., to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years for the offence under Section 506 of I.P.C. and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 5 years for the offence punishable under Section 25 (1-A) of the Arms Act . The present petition has been filed seeking to quash the proceedings against accused Nos.3,4 and 7 in S.C.No.250 of 2017 on the file of the I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ongole. 3) On 24.04.2019, when the matter is listed for admission, this Court passed the following interim order: “In the meanwhile, there shall be stay of all further proceedings.” 4) Sri Y.Koteswara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioners requested this Court to quash the proceedings against the petitioners in S.C.No.250 of 2017 mainly on the ground that accused No.2 was acquitted by this Court and the acquittal of accused No.2 was confirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, hence the chances for conviction of the petitioners herien are bleak. He further contended that the petitioners herein did not commit any offence as alleged by the prosecution and no specific overt acts were attributed to the petitioners herein. He further contended that the petitioners herein did not commit any offence as alleged by the prosecution and no specific overt acts were attributed to the petitioners herein. As the petitioners herein were falsely implicated in the case, the proceedings against them are liable to be quashed. 5) Sri P.S.P.Suresh Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor for C.B.I. contended that merely because the co-accused was acquitted for one reason or the other, based on appreciation of the evidence on record, does not ipso facto constitute any issue estoppel barring a trial as against the petitioners herein. The acquittal of co-accused is not a ground to quash the proceedings against the petitioners herein and every case has to be decided on the evidence adduced therein, and requested to dismiss the present petition. 6) Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsel representing both parties and on perusal of the material available on record, the points that arise for consideration are as follows: 1) “Whether the acquittal of co -accused in the present crime is a ground to quash the proceedings against the petitioners herein ? 2) Whether the proceedings against the petitioner in S.C.No.250 of 2017 on the file of the I Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ongole, Prakasam District, are liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.?” POINT No.1: 7) The present petition has been filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 8) Section 482 of Cr.P.C saves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It is an obvious proposition that when a Court has authority to make an order, it must have also power to carry that order into effect. If an order can lawfully be made, it must be carried out; otherwise it would be useless to make it. The authority of the Court exists for the advancement of justice, and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court must have power to prevent that abuse. In the absence of such power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice. In the absence of such power the administration of law would fail to serve the purpose for which alone the Court exists, namely to promote justice and to prevent injustice. Section 482 of Cr.P.C confers no new powers but merely safeguards existing powers possessed by the High Court. Such power has to be exercised sparingly in exceptional cases and this power is external in nature to meet the ends of justice. 9) Time and again, the scope of powers of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. were highlighted by the Apex Court in long line of perspective pronouncements, which are as follows: 10) Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the High Court to exercise its inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of Court. In proceedings instituted on complaint exercise of the inherent power to quash the proceedings is called for only in cases where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance is taken by the Magistrate it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 . It is not, however, necessary that there should be a meticulous analysis of the case, before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or not. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears on a consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement on oath of the complainant that ingredients of the offence/offences are disclosed, and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious. In that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court as held by the Apex Court in “ Mrs. Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, [ AIR 1990 SC 494 ]. ” 11) Keeping in view the above principles, I would like to examine the case on hand. 12) Admittedly, the case against the petitioners herein was split up and numbered as S.C.No.250 of 2017. The trial against accused Nos.1 and 2 was concluded and they were convicted as stated supra. ” 11) Keeping in view the above principles, I would like to examine the case on hand. 12) Admittedly, the case against the petitioners herein was split up and numbered as S.C.No.250 of 2017. The trial against accused Nos.1 and 2 was concluded and they were convicted as stated supra. Thereafter, accused Nos.1 and 2 preferred criminal appeal No.1672 of 2000 against the conviction and sentence recorded against them by order dated 04.08.2000 passed in S.C.No.315 of 1997 by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad, wherein High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad allowed the appeal filed by accused No.2 vide order dated 31.03.2003 and acquitted him by giving benefit of doubt while confirming the conviction and sentence recorded against accused No.1. Thereafter, State preferred criminal appeal No.173 of 2004 before the Hon’ble Apex Court against the acquittal of accused No.2, and accused No.1 preferred criminal appeal No.174 of 2004 against his conviction. The Hon’ble Apex Court vide common order dated 23.07.2009 dismissed both the appeals confirming the conviction of accused No.1 and acquittal of accused No.2. 13) In “ Moosa Vs. Sub Inspector of Police, [2006 CrLJ 1922] ”, relied upon by the learned Special Public Prosecutor for C.B.I., the High Court of Kerala held as follows: “In a trial against the co-accused the prosecution is not called upon, nor is it expected to adduce evidence against the absconding co-accused'. In such trial the prosecution cannot be held to have the opportunity or obligation to adduce all evidence against the absconding co-accused. The fact that the testimony of a witness was not accepted or acted upon in the trial against the co- accused is no reason to assume that he shall not tender incriminating evidence or that his evidence will not be accepted in such later trial. ...... The judgment of acquittal of a co-accused in a criminal trial is not admissible under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act to bar the subsequent trial of the absconding co-accused and cannot hence be reckoned as a relevant document while considering the prayer to quash the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Such judgments will be admissible only to show as to who were the parties in the earlier proceedings or the factum of acquittal.” 14) In “ Megh Singh Vs. State of Punjab , 2004 SCC (Crl.) 58 ” the Apex Court held that the acquittal of the co-accused does not by itself entitle the other accused in the same case to acquittal as a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. It may be noticed that the co-accused was acquitted in the same trial still it was held that that by itself is not a reason to acquit the other accused. 15) In “ Gorle Section Naidu Vs. State of A.P., [ AIR 2004 SC 1169 ] ” referring to Section 3 of the Evidence Act and credibility of evidence, it was held that mere acquittal of large number of co-accused does not per se entitle others to acquittal. The court has duty in suit cases to separate grain from chaff. 16) In “ Raju Rai Vs. State of Bihar , 2006 (1) KLT (SC) 8 : 2005 (7) Sup 459 ” the Apex Court held that the judgment of acquittal in the trial of the co-accused tried separately is wholly irrelevant in the subsequent trial of the other accused who was not tried earlier: but separated and that the judgment in their case is not admissible within the meaning of Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act. 17) In “ Karan Singh v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1965] 2 SCR 1 ”, there were 8 accused persons out of whom accused Ram Hans absconded, as such trial of seven accused persons, including accused Karan Singh, who was appellant before the Apex Court, proceeded and the trial court although acquitted other six accused persons, convicted the seventh accused, i.e., Karan Singh under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC . Against his conviction, Karan Singh preferred an appeal before the High Court. During the pendency of his appeal, accused Ram Hans was apprehended and put on trial and upon its conclusion, the trial court recorded order of his acquittal, which attained finality, no appeal having been preferred against the same. Against his conviction, Karan Singh preferred an appeal before the High Court. During the pendency of his appeal, accused Ram Hans was apprehended and put on trial and upon its conclusion, the trial court recorded order of his acquittal, which attained finality, no appeal having been preferred against the same. Thereafter, when the appeal of accused Karan Singh was taken up for hearing, it was submitted that in view of the judgment of acquittal rendered in the trial of accused Ram Hans, the conviction of accused Karan Singh under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC could not be sustained, more so when other six accused persons, who were tried with Karan Singh, were acquitted by the trial court and the judgment of acquittal attained finality. Repelling the contention, the High Court after considering the evidence adduced came to the conclusion that murder was committed by Ram Hans in furtherance of the common intention of both himself and accused Karan Singh and, accordingly, altered the conviction of Karan Singh from Section 302 /149 to one under Section 302 /34 IPC . Against the said judgment, when an appeal by special leave was preferred before the Supreme Court, it was contended that in view of the verdict of acquittal of accused Ram Hans, it was not permissible in law for the High Court to uphold conviction of accused Karan Singh. This Court, repelling the contention, held that decision in each case had to turn on the evidence led in it. Case of accused Ram Hans depended upon evidence led there while the case of accused Karan Singh, who had appealed before this Court, had to be decided only on the basis of evidence led during the course of his trial and the evidence led in the case of Ram Hans and the decision there arrived at would be wholly irrelevant in considering merits of the case of Karan Singh, who was appellant before this Court. The Supreme Court observed at page 1038 thus:- "As the High Court pointed out, that observation has no application to the present case as here the acquittal of Ramhans was not in any proceeding to which the appellant was a party. The Supreme Court observed at page 1038 thus:- "As the High Court pointed out, that observation has no application to the present case as here the acquittal of Ramhans was not in any proceeding to which the appellant was a party. Clearly, the decision in each case has to turn on the evidence led in it; Ramhans's case depended on the evidence led there while the appellant's case had to be decided only on the evidence led in it. The evidence led in Ramhans's case and the decision there arrived at on that evidence would be wholly irrelevant in considering the merits of the appellant's case." 18) In the present case, as the case against the present petitioners was split up, they did not face any trial. Acquittal of the other accused has nothing to do with the merits and demerits of the case pending against the petitioners herein. There is no justification on the part of the petitioners herein to seek quashment of proceedings to avoid trial in the split up case pending against him. 19) From the above discussion, it can thus be seen that the judgment rendered in the case of a co-accused and the reasoning of the judgment contained therein or appreciation of the evidence therein are not matters to be taken into account for the purpose of granting any relief to quash the proceedings and even when a co-accused is acquitted in the very same trial, the other accused can be convicted if there are good reasons to do so. In other words, the acquittal of some of the accused by itself is not a reason to quash the proceedings against the petitioners herein. Merely on the ground that the co-accused was acquitted, the proceedings against the petitioners herein cannot be quashed as the truth or otherwise can be decided after full-fledged trial. Accordingly, the point is answered against the petitioners. POINT No.2 20) The offences alleged to have been committed by the petitioners are punishable under Sections 147, 148, 307, 302 read with 149 of I.P.C. 21) On the perusal of the complaint, it is clear that the allegations made against the petitioners are serious in nature as the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C. is punishable with imprisonment for life or capital punishment of death. As the serious allegations are made against the petitioners herein, the truth or otherwise will be decided only after full-fledged trial. 22) Viewed from any angle, it is not a fit case to quash the proceedings against the petitioners herein. Accordingly, the point is answered against the petitioners. 23) Accordingly, the criminal petition is dismissed. 24) The miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.